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Institute for Peace Research and Security Studies at the University of Hamburg

KOSOVO

Mission Information Package

May 2002

Contents

Preface Glossary

iii v

PART ONE: INFORMATION ON KOSOVO

Map 1: Kosovo Box 1: Basic Social and Economic Indicators on Kosovo

1 2 3 3 6 8 10 12

I.

A Short History of Conflict in Kosovo

1. 2. 3. 4. Kosovo before 1987 Emerging Crisis, 1987-97 Conflict, 1997-9 Kosovo after the NATO Campaign

Box 2: Chronology of Main Events

II.

The Regional and International Context

1. 2. 3. Kosovo's Immediate Neighbours Other Countries in the Region Europe, the United States and Russia

Map 2: Former Yugoslavia

14 14 19 21 24

III.

Kosovo: Politics, Economy and Society

1. 2. 3. 4. Political System Internal and External Security Economy and Social Services Culture and Society

25 25 30 33 36

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PART TWO: THE INTERNATIONAL PRESENCE

IV. The International Community in Kosovo: Overview

1. 2. International Involvement in the Former Yugoslavia before 1999 The UNMIK Actors: UN, OSCE and EU

Box 3: International Initiatives/Involvement in the Former Yugoslavia

41 41 42 44 48 50 51 55 57

3.

The NATO Kosovo Force (KFOR)

Map 3: KFOR Deployment

4. 5.

Other International, Regional and National Actors International Involvement in Kosovo: Problems and Challenges

Organigram 1: Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe

V.

The United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK)

1. 2. 3. 4. Background and Mandate Decision-making and Administrative Structure Main UNMIK Activities Transfer of Authority and Priorities and Challenges for 2002

Organigram 2: Provisional Institutions of Self Government (PISG) and UNMIK

58 58 59 63 67 70 71 71 73 76 78 80 81

VI.

The OSCE Mission in Kosovo (OMIK)

1. 2. 3. 4. Background and Mandate Democratic Governance Human Rights and Rule of Law Priorities and Challenges for 2002

Organigram 3: OSCE Mission in Kosovo ­ Headquarters Box 4: OSCE Mission in Kosovo ­ Regional Structure

Annex 1: Annex 2: Annex 3: Annex 4:

List of International Activities by Area Further Links and Resources UN Security Council Resolution 1244 Mandate of the OSCE Mission in Kosovo

82 88 96 103

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Preface

Purpose of the MIPs This Mission Information Package (MIP) on Kosovo is the first in a series of packages for members of OSCE and UN missions. The purpose of the MIPs is to provide essential background information on the mission and the region in a concise and user-friendly format. Each MIP will include: · · · · · · Basic country information. Concise history and analysis of conflict. Comprehensive overview of international organisations active in the country. Description of major international and regional programmes. Maps, organigrams, and graphs. Extensive listings of relevant internet resources and literature.

The MIPs do not aim to provide an original academic contribution to research in the field, but rather to synthesise the vast literature available and present it in a cogent, digestible and practically relevant form. As such, they should provide a useful resource for current and prospective members of OSCE and UN missions, including participants of training courses for international peace missions organised inter alia by the German MFA. They will also be of interest to officials in other international organisations, NGOs and governmental agencies, as well as students and academics interested in the subject. The series of packages is being prepared by the Centre for OSCE Research (CORE), Hamburg, with the financial support of the OSCE Desk of the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in consultation with the Training and Capacity Building Unit of the OSCE Secretariat, the OSCE Mission in Kosovo (OMIK), and the UN Interim Administration in Kosovo (UNMIK). MIP on Kosovo The MIP on Kosovo covers the main events in and about Kosovo until spring 2002. It is divided into two main parts. Part One focuses on Kosovo itself, providing a history of the conflict and an overview of the current situation in Kosovo and the region. Part Two provides information on the various international actors and their activities in Kosovo, focusing in particular on UNMIK and OMIK. The package also contains a number of annexes, maps and organigrams, and a glossary of abbreviations. Each chapter section is enriched with an extensive list of internet links enabling readers to access further information. Individual chapters are structured as stand-alone units, and can thus be read as part of the overall package or individually. Readers may therefore find some of the information recurring in more than one chapter. Thus the overview chapter on international involvement provides a short summary of information that is further elaborated in subsequent chapters on the UN and OSCE activities. And information on the political and human rights situation in Kosovo will be addressed from different angles in chapters on the situation in Kosovo and on OMIK. CORE hopes this structure will provide a useful tool for quick reference. Disclaimer The information contained in the package does not necessarily reflect the views of the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the OSCE or any other organisations mentioned. Furthermore, any place names or geographical boundaries do not imply official recognition or endorsement. Place names in Kosovo are given in both Albanian and Serbian with the exception of the term "Kosovo", which for stylistic reasons is used in its international form. iii

CORE retains copyright for the contents of this Mission Information Package. Any citations from the MIP should indicate the source; wider copying or distribution of the text should be subject to CORE approval.

This Mission Information Package on Kosovo has been produced in a team led by Dr. Randolf Oberschmidt with contributions by (in alphabetic order): Mr. Max BornefeldEttmann, Ms. Kerstin Blome, Dr. Christina Boswell, Ms. Katri Kemppainen, Dr. Randolf Oberschmidt, Ms. Claudia Vollmer and Mr. Carsten Walter.

Your Views and Comments

CORE plans to review this Internet version of the Mission Information Package in the future. To ensure consistent high quality and accessibility, CORE would be very interested in any feedback and suggestions from users. Comments should be addressed to: Dr. Randolf Oberschmidt, Centre for OSCE Resarch, Falkenstein 1, D-22587 Hamburg. E-mail: [email protected]

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Glossary

AAK ABA/CEELI ACTWARN ADAB AIM Aleanca për Ardhmërinë e Kosovës DRSM Demokratska Muslims] EAC EAfR EBRD EBU EC ECAC Mreza (AIM), ECHR ECMI ECMM EIB EIM wirtschaftliche EMIS ERCC EU EUMM FAO FO FOM FRY FTO FVL FYROM GORED GSZ GTZ HCIC Development HLC Initiative Gora [Gradanska HPCC HPD HQ HR HR-Net HRW IAC IASC ICA ICG ICRC ICRS Investitionsund ICTY IDP IFES IFJ IFOR Reconstruction, Employment Assistance Centre European Agency for Reconstruction European Bank for Reconstruction and Development Information Network European Broadcasting Union European Commission Election Complaints and Appeals SubCommission European Convention of Human Rights European Centre for Minority Issues European Community Monitoring Mission European Investment Bank European Institute for the Media Education System European Roma Rights Centre European Union European Union Monitoring Mission Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations Foreign Office Representative of Freedom of the Media Federal Republic of Yugoslavia Field Training Officer Final Voters' List Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia German Office for Reconstruction and Development Ground Safety Zone Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Information Zusammenarbeit Humanitarian Centre Humanitarian Law Centre Housing and Property Claims Commission Housing and Property Directorate Headquarters Human Rights Hellenic Resources Network Human Rights Watch Interim Administrative Council Inter-Agency Standing Committee Institute for Civil Administration International Crisis Group International Committee of the Red Cross Information Service International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia Internally Displaced Person International Systems International Federation of Journalists Implementation Force Foundation for Election Counselling and Referral Community Management Information Reformska Stranka [Alliance for the Future of Kosovo] American Bar Association/Central and East European Law Initiative Activation Warning Associazione per le Donne dell'Area dei Balcani Alternative [Alternativna Informativna Mreza (AIM), Rrjeti Informativ Alternativ (RIA)] AIM Alternativna [Alternative AKSh BaH BAN BMZ BSDAK Informativna Information Network Muslimana [Democratic Reform Party of

Rrjeti Informativ Alternativ (RIA)] Armata Kombëtare Shqiptare Bosnia and Herzegovina Balkan Academic News Bundesministerium für Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung Bosnjacka Stranka Demokratske Akcije Kosova [Bosniacs Party of Democratic Action of Kosovo] BSEC CARDS CAS CDF CDHRF Black Sea Economic Cooperation Community Assistance, Development, and Stabilisation Programme Civil Administration Support Comprehensive Development Framework Council for the Defence of Human Rights and Freedoms [Këshilli për Mbrojtjen e të Drejtave e të Lirive të Njeriut (KMDLNJ)] CDRC CEC CEEOM CEI CFA CIDA CIG CIJ CiO CIS CLRAE CoE COLPI CORE DDGCS DEG DFID DHSW DoES DoJ Criminal Defence Resource Centre Central Election Commission Council of Europe Election Observation Mission Central European Initiative Central Fiscal Authority Canadian Agency Citizen's Iniciativa Gore] Coalition for International Justice Chairman-in-Office Commonwealth of Independent States Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of the Council of Europe Council of Europe Constitutional & Legal Policy Institute Centre for OSCE Research Department for Democratic Governance and Civil Society Deutsche Entwicklungsgesellschaft Department for International Development Department of Health and Social Welfare Department of Education and Science Department of Justice International

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IFRC IHF-HR ILO IMF INCORE INGO IOM IREX JAC JIAS JRTF KAP KCB KDOM KEK KFOR KfW KHC KIAI KIP KJI KLA KLC

International Federation of the Red Cross International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights International Labour Organisation International Monetary Fund Initiative Ethnicity International Organisation International Organisation for Migration International Board Joint Advisory Council Joint Interim Administrative Structure Joint Registration Task Force Kosovo Action Plan Kosovo Consolidated Budget Kosovo Diplomatic Observers Mission Kompania Energetjetike e Kosovës [Kosovo Power Company] Kosovo Force Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau Kosova Helsinki Committee Kosovo Information Assistance Initiative Kosovo Information Project Kosovo Judicial Institute Kosovo Liberation Army [Ushtria Çlirimtare e Kosovës] Kosovo Law Centre [Qendra Juridike e Kosovës (QJK), Pravni Centar Kosova (PCK)] Research and Exchanges Non-Governmental on Conflict Resolution and

OCHA OFDA OHR OMIK OSCE OTI PC PC DEC PCK PDAShK

Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance Office of the High Representative OSCE Mission in Kosovo Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe Office of Transition Initiatives Permanent Council Permanent Council Decision Pravni Centar Kosova [Kosovo Law Centre (KLC), Qendra Juridike e Kosovës (QJK)] Partia Demokratike [Ashkali Ashkali Shqiptare Democratic Kosovës Albanian

Party of Kosovo] PDK PLK PM PNDSh PPCF PPD PPSC PQLK PRIP PRK PShDK Partia Demokratike e Kosovës [Democratic Party of Kosovo] Partia Liberale e Kosovës [Liberal Party of Kosovo] Prime Minister Partia Nacionale Demokratike Shqiptare [Albanian National Democratic Movement] Political Party Consultative Forum Political Party Development Political Party Service Centre Partia Qendra Liberale e Kosovës [Liberal Centre Party of Kosovo] Public Reconstruction and Investment Programme Partia Republikane e Kosovës [Republican Party of Kosovo] Partia Shqiptare Demokristiane e Kosovës [Albanian Christian Democratic Party of Kosovo] QJK Qendra Juridike e Kosovës [Kosovo Law Centre (PCK)] REACT RFE/RL RIA Rapid Expert Assistance and Cooperation Teams Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Rrjeti Informativ Alternativ [Alternative Information Network (AIM), Alternativna Informativna Mreza (AIM)] ROLTT RTK SAP SDA SDI SEE SECI SEEAP SEEDUCOP SEEMO for SEERECON SFOR SG Rule of Law through Technology Radio-Television Kosovo Stabilisation and Association Process Stranka Demokratske Akcije Kosova [Party of Democratic Action of Kosovo] Social Development Initiative for South East Europe Southeast European Cooperative Initiative South-East European Regional Action Plan South East European Cooperation Network (Enhanced Graz Process) South East Europe Media Organisation Economic Reconstruction and Development in South East Europe Stabilisation Force Secretary General (KLC), Pravni Centar Kosova

KMDLNJ

Këshilli për Mbrojtjen e të Drejtave e të Lirive të Njeriut [Council for the Defence of Human Rights and Freedoms (CDHRF)]

KP KPC KPS KPSS KTC KTI KVM KWI LDK LSMS MAI MEBK MFA MINELRES MNB MPF MTA NATO NCSC NDI NGO NRC

Coalition for Independence [Koalicioni Per Pavaresi] Kosovo Protection Corps Kosovo Police Service Kosovo Police Service School Kosovo Transitional Council Kosovo Transition Initiative Kosovo Verification Mission Kosovo Women's Initiative Lidhja Demokratike e Kosovës [Democratic League of Kosovo] Legal Systems Monitoring Section Media Action International Micro Enterprise Bank Kosova Ministry of Foreign Affairs Minority Electronic Resources Multinational Brigade Multinational Protection Force Military Technical Agreement North Atlantic Treaty Organisation National Center for State Courts National Democratic Institute International Affairs Non-Governmental Organisation Norwegian Refugee Council

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SIDA SIPRI SNC-KM SP SEE SRSG TISK TMC UÇK UÇK UÇPMB

Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency Stockholm International Peace Research Institute Serbian National Council of Kosovo and Metohija Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe Special Representative of the Secretary General Transatlantic Kosovo Temporary Media Commissioner Ushtria Çlirimtare e Kosovës [Kosovo Liberation Army] Ushtria Çlirimtare e Kombetare [National Liberation Army] Ushtrisë Çlirimtare për Preshevë, Medvedjë dhe Bujanoc [Liberation Army for Presevo, Medvedje, and Bujanovac] Internet Seminar Series

UNHCHR UNHCR UNICEF UNIFEM UNMAS UNMIBH UNMIK UNMOP UNPREDEP UNPROFOR UNPSG UNSCR UNTAES

United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees United Nations Children's Fund United Nations Development Fund for Women United Nations Mine-Action Service United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo United Nations Mission of Observers in Prevlaka United Nations Predeployment Force United Nations Protection Force United Nations Civilian Police Support Group United Nations Security Council Resolution United Nations Transitional Authority in Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium

UN UNCHS UN CIVPOL UNCRO UNDP UNECE UNEP UNESCO UNFPA

United Nations United Nations Centre for Human Settlements (Habitat) United Nations Civilian Police United Nations Confidence Restoration Operation United Nations Development Program United Nations Economic Commission for Europe United Nations Environment Programme United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation United Nations Population Fund

UNV US(A) USAID USOP WB WFP WHO WT

United Nations Volunteers United States (of America) United States Agency for International Development US Office Pristina World Bank World Food Programme World Health Organisation Working Table

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PART ONE

INFORMATION ON KOSOVO

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Mission Information Package: KOSOVO

Map 1: Kosovo

Source: OSCE/ODIHR, Kosovo / Kosova. As seen, as told. An analysis of the human rights findings of the OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission, October 1998 to June 1999, Warsaw 1999, p. xii.

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Box 1: Basic Social and Economic Indicators on Kosovo

Population (1997/2000): 2.3 million/1.8 million Land area: 10,887 km² Population density (1997): 210 inhabitants per km² Ethnic composition (1991):* Albanian: 81.6% Serb: 9.9% Muslim (Bosniac, Goran): 3.4% Roma (incl. Egyptian, Ashkali): 2.3% Montenegrin: 1% Turk: 0.5% Other (Croat, Yugoslavian): 1.2% Languages: Albanian, Serbian Religions: Islam, Serbian Orthodox, Catholic Major Cities: Prishtinë/Pristina (capital): 300,000 Prizren: 70,000 Pejë/Pe: 60,000 Kosovska Mitrovicë/Mitrovica: 58,000 Gjakovë/Djakovica: 46,000 Gjilan/Gnjilane: 40,000 Administrative units: 30 municipalities, 5 districts Pre-war life expectancy: 76.6 years (females); 69.8 years (males) Birth rate: 3.2 births per person Unemployment (2000): 50 ­ 75% Pre-war GDP per capita: $400 Share of key sectors: Industry: 33.8% Agriculture: 28.8 % Others: 37.4% Exports (1990): $171 million Imports (1990): $191 million (trade deficit $20 million) Natural resources: Lead, zinc, nickel, coal, magnesium, lignite, kaolin, quartz, asbestos, limestone, marble, chrome and bauxite. Major rivers: Sitnica, Drini i Bardh/Beli Drim Highest mountain: Gjeravica (2,522 m)

Sources: World Bank (1999), Riinvest (1997). *The figures on ethnic composition are drawn from a 1991 Population Census conducted by FRY. The census was widely boycotted by ethnic Albanians, and may underestimate the proportion of Albanians. Albanian academics estimated in 1997 that up to 90% of the Kosovo population was ethnic Albanian. Since then, the proportion of current Albanian residents has probably risen because of Serb displacement.

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Chapter One A Short History of Conflict in Kosovo

Introduction Although one of the smallest units in the former Yugoslavia ­ its population in 1997 was just 2.3 million - Kosovo has had and continues to exert an inordinate influence on stability in the Balkans region. It was the Kosovo question that provided the first target for Milosevi's mobilisation of Serb nationalism from 1987 onwards, contributing to the break-up of the federation. And while the Kosovo problem faded into the background during the Croatian and Bosnian conflicts in the first half of the 1990s, it was again events in this province that triggered a NATO military action against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and arguably the UN's most ambitious reconstruction programme to date. One reason for the significance of the Kosovo question relates to its strategic repercussions on neighbouring countries and the region as a whole (see Chapter Two). But it also reflects the intransigency of the conflicting interests of the Albanian majority and Serb minority. Claims to this territory are historically deep-rooted on both sides, and were politically mobilised in the past two decades to create two incompatible but rigidly entrenched sets of demands. This makes the search for a peaceful solution to the Kosovo question especially difficult. Given the importance of these regional and historical perspectives in understanding current dilemmas, this overview will start by briefly tracing the emergence of ethnic conflict over the status of Kosovo. It will then outline the factors leading to the escalation of conflict in 19981999, and consider options and challenges to finding a solution to the Kosovo question.

1. Kosovo before 1987

Early history The purpose of this sub-chapter is not to side with a specific interpretation of Kosovo's history. Instead, the aim is to raise awareness about the complexity of facts and sensitivity surrounding various arguments. The following paragraphs cannot replace the reading of historical material and sources, but rather acts as an introduction and basis. Some references for further reading can be found at the end of the chapter. While the causes of the 1998-9 conflict should be understood in the context of events in the 1980s and 1990s, the ethnic fault-line along which conflict occurred had much earlier historical origins. This does not mean that there is a generally agreed upon historical past involving the conflicts of the two main groupings in Kosovo; the Kosovo-Albanians and the Serbs. The two parties, as well as academic literature influenced by them, heavily dispute what they claim are historical facts that have been used to justify the policies of both sides in the recent conflict. Kosovo's history can best be grasped by viewing it as a two-sided story; no single, objective history for Kosovo can be written. This is not only due to conflicting historical understandings and interpretations - where one side interprets itself to be a `liberator' of its `homeland' whereas the other views it as an `oppressor' and an `alien' ­ but also due to lack of evidence and historical documents. A fair history of Kosovo would need to illustrate the history of its main protagonists, being thus more a history of the region of Kosovo, and not of its Serbian or Albanian part respectively.

