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U.S. ARMED FORCES IN VIETNAM 1954-1975

Part One. Indochina Studies

U.S. Armed Forces in Vietnam

Part One. Indochina Studies

Edited by Paul Kesaris Guide Compiled by Ruth McClure

A microfilm project of UNIVERSITY PUBLICATIONS OF AMERICA, INC. 44 North Market Street · Frederick, MD 21701

Copyright ® 1983 by University Publications of America, Inc. All rights reserved.

ISBN 0-89093-444-4.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Reel! The Cambodian Incursion The Easter Offensive of 1972 The Khmer Republic at War and the Final Collapse Lam Son 719 Pacification Reel II Reflections on the Vietnam War The Royal Lao Army and U.S. Army Advice and Support The South Vietnamese Society Strategy and Tactics Vietnamization and the Cease-Fire RVNAF and U.S. Operational Cooperation and Coordination Reel III The RVNAF RVNAF Logistics The General Offensives of 1968-1969 Reel IV Leadership Territorial Forces The U.S. Adviser RLG Military Operations and Activities in the Laotian Panhandle Intelligence The Final Collapse 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 8 9 10 11 12 15 15 16 17 18 19 19

REEL INDEX

Reel I

0001 The Cambodian Incursion. Brig. Gen. Tran Dinh Tho. U.S. Army Center of Military History, Washington. D.C. 1979. 0004 Table of Contents. 4pp. 0008 Introduction. 17pp. The Friendly Situation Prior to the Incursion. The Enemy Situation Prior to the Incursion. RVN-Cambodia Relations. 0025 The Enemy Use of Cambodian Territory and Organization for Logistic Support. "PP. The Ho Chi Minn Trail. The Sihanoukville Port Route The Sea Route. The Base Area System. 0038 Planning the Combined Incursion and Early Cross-Border Operations. 22pp. Significant Events. RVN Appraisal of the Changed Situation in Cambodia. Concept for the Combined Incursion. Planning. Cross-Border Operations Prior to 30 April 1970. 0060 The Combined Incursion. 84pp. TOAN THANG 42. The Relief of Kompong Cham. TOAN THANG 43. 44. 45 and 46. Clearing the Mekong and Repatriating Vietnamese. CUU LONG II and III. BINH TAY I. II and III. The Evacuation of Khmer Forces from Ratanakiri Province. 0120 Cooperation and Coordination from 30 April to 30 June 1970.16pp. U.S.-RVN Cooperation and Coordination. RVN-Khmer Cooperation and Coordination. The Tripartite Meetings. RVN-U.S. Plans for Cambodia After 30 June 1970. 0136 Cross-Border Operations After 30 June 1970.7pp. TOAN THANG 42, Phase VI. CUU LONG 44. TOAN THANG 42/DAI BANG.

Khmer Participation. 35pp. Background. Communist Use of Cambodian Territory. The Royal Khmer Armed Forces. Attacks by NVA/VC Forces Against Cambodia After 18 March 1970. Khmer Cooperation with the RVN and U.S. Prior to the Cambodian Incursion. The Status of the FANK on 1 May 1970. FANK Activities during the Incursion. FANK-RVNAF Cooperation after U.S. Withdrawal. Critical Analysis and Conclusions. 0178 Observations and Conclusions. 24pp. General Results. Lessons Learned. Conclusions. 0203 Appendix. 50pp. A. Enemy Losses. Cambodian Incursion (As of 30 June 1970). B. Friendly Casualties. Cambodian Incursion. C. Military Elements of the U.S. Embassy Phnom Penh 18 March to 30 June 1970. U.S. Defense Attache Office at the End of the Sihanouk Period. U.S. Defense Attache Office After 18 March 1970. The Augmentation of the Defense Attache Office. Initial Military Assistance and Lon Nol's First Formal Request. The Office of the Politico-Military Counselor (POL/MIL). Military Activities and Patterns of Coordination by End of the Incursion. The Military Equipment Delivery TEAM--CAMBODIA (MEDTC). United States Influence on FANK Decisions. Critical Analysis. 0254 Glossary. 2pp. 0256 The Easter Offensive of 1972. Lt. Gen. Ngo Quang Truong. U.S. Army Center of Military History. Washington. D.C. 1979. 0259 Table of Contents. 3pp. 0262 Introduction. 14pp. From Insurgency to Conventional Warfare. General Character of the Easter Offensive. 0276 The Invasion of Quang Tri. 33pp. Situation Prior to the Offensive. The Initial Battles. Holding the Line. The Fall of Quang Tri City. 0309 Stabilization and Counteroffensive. 30pp. The Defense of Hue. Refitting and Retraining. Quang Tri Retaken. Role of U.S. Air and Naval Support. 0339 Defending Kontum. 28pp. The NVA Force Buildup. The Attacks On Tan Canh and Dakto. Pressure on Kontum City. The First Attack Against Kontum. The Enemy's Final Attempt. 0367 The Siege of An Loc. 31 pp. The Enemy's Offensive Plan in MR-3. The Attack On Loc Ninh.

