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Force Protection Design Standards


Accommodating the need for security and antiterrorism is a significant concern for all military design. Security and antiterrorism requirements must be integrated into the total project. Design of protective elements should seek to visually enhance and complement the design of a facility. Site elements such as fences, courtyards, screen walls, swales, berms, planters, and retaining walls can be used effectively for facility protection. These design elements should be utilized to provide visual harmony with the main facility, producing architectural compatibility through consistent use and application of materials, forms, and colors. All design decisions involving security and antiterrorism requirements will require coordination among the design disciplines including land planners, landscape architects, architects, intelligence personnel, security personnel, Force Protection Officer, facility users, and engineers. The designers must work to resolve conflicts and balance force protection requirements with all other requirements that impact design and development. These include the Americans with Disabilities Act Accessibility Guidelines (ADAAG), the Uniform Federal Accessibility Standards (UFAS), National Fire Protection Codes (NFPA), and all applicable local building codes and ordinances. The design team will also consult security personnel to determine whether portions of the design documents are subject to access limitations.


A primary concern for Army installations throughout the world is the threat of terrorist attack. To minimize the likelihood of mass casualties from terrorist attacks against DoD personnel in the buildings in which they work and live, DoD has developed the Unified Facilities Criteria (UFC) 4-010-01, DoD Minimum Antiterrorism Standards for Buildings. This document establishes the minimum building antiterrorism standards for all DoD components.


Implementation of the mandatory standards is obligatory for all new construction regardless of the funding source. These standards apply to FY 2004, and all subsequent fiscal years, for projects involving new construction and major renovations for inhabited structures. The standards will be reviewed before any site planning or design is initiated.

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Incorporating appropriate standoff distances around facilities is the most effective and desirable tool in meeting force protection requirements in facility site design. The need for standoff distances varies with the type of facility, its location, and the asset it contains. The DoD minimum standards, when applicable, may be supplemented by more stringent force protection building standards to meet specific threats inherent in the geographical area where the facility is to be constructed. Those additional requirements may be established by standards for specific SEE UFC 4-010-01 FOR SETBACK Combatant Commanders or based on Risk and/or Threat Analysis. REQUIREMENTS When the minimum standoff distances cannot be achieved because land is unavailable, the standards allow for building hardening to mitigate blast effects. Costs and requirements for building hardening are addressed in the DoD Security Engineering Manual. · The minimum standoff distances and separation for new and existing buildings are found in Table B-1 of UFC 4-010-01. · The minimum standoff distances and separation for expeditionary and temporary structures are found in Table D-1 of UFC 4-010-01. Additional guidance on applying the DoD Minimum Antiterrorism Standards for Buildings will be found in UFC 4-010-02, (FOUO) DoD Minimum Standoff Distances for Buildings. Currently, this document is in draft form. Until the DoD Security Engineering Manual is published, see the guidance provided on the Security Engineering Working Group website. Note: Website Access for Military and Government Users. This is a password protected website. To enter the site you must be accessing the site from either a ".mil" or ".gov" address. Upon initial entry, you will be prompted with instructions on how to acquire your password. Website Access for Non Military and Government Users. Currently, the Protective Design Center is developing a procedure for e-mailing the network administrator to receive procedures to enter the site. Upon initial entry into the site, if there are no instructions on these procedures, contact the Protective Design Center (CENWO-ED-S) at (402) 221-3151 for instructions.


The following force protection considerations will be given when determining the orientation of a building. Deny aggressors a clear "line of sight" to the facility from on or off the installation where possible. Protect the facility against surveillance by locating the protected facility out of range or out of view from vantage points. Protect against attack by selecting perimeter barriers to block sightlines such as obstruction screens, trees, or shrubs. Non-critical structures or other natural or man-made features can be used to block sightlines. 2 Fort Carson IDG

Fort Carson IDG Create "defensible space" by positioning facilities to permit building occupants and police to clearly monitor adjacent areas. If roads are nearby, orient building so that there are no sides parallel to vehicle approach routes. Design vehicular flow to minimize vehicle bomb threats; avoid high-speed approach into any critical or vulnerable area. Avoid locating the facility adjacent to high surrounding terrain, which provides easy viewing of the facility from nearby non-military locations.


Designers need to balance the need for signs that identify, locate, and direct residents and supported personnel to installation assets, versus the need to discourage and frustrate hostile intelligence gathering and access. One method of achieving this balance could be to direct people to a community support or information center to obtain directions to high security activities. Another could be signage like - "All incoming personnel and visitors report to building number ___."

Place trash containers as far away from the facility as possible. Antiterrorism/force protection requirements restrict the location of dumpsters to a minimum of 10 meters (33 feet) from inhabited buildings and 25 meters (82 feet) from billeting and primary gathering areas (Unified Facilities Criteria (UFC) 4-010-01, DoD Minimum Antiterrorism Standards for Buildings, Table B-1).