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Much of Kosovo's history involves `myths'. Myths begin to surface in nineteenth-century nationalist literature of both the Serbs and Albanians. The term is intended to illustrate, firstly, how difficult it is to draw a clear line between truth and exaggeration, or reality and interpretation. Secondly, the term implies that history is being used by present actors to both explain and justify their actions. This second point is important, as it shows how history is being used instrumentally, as an argument ("we were here first") to justify a goal ("we should be the only ones here"). Lastly, a `myth' implies that present actors are drawing on distant historical events ­ on events that are enveloped in uncertainty and that can therefore be moulded to serve a purpose with more ease. In the recent conflict, four main historical situations have been drawn upon to both explain the conflict between Serbs and Albanians and justify policies. The first historical situation, or myth, is based on the above-mentioned argumentation that the grouping that was present in the region first is entitled to it at present. The dominant Serbian claim was that Kosovo was the `Jerusalem of Serbia', the central `sacred' point of Serb identity. This argument is justified to the extent that Kosovo was a central region for Serbia both economically and strategically, as it was an important trading route since the medieval ages, and the seat of the Serbian Orthodox Church was in Kosovo for some time. However, to qualify this claim, the Serbian empire did not have its origins in Kosovo, but in Rascia, an area beyond Kosovo's north-western border. And the Orthodox Church was not originally or continuously seated in Kosovo: it was transferred to Kosovo after being burnt down in central Serbia and after a 154-year pause, was only reinstated by the modern Yugoslav state in 1920. Furthermore, Kosovo's political importance can be disputed, as it was not used for official occasions, such as marriages or coronations. The 1389 Battle of Kosovo is perhaps the most known event that became a myth. In this battle the Ottoman Empire conquered Kosovo, the first of a series of defeats that destroyed the mediaeval Serb kingdom and forced thousands of Serbs to flee to Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina. The myth told is that Serbian Prince Lazar martyred himself and Serbia in order to maintain Serbia's dignity, and therefore the battle and Kosovo itself became holy to Serbia. However, very few details and facts are known about the battle. It is probable that Albanians and Serbs fought together as allies in the battle, and the argument that the battle was decisive must be qualified by the argument that the Serbian empire had already disintegrated when Tsar Dusan died in 1355. Also, celebrating the date of the battle only began in the nineteenth-century when nationalist writers (e.g. Vuk Karadzic and Petar Petrovi Njegos) revived the myth. A third dispute surrounds the so-called Great Migration of 1690. The migration refers to Serbs being forced out of Kosovo under Austrian invasion, leaving a demographic vacuum that was filled by large numbers of settlers from neighbouring Albania who moved into the territory of Kosovo. Serbs have used this historical event to claim that present-day Albanians are aliens in Kosovo, and that the indigenous population ­ which also has a historical right to the region ­ is Serb. Albanians claim the opposite: the Albanians were the indigenous population and majority in Kosovo, and Slavs only entered the region in the early medieval ages. Both of these arguments need to be qualified. Albanians had a continuous presence in Kosovo already in the medieval ages, contrary to Serb claims, but they only became a majority in the late nineteenth century, contrary to some Albanian claims. A fourth area concerning the history of Kosovo that requires clarification, and that is closely linked to the above-mentioned myths, is that of ethnic identity. This issue mostly concerns 4

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the problem of dealing with singular identities, i.e. Albanian and Serb. An example of this problem is Serbia's claim that Kosovo has always been an integral and holy part of Serbia. However, with regard to Kosovo's early history, it was only a part of Serbia for around 250 years, from 1200 to 1455, until it was reincorporated into Serbia in 1912. It is therefore disputable whether Kosovo is an integral part of Serbian identity. Nevertheless, this does not mean that only Albanians are entitled to Kosovo. As already mentioned, both Serbs and Albanians have resided in Kosovo since the medieval ages. And it is a myth that Kosovo has always been an autonomous entity. It only became a political entity in name in 1870, and its present borders were only drawn in 1945. Albanian struggle for political power only began with the League of Prizren of 1878, which as its aim had national survival and was triggered by the mass-expulsion of Albanians from Kosovo in 1877-1878. However, systematic hostility and hatred on a great scale surfaced between Serbs and Albanians only when Kosovo was reincorporated into Serbia in 1912. At this time, the ethnic balance had shifted to produce a predominantly Muslim, Albanian majority. The Kosovo Albanians were fiercely resistant to Serb occupation, and their claims to self-determination were encouraged by the independence of Albania proper in 1912, and Albanian nationalist demands for a "greater Albania". The inter-war After World War I the peace treaties incorporated Kosovo into the new Serb-dominated Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. Kosovo Albanian resistance against Serbia years continued in the 1920s and from 1929 onwards under the more repressive Kingdom of Yugoslavia. In 1941 Yugoslavia was carved up under Nazi occupation, with Kosovo being split off from Serbia and united with Albania under Italian control. The territory was also briefly controlled by German and Bulgarian troops. With the help of the Italians, the Albanians forced most Serbians in Kosovo to flee. This brief experience of union with Albania between 1941-4 encouraged Kosovo Albanian demands for a greater Albania after World War II, further heightened by the communist party declaration of 1944 that granted Albania the right of secession from Yugoslavia, but the region was instead re-incorporated into a Yugoslav federation under Tito. The Tito era The 1946 Yugoslav constitution granted Kosovo the status of second autonomous region within the Republic of Serbia (the first was Vojvodina), implying a greater degree of autonomy than under pre-war arrangements. The following two decades saw a period of relative economic growth and ethnic stability in the federation. Tito´s regime was largely able to suppress nationalist claims through a one-party system that managed to transcend ethnic divisions, and which allowed some autonomy for the six republics and two autonomous regions. The traditional dominance of Serbia within the federation was also constrained through a complex system of constitutional checks and balances between the republics. The 1974 constitution further consolidated this approach, with Kosovo and Vojvodina granted near republic status as autonomous provinces. Two events threatened to upset this balance after 1980. First, the death of Tito that year created uncertainties about the future of the communist system, and no successor emerged who was able to provide similarly strong and charismatic leadership. Perhaps more importantly, the oil crisis of 1979 triggered depression in an economy that had already been in gradual decline for the past decade, leading to high unemployment, inflation and declining wages, as well as a serious international debt crisis. Economic liberalisation and growing demands for a multi-party system also undermined the single-party authoritarian system, thereby eroding what had been an important check on nationalist politics.

Domestic problems

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Growing nationalism

Political groups that emerged in the 1980s were increasingly ready to play the nationalist card to mobilise popular support. In Kosovo, traditional Albanian grievances against the Serbs were revived in the context of deteriorating economic and social conditions. While higher birth rates increased the proportion of Albanians in Kosovo to 78% by 1981 (the proportion had increased to around 90% by 1991), Albanians had access to less than half of all official positions in Kosovo. The unemployment rate was the highest in the federation, and income levels were only around a quarter of the national average. (See Chapter Three). A number of Kosovo Albanian groups attributed responsibility for these problems to the preferential treatment of the Serb minority and Kosovo's constitutional status. Demonstrators in 1981 demanded full republican status for Kosovo, and political agitation for greater economic and political rights continued throughout the 1980s. At the same time, a number of Serb nationalists and elements of the media increasingly drew attention to the problems of the Serb minority, raising Serb concerns about the plight of the diminishing proportion of Serbs in Kosovo. But it was the rise of Slobodan Milosevi and his exploitation of Serb nationalism in relation to Kosovo that was to be decisive in triggering a rising spiral of nationalist claims in Yugoslavia.

2. Emerging Crisis, 1987-97

Rise of Milosevi In the Spring of 1987, Milosevi exploited the Kosovo question to gain popular support for his bid to oust Serbian president Stamboli. Adopting the sort of nationalist rhetoric that had been suppressed under the Tito era, he supported Serb protests against their perceived marginalisation in Kosovo, demanding justice for the Serb and Montenegrin minorities. Milosevi succeeded in his bid for leadership of the Serbian League of Communists, and by the end of 1987 had consolidated his position as de facto leader of Serbia. Milosevi's mobilisation of Serb nationalism had two major repercussions for ethnic relations in Kosovo. First and most directly, under Milosevi's leadership Serbia introduced a series of measures to curtail Kosovo Albanian rights and undermine the status of Kosovo within the federation. These commenced in summer 1988 with the instatement of Serbian as the only official language in Kosovo, and the orchestration of a series of mass Serb demonstrations demanding reforms to diminish the constitutional status of Kosovo. In November the same year Milosevi managed to oust the moderate Kosovo League of Communists leader Vllasi, instating the more hard-line Morina. When Kosovo Albanians launched protests against this move, Milosevi responded with an anti-Albanian media campaign, and organised a further Serb mass demonstration in Prishtinë/Pristina, November 1988. In retaliation, more than 1,000 Albanian miners in Trepç a/Trepca launched a hunger strike in 1989. Milosevi declared a state of emergency, and sent in around 15,000 Serbian army troops and federal police to suppress the demonstrations. The Kosovo Assembly was surrounded by armed forces, and coerced into approving amendments to the Serb constitution which would permit Serbia to change the status of Kosovo unilaterally without the consent of the province. Tension between the two groups mounted over the following months. Milosevi used the 600th anniversary of the Battle of Kosovo in June 1989 to stage a mass Serb nationalist rally, and in his speech issued a thinly veiled threat that he was prepared to engage in conflict to defend Serb claims. He subsequently introduced a series of new measures to undermine the position of Kosovo Albanians, including further restrictions on Albanian language and property rights, measures to facilitate the removal of ethnic Albanians from public office, as well as policies to promote further Serb settlement in Kosovo. In July 1990 6

Serb nationalism

Repression of Kosovo Albanians

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the Kosovo Assembly was dissolved, Albanian media was banned, and thousands of Albanian managers, university staff, civil servants and other workers were dismissed. The provisions for Kosovo's political autonomy under the 1974 Constitution were effectively eliminated. Break-up of the Federation The second main effect of Milosevi's nationalist agenda was to trigger competing nationalist claims on the part of the other Yugoslav republics. Faced with the prospect of accepting a weaker status in a Serb dominated Yugoslavia, Croatian, Slovenian, Macedonian and Bosnian politicians responded by rallying popular support for their own nationalist agendas. In the absence of any concerted international attempt to define possible compromise constitutional arrangements, the only perceived alternative to the current federation was secession, especially as Milosevi rejected all compromise solutions to create a loose federation. The growing likelihood of the break-up of the federation added to Kosovo Albanian concerns about Serb repression. In some groups, demands for a "Kosova Republika" within the federation gave way to claims for fully fledged independence, which was seen as preferable to remaining within a rump Yugoslavia dominated by Serbia. Following the Croatian and Slovenian declarations of independence in June 1991, an underground referendum on Kosovo independence was called in September. The result demonstrated overwhelming support amongst Kosovo Albanians for secession, and Kosovo Albanian leaders declared Kosovo's independence later that month. Despite this radicalisation of Kosovo Albanian demands, political groups in Kosovo kept a remarkably low profile during the ensuing conflicts in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. One reason for this was a reluctance to be drawn into violent conflict with Serbia, which Kosovo Albanian leaders believed would trigger even more repressive measures against Kosovo. Thus they resisted attempts by Croatia and especially Bosnia to encourage the Kosovo Albanians to open a second front. Instead, Kosovo opposition groups established the Democratic League of Kosovo (Lidhja Demokratike e Kosovës - LDK) in 1989, which under the leadership of Ibrahim Rugova retained a fairly moderate agenda throughout the war. Rugova won elections staged in May 1992, but was prevented from forming a government by the Serbian authorities. Instead, the exile Bujar Bukoshi formed an alternative government in Germany, and gathered substantial financial backing from Kosovo Albanian emigrants and refugees abroad. Kosovo Albanians were able to use these funds to establish alternative education and health services for Albanians within Kosovo, as well as parallel media, financial and economic structures. This parallel administration helped relieve some of the strains on Albanians created by Serb repression, which continued unabated throughout the Bosnia conflict. Partly as a result of the LDK's political restraint, the Kosovo question largely faded into the background on the international stage. While Kosovo had been perceived in the 1980s to be one of the most likely sources of ethnic conflict ­ the "powder keg" of the Balkans ­ for the international community this concern was now overshadowed by the need to build peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Dayton Agreement of 1995 represented a belated attempt to hold together a Bosnia and Herzegovina that was by now almost irrevocably polarised into separate ethnic units. The success of the settlement was also dependent on the cooperation of Serbia, and the West lifted sanctions and the arms embargo against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). Given these dual concerns to avoid further fragmentation in the region and to enlist Milosevi's backing the West was reluctant to address the Kosovo question in the context of the Dayton Agreement. The only mention of Kosovo was in a Security Council resolution that set conditions for lifting the "outer wall of sanctions" against FRY (full diplomatic recognition and membership of international 7

Kosovo opposition

Dayton Agreement

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organisations and financial institutions). The conditions included compliance with the Dayton Agreement and addressing the situation of Kosovo Albanians. The omission of Kosovo was an oversight, but was necessary as it was one of Milosevi's conditions to enter the peace talks. It had substantial repercussions for the region. It encouraged Milosevi in the belief that he had a free hand in Kosovo, which was still part of Serbia and had not been defined as a subject of international interest. And it taught Kosovo Albanian nationalists that they would have to be far more aggressive in their tactics if they were to win the attention and support of the international community.

3. Conflict, 1997-9

Rise of the KLA Kosovo disillusionment with the Dayton Accords contributed to growing splits within the LDK. A number of political activists disillusioned with Rugova´s strategy of passive resistance formed the rival Democratic Forum, which favoured a more activist approach. Meanwhile, a number of former Kosovo Albanian army and police officers grouped together to launch armed attacks on Serbian police and military targets. Bolstered by new student recruits and returned exiles from abroad, these forces gained strength and consolidated themselves as the Kosovan Liberation Army (KLA, or Ushtria Ç lirimtare e Kosovë s ­ UÇ K). The LDK and the Bukoshi government both distanced themselves from the emerging KLA, which began to build up its own source of funding from abroad. In Autumn 1997 the KLA launched a series of attacks on Serbian security targets, some on Serb civilians as well as Albanians who were condemned as traitors. Serbia responded with a huge deployment of military and paramilitary forces, attacking villages accused of supporting the KLA, shelling citizens and destroying houses. In February and March 1998 there were further attacks including the notorious case of the village of Prekaz, where a large number of civilians were killed. The violence triggered the displacement of around 200,000 Kosovo Albanians by September 1998, including some 100,000 refugees escaping to Montenegro, Macedonia and Albania, and large numbers of internally displaced persons (IDPs). Meanwhile, the extent of the force used by Belgrade and concerns about the plight of Kosovo Albanians contributed to a swell in support for the KLA, which by now was operating with a force of around 10,000-15,000. Serbian actions in Kosovo triggered extensive international criticism, especially from West European countries and North America. International attention focused on reported civilian killings, and concerns about the threatened humanitarian crisis posed by the plight of IDPs who risked being trapped in the mountains over the winter of 1998-9. There were also more strategic concerns that the conflict between the KLA and Serb forces could spread to Macedonia and threaten the fragile peace in the region. Europe and the US reacted with a series of measures. The Contact Group (composed of the US, Russia, Germany, France, Italy and the UK) attempted to negotiate an agreement between Belgrade and the LDK in early 1998, but without success. In March 1998 the Security Council imposed an arms embargo and economic and diplomatic sanctions on the FRY. A further resolution 1199 agreed in September (with China abstaining) called for an immediate cease-fire, the removal of Serb and Yugoslav forces from Kosovo, and unhindered access for humanitarian organisations. Meanwhile, NATO increased its military presence in neighbouring Macedonia and Albania, and in September 1998 issued an Activation Warning (ACTWARN) for an air campaign against FRY.

Belgrade's response

International reactions

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Attempts at negotiation

There were hopes that a resolution had been found in October 1998, when US negotiator Richard Holbrooke reached an agreement with Belgrade over the partial withdrawal of forces from Kosovo. The agreement provided for the deployment of 2,000 OSCE personnel to monitor implementation of the terms, the so-called Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM ­ see Chapter Six). However, the agreement was reached without the involvement of the KLA, which re-occupied a number of positions left open by withdrawing Serbian forces, in violation ofits claim that it would adhere to the agreement. Following several KLA attacks, in December 1998 Milosevi launched a new offensive in violation of the Holbrooke agreement, producing another wave of refugees. In January 1999 reports of an alleged massacre of 45 civilians in Reç ak/Racak prompted the Contact Group to urgently review its approach. The Contact Group summoned the parties to the French Chateau Rambouillet for a round of intense negotiations, aimed at reaching terms for peace and for a longer term settlement of the Kosovo question. NATO made clear to FRY that failure to attend and to agree to a settlement could result in the use of NATO force. In the course of talks, the Contact Group managed to convince the KLA dominated Kosovo delegation to agree to a draft providing for NATO led implementation of the terms. However, Belgrade remained concerned about the provisions on NATO, in particular that of free movement of NATO troops in Yugoslavia. After attempts to secure Yugoslav agreement and a second round of talks in Paris, the FRY delegation refused to sign the agreement. Its reservations about the terms were shared by Russia, which also withheld support for the Rambouillet agreement. The talks were suspended on 20 March. Milosevi amassed FRY troops in and around Kosovo, launching a further offensive already on the same day. Over the following days the KVM was withdrawn from Kosovo. NATO commenced air strikes against Serbia on 24 March 1999, the beginning of a campaign that was to last for 11 weeks. The legitimacy of the campaign was defended on the basis of resolution 1199, although critics of the bombing argued that it was in contravention of international law. The main NATO targets were military installations, as well as state ministries, media and other objects considered to be central instruments of Milosevi's power. In the course of the bombing NATO also unintentionally hit a number of civilian targets, including a strike on a convoy of Kosovo Albanian refugees which, according to FRY reports, killed 64 civilians. Further casualties followed strikes on the Serbian state television agency and the bombing of the Chinese Embassy. In terms of military casualties, NATO announced that its strikes had killed over 5,000 members of the FRY security forces and wounded more than 10,000. These casualties and the general conduct of the NATO campaign were criticised by a number of commentators, notably Russia and China, but also sections of public opinion within NATO countries.

Rambouillet talks

NATO air strikes

Humanitarian The bombardments and continued ground fighting between Serb forces and the KLA within Kosovo triggered a mass refugee movement. At the early stages of conflict there were crisis reports of people crossing the border at a rate of 4,000 per hour, and Montenegro, Albania and Macedonia were overwhelmed with the influx. UNHCR estimated the extent of displacement during the campaign to be well over 800,000. Serbian attacks on Kosovo civilians also continued throughout the campaign, and increasing evidence of large-scale atrocities led to the indictment of Milosevi and other Serbian leaders by the UN war crimes tribunal in May for crimes against humanity. The humanitarian crisis also triggered calls for NATO to deploy ground troops to protect Kosovo Albanians, although Western leaders were reluctant to make any commitment on this until after the capitulation of Belgrade.

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Serbian capitulation

From early June there were signs that Milosevi was ready to concede, and on 9 June NATO and FRY commanders finally agreed on a Military Technical Agreement for a Serb withdrawal from Kosovo. The following day NATO called a suspension of air strikes. Meanwhile, Russia and NATO reached agreement on a UN Security Council resolution calling for an "international security presence" in Kosovo under UN auspices. This resolution 1244 was adopted on 10 June, providing the framework for implementation of a peace agreement.

4. Kosovo after the NATO Campaign

Resolution 1244 Resolution 1244 set out terms for the deployment of an international security presence in Kosovo, known as KFOR, whose tasks included deterring renewed hostilities and ensuring the withdrawal of FRY and Serbian forces, demilitarising the KLA and providing a secure environment for refugee return and for the international civil presence. There was some tension in the first stages of the deployment of international security presence when Russian forces occupied Prishtinë/Pristina airport on 12 June prior to the arrival of NATO. However, on 18 June Russia and NATO came to an agreement over the participation of the Russian contingent in KFOR under a unified command structure. Resolution 1244 also authorised the UN Secretary-General to establish an international civil presence in Kosovo,

to provide an interim administration for Kosovo under which the people of Kosovo can enjoy substantial autonomy within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and which will provide transitional administration while establishing and overseeing the development of provisional democratic self-governing institutions to ensure conditions for a peaceful and normal life for all inhabitants of Kosovo (para. 10).

UNMIK

In accordance with these provisions, the Secretary-General established a UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), led by Bernard Kouchner (in February 2002 replaced by Michael Steiner, who was the successor of Hans Haekkerup (head of UNMIK from January 2001 to February 2002). Status of Kosovo The resolution, however, left open the question of Kosovo´s future status. Annex 2 lists a number of principles which should provide the basis for a resolution of the crisis, including:

A political process towards the establishment of an interim political framework agreement providing for substantial self-government for Kosovo, taking full account of...the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia...(Annex 2, para. 8).

But no clear answer is given as to whether this commitment to respecting the territorial integrity of FRY applies to the final settlement for Kosovo, or is simply part of the interim arrangement. This ambiguity has encouraged both pro-independence Kosovars and profederation Serbians to retain hopes of a solution in their favour. For the majority of Kosovo Albanians, the "substantial autonomy" foreseen in the resolution must imply full fledged independence. For most of Serbia and the Serb minority in Kosovo, autonomy should be achieved within a federal Yugoslav state. The case for territorial integrity The Serbian case for retaining the integrity of Yugoslavia has undoubtedly been boosted by the overthrow of Milosevi's regime and the accession of a more moderate democratic coalition government. If the new government shows itself ready and able to respect human and minority rights and grant greater autonomy for Kosovo, the international community is 10

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more likely to consider options for keeping the province within a loose federation. The international community is also by and large reluctant to recognise a new state in the region, which it is feared would encourage secessionist claims in Macedonia, Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina. There are also concerns that a commitment to Kosovo independence could destabilise the new Serbian government by triggering a nationalist backlash, threatening to set back the fragile path towards democratisation in Serbia. For these reasons, the international community is unlikely to take steps towards the recognition of Kosovo in the short term. Attacks on minorities The deteriorating situation of non-Albanian minority groups in Kosovo has also generated concerns about the future treatment of ethnic groups within an independent Kosovo (see Chapter Three). After June 1999 widespread attacks on Serb, Roma and other minorities by Kosovar Albanians led to substantial displacement. Around 230,000 people were displaced from Kosovo into Serbia, Montenegro and Macedonia. This displacement has significantly reduced the proportion of non-Albanians in Kosovo with the numbers of Serbs estimated to be at under half of the pre-June 1999 population. There is pressure on the remaining members of minority groups to leave Kosovo, and the prospects for the return of Serbs, Roma and other minorities in the near future looks highly uncertain. However, there is also strong support for Kosovo independence not only from ethnic Albanians but also from a number of commentators who consider that Kosovo Albanian rights can only be guaranteed in an independent state. Other commentators support independence for the more pragmatic reason that any form of autonomy short of independence would be rejected outright by ethnic Albanians, and that some elements will continue using violent means until this goal is secured. On this argument, Kosovo independence would be the best means of avoiding further conflict in the region. This view has arguably been given weight by the recent activities of ethnic Albanian militants, thought to be splinter groups of the now officially disbanded KLA. Attacks on non-Albanian minority groups in Kosovo and across the Serb border since the NATO campaign demonstrate the frustration of Kosovo Albanian militants with current interim arrangements. But these ethnic attacks and more recently the incursions across the Macedonian border may also serve to de-legitimise Kosovo claims in the eyes of the international community, as already suggested. If opposition to the two options of independence and autonomy within a federation is so entrenched, are there any alternative solutions to the Kosovo problem? One possibility that has been raised is the partition of Kosovo into a predominantly ethnic Albanian state, and a northern Serb minority region that would be united with Serbia. Yet it is unclear how the border would be drawn, and which part would incorporate the mineral rich northern region of Mitrovicë/Kosovska Mitrovica. Partition would also imply the de facto "cleansing" of both areas into Albanian and non-Albanian ethnic populations, a solution which the international community would be unwilling to endorse and which it has sought to avoid in the context of the Dayton Agreement. Given these problems, it is possible that the international community will simply delay any decision on the question until the region is considered to be more stable, thereby prolonging uncertainty over the status and future of Kosovo.