0143

The Siege and First Attacks. The Second Phase of Attack. Relief from the South. Mopping Up Pockets of Enemy Resistance. 0398 Enemy Offensive in the Mekong Delta. 20pp. The Setting. Kompong Trach: The Opening Round. The Hau Giang Under Attack. Actions in the Tien Giang. Attacks in Dinh Tuong. The Aftermath. 0418 A Critical Analysis. 18pp. North Vietnam's Objectives, Strategy, and Tactics. The Defense Posture of South Vietnam. RVNAF Performance. U.S. Support. 0436 Summary and Conclusions. 7pp. 0443 Glossary. 2pp. 0445 The Khmer Republic at War and the Final Collapse. Lt. Gen. Sak Sutsakhan. U.S. Army Center of Military History. Washington, D.C. 1979. 0448 Table of Contents. 4pp. 0452 Introduction. 17pp. The Sihanouk Era. The Political Strategy of Neutrality. Neutrality of the Left. The Origins of the Khmer Republic. 0469 Cambodia and the Communists. 14pp. Vietnamese Communist Use of Khmer Territory. Khmer Communist Political Origins. Khmer Communist Military Development. 0483 The Armed Forces of the Khmer Republic. 27pp. Origins. The Initial Expansion After March 18.1970. Military Organization. The U.S. Military Assistance Program. The Khmer Krom Units. 0510 The First Two Years of the War. 28pp. The Initial Communist Attacks. The Evacuation of the Ratanakiri Garrison. FANK Strategy. CHENLA I. CHENLA II. Cooperation and Coordination with the RVNAF and the U.S. 0538 The Politico/Military Situation in Cambodia. 1972-1974.12pp. The Political Situation. Enemy Strategy. General Mobilization--The Plan for the Countryside. Condition of the FANK. The End of U.S. Bombing. 0550 Major Military Operations, 1972 Through 1974.50pp. Operations in Military Regions 1 and 2, and Against Phnom Penh, March-June 1972.

FANK Efforts to Keep Lines of Communications Open, July-December 1972. The Enemy Dry-Season Offensive, January-July 1973. The First Months Without U.S. Air Support, August-December 1973. Dry Season Operations, January-July 1974. The Wet Season, August-December 1974. 0600 Closing Months. January-April 1975.13pp. Peace Initiatives. Enemy Strategy. FANK Change of Command. Military Operations. The Departure of Lon Npl. 0613 The Final Days of the Khmer Republic. 10pp. Departure of the U.S. Embassy. The Last Government. One More Effort to Negotiate. The 17th of April 1975. 0623 Analysis and Conclusions. 5pp. 0628 Appendix. A. The Delegations to the Summit Conference of the Indochinese Peoples, April 25.1970. B. The Members of FUNK and GRUNK. C. Major Items of U.S.-Fumished Equipment in FANK. D. FANK Order of the Day, 5 October 1971. 0637 Glossary. 2pp. 0639 Lam Son 719. Maj. Gen. Nguyen Duy Hinh. U.S. Army Center of Military History. Washington. D.C. 1979: 0642 Table of Contents. 3pp. 0645 Introduction. 8pp. 0653 The Operational Environment. 23pp. The Ho Chi Minh Trail System. Enemy Situation in Northern Military Region 1. Enemy Situation in the Laos Panhandle. The Area of Operation. 0676 The Planning Phase. 26pp. How It All Started. The Basic Operational Plan. Division Planning and Preparations. U.S. Support. Solving Logistic Problems. Observations. 0702 The Offensive Phase. 40pp. Preparing to Cross the Border. Securing Ban Dong. The Enemy Counteracted. The Loss of Fire Support Base 31. Tchepone Was the Objective. 0742 The Withdrawal Phase. 28pp. The Disengagement. The Valiant ARVN 1st Infantry Division. "Lock Its Head, Grip Its Tail". Black Panther Raids.

0770 A Critical Analysis. 38pp. The Balance Sheet of LAM SON 719. United States Combat Support. Observations and Evaluation. Lessons Learned. 0808 Observations and Conclusions. 8pp. 0816 Appendix. 6pp. A. Task Organization, ARVN I Corps, for LAM SON 719. B. Task Organization. U.S. XXIV Corps, for LAM SON 719. 0822 Glossary. 2pp. 0824 Pacification. Brig. Gen. Tran Dinh Tho. U.S. Army Center of Military History. Washington. D.C. 1979. 0827 Table of Contents. 3pp. 0830 Introduction. 8pp. 0838 Pacification Strategy and Objectives. 24pp. The Enemy Threat. System Evolution. Strategy and Operational Concept. Interim Objectives and Priorities. The Ultimate National Goals. 0862 Operation and Support. 43pp. The GVN Organization For Pacification. Employment of Forces in Support of Pacification. U.S. Organization for Pacification Support. The Phoenix Program. 0905