Fences are used as protective measures against project-specific threats. They are most appropriately used to define boundaries and to deter penetration of a secure area. A fence will assist in controlling and screening authorized access to a secured area. Fences also serve the purposes listed below. As a platform for the Intrusion Detection System. As a screen against explosive projectiles. To stop moving vehicles (must be reinforced to do so).


Plants with tall growth habits and/or large mature growth will be located well away from security fences.

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Landscaping guidelines for buildings should not be ignored because of standoff distances. The landscape design should enhance the overall attractiveness of the facility while still providing the objective level of security. Establish clear zones along both sides of security fencing. Vegetation in the clear zone should not exceed four inches in height. (DoD 0-2000.12-H, Protection of DoD Personnel and Activities Against Acts of Terrorism and Political Turbulence, Appendix EE, Table EE-4) Strategically locate trees and planters to prevent penetration of an attack vehicle into the secure area perimeter. Vegetative groupings and earth sheltering berms provide inherent blast effect reduction from external blast forces. Plant material that can provide concealment will not be used adjacent to high security structures or fence lines. Use dense, thorn-bearing plant material to create natural barriers that will deter aggressors. Screen playground and outdoor recreation areas from public (offinstallation) view. Unobstructed Space. Ensure that vegetation and site features within 10 meters (33 feet) of inhabited buildings do not conceal from observation objects of 150mm (6 inches) in height. (UFC 4010-01 , Appendix B, Para B-1.2) This does not preclude landscaping within the unobstructed space, but it will affect the design and may affect plant selection.




Lighting systems for security operations provide illumination for visual and closed-circuit television (CCTV) surveillance of boundaries, sensitive inner areas, and entry points. When CCTV is used as part of security operations, the lighting system will be coordinated with the CCTV system. The specific installation environment and the intended use determine lighting system requirements. Often two or more types of lighting systems are used within a single area. Guidance on the use of security lighting may be obtained from TM 5-811-1, Electrical Power Supply and Distribution.


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12.6 BERMS

Use of berms for force protection can fulfill one or more of the following functions. Define boundaries of property or boundary limits. Provide a barrier to moving vehicles. Hinder pedestrian movement. Intercept projectiles. Obstruct lines of sight. Berms used to block lines of sight or projectiles must be high enough to achieve those objectives or may be combined with landscaping or other construction elements. Detailed design guidance is contained in Army Technical Manual (TM) 5-853-3/ AFMAN 32-1071, Vol. 3, Security Engineering Final Design. Note: This manual is a "For Official Use Only" document and is not accessible on the Army Corps of Engineers publications website. A copy of the manual can be acquired by ordering it through your standard publications account.



Installation entry points are key components in the force protection security program. The most effective entrances accommodate the functions of observation, detection, inspection, access control, and disablement of hostile personnel and vehicles, while containing the vehicles and pedestrians until access is granted. These areas are among the most important installation features in the creation of a sense of arrival for both installation personnel and visitors. It is important that these areas present a positive public image. The Headquarters Department of the Army, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, DAMOODL office, in coordination with the Protective Design and Electronic Security Centers of Expertise, are currently developing standards for Army access control points. These standards will be published in the near future. Contact number for the current status of the Access Control Point standards is (703) 693-2906. UFC 4-022-01 Security Engineering Entry Control Facilities/Access Control Points is the standard for Entry Control Facilities Design.


The Product Manager, Physical Security Equipment (PM-PSE) under DoD Directive 3324.3 is assigned the mission of developing, fielding, and supporting Physical Security Equipment (PSE) throughout its life cycle for the Army, Joint Services, and other government agencies. The DoD Directive assigns specific areas of responsibility which include: interior PSE, Command and Control Systems, security lighting, force protection systems, barrier and systems, and interior and Fort Carson IDG 5

Ft Carson IDG exterior robotics. The PM-PSE homepage and the DA-approved equipment Blank Purchase Agreements (BPAs) are listed below. Product Manager - Physical Security Equipment Homepage.

DA-approved PSE Equipment Blanket Purchase Agreements (BPAs).


Information contained in the Provost Marshals Office (PMO) and Physical Security (PS) portion of this planning guide is directed primarily toward the construction requirements for arms, ammunition, and explosives storage facilities and the installation's Integrated Intrusion Detection System (ICIDS) and related requirements. For additional information contact Mr. Peter R. Morris, DSN 691-2760 or Commercial 719-526-2760 or FAX 719-526-3961. New facilities requiring Secure Storage or a Controlled Substance storage vault please contact Physical Security to conduct a "Risk Analysis". Risk Analyses will be used to determine construction standards for these types of facilities.