The case for independence

Other options?

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Box 2: Chronology of Main Events

1389 1912 1921 1941-4 1946 1974 1980 1981 1987 1988 1989

1990 1991 1992 1995 1996 1998

1999

Battle of Kosovo. Serbia conquers Kosovo; Albania gains independence. Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes founded, incorporating Kosovo. Kosovo union with Albania under fascist occupation. Kosovo becomes an "autonomous region" within Tito's Yugoslav Federation. Kosovo gains constitutional powers as an "autonomous province". Death of Tito. Kosovo Albanian demonstrators demand "Kosova Republika". Milosevi becomes head of the League of Communists. Serbian is declared official language of Kosovo; Serb nationalist rallies are organised in Kosovo; Milosevi ousts the moderate leadership in Kosovo. Hunger strike of ethnic Albanian Trepç a/Trepca miners; Serbs celebrate 600th anniversary of Battle of Kosovo; Kosovo Assembly agrees constitutional changes under duress. Kosovo Assembly ceases its functions; new constitution reduces Kosovo autonomy. Croatia and Slovenia declare independence; Kosovans vote for independence in an underground referendum; war breaks out in Croatia. Rugova wins Kosovo elections but is unable to take office; war breaks out in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Dayton Agreement. KLA attacks on Serb targets in Kosovo; Belgrade responds with repressive measures. February Serb destruction of villages and civilian killings; refugee flows begin. March Security Council introduces sanctions and arms emgargo. September Security Council resolution calls for Serbian withdrawal from Kosovo; NATO issues ACTWARN. October Holbrooke agreement and Kosovo Verification Mission. December KLA and Belgrade violate Holbrooke agreement. January Alleged massacre in Reçak/Racak village. February Rambouillet talks. March Withdrawal of KVM. NATO commences air strikes. June Suspension of air strikes; Security Council resolution 1244; establishment of UNMIK and KFOR.

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Links and suggested further reading

General

Malcom, Noel "Kosovo - a Short History", Macmillan, London, 1998 Reuter, Jens/Clewing, Konrad "Der Kosovo Konflikt - Ursachen - Verlauf - Perspektiven", Wieser Verlag, Klagenfurt, 2000 INCORE Guide to Internet Sources on Conflict and Ethnicity in Kosovo The Balkans Pages. Kosovo/Kosova Crisis

Serbian Perspectives

Kosovo.com Balkania.Net

Kosovo Albanian Perspectives

Kosova Crisis Center Kosova Home Page Kosova Info Online (in German)

The Kosovo Conflict

Expulsions of Albanians (19 century until 1995) (pro-Albanian) Kosovo & Yugoslavia: Law in Crisis Chronology 1989-1999 (US State Department) Kosovo Report by the Independent International Commission on Kosovo (October 2000) Kosovo and the Challenge of Humanitarian Intervention, ed. by Schnabel/Thakur (March 2000)

th

Official Documents

UNSCR 1993-1999 UN SC President Statements 1998-2000 UN SG Reports and Letters (incl. inter alia OSCE CiO on OSCE activities in Kosovo conflict since 1998) Documents (until 4 August 1999) from OSCE, G-8, Contact Group, NATO, EU, ICTY, CIS, Ahtisaari-Chernomyrdin Peace Plan, Rambouillet Accords, MTA between KFOR and FRY KDOM Reports (1 October 1998 ­April 2000)

NATO Campaign and Humanitarian Crisis 1998-1999

Operation Allied Force (Official NATO Site) Kosovo One Year On (Official NATO Report) As Seen, As Told. Human Rights in Kosovo (October 1998 - June 1999) (ODIHR Report) ICTY Indictment of Milosevi (22 May 1999)

After Establishment of UNMIK (10 June 1999)

UNMIK Chronology UNMIK News 1999 UNMIK News As Seen, As Told. Human Rights in Kosovo (14 June 1999­31 October 1999) (OMIK Report) Assessment of the Situation of Ethnic Minorities in Kosovo (October 2000-February 2001) (UNHCR/OSCE Report) ICG Reports on Kosovo

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Chapter Two The Regional and International Context

Regional and The current situation in Kosovo and the question of its future status have important international repercussions for a number of regional and international actors. This is most clearly the case with surrounding states directly affected by the conflict, or those with a vested interest interests in the future territorial status of Kosovo: in particular Serbia, Macedonia and Albania, but also Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina. European Union states also have an interest in stability in Kosovo and surrounding countries, partly because of the proximity of the region to many current or potential EU Member States, and partly to minimise the "spillover" of refugees and trafficking activities. The EU, NATO and other organisations involved in Kosovo meanwhile have an interest in ensuring the success of peace-building efforts to vindicate their roles and activities in the region. In turn, NATO and particularly the US's active role has worried a number of non-NATO members such as Russia and China, not just because it accentuated the international pre-eminence of the US and its allies, but also because of concerns about the precedent Kosovo may set for humanitarian intervention and ethnic claims to secession. In short, much is at stake for a great many countries. Outline of the It is hardly surprising, then, that the situation in Kosovo has in turn been to a large extent shaped by the role and actions of these states and regional organisations. The escalation of chapter conflict and current dilemmas described in Chapter One cannot be understood simply as the outcome of an internal ethnic conflict within Kosovo: rather, it has been influenced by the interests and goals of other external actors. The purpose of this chapter is to describe some of these inter-linkages, and how they have shaped the evolution of events and the contemporary situation in Kosovo. The first section will look at the role and interests of Kosovo's immediate neighbours. Section two will consider other states in the region, and how they have been affected by and influenced the situation in Kosovo. And the third section will discuss the interests and concerns of other states, particularly European Union countries, the US and Russia.

1. Kosovo's Immediate Neighbours

Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY)

Serbia Political developments in the rest of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, which will possibly soon be renamed the union of "Serbia and Montenegro", have been and will almost certainly continue to be a central factor in determining the situation in Kosovo. It was Belgrade's demotion of Kosovo's constitutional status in the 1980s and its repressive treatment of Kosovo Albanians that contributed most to growing demands for independence and the escalation of conflict (see Chapter One). And former President Milosevi's intransigence vis-à-vis NATO precipitated the bombing campaign and the ensuing international presence. While the accession of a more democratic government in Serbia is unlikely at this stage to prompt Kosovo Albanians to ratchet down these demands, it will almost certainly influence the position the international community takes on the future status of Kosovo. It is therefore worth considering the current political situation in Serbia, and how it may evolve in the coming months.

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Fall of Milosevi

Following more than a decade of authoritarian rule by the Serbian Socialist Party and its partners, Serbia finally managed to oust Milosevi and his ruling coalition in October 2000. Under Milosevi Serbia had become engaged in three regional conflicts, was ostracised by the international community, and had drawn the country into conflict with NATO. Serbia's aggressive foreign policy towards Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina and international isolation - combined with wide scale corruption, mismanagement and suppression of opposition at home - has had a devastating effect on Serbia's political system, its civil and judicial institutions, its economy and not least its foreign relations. By September 2000, growing disillusionment amongst Serbs over the domestic situation led to a victory for FRY presidential candidate Vojislav Kos tunica, leader of the Democratic Opposition of Serbia (DOS). DOS was an alliance of 18 anti-Milosevi parties that finally managed to agree on a common opposition platform, after years of division and in-fighting between opposition parties. Under heavy domestic and international pressure ­ and a series of demonstrations now coined by Serbians the "October Revolution" - Milosevi caved in and accepted Kos tunica's victory. Kos tunica's accession was greeted with reticence and some apprehension in Kosovo. Political leaders pointed to his nationalist record, and argued that the lifting of sanctions should be conditional on the release of Kosovo Albanian prisoners, extradition of indicted war criminals to the International Criminal Tribunal on Yugoslavia (ICTY), and recognition of the right of Kosovo Albanians to self-determination. However, the West proved keen to embrace the new president. Despite initial concerns about Kos tunica's apparent slowness in replacing top Milosevi allies holding key administrative positions and his ambivalent attitude towards the extradition of indicted war criminals, the international community proceeded to restore economic and diplomatic relations. FRY was readmitted to the UN and the OSCE in October and November 2000, and also joined the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe. The extradition of Milosevi was followed by promises of the EU and USA to support Serbia with economic aid. However, extradition of other persons who have committed war crimes has progressed very slowly. In March 2002 the US claimed it would decrease its promised aid if further progress did not take place. In December 2000 DOS won a majority of seats in the Serbian parliamentary elections, and the more liberal and pro-European leader of the Democratic Party, Zoran ini was appointed Serbian Prime Minister. ini has proved more robust in his reformist drive and his efforts to secure US and EU support. This was evidenced by his orchestration of the arrest of Milosevi in April 2001. The divergences in approach between ini and Kos tunica illustrate the growing splits within the DOS coalition. Kostunica's party, the Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS), was unhappy with its position in the Serbian government as it held only one ministry (health). With lacking control over key ministries, the DSS aimed to restructure the government, and wished to see the interior and justice ministers replaced by DSS candidates. A great point of conflict was Milosevi's transfer to the ITCY in The Hague in the end of June. Kostunica and the DSS were against extradition and began a media campaign against ini, who supported cooperation with international institutions. He was charged of corruption and underworld connections, but the prosecution failed to provide evidence. In August the DSS decided to leave the Serbian government and call for new elections, but this position failed to receive a sufficient number of votes in the assembly. The DSS did not leave the DOS coalition officially, but henceforth voted with the opposition. In November the cooperation with the ITCY triggered a mutiny by the special police force (JSO). After the extradition of two Bosniac Serbs, a part of the JSO called for the ousting of Interior Minister Dusan Mihajlovi. The insurgents were supported by Kostunica. The mutiny ended with the resignation of Mihajlovi. By spring 2002, the conflict 15

International reactions

Kostunica and ini

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between pragmatic ini and conservative nationalist Kostunica has not been solved. In January 2002 the DSS refrained from a vote on granting autonomy to Vojvodina, which had been abrogated under Milosevi. The law was, however, passed by the assembly with the votes of other DOS members. The trial of Milosevi for alleged war crimes, committed during the 1990s in Croatia, Bosnia and Kosovo, began on 12 February 2002 and is expected to last several months. Serbia's approach to Kosovo Regarding policy on Kosovo, the new government has been broadly cooperative with UNMIK and KFOR, although continuing to assert the interests of the Serb minority in Kosovo and the right to defend the border area against attacks by Kosovo Albanian guerrillas. In March 2001 KFOR agreed to let Serbian militia re-occupy part of the buffer zone between Kosovo and southern Serbia. By May this agreement was extended to cover the rest of the Ground Safety Zone. KFOR readiness to allow FRY redeployment reflected its recognition of Serb concerns about the activities of the Liberation Army of Presevo, Medveja and Bujanovac (Ushtria Çlirimtare Presevo, Medvedje, Bujanovac - UÇPMB). However, Serbia has kept a low profile on the wider question of Kosovo's future status, instead biding its time and hoping for a further discrediting of Kosovo Albanian claims through the activities of Albanian guerrillas. Whether this policy of wait-and-see will continue depends to a great extent on the fate of the DOS coalition. If Kos tunica and ini decide to stand against one another in the next election, a Kos tunica victory could usher in a more nationalist agenda. The immediate fate of the DOS coalition will be partly dependent on events in the Federal Republic of Montenegro. Montenegro has for some years been demanding independence from FRY, and the Republic has had de facto independence since 1998. Thus it has been pursuing an independent economic and foreign policy, and a majority of Montenegrins have boycotted FRY elections for the past three years. In April 2001 ukanovi won Presidential elections in Montenegro on a pro-independence platform. However, the narrowness of ukanovi's electoral victory (he gained just 42.05% as opposed to 40.7% for the party in favour of staying in FRY) created concerns amongst the international community about divisions within Montenegro on the question of independence. After talks on the future of the Republic of Yugoslavia failed and were terminated in October 2001, the EU High Commissioner for Common Foreign and Security Policy, Solana, initiated a new set of talks between representatives of Serbia and Montenegro. These talks took place from December until March. International organisations such as the EU and OSCE, but also the USA, stressed that they reject the idea of an independent Montenegro, instead supporting a new, reformed Union. The Montenegrin population was and remains deeply divided on this issue. According to polls, 47% favour independence from Serbia, whereas 42% support maintaining the Federation. Approximately 11% of those questioned were still undecided. An agreement was finally reached in mid-March 2002 based on a EU proposal. The proposal is to create a united state with the name "Serbia and Montenegro". A referendum will be deferred by at least three years. A constitutional commission, including parliamentarians of both part-republics, will write a 'Constitutional charter' by mid-2002. This must then be accepted by the parliaments of both part-republics as well as by the national parliament. At present, Montenegro is not represented in the national parliament, as it boycotted the 2000 elections. New elections for the national parliament will be held in autumn 2002. The new state form is a combination of a loose confederation and federation, and will be responsible for foreign policy, defence, external and domestic trade as well as human and minority rights. The economic and finance systems, which had de facto been divided between the part-republics for years, will be harmonised. It remains unclear whether a common currency will be introduced. The army of Serbia-Montenegro will comprise of a 16

Montenegro

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three-headed committee of representatives from both part-republics and will serve the national state. Representation in international organisations will be carried out through a common seat, which Serbia and Montenegro will alternately hold. Criticism was voiced both in Serbia and Montenegro after the signing of the agreement, but both part-republics passed the agreement in parliament in April. Many claim that the agreement does not provide a solution to a multitude of questions, and is unsatisfactory for both sides. The liberal party, ukanovi's coalition partner that explicitly drives for Montenegrin independence from Serbia, has called the signing of the agreement treason, and four Montenegrin ministers resigned in protest in April. The future of the coalition as well as the domestic status of Montenegro therefore remain uncertain.

Albania, Macedonia and the "Albanian question"

Albania In comparison to other states in the region with ethnic "kindred" embroiled in conflict (notably Serbia and Croatia), Albania has managed to keep a relative distance from events in Kosovo. This is partly because the country has been preoccupied with its own series of political and economic crises, partly because it is keen not to jeopardise relations with the international community through inciting minority claims in Macedonia or Greece. Thus notions of a "Greater Albania" or "Ethnic Albania" have received little support from mainstream politicians, with the priority on intensifying economic and cultural links with the Albanian diaspora within existing borders. Nonetheless, Albania backs Kosovo Albanian bids for independence, and during the NATO bombing campaign provided support for the KLA on its territory. Albania also hosted almost half a million Kosovo Albanian refugees, and the increased contacts between Albanian and Kosovar nationals have encouraged efforts to strengthen ties between the two communities. Albania is keen to play a role in any political process determining the future status of Kosovo. However, acute poverty, corruption and a poor security situation as well as recurrent political and economic crises continue to prevent Albania from developing a consistent foreign policy. The former Yugoslavian Republic of Macedonia is a multinational state, dominated by the Slavic Macedonian ethnic group. According to the last census of 1994, Albanians comprise approximately 23% of the population. Some Albanians, however, claim that they constitute approximately up to 40%. Already in 1991 when the state was formed, the stance of many Albanians was to reject a Slav-dominated state. They found their legal status as a minority discriminatory and called for recognition as a national grouping and for the Albanian language to be recognised as a second state language. Ethnically motivated outbreaks erupted long before the intensification of the crisis in 2001. However, a break never occurred in the dialogue between the political representatives of the Macedonians and the Albanians, and Albanian parties continued to be represented in the government. Nevertheless, the gap between the two groupings of society continued to widen. Even though primarily socio-economic and political conditions in Macedonia resulted in the radicalisation of inter-ethnic conflict, the military spillover from Kosovo and Southern Serbia also played a decisive role. In February 2001, the Albanian so-called National Liberation Army (NLA or UÇK ­ Ushtria Çlirimtare Kombetare) began armed fighting in the mountains that lie North to Skopje, and later also in a region near Tetovo. Its members included many former UÇK fighters from Kosovo, as well as members of the so-called Liberation Army of Presevo, Medvedja and Bujanovac (UÇPMB), which was established by Albanians in Southern Serbia. The UÇK called for more rights for Albanians in Macedonia. Its fighting was supported by the so-called Albanian National Army (Armata Kombëtare Shqiptare 17

Macedonia

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AKSh). The AKSh was, according to its own reports, established already in 1999. No definite information is to be found on its strength and membership. The aim of the armed AKSh was to form a "Greater Albania" by establishing 'liberated zones' that were not controlled by Macedonian armed forces. When the fighters did not react to an ultimatum to surrender weapons and withdraw from the region, the Macedonian government began a counter-offensive. This, however, only temporarily de-escalated the situation. In the beginning of May, a grenade attack was carried out in the city of Bitola, in which eight soldiers and police of a Macedonian patrol were killed. Albanian stores were also attacked and plundered. The international community, wishing to halt any further escalation, placed pressure on both Albanians and Macedonians, but did not recognize the UÇK as a partner. In April, the EU and the Macedonian government signed a Stability and Association Pact, which aimed at opening up a concrete handling space for the EU, and on May 13 a large coalition was formed consisting of eight parties. Alongside the Albanian DPA, the second largest Albanian party, the PDP also joined the government. With 103 out of 120 parliamentary seats, the coalition commanded an absolute majority. In addition, both the EU and the USA sent a special envoy to Macedonia (Francois Leotard and James Pardew respectively). Despite a nationwide ceasefire, heavy fighting continued and the separatists advanced right into the centre of Tetovo. KFOR forces stationed in Kosovo attempted to halt the flow of further fighters to Macedonia through tighter border controls. This was to prevent the UÇK from building an operational basis in Kosovo for its own attacks. Even though geographical conditions did not allow for complete control over the border, KFOR was able to prevent several cases of arms smuggle (e.g. over 70,000 pieces of munitions and 1,000 anti-tank weapons were confiscated), and captured 385 persons. After long and difficult talks in Ohrid, Macedonia, where international mediators had gathered, the Macedonian government and representatives of the Macedonian majority signed a peace plan on August 13. This agreement fulfilled the main demand of the Albanians, i.e. the rewriting of the constitutional formulation according to which the Slavs were the sole nation of the state. The Christian-orthodox, Catholic and Muslim beliefs were also recognised as being equal. Albanian became the second official language in regions where Albanians constitute at least 20% of the population. The communes were also granted more extensive self-governing powers, and the police was reformed with an aim to increase the proportion of Albanian police to over 20%. A census is also to take place in order to establish the exact numbers of groupings in the population. Additionally, it was agreed that elections would be held in January 2002. A 45-day period was set for implementing all constitutional changes. 284 EU and OSCE monitors are to follow the reform process, including also the return of refugees. According to the UNHCR, over 120,000 persons fled from the fighting, of which approximately 50,000 travelled to neighbouring Kosovo. In early September, the Macedonian parliament passed the peace plan with a great majority. Although the UÇK was not directly involved in the peace talks, already on August 14 it agreed to hand over its arms to NATO in a disarmament and demobilisation plan signed by the UÇK and NATO. Before, Trajkovski had promised immunity from prosecution to persons who had not committed war crimes. In the NATO mission "Essential Harvest", that was to take 30 days, a total of 3,875 weapons were gathered. In the end, the UÇK announced that it would dissolve. The AKSh rejected the peace plan as unacceptable and reported that it would continue its military fight. A day after the first NATO mission terminated, Operation "Amber Fox" began on the September 27. Approximately 1,000 soldiers are stationed in Macedonia to protect civilian observers and to prevent recommencement of armed fighting. After the initial period of three months came to an end, the mission was prolonged by 18

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another three months in December, and will terminate in March 2002. Another renewal of the mission is probable, and the EU has indicated that it is willing to take over the command from NATO. In a resolution dated September 25, the UN Security Council welcomed the efforts of the EU and OSCE to send international observers to implement the agreement and to secure peace through a multinational security presence. A UN mandate was not required for the mission because it was carried out in agreement with the Macedonian parliament. The implementation of the peace plan came to a halt due to the re-escalation of armed conflict in November 2001. After the arrests of seven former UÇK fighters, who according to the Macedonian parliament committed war crimes against civilians, armed Albanians shot three police, and dozens of Slavic Macedonians were taken hostage. The AKSh claimed responsibility. Talks between representatives of the EU and USA with the Macedonian government followed, with strong pressure being set by the international parties, who threatened with both economic and political consequences. An international donor conference that was initially planned for October was postponed indefinitely due to delays on the Macedonian side. Consequentially, the Macedonian parliament agreed to carry out changes in the constitution that were set out by the peace plan. In January 2002 a law was passed that increased the self-governing powers and autonomy of provinces. After extensive implementation of the peace plan, the EU and the World Bank set a new date for the donor conference for March 2002. In February, OSCE training programmes began that aim to create multi-ethnic police forces. After approximately 100 ethnically Albanian persons joined the forces already in December, course members now also include members of Serb and Roma minorities alongside Macedonian and Albanian persons. In March 2002, the date for parliamentary elections was set for 15 September. Impact on Kosovo? It is unclear how far these developments in Macedonia will have a direct impact on the situation in Kosovo. Several thousand refugees have fled to Kosovo, but these are mainly ethnic Albanians and their presence is unlikely to have a major impact on stability in the province. However, frustration among Kosovo Albanian militants over the situation in Kosovo may have been a factor encouraging the rebellion in Macedonia. If this is the case, then Kosovo Albanian guerrilla support for the rebellion has almost certainly been counterproductive: it has contributed to increasing qualms on the part of NATO countries about their nature and intentions, which may serve to undermine the case for independence.