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RVN-US Cooperation and Coordination in Pacification. 14pp. The Central Level. The Corps Tactical Zone/Military Region Level. The Division Tactical Area Level. The Province/Sector Level. An Evaluation. 0919 Pacification Techniques and Operations. 20pp. Pacification Techniques. Coordination in Security Activities. Training. The Hamlet Evaluation System. 0939 Social Reform and Economic Development. 23pp. Objectives. The Self-Help Hamlet Development Program. Rural Health. The Rural Education Development Program. The Relief and Resettlement of Refugees. Agricultural Development. The Fisheries Program. An Evaluation. 0962 The GVN Political, Information and Chieu Hoi Efforts. 28pp. Information and Propaganda. The Chieu Hoi (Open Arms) Program. Relations with Ethnic Minorities. Land Reform and the "Land-To-The-Tiller" Program. Village and Hamlet Elections. People's Self-Defense Forces. An Evaluation. '· ·

0990 An Assessment of Pacification: Some Achievements, Difficulties and Shortcomings. 23pp. The Ideological Aspect of Pacification. Statistics Versus Achievements. The Communist Challenge to Pacification. The Problems of Cadres and Territorial Forces. The Impact of U.S. Policies. 1013 Observations and Conclusions. 13pp. . 1026 Appendix. 21pp. A. Decree--Military Organization of the National Territory. Territorial Organization. Chain of Command. Functions. Coordination. Special Provisions. B. Decree - Reorganization of Village and Hamlet Administration. Village People's Council. The Village Administrative Committee. Hamlet Management Committee. General Provisions. 1047 Glossary. 3pp.

Reel II

0001 Reflections on the Vietnam War. General Cao Van Vien and Lt. Gen. Dong Van Khuyen. U.S. Army Center of Military History. Washington. D.C. 1979. 0005 Table of Contents 1p. 0006 Nation-Building and Insurgency: 1954-1963.38pp. Concept of Defense. Organization and Training. Counterinsurgency Strategies and Tactics. Area Security. Significant Lessons Learned. 0044 Americanization of the War: 1964-1967.43pp. Strengthening and Expanding the RVNAF. U.S. Participation in the War. Pacification and Rural Development. Major Operations. Anti-Infiltration. Significant Lessons Learned. 0087 Vietnamization: 1968-1972.31pp. The 1968 Tet General Offensive. General Mobilization. Modernization and Improvement of the RVNAF. Cross-Border Operations. The 1972 Easter Offensive. Peace Initiative and Negotiations. Significant Lessons Learned. 0118 The Struggle for Survival: 1973-1975.20pp. The Paris Agreement. Cease-Fire and Violations. South Vietnam's Strategic Alternatives.

The Final Collapse. Significant Lessons Learned. 0138 Conclusions. 28pp. 0166 Glossary. 2pp. 0168 The Royal Lao Army and U.S. Army Advice and Support. Maj. Gen. Oudone Sananikone. U.S. Army Center of Military History. Washington. D.C. 1979. 0172 Table of Contents. 3pp. 0175 Introduction. 13pp. 0188 Origins of the Royal Lao Army. 17pp. French Military Missions. The Early Years of the National Lao Army. Training in the New NLA. 0205 The Royal Lao Army After the 1954 Geneva Accords. 14pp. Administration and Logistics. Regionalization of Command. The Programs Evaluation Office. 0219 The Factionalization of the National Lao Army. 26pp. Neutralism Versus Anti-Communism. ' ' The Committee for the Defense of the National Interests (C.D.N.I.). Phoui Sananikone's Hard Line Policy. Trouble in Samneua. Phoui Sananikone is Replaced. Kong Le Brings Neutralism to Vientiane. The Counter-Coup. 0245 The Phoumi Nosavan Period. 38pp. Two Governments. White Star. The Cease-Fire of May 1961. Approach to a New Coalition. NLA Offensive Operations During the Cease-Fire. The Dong Hene ROCS. American Pressure for the Coalition Succeeds. 0283 The Period of Escalation. 18pp. The New Coalition. Trouble on The Plaine des Jarres. Training and Other Activities of the Americans. The Meeting at Dalat. The Aborted Coup of April 1964. The Escalation Continues. The Departure of Phoumi Nosavan. The Departure of Kong Le. 0301 Three Wars in Laos 1966-1973.18pp. The Thais in Laos. The Special Guerrilla Units. Escalation and a Change in Strategy. 0319 The 1973 Cease-Fire. 31 pp. Difficult Steps Leading to Signature. Implementation of the Agreement. Demobilization and Modernization. The Pathet Lao in the Defense Ministry. The Final Days and the Communist Take-Over. 0350 Observations and Conclusions. 5pp.