New Facility Criteria (AR 190-11 was revised on 15 Nov 2006). If Category II arms are to be stored in new facilities built for the principal purpose of storing arms, the facilities will meet the following facility criteria. WALLS

Walls will be of 8 inches of concrete reinforced with No. 4 reinforcing bars at 9 inches on center in each direction in each face of the wall. Reinforcement in the 2 faces of the wall will be staggered on each face to form a projected grid approximately 4­1/2 inches square. Reinforcement in the walls will be tied into floors and ceilings in accordance with American Concrete Institute standards. CEILINGS AND ROOFS

Ceilings and roofs will be of reinforced concrete construction. The thinnest portion may not be less than 6 inches. reinforcing bar spacing will form a grid so that the area of any opening does not exceed 96 square inches using No. 4 bars or larger. FLOORS

Floors, if on grade, will be a minimum of 6­inch thick reinforced concrete construction reinforced with 6 inches by 6 inches, W4 by W4 welded wire fabric or equivalent steel reinforcing bars (based on area of steel per square foot). Where the floor slab acts as the ceiling of an underlying room or area, the 6 Fort Carson IDG

Fort Carson IDG ceiling standards will apply. Where equivalent steel reinforcing bars are used, bar spacing will form a grid so that the area of any opening does not exceed 96 square inches. DOOR AND DOOR FRAMES

The door will be GSA approved Class 5 armory door per GSA Fed Spec AA­D­600D. A GSA approved Class 5 vault door is not encouraged due to its electromechanical lock. Double door protection for arms storage facilities is not required. Door frames will be per Fed Spec AA­D­600D WINDOWS AND OTHER OPENINGS

Windows are not authorized. Ducts, vents, and other openings of 96 square inches or more with the least dimension greater than 6 inches will be secured in accordance with 1 of the following methods and otherwise limited to the minimum number and size that are essential Sealed with material comparable to that forming the adjacent walls. fitted with any of the barriers below with bars or steel mesh securely embedded in the structure of the building or welded to a steel frame that will be securely attached to the wall with fastenings inaccessible from the exterior of arms storage facility. Three­eighth inch or larger hardened steel bars with vertical bars not more than 4 inches apart and with horizontal bars welded to the vertical bars so that the openings do not exceed 32 square inches. A minimum of 8­gauge high carbon manganese steel mesh with 2­inch diamond grid. A 6­gauge cold drawn steel wire mesh with 2­inch diamond grid when 8­gauge mesh above is not available.


For the past 20 years, J-SIIDS has been the primary government-owned intrusion detection system. All the arms storage facilities on Fort Carson had been equipped with the J-SIIDS until August of 1995. At that time, a full conversion to an Integrated Commercial Intrusion Detection System (ICIDS) occurred. Installed J-SIIDS were retrofitted to facilitate interfacing with the ICIDS monitoring equipment. INTEGRATED COMMERCIAL INTRUSION DETECTION SYSTEMS (ICIDS) (REVISED SEPTEMBER 2002) DESCRIPTION

The ICIDS is an integrated system which includes interior and exterior sensors, closed circuit television (CCTV), entry control equipment (ECE), communications links, and alarm reporting Fort Carson IDG


Ft Carson IDG systems for monitoring control and display of various alarm and monitoring information. The ICIDS consists of a family of commercially available, reliable, state-of-the-art, standardized, intrusion detection equipment that is being installed at Department of Defense (DoD) facilities worldwide to enhance the physical security of the site and sensitive assets. It will be used by security and law enforcement agencies to provide a standard intrusion detection capability. The ICIDS is a NonDevelopmental Item (NDI) Basic Acquisition Program, composed of commercially available components. Functional aspects of the ICIDS equipment are described in the following: PRIMARY MONITOR CONSOLE (PMC)

The PMC has software used to control the system. The program is invoked when the system is initialized and acquires data from each Remote Area Data Collector (RADC) it is monitoring. If a RADC fails to respond, the system alarms and notifies the operator. OPERATOR WORKSTATION

The Operator Workstation allows operators to monitor the status of all equipment with the security system. Commands are entered into the system using the workstation keyboard. A legend of the available soft-keys appears on each operator's display and changes to reflect alternative soft-key options. REMOTE AREA DATA COLLECTOR (RADC)

A network of RADCs monitors and controls all intruder detection and access control equipment. Each RADC compiles a list of readings and changes, which it transmits to the PMC. The readings are then processed and stored, and operators' displays are updated to reflect any detected changes. SENSORS

While the majority of the J-SIIDS sensors were normally connected in a series, with ICIDS they are individually addressed (point sensors) to the control panel RADC. Conduit installed to accommodate IDS sensors should allow for additional wiring from control panel to sensor(s) location. POWER REQUIREMENTS (REVISED SEPTEMBER 2002)

The ICIDS/J-SIIDS is designed to operate on single-phase, 110-V to 125-V, 20amp, 48- to 62-Hz power. Power to the control units shall be supplied by independent lines separately fused at the distribution panel. The lines shall be enclosed in 1/2-inch (1.27 cm), rigid, heavy-wall, steel conduit. Power should be run from the distribution panel to a 4 square box at the proposed RADC location.