2. Other Countries in the Region

Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia

Dayton Accords Another important factor influencing the situation in Kosovo will be the future stability of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and especially the success or failure of the arrangements foreseen in the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (usually referred to as the Dayton Accords). The November 1995 Dayton Accords represented an attempt to hold together Serb, Croat and Bosniac minorities in a loose federation, the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Republic is comprised of two main entities ­ a Bosniac-Croat Federation and Republika Srpska. Annex Eight of the Accords sought to reverse the process of ethnic cleansing in the respective entities, through promoting the return of displaced persons to areas in which they are now the minority. Implementation of the accords is ensured by a Stabilisation Force (SFOR) of around 18,000 troops, and an extensive international civilian presence under the Office of the High 19

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Representative. Western states have also invested over $5 billion in reconstruction assistance. Parallels with Ensuring the successful implementation of the ambitious Dayton Accords will be critical not Kosovo just in terms of its impact on regional stability, but also because the complex peace-keeping operation in BaH has a number of parallels with international activities in Kosovo. As such, the ability to develop democratic institutions, rebuild the economy and promote inter-ethnic integration in Bosnia and Herzegovina without the break-up of the entities will be read as an important indicator of the success of international efforts in bringing peace to the Balkans. Obstruction of Dayton Recent developments in Bosnia and Herzegovina are not encouraging in this respect. Five years after the signing of the Dayton Peace Accords, political leaders are continuing to obstruct the implementation of the Accords. The nationalist Serb Democratic Party (founded by Radovan Karadzi) regained power in Republika Srpska in November 2000, and continues to impede the return of non-Serb minority groups, and to press for independence. Meanwhile the Bosnian Croat para-state Herzog-Bosna ­ although officially disbanded by Dayton ­ exercises de facto control over Croat institutions, with its own separate Croat army and administration. Bosnia and Herzegovina continues to be run by three separate monoethnic structures, and local leaders are frustrating attempts to establish democratic and inter-ethnic institutions in the country. Only Bosniac political leaders show signs of willingness to cooperate with the international community in these areas. Many commentators believe that stability is effectively contingent on the continued presence of SFOR, and that a withdrawal could trigger the collapse of Dayton and even renewed conflict. The fall of dictatorial regimes in Serbia and Croatia may to some extent erode outside political and financial support for these nationalist aspirations. A positive signal and a sign of normalization could have been the first meeting of national officials from the municipalities of Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina's Republika Srpska in Croatia in February 2002. A dialogue was started on matters of mutual interest, including for example ecological problems and infrastructure. The impasse in the implementation of Dayton suggests a number of parallels with Kosovo. The international community has thus far failed to establish functioning and self-sustaining autonomous democratic structures, and peace remains very much dependent on the international presence. There were, however, some positive signs concerning resolving the refugee problem, even though nearly one million displaced persons are still in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Yugoslavia and Croatia. Each of these countries has developed a national action plan to solve the vast refugee problem. With approximately 90,000 persons in Bosnia and Herzegovina and 23,000 in Croatia in 2001, the number of returning refugees has been at its highest since the Dayton agreement that ended the war. The plans are implemented as a part of the Stability Pact For South Eastern Europe of June 2001.This could be a positive signal for the question of Serb minority returns to Kosovo. Developments in Croatia have been somewhat more positive. The death of Tudjman and elections in early 2000 ushered in a more moderate government, which has refused to lend its support to Croat nationalism in Bosnia and Herzegovina and has been ready to play a constructive role in promoting reconstruction and stability in the region. The government has pledged to solve the refugee problem by the end of 2002, allowing Serbs and others who fled during war to return. About 100,000 ethnic Serb refugees have returned from Yugoslavia, Bosnia and other parts of the region so far. Furthermore, the government pledged to return all property to the owners by the end of 2002. 20

Impact on Kosovo?

Croatia

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Greece

Other countries in the region have traditional linkages with one or other side in the Kosovo conflict, and thus a vested interest in the fate of the province. Greece has a history of friendly relations with Serbia, partly reflecting Christian orthodox cultural links, but perhaps more importantly because of shared interests in constraining Albanian influence. The Epirus region of Greece has an Albanian "Cham" minority, which Albania has been encouraging in its claims for greater cultural rights and compensation from the Greek government for property confiscated at the end of World War Two. More extreme Albanian nationalists claim this territory as part of an greater ethnic Albania. As a member of NATO, Greece had distinctly ambivalent feelings about the bombing campaign. There was overwhelming public opposition to the bombing, and Greece focused its efforts on providing humanitarian assistance to refugees, especially through assistance to Macedonia. Bulgaria, as a Slavic Orthodox country, faced a similar conflict of interests: public opinion broadly sided with FRY, but the government supporting the NATO action, partly with a view to securing eventual membership. This strategy seems to have paid off, with Bulgaria's loyalty to NATO during the campaign securing it recognition as a potential candidate for membership (along with Romania). Bulgaria suffered economically from the conflict, with exports disrupted by the cutting off of road links to Central and Eastern Europe. Outside of Kosovo, Bulgaria retains an interest in events in Macedonia and is especially concerned about the disputed issue of whether there is a Macedonian minority in Bulgaria. Bulgaria refuses to acknowledge the existence of a Macedonian nation or national minority, although it has recognised the FYR of Macedonia as a political entity.

Bulgaria

Romania and Romania and Hungary also supported the NATO action, and both broadly favour autonomy Hungary for Kosovo within existing FRY borders. During the bombing campaign Hungary was concerned to ensure the safety of the 18% Hungarian minority in the Serbian province of Vojvodina. Since then it has sought to influence the international community to grant greater autonomy to Vojvodina, which under the 1974 Yugoslav constitution had the same constitutional status as Kosovo (see Chapter Two), although to date this has not been an international priority in the region, the Serbian DOS coalition (excluding the DSS) granted autonomy to Vojvodina again in January 2002. Romanian and Hungarian trading routes were affected by the blockage of the Danube caused by the bombing. Both countries have a strong interest in the repair of damaged infrastructure and the restoration of markets in the region. Turkey Turkey meanwhile showed strong support for NATO and the Albanian cause in Kosovo, although was somewhat apprehensive about the NATO campaign given possible parallels between FRY's role in Kosovo and the Turkish government's treatment of Kurds. Despite fears about Turkish-Greek tensions over the Kosovo question, both governments strongly refuted claims that there was any risk of an escalation of conflict between them.

3. Europe, the United States and Russia

EU interests The European Union (EU) has an active interest in promoting stability and prosperity in the Balkans. This is partly because of its proximity to a number of EU Member States, especially Greece and Italy, and the threat of a spill-over of ethnic tension, refugees, trafficking and organised crime to neighbouring states. Europe also has an interest in developing markets in the region, and in the eventual integration of a more stable South Eastern Europe into the European common market. Some commentators also understand the EU's involvement in Kosovo as an attempt to rectify or at least avoid repeating some of 21

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the mistakes it now acknowledges were made in response to the break-up of Yugoslavia and conflict in Bosnia. Thus it has adopted a more cautious approach to recognising new states, and was prepared to engage in an earlier and more forceful military intervention in Kosovo than had been the case in Bosnia. It has also developed a more long term and comprehensive approach to promoting stability in the region, in the form of the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe, launched in July 1999 (see Chapter Four). Europe and NATO Regarding security issues, France and Britain and to a lesser extent Germany and Italy played a central role in negotiations before the bombing, as members of the Contact Group (along with the US and Russia) and of NATO. France and Britain also played a highly visible leadership role during the NATO bombing campaign, while Italy was more constrained by public opposition, and the German government also faced a heated domestic debate about its first involvement in an aerial bombardment campaign since 1945. Not surprisingly, there were a number of divergences between EU states on the NATO campaign, with Germany and Greece not supporting the later phases of the operation when the raids were expanded to civilian targets. There was also some tension when an Italian proposal to halt the bombing during negotiations in mid-May was rejected by NATO. Some commentators have argued that these differences of opinion within the Alliance impeded the effectiveness of the action, forcing NATO to adopt an "incremental" rather than a high impact campaign that would have struck key Belgrade targets from the outset. US Republicans have also been critical of the disproportionate costs born by the US compared to its European Allies, and in Spring 2000 a motion backing the withdrawal of US forces from Kosovo was only narrowly defeated in Congress. President Bush suggested he would consider withdrawing forces shortly before his election in Autumn 2000, and has reiterated this claim after the September 11 attacks. While stability in the Balkans remains a recognised US interest, the US has signalled that it will take a less prominent role in peacebuilding in Kosovo, instead leaving the bulk of the reconstruction effort to Europe. The West's response to the Kosovo question is seen by many as reflecting a growing willingness on the part of the US and Europe to intervene in other states on human rights or humanitarian grounds. NATO's involvement is also interpreted by many as indicating a shift of the organisation's role from that of a Cold War defensive body to a more assertive multilateral force. Some states have been anxious about these apparent trends. In particular, non-NATO members argue that NATO acted without direct authorisation from the UN Security Council, arguably undermining the UN and international law, and setting a dangerous precedent for future multilateral action. The West's policy is more generally seen by critics in Russia and China as reflecting the growing international power imbalance, with NATO and especially the US head of a new "unipolar" system. Subsequent discussions about a possible NATO expansion to incorporate Romania and Bulgaria and possibly the Baltic states have added to Russia's concerns about NATO dominance. Despite these misgivings, Russia has played a constructive role in efforts to promote peace in Kosovo. Former Russian premier Chernomyrdin succeeded in mediating an agreement between NATO and Belgrade in June 1999, and Russia was able to reach agreement with the Alliance on the terms for an international presence established in Security Council resolution 1244. There was some tension when 200 Russian peacekeepers were marched from Bosnia to Prishtinë/Pristina on 12 June and occupied the airport before NATO troops arrived. But the stand-off was short-lived, and Russia and NATO have since negotiated provisions on a unified command structure for KFOR. Russian participation has been critical for ensuring a politically balanced international military presence in the province. 22

US attitudes

NATO's new direction

The Role of Russia

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Attitudes on Kosovo's status

The key question in the coming months will of course be the stance adopted by the Allies and other key states vis-à-vis Kosovo's future status. For obvious reasons, Russia and China are likely to be strongly opposed to recognition of the secessionist demands of ethnic minority groups. There are also clear indications that the EU and the US will be reluctant to support a secession that could have repercussions for claims in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro (although the question of Montenegro's status may well be settled sooner than that of Kosovo). As pointed out earlier in this chapter and in the previous chapter, the case against secession has undoubtedly been strengthened by the accession of a democratic government in Belgrade. Nonetheless, ethnic Albanians remain adamant in their demands, and there is an influential and vocal community outside of Kosovo arguing in favour of some form of conditional independence.

Links and suggested further reading

General

Stability Pact Lasting Balkans Peace (ICG Report 26 April 2001) Balkan Regional Profile Monthly Newsletter (Institute for Security and International Studies)

Federal Republic of Yugoslavia - Serbia

Belgrade's Lagging Reform (ICG Report 7 March 2002) Serbia's Transition - Reforms Under Siege (ICG Report 21 September 2001) Report on Serbia (ICG Report 21 September 2001)

Federal Republic of Yugoslavia - Montenegro

Settling for Independence? (ICG Report 28 March 2001)

Albania

State of the Nation 2001 (ICG Report 25 May 2001) Resolving the Independence Deadlock (ICG Report 1 August 2001)

Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia

NATO Operation Essential Harvest NATO Operation in Skopje Macedonia's Name (ICG Report 10 December 2001) Macedonia: Filling the Security Vacuum (ICG Report 8 September 2001)

Bosnia and Herzegovina

NATO's Challenge in Bosnia (ICG Report 22 May 2001) November Elections (ICG Report 18 December 2000) Confronting Bosnia's Republika Srpska (ICG Report 8 October 2001)

Russia

Russia's Balkan Strategy (IWPR Balkan Crisis Report, Issue 181, 5 October 2000) Alexei G. Arbatov, The Transformation of Russian Military Doctrine: Lessons Learned from Kosovo and Chechnya, GarmischPartenkirchen 2000

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Map 2: Former Yugoslavia

Source: Ken Booth (Ed.), The Kosovo Tragedy. The Human Rights Dimensions, London and Portland 2001.

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Chapter Three Kosovo: Politics, Economy and Society

1. Political System

Political Institutions

Until 1989, Kosovo was an autonomous province within the Republic of Serbia. The 1974 Previous constitutions constitution granted Kosovo and Vojvodina a constitutional status almost on a par with that of the six republics of Yugoslavia ­ Serbia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, Slovenia and Montenegro. Thus it had a separate parliament, executive council, judiciary and constitutional court, and wide-ranging legislative powers in social and economic policy, education, minority issues and internal security. In 1989 the Serbian government effectively abrogated Kosovo's autonomy, introducing a new Serbian constitution that integrated Kosovo into the Republic of Serbia. Over the following two years Belgrade passed further laws to cease the functioning of Kosovo's autonomous political institutions (see Chapter One). Parallel structures In response to these measures, from 1992 onwards the Kosovo Albanian community developed an unofficial "parallel administration" to provide public services to ethnic Albanians. Thousands of professionals who had been dismissed from their posts by the Serb authorities organised councils to regulate provision of services in education, health, social support, justice and human rights. Parallel market and banking structures were established, as well as a tax system that levied 3% on Albanians in Kosovo, and procured funds from the Albanian diaspora abroad. The parallel structure also incorporated unofficial political institutions: a presidency and parliament, selected by means of underground elections. The parallel administration was successful in providing much needed social services to the Albanian community, and facilitated the emergence of many valuable civil societal initiatives. Nonetheless, as a non-legal structure it lacked accountability, and was only accessible to ethnic Albanians. It also enabled some Albanian leaders to build up a local power base that would later prove difficult to break down. Following Belgrade's capitulation in June 1999, the Security Council agreed that Kosovo should be granted "substantial autonomy" within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. However, the final constitutional status of Kosovo was left open, thus provisions on the extent and form of this autonomy have not been codified in a final constitution. Instead, it was foreseen in Security Council resolution 1244 that provisions on the scope and division of legislative and executive power would be developed in phases. In an initial phase the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) had full legislative and executive power, and the scope of its competences within the FRY structure were wider than pre-1989 arrangements in Kosovo. Thus Kosovo regained its "substantial autonomy" from Serbia, although under international administration rather than through elected representatives. Under current arrangements, the head of UNMIK, the Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) is authorised to pass legislative decisions through UNMIK Regulations. Otherwise, laws in force in Kosovo as at 22 March 1989 continue to apply, provided these are consistent with international standards of human rights. Current provisions on the legislature have been criticised by commentators as investing too much power in the Interim Authority, and failing to draw sufficiently on the local power structures developed by the Kosovo Albanian community in the 1990s. UNMIK aims to 25

UN interim provisions

Transfer of power

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rectify this through transferring authority to local structures, with democratic Kosovar institutions eventually superseding the interim authority. A number of steps have already been taken in this direction. In January 2000 the SRSG, Bernhard Kouchner, established a Joint Interim Administrative Structure (JIAS) to create co-governance between UNMIK and Kosovo representatives and to integrate the "parallel" structures established in the 1990s into the administration. The two main Kosovar bodies ­ the Kosovo Transitional Council (KTC) and the Interim Administrative Council (IAC) ­ only have a consultative role (see Chapter Five). The SRSG retains authority to veto decisions or to take decisions in the absence of a majority agreement. After the municipal elections in October 2000 significant institutional responsibilities were transferred to the local level. The municipalities became responsible for instance for public health, education, public and social services, infrastructure. New framework A further step towards transferring power was the constitutional framework signed in May 2001, which identified the responsibilities of an elected provisional assembly. The assembly elections took place in November 2001. The Assembly is composed of 120 members, 100 of whom are elected by proportional representation with 10 seats reserved for Serbs and 10 for other non-Albanian minorities. The Assembly elects a president, who in turn is authorised to propose a prime minister as head of the government. In March 2002 the representatives elected Ibrahim Rugova as president with a three year mandate. Rugova agreed to appoint Bajam Rexhepi from the PDK as prime minister after international mediation. The new provisional institutions will have authority in such areas like health and education, economic and financial policy, culture, labour and social welfare. Together with the municipalities the provisional government will control nearly three quarters of the consolidated budget 2002. Justice, policing and military security, external relations and final authority over the budget remain under the authority of UNMIK. (See Chapter five for a more detailed description of the framework.) The proposal has been criticised by both Albanian and Serb groups. Ethnic Albanians consider it does not grant enough autonomy to locally elected structures, while Belgrade has expressed concerns that there is no right of veto for Serb members of the Assembly. The transfer of power from UNMIK to Kosovar representatives was delayed by the slow establishment of self-government institutions after the election. Until the power-sharing arrangement was reached, the political crisis between LDK and PDK revealed the inexperience of Kosovo's parties with political power and highlighted the difficulties that UNMIK will face in transferring further authority to provisional bodies. One of the main challenges will be generating public support for the new democratic institutions, given the widespread scepticism of government structures engendered by a decade of civil resistance. The independence and professionality of the Kosovo judicial system was effectively destroyed under FRY governance in the 1990s, with Kosovo Albanian judges dismissed from their posts. The priority after June 1999 was to develop legislation to ensure the independence and integrity of the judicial system, and procedures for training and appointing judges according to professional and impartial criteria. However, there is still a serious shortage of judges and many courts still do not function. There are also problems with ethnic bias in cases involving ethnic questions, and a number of international judges have been appointed by UNMIK to help ensure impartiality. Further development of the judicial system is required before it can function effectively and autonomously. The constitutional framework grants the Kosovo provisional institutions responsibility in a number of areas, including the selection of judges and prosecutors (although they must also be approved by the SRSG), and organisation and administration of the courts.

Judicial system

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Political Parties and Elections

LDK

Political parties in Kosovo remain ethnically exclusive in their membership bases, although there are substantial divisions between parties within particular ethnic communities. The principal political party in Kosovo is the Albanian Democratic League of Kosovo (Lidhja Demokratike e Kosovës - LDK), established in 1989 under the leadership of Ibrahim Rugova. The party was largely unchallenged throughout the 1990s as the main representative of ethnic Albanian claims, and won underground elections in 1992 and 1998, as well as the assembly election of 2001. Under the parallel administration Rugova was elected president, with Bujar Bukoshi as prime minister. Bukoshi was based in Germany, and was successful in gathering substantial funds from the Kosovo Albanian diaspora to support parallel services in Kosovo. In 1995 a disagreement with Rugova led to a split which meant that funds were no longer channelled to the LDK. Rugova's leadership and strategy of passive resistance was subject to increasing criticism after 1995 (see Chapter One), with many former LDK members beginning to advocate more militant methods and supporting the tactics of the KLA. Rugova was also criticised for his role during the NATO conflict, when he was under house arrest in Prishtinë/Pristina and photographed holding apparently friendly talks with Milosevi. He was subsequently allowed to escape to Rome, and only returned to Pristina/Prishtinë at the beginning of August 1999. Despite these compromising episodes, Rugova remains leader of the LDK and won a solid 58% of the vote in the October 2000 municipal elections. The LDK's support is especially strong amongst urban voters. Rugova's position is unequivocally pro-Kosovo independence, but he is willing to countenance a more gradualist approach to the transfer of power, in line with the UNMIK strategy. In the November 2001 assembly elections, the LDK remained the strongest party with over 45%. After overcoming a political crisis, which caused a three-month-deadlock, Rugova was appointed president. The second major political force in Kosovo is the Democratic Party of Kosovo (Partia Demokratike e Kosovës - PDK), established in July 1999 and led by former Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) leader Hashim Thaç i. Thaç i led a provisional government during the NATO campaign, a coalition of ethnic Albanian parties which was established on the basis of an agreement between Albanian delegates at Rambouillet. Rugova was initially included in the agreement, but the LDK subsequently boycotted the coalition. After the withdrawal of Serb forces in June 1999 the provisional government stepped into the political vacuum and KLA fighters occupied positions in town halls, while Thaç i attempted to institutionalise his provisional government. Following a short period of uneasy cooperation between the KLA and UNMIK, on September 20 the KLA was disbanded and by the end of 1999 the parallel administration and the provisional government officially dissolved. After this date, the KLA became increasingly marginalized on the political stage, perceived by Albanians as essentially a resistance movement rather than a peace-time democratic political party. Nonetheless the PDK has been able to shift its agenda towards questions of reconstruction and local institution building. Thaç i remains a strong advocate of converting the KLA into a future national army for Kosovo. (See below for a background of the KLA.) In the November 2001 assembly election, the PDK also remained the second strongest party and Bajram Rexhepi was appointed prime minister. Since July 1999, a number of leading PDK members have split with Thaç i and formed their own parties. The most significant of these is the Alliance for the Future of Kosovo (Aleanca për Ardhmërinë e Kosovës - AAK), led by another former KLA leader Ramush Haradinaj. 27

Rugova

PDK

AAK

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The party is an alliance of several political parties, which suffers from continual shifts in coalition members. It has a more radical agenda than that of the PDK, supporting notions of a "Greater Kosovo" and advocating a more forceful approach to gaining independence. Other Albanian parties Other secessionist ethnic Albanian parties, all of which hold one seat in parliament, include Mark Krasniqi's Albanian Christian Democratic Party (Partia Shqiptare Demokristiane e Kosovës - PShDK), whose goal is Kosovo's integration into Euro-Atlantic structures; the Justice Party (Partia e Drejtsis - PD), which aims for a democratic society grounded on inter-ethnic and -religious tolerance; the People's Movement of Kosovo (Lvizja Populare e Kosovs - LPK) and the National Movement for Liberation of Kosovo (Lvizja Kombtare pr Çlirimin e Kosovs - LKÇK), which rejects UN Resolution 1244.