0355 Glossary. 2pp. 0357 The South Vietnamese Society. Maj. Gen. Nguyen Duy Hlnh and Brig. Gen. Tran Dinh Tho. U.S. Army Center of Military History. Washington, D.C. 1979. 0360 Table of Contents. 1 p. 0361 The Vietnamese Heritage. 19pp. Ancient Vietnamese Society and the Chinese Influence. The Vietnamese Spirit of Struggle in Ancient Times. Vietnamese Society Under French Rule. The Birth of Political Parties and The Resistance Movement. A Society in Transition. Contact With Communism.

0380

The Consolidation of South Vietnam. 35pp. The Preliminary Conditions. Building Strength and A National Cause. Motivation of the People. 0415 American Influence on South Vietnamese Society. 17pp. Significant Contrasts. Major Objectives and their Impact. Social Impact of the American Presence. 0432 Social Problems. 50pp. Discrimination and Factionalism. The Struggle of Political and Religious Groups. The Problem of Ethnic Minorities. The Impact of Communist Insurgency and Protracted War. 0483 The Regime and Leadership. 32pp, South Vietnam and Democracy. Democracy and the Leadership of President Ngo Dinh Diem. Democracy and Leadership since November 1963. 0515 Observations and Conclusions. 21 pp. 0536 Glossary. 1p. 0537 Strategy and Tactics. Col. Hoang Ngoc Lung. U.S. Army Center of Military History. Washington, D.C. 1979. 0540 Table of Contents. 2pp. 0542 Introduction. 9pp. North Vietnam's National Objectives and Basic Strategy. South Vietnamese National Objectives and Basic Strategy.

Early Strategies. 23pp. Pacification. Strategy Under the First Republic of South Vietnam. Improving Communications and Control. Strategic Hamlets. 0574 Strategy During the Period of U.S Participation. 29pp. Pacification and Rural Development. Operation Phoenix Vietnam izaton. The Problem of Survival. 0603 United States' Influence on Republic of Vietnam's Strategy. 15pp. American Influence in the Pre-lntervention Period. Americanization. American Influence After Withdrawal.

0551

0618

The Tactics of the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces. 28pp. The First Steps. A New Direction. Modified Tactics and Their Effects. Solving Difficult Tactical Problems. Night Operations. Cordon and Search. Defense Against Sappers. Defense Against Shelling.

0646

Special U.S. Combat Techniques. 17pp. 8-52 Bombers. Defoliation. The Rome Plow. Riot Control Agents. 0663 Strategies and Tactics of North Vietnam. 8pp. The Military Art. Common Communist Tactics. 0671 Observations and Conclusions. 8pp. . . 0679 Glossary. 1p. 0680 Vietnamization and the Cea»e-Flre. Maj. Gen. Nguyen Duy Hinh. U.S. Army Center of Military History. Washington, D.C. 1979. 0680 Table of Contents. 2pp. 0686 Background. 12pp. The Decisive Year of 1968. The Precursor of Vietnamization. 0698 The Nixon Doctrine and Vietnamization Program. 17pp. The Nixon Doctrine. The Vietnamization Program. Redeployment of US and Allied Forces. 0715 Strengthening the Republic of Vietnam. 32pp. Force Structure Increase. Improvement and Modernization. The Training Effort. 0747 Meeting the Obstacles and Challenges. 48pp. The Military Challenge. Problems of Transition. Pacification Achievements. Toward Self-Reliance. The Communist Counteraction. 0794 Peace Negotiations and the Cease-Fire. 34pp. The American Quest for Peace. The Paris Agreement. The Communist Scheme. The Cease-Fire. 0828 Developments Following the Cease-Fire. 37pp. Implementing the Agreement. Communist Preparations. The RVN after the Cease-Fire. The New Balance of Forces. 0865 Summary and Conclusions. 12pp. 0877 Glossary. 3pp.

0880 0883 0885

RVNAF and US Operational Cooperation and Coordination. Lt. Gen. Ngo Quang Truong. U.S. Army Center of Military History. Washington, D.C. 1979. Table of Contents. 2pp. Introduction. 17pp. The Build-Up. Large Scale Operations. The Phasing Down of US Combat Activities. Summary of Major Events and Comments.

0902 The Joint General Staff and MACV. 24pp. Role of the Joint General Staff. Operational Coordination. Combined Intelligence Activities. Logistical Support of The RVNAF. 0926 ARVN Corps and US Field Forces. 21pp. Deployment of RVN and US Forces. Organizational Arrangements for Command and Control. Mission Relationships. 0947 RVNAF-US Joint Combat Operations. 52pp. Operational Cooperation and Coordination Procedures. Intelligence. Operational Planning. Assignment of Objectives. Operational Areas and Free-Fire Zones. Allocation of Resources. Use of Firepower. Civilian Evacuation, Casualties and Property Damage. Special Planning Considerations. Operation Delaware/Lam Son 216. Operation Lam Son 260/Nevada Eagle. 0999 Combined Operations as a Means of Improving ARVN Combat Effectiveness. 38pp. Objectives and Procedures. The Combined Action Program. Operation Fairfax/Rang Dong. The Pair-Off Concept. The Dong Tien (Progress Together) Program. Summary and Evaluation. Some Considerations Affecting RVNAF Performance. 20pp. Expansion of the US Territorial Advisory System. The Mobile Assistance Concept. Attitude of RVNAF Troops Toward Americans. The Tendency to Let Americans Do It All. Effect of One-Year Tour and Six-Month Rotation. 1056 Summary and Conclusions. 12pp. 1068 Glossary. 5pp. 1036