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A conduit raceway needs to be provided from the telephone room to the area to be alarmed with a pull string to separate 4 square box at proposed RADC location. CONDUIT

The requirements for the use of conduit when installing electronic security systems (ESS) vary from installation to installation. It is incumbent on the designer to research the requirements for a given installation. For instance, the National Electrical Code states that when installing electrical equipment in certain hazardous environments, an explosion-proof conduit system is required. This type of conduit system is quite expensive but is required in order to maintain safety inside the hazardous environment. For many years, conduit systems were required when installing ESS in sensitive compartmented information facilities (SCIFs). However, recent regulatory changes have relaxed these requirements in certain applications. In exterior applications, conduit requirements will be different still and must conform to the requirements of the National Electrical Code. Still, it remains a designer's responsibility to research and verify conduit system requirements for given ESS installations. The designer must consider factors such as line supervision requirements, safety, potential physical damage, electromagnetic interference. Conduit will be run from proposed RADC location (4 square box) to approved sensor locations (4 square box) with pull strings. The vast majority of interior ESS installations are neither SCIFs nor hazardous in nature. Therefore, in most areas where ESS is installed, the designer must consider the use of conduit systems in terms of practicality and cost effectiveness. For example, in areas where wiring may be subject to physical damage (from forklifts or other sources), a rigid conduit system may very well be justified. On the other hand, where interconnecting wiring is not exposed (such as above ceilings or concealed inside walls, etc.) and not subject to physical damage, a conduit system may not be required at all. Where wiring will be exposed and subject to only minor physical damage, the designer may choose to use an electrical metallic tubing (EMT) or polyvinyl chloride (PVC) conduit system. While there are no specific regulatory requirements mandating the use of rigid conduit, it remains the responsibility of the designer to determine conduit system requirements for specific ESS applications in accordance with the appropriate and governing regulations, codes, or standards. It is this particular area of concern which leads to the Corps' requirement that firms engaged in this type of design be Registered Professional Engineers proficient in all aspects of the design requirements, codes, and standards in effect at the time of design. The Corps of Engineers Guide Specifications (CEGS) are a family of generic specifications which must be tailored to specific project requirements. A CEGS by itself does not constitute a requirement until the designer modifies the generic specification to fit a specific project at a specific site. The CEGSs include notes to the designer to assist in making intelligent choices where that latitude exists. The type of conduit system to be provided is one such designer choice. Once modified, the document becomes a project specification. The project specification and design drawings must accurately describe the technical requirements for a specific project, including conduit as well as other regulation, code, or standards driven requirements.

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COE, Huntsville, DSN: 760-1756, Commercial 205-895-1756. PSEMO, DSN: 654-2415, Commercial 703-704-2415, PSE.


The cited Army standards shall be met. Unified Facilities Criteria (UFC) 4-010-01, DoD Minimum Antiterrorism Standards for Buildings. Unified Facilities Criteria (UFC) 4-010-10, DoD Minimum Antiterrorism Standoff Distances for Buildings (This document is a "For Official Use Only (FOUO)" publication. Users may contact the Point of Contact posted at the noted website for inquires regarding this document.) Uniform Federal Accessibility Standards (UFAS). Americans with Disabilities Act Accessibility Guideline (ADAAG). · DoD Instruction 2000.16, DoD Antiterrorism Standards.


The following references are provided for guidance. Unified Facilities Criteria (UFC) 2-600-01, Installation Design, Chapter 12. DoD Handbook 2000.12-H, Protection of DoD Personnel and Activities Against Acts of Terrorism and Political Turbulence, February 1993. (This handbook is a "For Official Use Only (FOUO)" publication. Users may contact the Point of Contact posted at the following website to obtain a copy of the Handbook.) Army Regulation (AR) 525-13, The Army Force Protection Program (available only through the Army Knowledge Online web portal). UFC 4-010-02, DoD Security Engineering Manual. (This document is in draft form. See the Security Engineering Working Group website.) U.S. Air Force, Installation Force Protection Guide: Contains information on installation planning, engineering design, and construction techniques that will preclude or minimize the effect of a terrorist attack. Technical Manuals/Air Force Manual series TM 5-853/AFMAN) 32-1071, Security Engineering, three volume series: (Volumes 2 and 3 are "For Official Use Only (FOUO)" and are not available on the Army Corps of Engineers publications website.) A copy of the manuals can be acquired via your standard publications account. The three volumes cover project development, concept design, and final design respectively. Extracted from IDG on 23 Jul 2007, 15:11 10 Fort Carson IDG


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