Serb political The Serb minority in Kosovo is strongly opposed to Kosovo independence, and after June 1999 adopted a strategy of non-cooperation with the UNMIK structures. The Serb minority groups is in general more radical and nationalist than mainstream public opinion in Serbia proper. Thus in the September 2000 FRY elections, it was reported that of the 45,000 Serbs voting in Kosovo around 40,000 voted for Milosevi's party (although it should be noted that these results were not subject to independent scrutiny). More moderate Serb positions are represented by the Serb National Council, headed by the Serb Orthodox Bishop Artemije who is based in Gracanica. Since April 2000 the Serb National Council has been represented in the Interim Advisory Council by Rada Trajkovi. Other groups of Serbs, for example the Serb community in Kosovska Mitrovicë/Mitrovica, have refused to cooperate with the interim structures. However, the Serb minority did not oppose the November 2001 assembly elections, and the Coalition Return (Koalicija Povratak - KP) won 22 seats. Return is a coalition of parties which represent the Serbian ethnic community in Kosovo and Metohija, and which aims for a multiethnic society in Kosovo within the FRY and Serbia. The coalition's goals are full security and freedom of movement for Serbs and other nonAlbanian persons in Kosovo and Metohija, as well as for the return of their property. Other minority groups are represented by a number of different parties. The most electorally Minority group parties significant (i.e. those who won seats in the November 2001 assembly elections) are: the VATAN Coalition (VTN), which consists of three Bosniac political groups (Party of Democratic Action ­ SDA; Democratic Reform Party of Muslims ­ DRSM; and Gorani Citizens' Initiative ­ GIG). The Coalition advocates the idea that Kosovo should be a country for all of its citizens, rejecting all forms of discrimination. Its goal is for Bosniacs to attain full rights, and for the return of their property. The (Bosniac) Party of Democratic Action of Kosovo (Stranka Demokratske Akcije Kosovo SDA) supports the return of displaced Bosniacs, their representation in all institutions and education in Bosniac mother tongue. The Democratic Party of Albanian Ashkaelia in Kosovo (Partia Demokratike Ashkali Shqiptare Kosovës - PDASHK) believes that only the recognition of Kosovo's independence will bring peace to the region. The members support the integration of Kosovo into the EU and NATO. The Turkish People's Party of Kosovo (Turk Halk Partisi e Kosoves ­ KTHP) aims for education in Turkish, access to mass media for all communities and better job opportunities for ethnically Turkish persons. The United Roma Party of Kosovo (Partia Demokratike e Kosovs ­ PREBK) drives for the integration of the Roma population, to increase their standard of living. The last notable party is the New Initiative for a Democratic Kosovo (Inciativa e Re Demokratike e Kosoves ­ IRDK).

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October 2000 Twenty four political parties took part in the October 2000 municipal elections. Turnout among the roughly 1 million electorate was around 80%, but the elections were widely elections boycotted by the Serb minority and the run-up to the elections was violent. The result was that Thaç i's PDK won around 27% of the vote, and despite voicing complaints about stolen votes, accepted the result. However, the results were not recognised by the new DOS government in Belgrade. Instead UNMIK appointed representatives for the administrative structures.The establishment and functioning of municipal assemblies was initially difficult. In particular, the refusal of the LDK and PDK to cooperate in a number of municipalities impeded the passage of legislation and the functioning of local administration. November 2001 elections The date of the assembly election was announced by the SRSG in May, and took place on November 17. Anti-election intimidation occurred in some, but in general the election took place in a more peaceful atmosphere than the municipal election of 2000. The vast majority of approximately 1.25 million voters cast their ballots in polling stations in Kosovo. But about 136,000 people living in Serbia, Montenegro and beyond were also eligible to participate in the election. Approximately 35,000 persons could also vote by mail. The turnout was 64,3 per cent. Voters from all ethnic groups participated, although the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) and Kosovo Serb leaders endorsed the electoral process only 12 days prior to the election. 220 international and more than 13,000 local observers monitored the election. 14 out of 26 contesting political entities won seats. The 120-member assembly currently includes members of all of Kosovo's ethnic groups, and 34 of them are female. A total of 35 seats are held by minority parties, and in accordance with the constitutional framework of UNMIK, provide two ministers. Entity-Name LDK PDK KP AAK VATAN KDTP IRDK PDASHK LKCK PSHDK PD LPK BSDAK PREBK Votes (%) 45.65 25.70 11.34 7.38 1.15 1.00 0.50 0.43 1.11 0.98 0.57 0.56 0.37 0.34 Seats 47 26 22 8 4 3 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1

Recent developments

Until February 2002, assembly members failed to elect a president and to form a government in Kosovo. The transfer of responsibility from UNMIK to the new institutions was deadlocked. The LDK-candidate, Ibrahim Rugova, missed the majority of 61 votes three times, because he rejected a PDK prime minister. The PDK believed that one of the key positions belonged to them, and feared that PDK ministers would be dismissed by an LDK prime minister. An agreement was, however, reached after mediation by SRSG Michael Steiner and other international diplomats.

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On March 5, 2002 the assembly elected Rugova, Bajram Rexhepi from the PDK was appointed as prime minister and hence a multi-ethnic government was formed. Four ministries are held by LDK and two by PDK and AAK respectively. Both the Serbian entity "Povratak" and the Bosniac coalition "Vatan" hold one each. The new ministers are: Ali Sadriu Rexhep Omani Zef Mornia Ali Jakup Jakup Krasniqi Ethem Ceku Ahmet Yusuf Numan Balic n.n LDK LDK PShDK - LDK PDK PDK AAK AAK Vatan Coalition Povratak Finance and Economy Culture, Youth and Sports Transport and Communications Trade and Industry Public Services Environment and Spatial Planning Labour and Social Welfare Health Agriculture, Forestry and Rural Development

After his appointment as president, Rugova demanded for full independence for Kosovo. The majority Albanians agree that Kosovo should never again be subject to Serbian sovereignty, while the minority of Serbs, supported by Belgrade, are equally adamant that Kosovo must be restored to Serbia. The issue of Kosovo's final status still remains the key issue. Alongside the external dimension of the question, which involves the interests of the various actors, there is an internal dimension that concerns the development of Kosovo's own democratic institutions and laws. The slow establishment of self-governing institutions reveals the inexperience of Kosovo's political parties, the deep fault-lines that divide the society, and also highlights the difficulty that UNMIK faces in transferring authority to local bodies.

2. Internal and External Security

Crime and Policing

The level of crime in Kosovo remains high Key concerns are organized crime, political violence and violence against minorities. Organized crime is a region-wide problem and includes trafficking of women, weapons, drugs and money laundering. The transnational character of organized crime requires cross-border co-operation. Some progress was made by signing an agreement for police co-operation between UNMIK and the FRY in fields of terrorism and organized crime. On February 2002, KFOR and the armed forces of Albania signed an agreement to improve the cross-border security situation. A similar arrangement exists between KFOR and the FYROM. While violence against minorities has declined, large parts of Kosovo remain profoundly unsafe, especially for Serbs and Roma. Murder and assaults Since June 1999 the KFOR and the UNMIK Police (CIVPOL) have had some success in containing the level of violent crime In 2001 the number of murders fell by half compared with the previous year (the homicide rate fell from a weekly average of 4.7 in 2000 to 2.3 in 2001) and cases of attempted murder were also lower. While cases of rape and attempted rape increased, the police believe that this reflects the increased willingness of individuals to report crime rather than increases in crime levels themselves. According to UNMIK some 30

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shifts in the crime trends were not reflected in the figures. Most of the recent crimes seem to have been prompted by personal, business or political differences rather than by ethnic considerations. UN Police and KFOR UNMIK originally envisaged the rapid deployment of an international civilian police force, but the first units did not arrive until August 1999, and it took three months to bring the number of officers up to 1,400. By early 2002, more than 4,400 international police officers work in Kosovo. The UNMIK Police's main role was to establish public safety and order and to help develop a new multi-ethnic Kosovo Police Service (see Chapters Five and Six for more information). 4,300 KPS Officers have graduated from the OSCE Police Service School by the beginning of 2002. 18% of them were women and approximately 15% were minorities. The international community hopes to train a total of 10,000 KSP officers, who should gradually take over policing functions The present number of KFOR troops totals to nearly 40,000. Their main activity is to try to protect the non-Albanian community from attacks. This involves security patrols, control of check-points and guarding of Serb and other minority residences, facilities and religious and cultural sites. KFOR's function therefore covers a number of traditional civilian policing roles, as well as military functions. However, many commentators argue that the UNMIK structures lack experience in dealing with organised crime, which is increasingly becoming one of the central security problems in the region. Drugs trafficking, particularly in heroine, has escalated since 1999, although UNMIK and KFOR have so far had little success in tackling it. Experts believe that four main Kosovo Albanian clans are at the centre of a narcotics trade that shifts an estimated 4.5 to 5 tons per month. Heroine is smuggled from Afghanistan, northern Iran, the southern states of the Russian Federation, Azerbaijan, Turkey, and then through Kosovo into Western Europe and the US, where it can fetch double the price as in Kosovo. The trade has been an important source of funding for Albanian militant groups. The level of trade has increased since the withdrawal of Serbian police units, who were more experienced in dealing with drug smuggling in the region. International attempts to tackle the problem are especially difficult, given that the Kosovo narcotics trade is based on local extended family structures and very difficult to infiltrate. Another major problem is trafficking in women. Large numbers of women ­ mainly from CIS countries - come to Kosovo with the promise of finding normal employment, and are then forced into prostitution and often trafficked to West Europe or North America. There is also a high incidence of trafficking in migrants, with Kosovo an important stop on the so-called "Balkans route" into West Europe. Concerns about trafficking have triggered a number of multilateral efforts to combat this form of organised crime, including through the Stability Pace (see Chapter Four) and other EU initiatives.

Narcotics

Human trafficking

Demilitarisation and Security

Despite the official demilitarisation of Kosovo militia and the disbanding of the KLA, there remain serious security problems in the province linked to the activities of ethnic Albanian guerrillas. KLA: Background The most significant ethnic Albanian militant group between 1996-9 was the Kosovan Liberation Army (KLA, or Ushtria Ç lirimtare e Kosovë s ­ UÇ K). The KLA is generally believed to have been established in 1993, although it remained largely inactive until April 1996, when it organised a series of attacks targeting Serb police and civilians, as well as 31

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Albanians considered to be loyal to the FRY administration. It is believed that the KLA operated under a command structure located in Germany, and was based on an alliance of activists from different clans who were for the most part "sleepers" awaiting instructions for attacks. Some commentators claim that these early guerrilla attacks were carried out by groups of three to five men who would be involved in several exercises, and then be smuggled out of Kosovo into western Europe. Until 1997 the KLA was thought to consist of no more than around 200 men, and had limited possibilities for gaining weapons because of tight Serbian security measures. Growth of the However, the implosion of Albania in 1997 and the sudden widespread availability of weapons enabled the KLA to substantially increase its stock of arms. And as the KLA's KLA reputation and popularity grew in 1998-9 it was able to recruit an estimated 10,000 - 15,000 armed guerillas, drawing on funds from the narcotics trade and contributions from the Albanian diaspora. The organisation was also reputed to have received funds and training support from Western secret services. KLA activities escalated after February 1998, and it captured substantial amounts of territory from FRY forces, before Belgrade ordered a counter-offensive in July 1998. Following a short ceasefire in late 1998, fighting between the KLA and FRY forces continued in 1999 and throughout the NATO campaign. The KLA was officially disbanded in September 1999 through a compromise agreement, whereby UNMIK agreed that large numbers of KLA fighters could be transferred into a Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC) composed of 3,000 full-time troops and 2,000 reserves. The KPC is a civilian force established to respond to civil emergencies and natural disasters. However, many Kosovo Albanians see it as the basis for a future national Kosovar army, and Thaç i has been pushing for it to have a more expanded role. The KPC itself has made no secret of its desire to become the professional army of an independent Kosovo. Some KPC members have been suspected of organized crime, violent acts against minorities and illegal policing. The arrests of several KPC members has increased the suspicion of the international community. UÇPMB The KLA has now officially been "demilitarised", and thousands of weapons have been handed in or seized and destroyed by KFOR. Nonetheless, it is widely believed it still possesses substantial numbers of arms, many of which are hidden in Albania. It is also thought to have backed a number of the military groups that have emerged since 1999. The most important of these is the Liberation Army of Presevo, Medvedja and Bujanovac (Ushtria Çlirimtare Presevo, Medvedje, Bujanovac - UÇPMB), a group of ethnic Albanian guerrillas who since Spring 2001 have been launching attacks against Serb forces across the border between Kosovo and Serbia proper, especially in the Presovo region (see Chapter Two). Belgrade was highly critical of KFOR for failing to stop these attacks, and between March and May 2001 FRY forces were allowed back into the Ground Safety Zone between Kosovo and Serbia. To minimise conflict between the UÇPMB and returning FRY forces, KFOR announced an amnesty whereby Albanian guerrillas would be given the opportunity to hand in their weapons without facing prosecution. By late May over 450 former guerrilla fighters had handed in weapons to KFOR. KLA is also widely believed to have supported and assisted the activities of the Albanian National Liberation Army (Ushtria Çlirimtare Kombetare ­ UÇK) in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. Another major security problem remains that of mines. In June 1999 there were an estimated 40,000 mines in the province. Most of these have subsequently been cleared or the sites marked by KFOR, but there have been a number of casualties, including the deaths of two mine clearance personnel.

Mines

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3. Economy and Social Services

Industry and Agriculture

Background For decades, Kosovo's economy has remained one of the least developed in Europe. Despite its rich natural and mineral resources and fertile agricultural land, a combination of factors have impeded economic growth: under-investment, ill-advised central planning under Tito, discriminatory policies under Milosevi, and conflict. Within the Yugolsav economy, Kosovo was used as a source of cheap raw materials and energy for the Yugoslav and especially Serbian market. The Tito regime in particular developed Kosovo industry and mining, with the Trepça/Trepca industrial complex providing an important source of coal, lead, silver and zinc. Despite some investment in these industries in the 1970s and 80s, the Yugoslav system of management through social ownership provided little incentive for restructuring or investment, and central planning led to major inefficiencies. The excessive emphasis on raw materials meant that there was little diversification in production and the economy was heavily reliant on Serbian markets. Meanwhile, the mainly private agricultural sector remained based on small family units producing at subsistence level, with labour intensive and backward farming methods. Increased autonomy for Kosovo in 1974 and some degree of economic liberalisation under Tito facilitated the development of a modest ­ mainly ethnic Albanian - private sector. This was assisted by a substantial injection of foreign currency through migrant remittances from abroad. The founding of the University of Prishtinë/Pristina in 1971 also encouraged the emergence of an educated Albanian elite, although the lack of prospects in Kosovo prompted many skilled Albanians to emigrate. However, pressures on the Yugoslav economy in the 1980s brought an end to this period of growth, with falling productivity and rising unemployment. The economic situation radically deteriorated from 1988 onwards, with the Belgrade regime either destroying or taking over most of the state and socially owned industries, and thousands of ethnic Albanians were dismissed from their jobs in the state sector. Although there is a lack of reliable figures, it is estimated that in 1988 the Kosovo national product was $700 per capita, equivalent to only 27.8% of the average in Yugoslavia. This compared to the per capita national product in Montenegro which was $1,827; while in Vojvodina it was $3,134; and in the rest of Serbia $2,284. By 1995, a combination of domestic political developments and regional conflict meant that the national product in Kosovo had sunk as low as $340 per capita. The industrial sector was particularly badly affected. In 1988, industry and mining had accounted for almost half of the national product (47.4%), with agriculture comprising just over 20%. Other important sectors were construction (5.7%), transport and communications (4%), and handicrafts (3.3%). But between 1989 - 1995 industrial production declined by 71.6%, with its share in the national product declining to 21.1%.

Industry in the 1970s80s

Declining productivity

Impact of the NATO bombing and conflict between the KLA and FRY forces caused further substantial 1999 conflict damage to the Kosovo economy, with telecommunications infrastructure and some factories destroyed. There was also severe damage to agriculture and private housing, with around a third of all housing units damaged or destroyed. Conflict and massive displacement meant that industrial output effectively ceased, two planting seasons were missed, and up to 50% of livestock was lost. The displacement of almost one million Kosovars before and during the conflict meant large numbers of industries and services simply ceased to function. Since

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the deployment of KFOR, the displacement of more than 140,000 Serbs has in turn led to a substantial loss of qualified staff in administration and public enterprises. Priorities and Most political parties in Kosovo support transition to a market economy and eventual integration into the European common market. These priorities are shared by the problems international community in Kosovo, with UNMIK focusing on the recovery and expansion of the private sector through restructuring and investment. Most economists consider that the best route to increased productivity is through well targeted local and foreign investment in small and medium sized enterprises. The large, socially or state-owned industries are highly inefficient and uncompetitive, and many would be unlikely to survive under free market conditions. In cases where these firms are considered attractive to investors, privatisation will also be impeded by the legal problem of the lack of clarity of ownership, as many were forcibly "integrated" into Serb firms after 1989. Pending the establishment of an effective legal basis for large-scale privatisation, the primary step has been the leasing of productive assets to new management. 12 such contracts have been concluded so far, and further eight are currently being drafted. Together these contracts have a volume of over 50 million euros, and employ more than 2,600 persons. By early 2002 approximately 35,000 private enterprises have signed the UNMIK business registry. Training Also critical for economic growth will be substantial investment in training and development of management skills and the development of a strong civic and law-based entrepreneurial culture. While many Kosovo Albanians were able to run successful private businesses in the context of the parallel market structures established in the 1990s (see section 1), these were for the most part operating outside of the normative and legal frameworks necessary for a credible and democratic market economy.

Uncertainties In addition to the normal problems of transition to a market economy, Kosovo faces a further set of impediments linked to the lack of clarity over its future. Foreign investors may over future be deterred by political uncertainty over the future status of Kosovo, and the perceived status fragility of the legal and political institutions set up by the interim authority. A number of critical economic policy areas ­ including currency reform and the central bank ­ are still unresolved, pending a decision on the question of sovereignty. Kosovo's eventual constitutional relationship with Serbia will also be important in influencing the direction of trade flows, although at present there are strong indications that Kosovo will increasingly find other partners, especially Albania. Social upheaval The process of transition may well cause substantial social upheaval, although given the extreme hardship endured by many Kosovars over the past decades, arguably this will not be as extreme as in other Central East European countries. Nonetheless, there is a degree of nostalgia for pre-1989 conditions, and many Kosovars hope that socio-economic reforms could revive previous levels of social protection and labour market security. Economic restructuring may in the short to medium term produce disillusionment amongst certain social groups. Some commentators have pointed in particular to potential problems in rural areas if the agricultural sector is not heavily supported and restructured, especially given that this is the traditional heartland of KLA support. A further problem will be tackling the criminal economy including drugs trading and smuggling activities, which currently accounts for a significant proportion of the economy.

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Macro-economic Policy

Monetary policy Kosovo's macro-economic situation was severely affected by Serbian policies in the 1990s and the conflict in 1999, and faces a number of impediments to achieving long-term stabilisation. Until June 1999 the only official Kosovo currency was the FRY Dinar, although the DM had been the de facto currency for most transactions for a number of years. UNMIK legalised foreign currencies, the DM followed by the euro became the official currency in Kosovo. This has implied a relatively tight control of money supply and limited inflation. The new Constitutional Framework of May 2001 states that the Special Representative will retain responsibility for monetary policy, as well as control over the customs service and right of approval over the budget. However, a major problem remains the lack of confidence in the Kosovo banking system, which lost credibility in the 1990s when the Belgrade regime confiscated foreign currency saving accounts. It is estimated that Kosovars receive up to half a billion dollars annually through remittances from over half a million migrants abroad. Channelling these funds into the official banking system would clearly be highly beneficial to the economy. The Belgrade administered system of taxation in the 1990s was discriminatory and inefficient, and little of the revenue collected was re-channelled into expenditure in Kosovo. Instead, most Kosovo public services were provided using resources from unofficial parallel taxation. After June 1999 the Interim Authority began to develop a system of taxation, mainly through customs tariffs and taxes on imports and excise taxes on certain goods. Income and corporate taxes were introduced in 2000 followed by a value-added-tax in 2001 and a payroll tax in 2002. The Central Fiscal Authority (ICA, see Chapter Five) has succeeded in raising domestically generated revenues to the point that in the 2002 budget it is anticipated that donor participation will be needed to cover only 7% of the ordinary operating expenses. (In 1999 90% of operational expenses being funded by donors; 50% in 2000 and 30% in 2001). Major priorities for expenditure will be labour and social welfare, education, health and environment. Longer term provisions for taxation and expenditure are still pending a settlement on the future status of Kosovo. It is likely that in the future authority over expenditure will be decentralised to the municipal level, with municipal authorities also granted some tax raising powers. Questions of customs is also difficult to resolve given Kosovo's ambiguous legal status. The current 10% tariff on goods from FRY - with limited exemptions for medical and food products - is criticised by Belgrade, and is likely to be damaging the Serbian economy.