Reel III

0001 The RVNAF. Lt. Gen. Dong Van Khuyen. U.S. Army Center of Military History. Washington, D.C. 1979. 0005 Table of Contents. 5pp. 0010 Introduction. 25pp. The Formative Years: A French Legacy. Reorganization Under U.S. Military Advisory Assistance. Growth and Maturity. Improvement and Modernization Under Vietnamization. Cease-Fire and Collapse. 0035 Personnel. 0036 Personnel Administration. 50pp. Requirements. Recruitment. Conscription. Utilization of Manpower. Ethnic Minorities. The Induction Process. Classification. Assignment, Transfer and Rotation. Discharge. Strength Accounting. The Problem of Combat Unit Strength. Observations. 0086 Awards and Promotions. 29pp. RVNAF Awards and Decorations. Ranks and Grades. Promotion Authority and Procedure. Annual Officer Promotion. Promotion of NCOs and EM. . . . Special Promotions. Observations. 0115 Personnel Services. 19pp. Personnel Records. Casualty Reporting. Leaves of Absence. The Military Postal System. 0134 Discipline, Military Justice, and Problems of Desertion. 28pp. Disciplinary Action and Military Justice. Military Courts and Prisons. Absence Without Leave and Desertion. The RVNAF Efforts to Control Desertion. Observations. 0162 Training. 0163 The RVNAF Training Base. 32pp. Organization and Development. Individual Training for Recruits and NCOs. · · Officer Training. Specialized Training. Unit Training.

0195

0219 0220

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Methods of Training. 24pp. Formal Instruction. In-Place Training. On-The-Job Training. Combined Operations. Offshore Training. Observations. Welfare and Support. Pay and Welfare. 38pp. The RVNAF Pay System. Pay Structure. Gratuities and Pension. The Lost Battle Against Inflation. Military Dependent Housing. The Veterans. Observations. Medical Support and Combat Equipment. 36pp. The RVNAF Medical Treatment System. Medical Evaluation. Medical and Blood Supply. Preventive Medicine. Observations. Combat Equipment and Supplies. The Impact of Reduced Aid. Observations. Political Warfare. Deportment and Conduct. 18pp. Relations with the People. Relations with the Enemy. Treatment of Prisoners of War. Indoctrination and Motivation. 16pp. Indoctrination. Other Motivation Measures. An Evaluation. Special Areas. Regional and Popular Forces. 12pp. Evolution. Observations. Corruption. 38pp. Forms and Causes of Corruption. The RVNAF Anti-Corruption Efforts. Achievements of the New Horizon Campaign. Corruption As a National Problem. The Corruption Upheaval of 1974-75. Observations. Observations and Conclusions. 13pp. Appendix. 5pp. RVNAF Decorations and Criteria for Award. Glossary. 3pp. RVNAF Logistics. Lt. Gen. Dong Van Khuyen. U.S. Army Center of Military History. Washington, D.C. 1980. Table of Contents. 7pp.

0294 0295

0313

0329 0330

0342

0380 0393 0398 0401 0404

0411

0429 0430

0458

0509 0510

0533

0566

0590

0635

Introduction. 18pp. The Logistic Environment. Toward Economic Recovery. The Formative Years: 1955-1968. Logistical Organization. 28pp. Background. The RVNAF Logistics System. Logistical Operation. 51pp. Supply Procedures. Requirements Planning. Stock Control. Equipment Modernization. Excess Disposal. Maintenance. Infantry Division Supply and Maintenance. Support for Regional and Popular Forces. Support for US and FWMA Forces. Transportation. Hospitalization and Medical Evacuation. Training. Operational Support. Summary of Part One and Evaluation. The Years of Consolidation and Improvement: 1969-1972. Logistics Improvement Programs. 23pp. Background and Objectives. The Logistics Offensive Campaign. Base Depot Upgrade. The TMDE Calibration Program. Improving RF-PF Logistics Support. Training. The Food Program. The Supply and Maintenance Improvement Program. 33pp. Basic Concept and Objectives. Major Reorganizations. Supply Activities. Secondary Items: Effect of Automation. Class I Supplies. Class III Supplies. Maintenance Activities. Support Activities and Base Transfer. 24pp. Ammunition Supply. Ammunition Storage, Transportation, Security, and Disposal Problems. Transportation and Movement Control. The Transfer of US Bases. Logistic Support for Combat Operations. 45pp. General Concept. The Cambodian Cross-Border Operation. Lam Son 719. The 1972 Easter Offensive. Summary of Part Two and Evaluation. The Most Crucial Years: 1973-1975.