Banking system

Budget

Issues pending

Welfare and Public/Social Services

Education The population of Kosovo is relatively well educated, with a 75% literacy rate. However, despite the impressive efforts of the parallel structure, education suffered in the 1990s with many children and especially girls unable to attend school classes. Ethnic Albanians have also been unable to obtain officially recognised university qualifications since 1989. Around 30% of school facilities had been damaged or destroyed by the end of the Kosovo conflict, including 45% of the estimated 1,000 primary schools. By the end of 2002, more than 100 new school buildings had been constructed and 150 were rehabilitated with financial support from donors.

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Health

From 1989 onwards management of the Kosovo health insurance fund was centralised in Belgrade, and only around half of the Albanian population was covered by the system. Ethnic Albanians were dismissed from management and senior medical positions in the health system. Many of these worked in the parallel system through the Mother Theresa Society from 1991 onwards, which provided training for 700 doctors and 1,200 nurses, and delivered services through private practice. This parallel system collapsed after the conflict, as staff returned to hospitals to resume their former jobs. Rural and district services suffered particularly severely as a result, with serious shortages of qualified staff. There are also substantial problems for minority groups in obtaining health care, with access to hospital treatment often requiring KFOR or Kosovo Police Service escorts and protection. Given problems with access, a significant proportion of healthcare is provided through mobile clinics. Kosovo's pre-1989 social protection system included contributory pensions, unemployment benefits, means-tested child allowances, and targeted social help for households with no resources. Centres for Social Work provided general social services to children, elderly and disabled. In 1990, many of these services were integrated with Belgrade ones, resulting in discrimination in access to and quality of services, as well as large-scale dismissals. The system largely came to a standstill with the onset of conflict in 1999. UNMIK has designed a three-tier system that will be introduced in 2002 and will provide a minimum social safety net for the old. This will be funded through the general budget and the creation of a mandatory fully funded system for new contributors. The system also allows private pension funds on a voluntary basis.

Social insurance

4. Culture and Society

Demography and Ethnic Structure

Break-down of groups Of Kosovo's post-conflict population of 1.8 million, approximately 90% are ethnic Albanian. The second largest groups is ethnic Serbs, who currently comprise around 5% of the population. Before the 1999 conflict the proportion of Serbs was higher (up to 10%), but more than 140,000 fled after the deployment of KFOR troops and the return of Albanian refugees. Other important groups are non-Albanian Muslims (often termed Goran or Bosniacs), Roma, Ashkali, Egyptians, Turks and Montenegrins. Accurate figures on the numbers of these groups are not available, and the last government census was carried out in 1991 (see figures in Box 2). Kosovo has the youngest population in Europe, with half its inhabitants estimated to be under 20 years old. This is mainly a function of the exceptionally high birth-rate of Kosovo Albanians, which is 3.2 births per capita. A combination of ethnic conflict, scarcity of agricultural land and under-development in Kosovo over the last century has produced several waves of migration and displacement. Up to a quarter of a million Albanians left Kosovo in the inter-war years, escaping poverty and pushed out by Yugoslav land reforms, and by 1941 around 100,000 new Serbian settlers had been encouraged to move into the province. Under the Kosovo union with Albanian during the Second World War thousands of Serbs and Montenegrins were killed or expelled, and around 70,000 migrants from Albania settled in Kosovo. Ethnic Albanian emigration to Europe and North America continued in the post-war decades, although the high Albanian birth-rate meant that the proportion of ethnic Albanians compared to other minorities continued to rise. A further 40,000 or more Albanians left Kosovo during the period of Serb repression in 1991-6, and in 1994-6 Milosevi encouraged thousands of Serb 36

Migration since the 1920s

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refugees from Bosnia and Croatia to settle in Kosovo, including over 20,000 from the Krajina. Recent flows Between 1998-9 the escalation of conflict between the KLA and Serb and FRY forces and Begrade's attacks on the civilian population led to a further wave of displacement, with around 300,000 displaced within and around Kosovo over this period. The flows escalated dramatically during the NATO campaign, with over 1.3 million people ­ the vast majority of them ethnic Albanian ­ displaced within Kosovo or in neighbouring areas. According to UNHCR, only a total of 2,432 out of the internally displaced Serbs returned to Kosovo by December 2001, with a decreasing rate of return. Two thirds of Serbs returned during 2000, while less than 1,000 returned in 2001. Due to fighting in summer 2001 some 50,000 people fled from the neighbouring Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to Kosovo. After the signing of the Ohrid peace accord, the number of refugees declined. In early 2002 ,10,000 were still estimated to be in Kosovo. Most of the Serbs who have remained in the province are concentrated in ethnic enclaves. Thus 50,000 Serbs live in a Serb zone stretching from northern Mitrovicë/Kosovska Mitrovica to the border with Serbia proper 40 km to the north. A further 17,000­20,000 live in Prishtinë/Pristina, Obiliq/Obilic and Fushë Kosovë/Kosovo Polje. 10,000­11,000 Serbs are now in Kamenica/Kosovska Kamenica, and 12,500 in Gjilan/Gnjilane. Other minorities have also fled Kosovo since June 1999, including tens of thousands Roma, Ashkali and Egyptians. The Roma remaining in Kosovo are concentrated in a number of places: Prishtinë/Pristina, Obiliq/Obilic and Fushë Kosovë/Kosovo Polje, which host around 2,5003,500 Roma; a further 7,000 Roma are based in Gjakova/Djakovica, and Deçani/Decani; and 3,500 ­ 4,000 Roma live in Pejë/Pe, Klinë/Klina, Istog/Istok; 1,500 are in Lipjan/Lipljan. There are a futher 4,200 Ashkali in Ferizaj/Urosevac. Muslim Slavs live in both Albanian and Serb dominated areas. Most Gorani live in Dragash/Dragas.

Location of minorities

Inter-Ethnic Conflict

Albanian nationalism Inter-ethnic tension between Albanians and Serbs has been more or less marked since the incorporation of Kosovo into a Yugoslav federation in 1918 (see Chapter One). Since then, Albanian nationalist groups have been claiming increased autonomy for Kosovo, while Serbs have typically sought to retain close links with Serbia. Albanian nationalist claims became more focused after 1968, when the Albanian community abandoned their diverse dialects and adopted a standardised form of Albanian as used in Albania. The systematisation of Albanian education and media engendered the development of a stronger sense of national identity, which was bolstered by the experience of increased political and economic autonomy after 1974. In the 1980s, concerns about rising unemployment and economic decline were channeled into grievances about the discriminatory treatment of Kosovo within Yugoslavia. The rise in Serb nationalism from 1986 and the secession of successor states in 1991 led to a hardening of Albanian nationalist claims, and from 1989 onwards most political parties favoured full independence for Kosovo. Events in the 90s further radicalised Kosovo Albanians, with many - especially those from rural areas - increasingly supporting violent resistance as the best means to securing independence. Belgrade's brutal suppression of Albanians in the 90s and widespread human rights abuses in 1998-9 have further entrenched inter-ethnic animosity.

Serb minority The position of the Serb minority in Kosovo has been protected and advanced by Belgrade over the past century, in large part because of the historical significance vested by Serb 37

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nationalists in the province (see Chapter One). Thus Serbia has encouraged the settlement of ethnic Serbs in Kosovo as a means of bolstering Serbian influence in the province. Often exaggerated concerns about the Serb minority in Kosovo have been used as a basis for mobilising Serb nationalism and anti-Albanian feeling, particularly under Milosevi. The new interim arrangements for Kosovo cut off the possibility of this support from Belgrade, and as a consequence the situation of the Serb minority has become extremely vulnerable. Serbs are frequently victims of grenade attacks, mortar bombs, newly laid landmines, shootings, arson attacks and abductions. Ethnic attacks Security and freedom of movement for Kosovo's minority communities remain a concern. Although the number of serious crimes against members of minorities decreased, the attack against two Serbs in Kosovo Polje at the end of November 2001, which resulted in the death of one, acted as a reminder of the potential for violence against members of minority communities. KFOR reported an increase in cases of minor inter-ethnic intimidation and violence, and a slight increase in inter-ethnic violence in the Gujilane region, following the demobilization of the UÇPMB, which operates in southern Serbia, and the NLA, which operates in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. Roma, Ashkali and Egyptians are widely perceived by ethnic Albanians as having collaborated with Serbia in the 1990s, and like the Serbs in Kosovo have become victims of violence from the Albanian community. Around 120,000 of these minority groups have fled Kosovo since June 1999, and their situation remains highly precarious. There have been numerous security incidents ­ including, for example, the murder of four Ashkali men shortly after their return to Kosovo in November 2000. There is also a small group of Croatians (around 500) who are at high risk, and efforts are being made to find a host country for their resettlement outside of Kosovo. Ethnic tensions between all groups are exacerbated by the media, much of whose reporting is highly ethnically biased and serves to incite further hatred and violence. This is especially concerning in the context of coverage of political affairs and elections, with many Albanian language daily newspapers and private radio stations extremely partisan in their reporting. There have also been a series of attacks on journalists, including the shooting of an ethnic Albanian newspaper correspondent, and attacks on a number of Serbian or ethnically mixed radio and newspaper journalists. UNMIK has introduced legislation to counter this, and the UN and OSCE have launched various training and monitoring initiatives to limit ethnic hatred in the media (see Chapter Six).

Other minorities

Media

Family and Social Structures

Albanians Around 95% of Kosovo Albanians are Muslim, 5% Catholic. However, a large number of ethnic Albanians are also secular, especially in the urban areas, and Albanians and Serbs tend to emphasise linguistic rather than religious differences between the two groups. Within the Albanian ethnic group there are linguistic and cultural differences between Gegs and Tosks, with the former mainly residing in North Albania and Kosovo, the latter in South Albania. Geg society (including that of Kosovo Albanians) was traditionally based on a series of social units, the most important of which were tribes or clans ("fis" in Albanian) of several different families; and smaller groups of extended family ­ brotherhoods, or "Vellazeri", which were the most important units of membership, with a strong sense of loyalty, mutual support and shared norms of justice. These clan structures have been to some extent eroded, especially in urban areas. However, some commentators argue that 38

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the pattern of resistance to Serb and Yugoslav state structures for most of the last century as well as the lack of economic development has served to sustain this pattern of reliance on local groupings. Thus for many Albanians the central attachment remains to the local clan, rather than the state or some more abstract notion of Albanian nationalism. Arguably, given the preponderance of clan loyalties, Albanian support for independence may be best characterised as a struggle to protect local structures and livelihoods against outside interference, rather than motivated by a strong sense of national consciousness. Customs The Albanian clan structure was male dominated, with inheritance passing through the male line and women denied any significant role in the public sphere. In many rural areas women are discouraged from voting, although in urban areas they have much more independence. Typical norms of customary law within clans were based on concepts of personal honour, equality of men, trust and intense loyalty to the extended family. There is little inter-marriage between religions, although it is equally rare for people within the same Vellazeri to marry, as they are seen as blood relatives. Albanians are also known for their hospitality, although norms of loyalty and justice traditionally do not extend beyond the clan.

Serb minority The Serb minority is nominally Serb Orthodox, although in practice Serbs have become largely secularized over the past decades, at least until the recent resurgence of Serb nationalism. Like the Albanians, Serb society was traditionally based on loyalty to the extended family, and in rural areas Serb families used to share land and resources in collective farms. However, the earlier development of Serb national consciousness and Serb nation-building in the first decades of the twentieth century is likely to have inculcated a stronger sense of collective identity as well as loyalty to state structures. Civil society Civil societal structures in Kosovo are based predominantly on Albanian clan loyalties, or where these are transcended, on ethnic groups. In the economic system, non-clan based civil society is only in very limited evidence. Political and social civil society were substantially developed through the experience of the parallel administration, including through a number of highly effective NGOs such as the Mother Theresa Society. However, these organisations remain mono-ethnic, and the level of inter-ethnic hatred makes it difficult to envisage genuine attempts to transcend these divides. Some commentators have argued that the only means of breaking up these mono-ethnic and clan based structures will be through grass-roots, civil societal initiatives. Attempts to transcend clan loyalties through top-down, state initiatives have consistently failed over the past century. Given the Albanian pattern of resistance to state authority and loyalty to clans, the interim authority faces a challenging task in trying to generate civic support for the new institutions. More pessimistic assessments argue that the democratic and multi-ethnic state structures developed by the interim authority will be unlikely to secure the loyalty of Albanian civil society for a long time to come.

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Links and suggested further reading

Political System

Legislation

UNMIK Regulations OSCE Reports on Judicial System Legislation/Rule of Law in Kosovo OSCE Report on Property (February 2002)

Political Parties

Central Election Commission ICG on Political Actors (Aug ust1999) Shkelzen Maliqi, Collapse of the Kosovo Albanian Political Scene (May 1999)

Assembly Elections November 2001

Election Information Package (OSCE Report) Election 2001 (OSCE Report) Elections 2001 (ICG Reports)

Internal and External Security

Ethnic Minorities

OSCE/UNHCR Reports on the Situation of Ethnic Minorities UNMIK Police Crime Statistics KLA Profile (1999)

Economy and Social Services

Report on Economic Activities and Democratic Development of Kosova (1997) Budget 2002 Economic Development of Kosovo ILO Report on Employment and Social Security (October 1999) USAID Strategy for Kosovo (2001-2003)

Culture and Society

Religious Aspects of the Kosovo Conflict

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PART TWO

THE INTERNATIONAL PRESENCE

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Chapter Four The International Community in Kosovo: Overview

Introduction International involvement in the Southern Balkans region has become progressively more active since the beginning of the Yugoslav crisis, culminating in 1999 with a NATO campaign against FRY and the deployment of an ambitious reconstruction programme, interim administration and military presence. This chapter outlines the development of international activities in the region (section 1), and then describes the main organisations working within the UNMIK structure (section 2), the military presence (section 3), and other international, regional and national agencies active in Kosovo (section 4). The final section outlines some of the general problems of international involvement in the province.

1. International Involvement in the Former Yugoslavia before 1999

Initial responses Following the outbreak of hostilities in Slovenia, the first Yugoslav country to declare independence, the European Council dispatched a Troika of foreign ministers to broker a cease-fire (the July 1991 Brioni Accord), although by this point the conflict had already spread to neighbouring Croatia. The European Community and the UN subsequently succeeded in brokering an agreement to end the conflict in January 1992 with the Sarajevo Accord. However, in its subsequent responses the international community failed to develop a strategy for the whole country, instead dealing piecemeal with each individual region. It also remained undecided as to whether to deploy a peace-keeping force. Partly as a result of these short-comings, war broke out in Bosnia and continued unabated until November 1995, despite the deployment of some 36,000 UN peace-keepers. By late 1995 the military balance had shifted in favour of Croat and Bosniac forces: France and the UK had deployed a more robust Rapid Reaction Force in Bosnia, and NATO had begun to bomb Bosnian Serb communication lines. Under these new circumstances the US made a determined effort to secure a peace agreement. A negotiation team led by Richard Holbrooke and with European backing hammered out the Dayton General Framework Agreement for Peace, signed in Paris on 14 December 1995. The Dayton Agreement established a quasi protectorate in Bosnia and Herzegovina under the authority of the Office of the High Representative and with the involvement of other international organisations (including the OSCE, EU and UN agencies). Military security was to be secured by the NATO led SFOR (initially termed IFOR). Although the ultimate success of the Accord is still unclear (see Chapter Two), Dayton constituted a turning point in international involvement in the former Yugoslavia. The EU in particular began to adopt a more regional approach in South Eastern Europe, initiating in December 1995 the Process of Stability and Good-Neighbourliness in South Eastern Europe (Royaumont Process), as well as EU aid programmes for the region since July 1996 (Obnova). However, real progress was impeded by the international community's failure to tackle the Kosovo question. The situation deteriorated from 1998 onwards, culminating in the NATO bombing campaign of March­June 1999 (see Chapter One). In its efforts to build peace and stability after the Kosovo conflict, the international community was keen to learn from previous mistakes in the region. In June 1999 the UN established an integrated Mission in Kosovo, which aimed to coordinate international efforts through bringing the UN, OSCE and EU under one umbrella. At the same time the EU 41

Dayton Agreement

EU approach

Kosovo and UNMIK

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launched the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe, to strengthen regional co-operation in the perspective of eventual EU integration. The EU and the World Bank are co-ordinating donor efforts through a joint Office for South East Europe.

Hans-Georg Ehrhart/Albrecht Schnabel (eds.), The Southeast European Challenge: Ethnic Conflict and the International Response, Baden-Baden 1999 (NOMOS) (Democracy, Security, Peace; Vol. 121) Lykke Friis/Anna Murphy, Negotiating in a time of crisis: The EU's response to the military conflict in Kosovo (EUI Working Papers, RSC No. 2000/20) UN Peace-keeping Operations OSCE Field Activities EU Activities in South Eastern Europe Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe SEE Cooperative Initiative SEERECON

2. The UNMIK Actors: UN, OSCE and EU

The United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK)

Mandate On 10 June 1999, following the withdrawal of FRY security forces and the suspension of the NATO air operation, the UN Security Council adopted resolution 1244 which paved the way for the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). UNMIK has authority over the territory and people of Kosovo, including legislative and executive powers and administration of the judiciary. Its key tasks are: · · · · · to establish substantial autonomy and self-government in Kosovo; to perform basic civilian administrative functions; to facilitate a political process to determine Kosovo's future status; to support the reconstruction of key infrastructure, and humanitarian and disaster relief; to maintain civil law and order, promote human rights, and assure the safe and unimpeded return of all refugees and displaced persons to their homes in Kosovo.

Tasks

Operational framework

The Special Representative of the Secretary General, Michael Steiner (from Germany), who succeeded Hans Haekkerup (from Denmark) in February 2002, presides over the "four pillars": · · · · Police and justice (United Nations); Civil administration (United Nations); Democratisation and institution-building (OSCE); Reconstruction and economic development (EU).

The humanitarian assistance pillar (UNHCR) was phased out by July 2000. General strategy UNMIK's activities were planned in five integrated phases: · Phase I: Establishment of administrative structures; deployment of international civilian police; emergency assistance for returning refugees and displaced people; restoring of public services; training local police and judiciary; enhancing economic recovery with the goal of developing a self-sustaining economy. 42

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· · ·

·

Phase II: Administration of social services and utilities; consolidation of the rule of law; transfer of health and education to local authorities; preparation for elections. Phase III: Elections for a Kosovo Transitional Authority. Phase IV: Assistance to Kosovo's elected representatives in organising and establishing provisional institutions for democratic and autonomous self-government; transferral of the remaining administrative responsibilities. Phase V: After a final settlement of the status of Kosovo, oversight of the transfer of authority from Kosovo's provisional institutions to institutions established under a political settlement.

In April 2002, UNMIK was at the stage of Phase IV. See Chapter Five for a more detailed description of UNMIK.

UN Security Council Resolution 1244 UN Homepage UNMIK

Other UN Agencies in Kosovo

OCHA The Office for Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), which has a field office in Pristina, is part of the UN Secretariat, with functions focused in three core areas: policy development and coordination functions in support of the Secretary-General; advocacy of humanitarian issues with the Security Council; and coordination of humanitarian emergency responses through Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) consultations.

Office for Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs Relief Web Balkans (OCHA clearinghouse) UN Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal for SEE 2002 (January 2002)

UNHCR

During the Kosovo crisis the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) had main responsibility for dealing with all aspects of refugee and IDP protection and assistance. After the return of most of the refugees to Kosovo UNHCR was phased out as a distinct component of UNMIK on 14 July 2000 and replaced by a UN Humanitarian Coordinator. UNHCR's main tasks are to protect and assist vulnerable refugees, IDPs and residents at risk; to support reintegration and reconciliation initiatives; and to hand over responsibilities to UNMIK, OSCE and other specialised agencies.