0636

The Post-Cease-Fire Logistic Structure. 24pp. Background. Concept and Objectives. Consolidation of Field Support. Consolidation of Base Depots. The Re-Structured Base Depots. Technical Service Departments After Reorganization.

Improving Supply and Maintenance Management. 75pp. Replacement of War Material and Armaments. Secondary Items: Some NMMA Achievements. Storage, Shipment, and Excess Disposal Activities. New Management Techniques. Petroleum Supply. Maintenance Activities. Improved Cannibalization and Direct Exchange of Parts. Enhancing Rebuild Capabilities and Performance. The Offshore Rebuild Program. In-Country Rebuild Achievements. Common Items Supply and Maintenance Support. In-Country Procurement. 0735 Ammunition Support. 25pp. Ammunition Economy. Management Activities. Supply Versus Consumption. Storage Security and Dispersion. Ammunition Aid Program for FY-1975. 0760 Service Support: Transportation and Medical. 17pp. Transportation Facilities. Improving Movement Control. Contingency Plans. Medical Treatment. Medical Evacuation. Construction. 25pp. The Lines of Communication (LOG) Program. Role of ARVN Engineers. Tactical Bridges. The Dependents Shelter Program. A Lesson Well Learned. Maintenance of Transferred US Bases. Support for the GVN Resettlement Program. The Bien Hoa Military Cemetery. Financial and Budget Management. 16pp. Planning and Budgeting. The FY-1975 Military Aid Program. A Re-Programming Effort. The Final Days. 22pp. Impact of the New Strategy. The Logistics Redeployment Plan. The Evacuation of ARVN Units and Refugees from MR-1 and MR-2. Regrouping and Refitting Efforts. Support for MR-3 During the Final Days. Conclusion. 12pp. Glossary. 6pp.

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0841 0853

0859 The General Offensives of 1968-69. Col. Hoang Ngoc Lung. U.S. Army Center of Military History. Washington, D.C. 1980. 0863 Table of Contents. 2pp. 0865 War During the 1965-1967 Period. 13pp. The Impact of U.S. Search-and-Destroy Operations. Situation as of the Second Half of 1967. 0878 North Vietnam's Change of Strategy and Preparations for the General OffensiveGeneral Uprising. 18pp. Communist Strategy in South Vietnam During the 1965-1966 and 1966-1967 Dry Seasons. Vo Nguyen Giap's Strategic Viewpoint After the 1966-1967 Dry Season. Reasons for the 1968 General Offensive and Communist Preparations. 0896 The RVN and Enemy Preparations. 14pp. How Much Did We Know. The Surprise: Why? 0910 The General Offensive, Phase 1.46pp. A Bird's Eye View. The Attack on Saigon. Supporting Attacks in III Corps Area. Clearing Operations in Saigon. The Battle of Hue. 0956 The Offensive, Phases II. Ill, and IV. 35pp. Phase II, May 1968. The Offensive, Phase III. The Offensive, Phase IV, February 1969. 0991 Impact of the 1968-1969 General Offensive. 19pp. "Talk and Fight". COSVN Resolutions No. 9 and 14/DKCT. A Windfall for South Vietnam. The Limitations of South Vietnam's Efforts. 1010 Observations and Conclusions. 11 pp. 1023 Glossary. 2pp.

Reel IV

0001 Leadership. General Cao Van Vien. U.S. Army Center of Military History. Washington, D.C. 1980. 0004 Table of Contents. 2pp. 0006 Introduction. 19pp. A Millenary Tradition of Military Leadership. Birth of the Vietnamese National Army. A French Legacy. 0025 Leadership Under President Diem's Regime. 43pp. Background. Training and Leadership Development in the RVNAF. Operations Against the Binh Xuyen and Rebellious Religious Sects. Performance of the 7th Division in the Battle of Ap Bac. Military Province Chiefs. Small-Unit Leadership. Observations.