UNHCR

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Box 3: International Initiatives/Involvement in the Former Yugoslavia

Regional

since 89 7/7 91 March 95 13/12 95 ­ 31/5 00 25/7 96 since 6/12 96 since 5/6 98 since November 98 since 26/5 99 since 10/6 99 since November 99 since 10/5 00 since 5/12 00 Central European Initiative (CEI) EC sends monitoring mission (ECMM) to Western Balkans (since 22 Dec. 00 EUMM) Pact on Stability in Europe Process of Stability and Good-Neighbourliness in South Eastern Europe (Royaumont) Start of EU Aid-Program for BiH, Croatia, FRY, FYROM (Obnova) Southeast European Cooperative Initiative (SECI) (initiated by the USA) Organisation of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Educational Co-operation for Peace, Stability and Democracy in South Eastern Europe (Graz Process) Stabilisation and Association Process for Countries of SEE (SAP) (European Commission) Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe (under the auspices of the OSCE) SEERECON (EC/WB) EU Programme for Assistance, Reconstruction, Development and Stabilisation (CARDS) European Agency for Reconstruction (EU) (with Headquarter in Thessaloniki)

Croatia

Febr. 92 ­ March 95 March 95 ­ Jan. 96 Jan. 96 ­ Jan. 98 since January 96 since 18/4 96 Jan. 98 ­ Oct. 98 UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) UN Confidence Restoration Operation (UNCRO) in Croatia UN Transitional Authority in Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium (UNTAES) UN Mission of Observers in Prevlaka (UNMOP) OSCE Mission to Croatia UN Civilian Police Support Group (UNPSG)

Bosnia and Herzegovina

June 92 ­ March 95 21/11 95 (signed in Paris 14/12) since December 95 since 8/12 95 20/12 95 ­ 20/12 96 since 20/12 96 UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) Dayton General Framework Agreement for Peace, providing the mandate for the Office of the High Representative (OHR) and other international organisations UN Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH) OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR) - Operation Joint Endeavour NATO-led Stabilisation Force (SFOR)

Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia

since 14/8 92 Dec. 92 ­ March 95 March 95 ­ Febr. 99 August 01 - September 01 September 01 - March 02 OSCE Spillover Monitor Mission in Skopje UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) UN Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREDEP) in Macedonia Operation Essential Harvest (NATO) Operation Amber Fox

Federal Republic of Yugoslavia

14/8 92 ­ 11/1 01 25/10 98 ­ 7/6 99 8/6 ­ 30/6 99 since 10/6 99 since 12/6 99 since 1/7 99 since 11/1 01 OSCE Missions of Long Duration in Kosovo, Sandjak and Vojvodina (not active after 7/93; officially terminated with establishment of OSCE Mission to FRY) OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission (withdrawn from Kosovo 20/3) OSCE Task Force for Kosovo UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) International NATO-led Security Force for Kosovo (KFOR) OSCE Mission in Kosovo OSCE Mission to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia

Albania (not former Yugoslavia)

since 27/3 97 28/3 97 ­ July 97 since September 98 OSCE Presence in Albania Italian-led Multinational Protection Force (MPF) ­ Operation Alba Friends of Albania Group (group of donor countries and international organisations)

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UNHCHR

The Office of the UN High Commissioner on Human Rights (UNHCHR) has a field presence in Belgrade, and is mandated to promote the observance of human rights in Kosovo. Its main activities include monitoring, investigating and reporting on the human rights situation, and judicial capacity building. It also gathers information on the arrest of prisoners transferred to Serbia and persons kidnapped in Kosovo.

UNHCHR in Yugoslavia Human Rights in Kosovo

UNICEF

The United Nations Children's Fund's (UNICEF) Kosovo office in Prishtinë/Pristina focuses on health and nutrition of children, education (including minority issues, human rights and tolerance), mine education, child protection, and draft legislation on juvenile justice.

UNICEF UNICEF Activities in SEE

World Bank and IMF

The World Bank Group (WB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) provide loans and temporary financial assistance for development, economic growth and employment promotion. The WB co-operates with the EU in the joint initiative Economic Reconstruction and Development in South East Europe (SEERECON) and with the Council of Europe (CoE) and others in the Social Development Initiative for South Eastern Europe (SDI SEE). It also supports numerous projects on reconstruction and development.

WBSDISEE WB/EC SEERECON IMF

ICTY

The Hague based International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) was established by Security Council resolution 827 on 25 May 1993. It is mandated to try and prosecute persons allegedly responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law committed on the territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991, including Kosovo.

ICTY

Other agencies

UN Volunteers (UNV) assist UNMIK and other agencies in Kosovo by providing specialists in the fields of administration, humanitarian assistance and reconstruction. The UN Centre for Human Settlements (UN Habitat) manages the Housing and Property Directorate (HPD) and Housing and Property Claims Commission (HPCC) which are mandated to regularise housing and property rights in Kosovo. The UN Environmental Program (UNEP) has established a special unit, UNEP Balkans, formerly the Balkans Task Force (BTF), to investigate the consequences of the Kosovo war, focusing inter alia on the issue of depleted uranium. The International Labour Organisation's (ILO) principal role in Kosovo is to create opportunities for securing decent employment and incomes. The Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations (FAO) deals with the rehabilitation of the agricultural sector in Kosovo. The World Food Programme (WFP) provides aid to the population, although it is in the process of significantly reducing its programmes. The UN Population Fund (UNFPA) contributes to the rehabilitation of maternity facilities. The UN Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM) has created a gender task force, initiated capacity building programmes for women and made assessments on violence 45

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against women and economic opportunities for women. The UN Mine-Action Service (UNMAS) works towards reducing the casualty rate for minerelated incidents, and provides psycho-social support to mine victims. The World Health Organisation (WHO) has contributed to the rehabilitation of the health system in cooperation with UNMIK, developing health policy guidelines and coordinating organisations working in healthcare. The UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) aims to protect the cultural heritage of Serbs, Albanians and others in Kosovo.

UNDP Regional Bureau for Europe and the CIS UNV UN Habitat UNEP Balkans ILO in Kosovo FAO in Europe WFP UNFPA UNIFEM WHO UNESCO

The OSCE Mission in Kosovo (OMIK)

Mandate The OSCE Mission in Kosovo (OMIK) was established by the OSCE Permanent Council on 1 July 1999 (PC.DEC/305). Since then it has taken the lead role in matters relating to institution and democracy building, the rule of law, and human rights. The Mission forms a distinct component of the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). OMIK is primarily tasked with: · Human Resources Capacity-Building. This includes police training within the Kosovo Police Service School, and training of judicial and civil administrative personnel. Democratization and Governance. This focuses on the development of civil society, non-governmental organisations and political parties. Election Organization and Supervision. Under this area OMIK organises voter registration, political party services, training and education and elections operations. Media Affairs. OMIK aims to promote independent media through the monitoring, support and development of standards and legislation. Rule of Law. This includes developing a training institute for Kosovo judges and prosecutors, and promoting Kosovo research on development of the rule of law. Human Rights Monitoring. This area involves the promotion and protection of human rights, including the establishment of an Ombudsperson's institution, in cooperation with other international partners.

Tasks

· · · · ·

Operational framework

OMIK constitutes the largest field activity within the OSCE, with a budget of approximately 70 million in 2001, an international staff of up to 700, and local staff numbering up to 1,400. Headed by Pascal Fieschi, it has its Headquarters in Prishtinë/Pristina, and has five Regional Centres in Prishtinë/Pristina, Pejë/Pe, Prizren, Mitrovicë/Kosovska Mitrovica and Gjilan/Gnjilane, as well as 16 field offices.

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OMIK's headquarters are split into four main departments: a Department of Media Affairs; the Democratisation Department; the Department of Elections; and the Rule of Law and Human Rights Department. The latter is subdivided into a Rule of Law Division and Human Rights Division. General strategy In 2001 OMIK organised the Kosovo-wide general elections in November. In 2002, it continues its task to assist in the development of efficient, sustainable and self-sufficient local institutions with a view to handing over policy and management responsibilities to the population of Kosovo. See Chapter Six for a more detailed description of OMIK and its activities.

OSCE PC.DEC/305 OSCE Homepage OSCE Mission in Kosovo OMIK Overview Report on OMIK Activities

The European Union (EU)

The EU has been present since the outset of international involvement in Kosovo, and is by far the largest donor (its budget for assistance and reconstruction in Kosovo in 2001 was around 330 million). The European Union's presence in Kosovo takes three major forms. EU Pillar of UNMIK The EU pillar is responsible for four departments within the UNMIK structure, each coheaded by an international and a Kosovar representative. · The Central Fiscal Authority. Management and development of Kosovo's budget and public finances; customs service and tax authority. · Public Utilities. Repair and modernisation of electricity, water, heating and waste management. · Trade and Industry. Creation of a legislative framework for the private sector; encouragement of investment in industry; and support for the development of enterprises. · Reconstruction. Development of reconstruction programme; co-ordination of international aid. The EU pillar is also responsible for Kosovo's Banking and Payment Authority (BPK), which co-ordinates efforts to develop an effective, well-regulated financial sector, including banking and insurance. ECHO The European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO) provides emergency assistance and is currently working closely with the European Agency for Reconstruction and UNMIK to try to ensure a smooth transition from humanitarian aid to reconstruction and recovery assistance. Thus its programmes for 2001 have been substantially reduced, and its Prishtinë/Pristina office was shut down in summer 2001. Main activities include: · Emergency rehabilitation of accommodation and accommodation for returnees/DPs. · Emergency rehabilitation and equipment of schools. · Water, sanitation, emergency health care and provision of medical supplies. 47

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· · · · European Agency for Reconstruction

Small-scale agricultural assistance and income generation projects. Identification of individual witnesses to be interviewed by ICTY. Support for a Rehabilitation Centre for Torture Victims. Assistance to the UNHCR, WFP, UNICEF and the Red Cross Societies.

The European Agency for Reconstruction (EAfR) took over from the EC's Task Force for the Reconstruction of Kosovo in February 2000. The main focus is on reconstruction and institution building in co-operation with UNMIK (in particular its EU led Pillar), other international agencies and KFOR. Its main activities include: · Establishment of electricity supplies, rehabilitation of houses, roads and bridges. · Water and environment programme and support for the health sector. · Rehabilitation of University of Prishtinë/Pristina. · Economic development, including village employment and rehabilitation programmes. · Demining, training and equipment for the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC). · Support for the postal services, technical support for civil registration, and expert support to the UN Central and Municipal Administration.

The EU and SEE The EU in Kosovo The EU and Kosovo EC/WB Kosovo Program UNMIK (EU) Plan 2001-03 EIB Balkan Task Force EAfR Homepage ECHO Homepage

3. The NATO Kosovo Force (KFOR)

Mandate KFOR entered Kosovo on 12 June 1999 under a UN mandate, two days after the adoption of resolution 1244. In accordance with this resolution KFOR's mission is: · to establish and maintain a secure environment in Kosovo, including public order; · to monitor, verify and where necessary enforce compliance with the Military Technical Agreement and the demilitarisation of the KLA (completed by September 1999); · to provide assistance to the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). KFOR deploys almost 40,000 troops in Kosovo from over 30 countries, with another 7,500 based in Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), Albania and Greece. KFOR contingents are grouped into five multinational brigades (MNB) under one chain of command under the authority of the Commander of KFOR. KFOR's first task was to monitor the withdrawal of the Yugoslav Army and to safeguard the return of refugees to the province. Other priorities have been mine clearance, the collection of weapons and ammunition, and involvement in reconstruction and humanitarian projects. KLA has now been officially demilitarised, and many of its former members participate in the Kosovo Police Service or in the provisional Kosovo Protection Corps (see Chapter Three).

Operational framework

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General strategy

However, the security situation in Kosovo remains fragile and KFOR is required to protect the Serbian, Roma and other minorities against attacks. The ethnically divided town of Mitrovicë/Kosovska Mitrovica is the scene of frequent clashes between Serbs and Albanians. In spring 2001 violence broke out between Albanian guerrillas, the Liberation Army for Presevo, Medvedja and Bujanovac (Ushtria Çlirimtare Presevo, Medvedje, Bujanovac - UÇPMB) and Serb security forces in Southern Serbia (Presevo valley). Other clashes occurred between the Albanian National Liberation Army (Ushtria Çlirimtare Kombetare - UÇK, not to be confused with the KLA) and Macedonian security forces in FYROM. Both situations necessitated a KFOR response: KFOR concluded an agreement with the Yugoslav Army concerning their return to the Ground Safety Zone in Southern Serbia, and KFOR is also stepping up control of the Kosovo border in order to prevent the smuggling of weapons and the infiltration of guerilla movements.

KFOR Main Page KFOR Structure History of KFOR Deployment Kosovo Protection Corps KFOR Maps Basic Documents UN Security Council Resolutions 1160, 1199, 1203, 1239, 1244; Military Technical Agreement between KFOR and the Governments of the FRY and Serbia; Agreement for Russian Participation; Undertaking of Demilitarisation and Transformation by the UÇK

KFOR Deployment

KFOR HQ Main KFOR HQ Rear Communication Zone (South) Communication Zone (West) MNB Centre MNB North MNB South MNB East MNB West Prishtinë/Pristina Skopje (FYROM) Thessaloniki (Greece) Durres (Albania) Prishtinë/Pristina (UK) Mitrovicë/Mitrovica (France) Prizren (Germany) Ferizaj/Urosevac (USA) Pejë/Pe (Italy)

The Russian contingents (maximum 2850 troops plus up to 750 for logistics, plus 16 liaison) are deployed in MNBs Centre, North, South and East.

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Map 3: KFOR Deployment

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4. Other International, Regional and National Actors

International and Regional Organisations

Council of Europe The Council of Europe (CoE) is an intergovernmental organisation with its headquarters in Strasbourg, whose principle aims are to protect human rights, democracy and the rule of law; seek solutions to problems of discrimination and xenophobia; and consolidate democratic stability. CoE's principle contribution is in the area of standard setting on human rights, with the Council agreeing a number of important conventions, such as the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). CoE has also created special human rights related bodies like the European Court of Human Rights, and the Commissioner for Human Rights. Although not officially a part of the UNMIK structure, the CoE has had an office in Prishtinë/Pristina since July 1999, and plays an important role in Kosovo. It works in close co-operation with UNMIK, OMIK and EU to contribute to the reconstruction of the judiciary and local administration, as well as the protection and promotion of human rights and institution building. Activities so far include: · · · · · Observing the October 2000 municipal and the November 2001 assembly elections. Close involvement in the work of the Joint Advisory Council on Legislative Matters. Co-operation with OMIK in a human rights awareness raising campaign. Training of judges, prosecutors and lawyers in human rights standards. Co-operation with, inter alia, the Kosovo Judicial Institute (KJI), the Human Rights Centre of the University of Prishtinë/Pristina, the Kosovo Law Centre (KLC) and the Ombudsperson Institution.

CoE Homepage CoE Directorate of Human Rights

IOM

The International Organisation for Migration (IOM) is an intergovernmental body which aims to assist with practical problems related to migration, advance understanding of migration issues, encourage development through migration and protect migrants. Its main activities in Kosovo include: · Activities related to refugee return, including the Kosovo Information Project (KIP); and the Kosovo Information Assistance Initiative (KIAI) to help relocate lost family members. · Compilation of a Kosovo Demographic Socio-Economic and Reproductive Health Survey, training in health management and on psychological and trauma response. · Kosovo Transition Initiative (KTI) aimed at maximising the number of Kosovars involved in decision making processes. · Reintegration of former combatants through Employment Assistance Centers (EAC), a KPC Training Program, and Information Counseling and Referral Service (ICRS).

IOM Homepage IOM Office in Prishtinë/Pristina

Red Cross

The bodies of the Red Cross agencies are in principal non-governmental organisations, but de facto have acquired the role of international organisations. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) is an impartial, neutral and independent organisation whose exclusively humanitarian mission is to protect victims of war and internal violence and to 51

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provide them with assistance. It directs and coordinates the international relief activities of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement (IRCM) in conflict situations. It also endeavours to promote and strengthen humanitarian law and universal humanitarian principles. The ICRC and the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC), together with the National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, form the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement. The ICRC has an office in Prishtinë/Pristina which co-ordinates the activities of National Red Cross/Red Crescent Societies from 12 countries and of the IFRC in Kosovo. At the peak of the humanitarian crisis ICRC provided first aid to refugees and IDPs and prepared shelters and winter aid. The focus of its activities has now shifted, including: · Collection of data on missing persons, identification and exhumation of bodies. · Promoting the protection of Kosovar detainees in Serbian prisons. · Relief, agricultural, health, water and habitat programmes. · Mine awareness and capacity building.

ICRC Home Page ICRC in Kosovo

EBRD

The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) was established in 1991 with the aim of fostering transition towards open market-oriented economies and promoting private and entrepreneurial initiatives in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States. EBRD's activities in Kosovo are part of its South-East European Regional Action Plan (SEEAP), which includes: · Participation in the founding of the Kosovar Micro Enterprise Bank, which provides loans to micro and small enterprises and opened in January 2002. · Funding of technical co-operation projects.

EBRD Home Page

Regional Initiatives

Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe The Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe (SP SEE) was adopted in Cologne on 10 June 1999. The Pact was initiated to provide more comprehensive responses to the almost ten year long crisis in this region. The Pact is under the auspices of the OSCE, chaired by EU Special Coordinator Erhard Busek, and has 29 participants, 11 facilitators, and five regional initiatives. Its aims are to: · · · · Secure lasting peace, prosperity and stability for South Eastern Europe. Foster effective regional cooperation and good-neighbourly relations. Create vibrant market economies. Integrate the countries of South Eastern Europe into European and Atlantic structures.

The Stability Pact is organised under the following working tables: · South Eastern Europe Regional Table (umbrella body of the Pact). · Democratisation and human rights (Working Table I). · Economic reconstruction, development and cooperation (Working Table II). · Security issues, with two Sub-Tables: Security and Defence, and Justice and Home Affairs, (Working Table III). 52

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Although primarily dealing with other countries, some of the projects in the so-called Quick Start Package deal with Kosovo, especially under Working Table I (Minorities, Media, Education and Training, Gender, Return of Refugees). The Stability Pact has gained momentum after donors pledged 2.4 billion at both the Regional Funding Conference in Brussels in March 2000 and 3 billion in Bucharest in October 2001. The admission of the FRY to the SP SEE has increased the prospects for building stability and prosperity in the region.

Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe Mabel Wisse Smit, The jury is still out on the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe (2000)

Other regional initiatives

Other regional initiatives, such as the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC), Central European Initiative (CEI), and Southeast European Cooperative Initiative (SECI) fall within the framework of the SP SEE, or have been integrated into the Stability Pact. Other examples of such an initiative is the Royaumont Process, which formally terminated its activities on 31 May 2000 (its former chairman is now chairman of WT I (Democratisation and Human Rights)), and the Enhanced Graz Process, an educational cooperation network for South Eastern Europe charged with the co-ordination of the Task Force Education and Youth within WT I of the SP SEE. The picture becomes even more complicated by the fact that some participants in the SP SEE (states, international organisations, regional initiatives) have co-ordinated their efforts in a South Eastern European regional perspective, thus creating a new kind of regional initiative which is also linked to the SP SEE indirectly through its participants. One example of this is the CEI/WB/EC South East European Economic Reconstruction and Development Initiative (SEERECON) (see also Section 6 of this chapter on the EU). A more recent development has been the initiation of a process to develop regional initiatives among participants from the targeted region.

BSEC Homepage CEI Homepage SECI Homepage Royaumont Process SEEDUCOP (Enhanced Graz Process) WB/EC SEERECON

Governmental Agencies

Goals Another important element in channelling international aid and assistance programmes to Kosovo is the work of governmental agencies. States use these governmental agencies in order: · · · · to integrate assistance into their overall foreign policy goals; to exert direct control over the money spent; to exert influence over political and economic development; to support organisations and companies from their own country.

United States In September 1999 the United States opened the US Office Pristina (USOP), which implements US policy in Kosovo. Its main activities are channelled through the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), which is the principal US federal 53

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government agency implementing US foreign economic and humanitarian assistance programmes. It receives overall guidance from the Secretary of State. USAID concentrates its activities in the fields of economic reform, community infrastructure, disaster assistance (through the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA)), NGO and media support (through its Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI)), and democratic reforms (judiciary, media, civil society, elections). USAID regularly co-operates with other organisations managing USAID grants for projects in Kosovo, such as the American Bar Association/Central and East European Law Initiative (ABA/CEELI), the National Center for State Courts (NCSC), and the International Research and Exchanges Board (IREX). Germany Germany is represented in Kosovo through, inter alia, Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ), Deutsche Investitions- und Entwicklungsgesellschaft (DEG) and Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KfW). These organisations together run a German Office for Reconstruction and Development (GORED) in Prishtinë/Pristina, in co-ordination with the Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung (BMZ). GTZ projects include providing support for the University of Prishtinë/Pristina, capacitybuilding within the health system, development and rehabilitation of power and water supplies, road repair and maintenance, solid waste disposal, housing rehabilitation, and measures to promote economic activity and employment. KfW initiated the establishment of the Micro Enterprise Bank Kosova (MEBK) and finances infrastructure projects. Other relevant governmental agencies active in Kosovo include the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), the Swedish International Development Co-operation Agency (SIDA), and the UK Department for International Development (DFID). Several other European countries are also present in Kosovo, including Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Italy, Luxemburg, Netherlands, Norway, Switzerland; countries from the region, including Albania, Croatia, Greece and Turkey; and the Islamic world through their relief and assistance organisations.

Link-list of Development Agencies US Office Pristina USAID/Kosovo and Montenegro USAID Strategy for Kosovo 2001-2003 GTZ Kosovo KfW - The German Development Bank CIDA Sida DFID

Other agencies

International NGOs

Role of (I)NGOs Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) play an important role in the functioning of a civil society. They are also often better suited or show greater flexibility in responding to crisis situations and post-conflict rehabilitation than international organisations, which can be overly bureaucratic. NGOs can also have better knowledge and understanding of local needs and conditions. This is equally true in the case of Kosovo, where hundreds of national and international NGOs are active in the different fields of humanitarian assistance. Good sources on the various NGOs active in Kosovo are: · The UN-run Humanitarian Community Information Centre (HCIC) which promotes and facilitates coordination by serving as an information focal point for local and international NGOs, UN and other inter-governmental agencies, donors and KFOR. 54

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· ·

OMIK NGO Resource Centres in several regions of Kosovo. OMIK Municipal Profiles which provide basic information on political parties, the municipal civil administration, NGOs, and other civil society actors in the 30 municipalities of Kosovo.