0068 Leadership During the Period of the Directorate. 33pp. Background. Manpower and Training. I Corps and the 1st Infantry Division During the 1966 Buddhist Crisis. Military Province Chiefs. Airborne Night Raid Against a Communist Base. Observations. 0101 Leadership During President Thieu's Era. 68pp. Background. The Challenge of Vietnamization. The Challenge of Peace. The Challenge of Corruption. Leadership at the Corps Level: III and IV Corps During the Cambodian Incursion. Leadership at the Corps Level: I Corps During the 1972 Easter Offensive. Leadership at the Corps Level: II Corps During the Redeployment from KontumPleiku. Leadership at the Division Level: The 23d Division's Defense of Kontum. The Leadership of the Province Chiefs of Binh Dinh, Thua Thien and Khanh Hoa. A. Battalion Commander: Tong Le Chan. 0169 Summary and Conclusions. 10pp. 0179 Appendix. 28pp. A. Sources of Vietnam's Nationalist Tradition. B. Small Unit Commander's Handbook, 1966. 0207 Glossary. 2pp. 0209 Territorial Forces. Lt. Gen. Ngo Quang Truong. U.S. Army Center of Military History. Washington, D.C. 1980. 0213 Table of Contents. 3pp. 0216 Introduction. 8pp. An Abstract of Communist Insurgency in South Vietnam. The RVN's Counter-Insurgency Efforts. 0224 South Vietnam's Organization for Territorial Defense. 15pp. The Geographical Environment. Military Organization and Control. 0239 The Regional and Popular Forces. 36pp. Evolution of a Concept. Background and Missions. Organization and Force Development. Recruitment and Administration. Training. 0275 The Para-Military Forces. 15pp. Rural Development Cadres. People's Self-Defense Forces. The National Police. 0290 RF-PF Employment and Performance. 26pp. Role and Responsibilities. Deployment of Forces. Outposts and Strongpoints. Village and Hamlet Defense. Pacification. Dong Khoi Operations. Combat Support. 0317 Efforts to Improve RF and PF Combat Effectiveness. 24pp. Morale and Welfare.

0341

0355

On-The-Spot Training. Mobile Advisory Teams. Combined Operations. Observations and Conclusions. 14pp. The Importance of Territorial Security. The RF and PF Soldier. Evolving Problems. Conclusions. Appendix. 14pp. A. Insignia of Territorial and Para-Military Forces. B. The Viet Cong Infrastructure. C. Principles of Territorial Security.

0367 Glossary. 2pp. 0369 The U.S. Adviser.General Cao Van Vien/Lt. Gen. Ngo Quang Truong/Lt. Gen. Dong Van Khuyen/Maj. Gen. Nguyen Duy Hinh/Brig. Gen. f ran Dinh Tho/Col. Hoang Ngoc Lung and Lt. Col. Chu Xuan Vien. U.S. Army Center of Military History. Washington, D.C. 1980. 0374 Table of Contents. 3pp. . 0377 Introduction. 21pp. A Brief Comparative Historical Account. The U.S. Advisory System. Vietnamese Requirements for Advisory Assistance and Support to the U.S. Advisory Effort. 0398 The JGS and MACV. 24pp. A Matter of Personal Relationship. Reorganization and Development of the RVNAF. Highlights of a Fruitful Relationship. Procedures for Cooperation. An Evaluation. 0422 ARVN Battalion to Corps and the Tactical Adviser. 31 pp. The Tactical Advisory System. The Tactical Adviser's Responsibilities. The Adviser's Role in Operational Planning and Combat Intelligence. U.S. Support and the Problem of Leverage. Observations on Tours of Duty and Relationships. An Evaluation. 0453 The Intelligence Adviser. 19pp. A Pioneering Effort. Increasing Commitment. The Period of Full-Fledged Cooperation. Anatomy of a Relationship. 0472 The Logistic and Technical Adviser. 27pp. Significant Milestones. The Base Depot Upgrade Program. Path-Finder I and Path-Finder II. Observations of the U.S. Logistical Advisory Effort. Some Lessons Learned. 0498 The Pacification Adviser. 35pp. The U.S. Response to Insurgency. CORDS Organization and Operations. Relations and Contributions. Some Lessons Learned.

0533 The Training Adviser. 29pp. A Monumental Achievement. Organization for Training and Training Support. Training Advisory Activities. Observations and Comments. 0563 Observations and Conclusions. 13pp. 0576 Appendix. 5pp. A. Principles Authorizing Trim Advisers with Units and Formations of the Vietnamese National Armed Forces. B. The Assistance of American Advisers. 0581 Glossary. 2pp. 0583 RLG Military Operations and Activities In the Laotian Panhandle. Brig. Gen. Soutchay Vongsavanh. U.S. Army Center of Miliary History. Washington, D.C. 1981. 0586 Table of Contents. 3pp. 0589 . Introduction. 22pp. The Laos Panhandle. The Ho Chi Minh Trail. The Sihanouk Trail. The Pathet Lao. Relations Between the Pathet Lao and the NVA. Significant Developments Following the 1962 Geneva Agreement. 0611 The Organization and Employment of Irregular Forces in Southern Laos. 28pp. The Military Regions. Interdiction of the NVA Logistics System in the Panhandle. South Vietnamese Activities in the Panhandle. Coordination between Cambodia and Laos in the Panhandle. Laos Irregulars Before 1970. Laos Irregulars After 1970. Command Problems. 0639 The Initiation of Conventional Warfare in Southern Laos. 12pp. Attopeu. Saravane. Tchepone. 0651 The NVA Panhandle Offensives of 1971 and 1972.24pp. Paksong and Route 23. Reorganization. Saravane. Khong Sedone. Saravane Again and the Approach of Cease-Fire. 0675 Developments Following the February 1973 Cease-Fire. 15pp. Agreement to Restore Peace and Achieve National Concord. Violations of the Cease-Fire. Reduction of Royal Lao Military Strength. 0690 Observations and Conclusions. 9pp. Successes and Failures. Observations. 0699 Appendix. 8pp. A. The Agreement on the Restoration of Peace and Reconciliation in Laos. General Principles. Military Provisions. Provisions on Political Affairs. The Joint Commission for Implementation of the Agreement and the International Commission for Supervision and Control.

0707 0709 0715 0718 0735

0754

B. Protocols to the Agreement. Summary of Main Provisions. Glossary. 2pp. Intelligence. Col. Hoang Ngoc Lung. U.S. Army Center of Military History. Washington. D.C. 1982. Table of Contents. 3pp. Introduction. 17pp.' Nature of The Vietnam War. Role of Intelligence in the Vietnam War. Intelligence, Culture, and Language. 19pp. Characteristics of Vietnamese Culture and Language. Communist Culture and Language. South Vietnamese Culture and Language. Language, Translation and Cultural Interpretation. Republic of Vietnam and United States Intelligence Organizations in South Vietnam.

42PP.

0796

0846

0862

0909

0949 0958 0961

The RVN National and Local Intelligence Coordination Committees. Vietnamese Civilian Intelligence Agencies. Vietnamese Military Intelligence Organizations. United States Intelligence Organizations in Vietnam before the Paris Agreement. Intelligence Cooperation and Coordination. 48pp. Concepts and Problems. Combined Intelligence Activities. Intelligence Cooperation and Coordination at The Field Level. Military Intelligence Detachments (MID). Cooperation and Coordination in Human Intelligence. Cooperation and Coordination in Aerial Photo Reconnaissance. Signal Intelligence. Intelligence Training. Military Intelligence Cooperation and Coordination in Vietnam Following United States Military Disengagement. 16pp. Defense Attache Office, Intelligence Branch. Difficulties Encountered. United States-ARVN Intelligence Cooperation and Coordination In the Face of New Difficulties. Conclusions. Successes and Failures of ARVN Intelligence. 47pp. The 1968 General Offensive. The 1972 Easter Offensive. The Post-Cease-Fire Period. The 1975 General Offensive. Communist Intelligence. 40pp. North Vietnam's Intelligence Theory and Practice. North Vietnam Intelligence Agency. COSVN Intelligence Organization. Sources and Dispatching Methods. Successes and Failures of Enemy Intelligence. An Evaluation of Enemy Intelligence. Conclusions. 9pp. Glossary. 3pp. The Final Collapse. General Cao Van Vien. Center of Military History United States Army. Washington, D.C. 1983.

/

0965 0969 0975

Table of Contents. 3pp. Introduction. 6pp. The Situation Before the Paris Agreement. 18pp. Earlier Peace Proposals. Arranging the Cease-Fire. South Vietnamese Reactions. 0993 The Military Situation After the Cease-Fire. 1973-74.15pp. Role of ICCS. The Attempted Land and Population Grab. Cua Viet. Sa Huynh, Hong Ngu. Trung Nghia. and Tong Le Chan. Communist Military Preparations. Communist Policy and Strategy. 1008 Problems and Policies. 1973-74.16pp. Organization of the Armed Forces. The Reduction in U.S. Military Aid. .Air Force and Naval Aid. Replacement of Items and Parts. Fuel and Ammunition. Forebodings for 1975. 1024 The Beginning of the End. 25pp. Ban Me Thuot. President Thieu's Fateful Decision. 1049 The Rout in the Highlands. 13pp. General Phu's Plan. The Flight. Causes and Results. 1062 Defeat in the North. 26pp. General Truong's Plans. Northern and Southern MR-I. The Final Evacuation. The Refugee Problem. The Final Days of MR-II. 1088 Defense in the South. 19pp. Regrouping, and Refitting. High-Altitude Bombing. The Situation in MR-MI. The Situation in MR-IV. The Last Days. 13pp. The Evacuation. Saigon. 1121 Conclusions and Observations. 13pp. 1134 Glossary. 1 p. 1135 Appendix. 15pp. A. The Role of the Joint General Staff. B. Testimony, 27 January 1976, by Ambassador Graham Martin Before the Special Investigations Subcommittee of the House International Relations Committee. Subject: The Balance of Forces in Vietnam. C. Testimony, 27 January 1976, by Ambassador Graham Martin Before the Special Investigations 'Subcommittee of the House International Relations Committee. Subject: Efforts To Achieve a Negotiated Settlement With the Communists. Index. 1107

U.S. ARMED FORCES IN VIETNAM 1954-1975

Part One. Indochina Studies Part Two. Vietnam: Lessons Learned Part Three. Vietnam: Reports of U.S. Army Operations Part Four. Vietnam: U.S. Army Senior Officer Debriefing Reports

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