Some of the most important organisations working in fields related to the activities of OMIK include: NGOs by area of activity Police Education: The Rule of Law Through Technology (ROLTT) initiative, SIPRI's international policing project, the Constitutional and Legal Policy Institute (COLPI). Human Rights: The Coalition for International Justice (CIJ) supports the international war crimes tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. Rule of Law: The American Bar Association ­ Central and East European Law Initiative (ABA/CEELI), DPK Consulting. Media Affairs: Press Now from the Netherlands, Pro Media (a branch of the US International Research & Exchanges Board (IREX)). Elections: National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI), International Foundation for Election Systems (IFES). For more information see Annex 1.

HCIC OMIK NGO Resource Centres ROLTT SIPRI International Policing Project COLPI CIJ ABA/CEELI DPK Consulting Kosovo Press Now Pro Media (IREX) NDI IFES InterAction Kosovo (List of US NGOs)

5. International Involvement in Kosovo: Problems and Challenges

Introduction It is clear that international involvement in Kosovo has been and will remain indispensable in the short to medium term: the challenges of rebuilding a whole society are immense, and certainly too great for the Kosovar population to cope with alone. Nonetheless, it should not be automatically assumed that all of the assistance and aid provided by the international community has had an exclusively positive effect. Rather, it is important to consider the possible negative side-effects of such assistance in what is a highly unstable social and political environment. This section will consider some of the risks and challenges related to international involvement in Kosovo. The end of NATO's air campaign Kosovo was followed by the establishment of an enormous number of assistance and aid programmes, at a level that was probably unprecedented. There was clearly a direct relationship between media coverage of the Kosovo crisis and the scope of international assistance, with many NGOs and agencies securing substantial funding through donations from the public, and governments receiving 55

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extensive public support for assistance activities. However, there have already been a number of cases of organisations moving on to the next crisis highlighted by the media, without completing projects already started. Another set of problems relates to the general strategy for assistance programmes, with a tension between the need to carefully develop a strategy based on in-depth analysis or needs assessment, and the need to start these programmes as soon as possible. A third question is that of whether the assistance projects really reflect the most urgent needs of the population, or rather donor-driven preferences. Impact on the Keywords for the goals of international development assistance are sustainability and local ground ownership. That means that any assistance provided for Kosovo should strive for lasting changes and enable the local population to feel that they themselves are owners of this process. The international community is aware of these principles and strives to implement them in their projects and programmes. Nevertheless it should be noted that international assistance always carries a risk of creating new dependencies, as these projects and programmes can also have a significant impact on the local economy in war-torn societies with a high rate of unemployment. Another unwelcome effect is the tendency of the English -speaking intelligentsia of Kosovo to opt to work as drivers or interpreters for the numerous international organisations in order to gain a higher salary, rather than receiving the lower salary granted to teachers, civil servants, and so on. Impediments There are a number of other factors specific to the situation in Kosovo that may serve to undermine international assistance efforts. The first is the experience of the parallel society developed in the 1990s. While it provided many Kosovo Albanians with experience of organising and participating in civil societal initiatives, the services were nonetheless operating outside of official structures, lacked accountability, and were exclusively provided for ethnic Albanians (see Chapter Three). Secondly, the still undecided question of Kosovo's future status is increasingly impeding progress in the development of a civil society, and even poses a threat to the overall security situation on the ground. If radical forces in Kosovo continue or increase their activities targeting the international community, this could lead to a reluctance on the part of the international community to continue activities in Kosovo. Another set of problems which pose a real challenge is the question of inter-institutional cooperation and co-ordination. International actors constantly stress the need for co-ordination to avoid duplicating efforts and unnecessary competition. However, in reality the situation tends to be quite different. An efficient division of labour is often beyond the capacity of the integrated UNMIK structure, despite its attempts to learn lessons from mistakes made in Bosnia and Herzegovina. It is even more difficult to achieve in the case of other international agencies competing for funds and influence.

Inter-locking or interblocking institutions?

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Organigram 1: Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe

OSCE

reports endorses

EU

appoints

Chair: Erhard Busek (Special Co-ordinator) Regional Table

Working Table 1 Democratisation and Human Rights

Working Table 2 Economic Reconstrution

? Regional Infrastructure; Energy; ? Private Sector Development; ? Intraregional Trade; ? Investment Compact; ? Business Advisory Council; ? Environmental Issues; ? electronic South Eastern ? Europe; SAVA Basin Initiative; ? Initiative for Social Cohesion.

Working Table 3 Security Issues

Sub-Table on Defense and Security Issues

Arms Control, Non-Proliferation and Military Contacts; Defence Economics; Disarmament; Mine Action; Small Arms and Light Weapons; Disaster Preparedness and Prevention. ? ? ? ? ? ?

Sub-Table on Justice and Home Affairs

Anti Corruption; Organised Crime; Asylum and Migration; Judiciary; Police and Border Control; Trafficking in Human Beings.

? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?

Human Rights and National Minorities; Good Governance; Gender Issues; Media Task Force; Education and Youth; Parliamentary Cooperation; Refugee Matters; The Szeged Process.

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Chapter Five The United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK)

Introduction The UNMIK constitutes an attempt to provide temporary governance in Kosovo pending the resolution of the province's future status and the handover of institutions to local Kosovar actors. It also aims to co-ordinate the activities of the major organisations involved in governance, capacity building and reconstruction, especially the UN, OSCE and EU. This chapter will describe the objectives and main activities of UNMIK, outlining its background and mandate (section one), decision-making structure (section two), major activities (section three) and the transfer of power and priorities for this year (section four).

1. Background and Mandate

Establishment of UNMIK UN Security Council resolution 1244 of 10 June 1999 foresaw the deployment of an international civil and security presence with a far-reaching mandate under UN auspices, the United Nations Interim Administration Mission (UNMIK). The new UN Interim Administration set a precedent in terms of its structure for inter-organisational co-operation under one central UN umbrella. UNMIK was established as a transitional government with full executive, legislative and judicial powers. Its primary aims were to establish substantial autonomy and selfgovernment in Kosovo, perform basic civilian administrative functions, and to facilitate a political process to determine Kosovo's future status. It was also mandated to support the reconstruction of key infrastructure, and humanitarian and disaster relief; and to maintain civil law and order, promote human rights, and assure the safe and unimpeded return of all refugees and displaced persons to their homes in Kosovo. UNMIK's Headquarters were established in Prishtinë /Pristina, with five District Centres in Prishtinë /Pristina (Centre), Mitrovicë/Kosovska Mitrovica (North), Pejë/Peæ (West), Gjilan/Gnjilane (East) and Prizren (South). Once a more concrete operational concept for the UN Mission in Kosovo had been finalised, Bernard Kouchner of France was appointed Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) and Head of UNMIK, assuming office on 15 July 1999. His successor Hans Haekkerup from Denmark took over on 13 January 2001, followed by Michael Steiner from Germany on 14 February 2002. The task of rebuilding a democratic society in Kosovo is currently being carried out by the United Nations, the OSCE and the EU. Responsibility is divided into the following sectors: · Police and Justice, under the United Nations (Pilar I, established in May 2001. Police and Justice previously fell under Pillar II (Civil Administration). The former Pillar I involved providing humanitarian assistance under the leadership of UNHCR, which assisted the repatriation of 700,000 refugees in the first months of UNMIKs activities and was phased out in June 2000. · Civil administration, under the United Nations (Pillar II). · Democratisation and Institution Building, led by the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) (Pillar III). · Reconstruction and Economic Development, managed by the European Union (EU) (Pillar IV).

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Structure of the Mission

The Executive Committee, comprising the SRSG, his Principal Deputy Charles H. Brayshaw (USA) and the Deputy Special Representatives (Heads of Pillars I, II, III and IV) meets on a daily basis to co-ordinate Pillar activities. The Executive Committee's Joint Planning Group establishes working groups and task forces to address issues of concern, such as the Joint Working Group on Returns, the Joint Working Group on the Legal Framework and the Joint Interim Administration Task Force. The Joint Planning Group is serviced by a Secretariat. Coordination with KFOR and other international agencies on security issues is maintained by the Military Liaison Office. The Office of Gender Affairs is responsible for mainstreaming gender issues throughout UNMIK. It was foreseen that the work of UNMIK would be carried out in five integrated phases: Phase I: Establishment of administrative structures; deployment of international civilian police; emergency assistance for returning refugees and displaced persons; restoring of public services; training local police and judiciary; enhancing economic recovery with the goal of developing a self-sustaining economy. Phase II: Administration of social services and utilities; consolidation of the rule of law; transfer of health and education to local authorities; preparation for elections. Phase III: Elections for a Kosovo Transitional Authority. Phase IV: Assistance to Kosovo's elected representatives in organising and establishing provisional institutions for democratic and autonomous self-government; transferal of the remaining administrative responsibilities. Phase V: After a final settlement on the status of Kosovo, oversight of the transfer of authority from Kosovo's provisional institutions to institutions established under the political settlement. In 2002 UNMIK was at the stage of Phase IV.

UNSC Documents on Kosovo UNSCR 1244 UNMIK Structure UNMIK Website UNMIK Constitutional Framework

Five Phases

2. Decision-making and Administrative Structure

First activities The breakdown of civil structures in Kosovo was not solely a result of destruction caused by the air strikes, but had earlier roots in FRY policies towards Kosovo. The public sector had suffered from financial neglect by the FRY, and discriminatory employment policies that favoured the minority Serb population. In addition, most of the Serb civil administrative staff left their posts just before UNMIK entered the province in June 1999. The international civilian presence faced the task of dismantling the ethnic Albanian parallel government structures established in the province in the 1990s as part of the resistance to repressive Serbian politics in Kosovo (see Chapter Three). UNMIK's activities in this initial phase were hampered by the difficulties in increasing the numbers of deployed personnel rapidly enough, an unclear division of competences, and a lack of information about the situation on the ground.

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JIAS

On 15 December 1999 UNMIK established a formal structure for administering Kosovo. The Joint Interim Administrative Structures (JIAS) provided a framework for sharing the responsibility for provisional administration with representatives of Kosovar society. JIAS was established as a provisional set of institutions, and is currently replaced by more permanent structures following assembly elections in the province in November 2001. JIAS's core structure includes three distinct elements: · Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG). · Kosovo-wide oversight and advisory organs representing Kosovo's institutions and political groupings, including the Interim Administrative Council (IAC), the Kosovo Transitional Council (KTC). · 20 Prishtinë/Pristina-based administrative departments responsible for administration, service delivery and revenue collection.

Office of the SRSG

The JIAS is headed by the Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG), who was granted a broad range of competences in order to fulfil the mandate as laid out in resolution 1244. Thus the SRSG has ultimate legislative and executive authority, including over the administration. Legislative acts are issued in the form of regulations by UNMIK. . The Interim Administrative Council (IAC) serves as an advisory cabinet for the SRSG and as an executive board for the JIAS, and is chaired by the SRSG. It was foreseen that the Serb representative would participate fully in proceedings, but the SNC decided to adopt merely observer status. The IAC makes recommendations to the SRSG on amending the applicable law and on the drafting of new regulations and from April 2001 onwards was involved in the process of drafting the constitutional framework for the province (see below). The Kosovo Transitional Council (KTC) consisted of 36 representatives of Kosovo society and was intended to serve as the link between Kosovo society and the components of the JIAS, with no formal role in decision making. UNMIK viewed the KTC as a testing ground for democratic procedures and tolerance building, although it was criticised that the KTC was not directly included in the decision making process. The November 2001 elections aimed to rectify this issue, as an elected assembly of representatives replaced the KTC (see below). A number of commissions and working groups enhanced discussion and scrutiny of legislation and drafted proposals for the SRSG, f. ex the Working Groups on Tolerance, Protection of Local Communities, Economic Affairs, Education, and the Working Group on Detainees and Missing Persons. A departmental structure was established with 20 departments covering the full range of internal governmental functions. Initially, the UN was responsible for 15 of the departments, the EU for four departments and the OSCE for one department. In 2001, the departments were restructured into nine departments, which in 2002 became ministries after the formation of government (see Chapter 4).

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Assembly

The main legislative body is the Assembly, which is responsible for adopting laws and resolutions in the areas of responsibility listed in paragraph 5 (see below). It elects the President of Kosovo, and can endorse or reject the Prime Minister and the list of Ministers proposed by him or her. It can initiate a vote of no-confidence in the Government, instruct the Government to prepare draft laws, and request the calling of new elections on the basis of a two-thirds majority. Assembly decisions are adopted by a simple majority of those present and voting, and the quorum for voting is a majority of all members. The Constitutional Framework also sets out a procedure whereby minority groups can protest against legislation that they consider has violated their "vital interests". The Assembly is elected by proportional representation (100 seats) with 20 reserved seats for minorities. Ten of these are reserved for Serb parties and candidates, and are allocated in proportion to the number of votes received by each. The other ten are allocated to the Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian communities (4), the Bosniac community (3), the Turkish community (2), and the Gorani community (1), again in proportion to the number of votes received. The Assembly is elected every three years. The President of Kosovo also has a mandate of three years. He or she may take action in the field of external relations (according to the areas listed in the Constitutional Framework and in coordination with the SRSG), and should guarantee the democratic functioning of the Provisional Institutions. The President can propose the Prime Minister (PM), who in turn submits a list of proposed Ministers to the Assembly. The PM and Ministers are then elected together by a simple majority. At least two of the Ministers should be from minority communities, including at least one from the Serb community and one from the other communities. The Government may propose draft laws, and must make proposals when the requested to do so by the Assembly. Meetings of the Assembly, the Government and its bodies are conducted in both Albanian and Serb, and all official documents are printed in both languages. Other minorities are also permitted to use their own languages in Government or Assembly meetings. The Constitutional Framework contains a number of additional provisions and safeguards on minority rights and interests. In addition to the provisions on allocating Assembly seats and ministerial posts to minority representatives, Chapter 3 sets out various principles on equality, non-discrimination and human rights. And Chapter 4 lists the rights of communities and their members, including on language, education, equal opportunity in employment, non-discrimination in access to public services, use of symbols, right of association, preservation of historical, cultural and religious sites, and representation in the media. The Framework establishes the office of an Ombudsperson to investigate complaints on human rights violations and discrimination against minority groups, and to monitor and make recommendations on these matters. The Constitutional Framework presented by UNMIK in May 2001 foresees the transfer of responsibility to provisional Kosovar institutions in the following areas (para. 5.1): · Economic policy: financial policy, fiscal and budgetary issues, various areas of customs policy, domestic and foreign trade, industry and investments; however, the SRSG has final authority "to set the financial and policy parameters" and to approve the budget. The SRSG also retains responsibility for monetary policy, auditing of the budget, and control over the Customs Service. The SRSG also retains authority over state and public owned property and companies. Social policy: health, labour and social welfare, family, gender and minors.

Presidency and government

Minority issues

Policy areas

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·

· · · ·

Environment and transport: environmental protection, transport, post, telecommunications and information technologies, agriculture, forestry and rural development, spatial planning. However, the SRSG retains control of railways, frequencies and civil aviation. Public administration: public administration services, statistics. Culture and education: youth and sport, culture, tourism, education, science and technology. Human rights: good governance, human rights and equal opportunity. Foreign affairs: this remains within the remit of UNMIK, except in the area of nonresident affairs which will be transferred to the Provisional Institutions, and the areas mentioned below (para. 5.6).

Municipalities

Following the October 2000 municipal elections, municipal assemblies of between 17 and 51 members were established in 27 of the 30 municipalities. In the three Serb dominated municipalities that boycotted the elections, the SRSG appointed members to the assemblies. In support of the municipal self-governing process, municipalities receive funding for economic development projects from UNDP, the United Nations Centre for Human Settlements (HABITAT) and the European Agency for Reconstruction. The Institute for Civil Administration (ICA), established by the OSCE, has carried out training for newly elected assembly members covering the municipal regulation and the model municipal statute. Areas already devolved to local competency are primary healthcare and education. Further efforts are under way to hand over authority to municipalities in various sectors (for example public health, public services, infrastructure, social services and housing) but in practice the transfer of responsibility from the UNMIK to the local level is slow. In order to increase revenue, a programme has been put in place for municipalities to impose property tax. After a one-year programme in financial management UNMIK will be able to transfer financial power before the next local elections. The current two-year mandate expires in October 2002 and the SRSG has announced second municipal elections for September. There has been some progress with the inclusion of minority members in the local government. At the end of 2001 approximately 90 Kosovo Serbs participate in 13 assemblies and also representatives of other minority communities participate in assemblies of their respective municipalities. Law enforcement in Kosovo is currently carried out by three main actors: KFOR, UNMIK Police (CIVPOL) and the Kosovo Police Service (KPS). It is envisaged that responsibility will gradually shift from KFOR to UN CIVPOL and ultimately to KPS. UNMIK Police is not part of the departmental structure but is under the direct control of UNMIK. Unlike other UN CIVPOL missions, the task of UNMIK Police is not predominantly that of monitoring. Instead, UNSCR 1244 has tasked it to oversee temporary law enforcement; and establish and develop a professional, impartial and independent local police, the KPS. In May 2001 UNMIK moved police activities from Pillar II into a new Pillar I (Police and Justice), with the aim of enhancing and better coordinating activities in this area. Among the priorities in this respect are developing more effective approaches to dealing with organised crime and terrorism. In January 2002 UNMIK had 4,555 civilian police from 49 participating countries deployed in the five regions of the province and at four border crossings. Headquarters are located in Prishtinë/Pristina with five regional centres supervising regional police stations. Main activities include: patrolling and maintaining public order, investigating crimes, preventative measures, field training for KPS, collection of criminal intelligence, border and immigration control and traffic control. In November 2000 UNMIK Police established an anti-prostitution 62

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and trafficking unit. 1,100 special police with the largest contingents from Pakistan, Jordan and India are deployed for crowd control and other special duties. The UNMIK Police has full responsibility for daily operations in four of the five regions and in the remaining region (Mitrovica) and already has full investigative primacy. In addition it has assumed operational responsibility at six border and boundary crossing points. A continued high priority of UNMIK is the fight against terrorism and organized crime. To strengthen its capacity in this area, the UNMIK police is in the process of forming two new units: the `Central Intelligence Unit' with 40 officers specialized on terrorism and organized crime and the `Kosovo Organised Crime Bureau', an expert investigative unit. After the signing of a Common Document between the SRSG and Serb representatives in November 2001, aiming to provide a solid basis for a co-operative relationship, some progress was made on the issue of missing persons. The UNMIK police Missing Persons Unit, which is in the process of establishing a sub-office in Belgrade, will be granted full access to post-mortem data collected by the Serbian police and forensic pathologists. This will be an important support for the identification of hundreds of Kosovo Albanians exhumed over the past months.

UNMIK Organigramme UNMIK Departments UNMIK Regulations (eng., alb., serb.) Regulation on Municipalities 2000/45 UNMIK Police UNMIK Police Organigramme

3. Main UNMIK Activities

Public Order and Justice

KPS UNMIK cooperates with the OSCE In developing the local Kosovo Police Service (KPS), with OSCE running the Kosovo Police Service School (KPSS) near Prishtinë/Pristina (see Chapter Six). The goal of the KPSS is to train 10,000 Kosovo Police Service officers. At the end of 2001 the number of KPS officers was 4,392, of whom over 8% are Kosovo Serbs and around 7% other minorities. In 2002 approximately 1,400 candidates will receive basic training. There are mixed patrols of Serb and Albanian KPS officers in some areas, but up to now it was not possible to establish their presence in Serb enclaves. The majority of Serb communities are still policed by Serb KPS patrols only. The KPS has been entrusted with the security of assembly members, resulting in the forming of a new service division of 96 police officers. This division will be expanded in 2002 in order to provide security services to all the provisional institutions of self-government. A clear hand-over strategy for transferring responsibilities from UNMIK Police to KPS has been developed. Frontline KPS officers are being prepared to assume full responsibility for patrol duties at the end of 2002 and the full responsibility for one of the five regional police stations should be handed over. By the end of 2003, KPS officers will be in supervisory positions; by 2004 they should be in middle management positions; and by 2005 they are to assume executive management positions. In order to absorb former KLA members into a civilian agency, the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC) was established by Regulation 1999/8 and charged with providing emergency responses and reconstruction services to Kosovo. Modelled on the French Sécurité Civile, the KPC consists of an active corps of 3,000 members and a reserve of 2,000.

KPC

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The main tasks of the KPC are to: · provide disaster response capability, including for major fires and industrial accidents; · conduct search and rescue activities; · provide humanitarian assistance in isolated areas; · assist in de-mining; · contribute to reconstruction. Activities The KPC has no role in the maintenance of law and order and only 200 of its officers are authorised to carry weapons. It operates under the authority of the SRSG and is supervised by KFOR. The decision to establish the KPC as part of UNMIK´s strategy to demilitarize the KLA has been criticised, and has generated fears that the KLA will continue to exist under a new name. Thus a number of activities have been initiated to increase the acceptance of KPC and its role in rebuilding Kosovo. However, some KPC members have been arrested because they have been suspected of organized crime, violent acts against minorities, illegal policing and breaches of political neutrality. Regarding the judiciary, UNMIK's strategic goal is to establish an effective and efficient justice system that promotes the rule of law and respect for human rights. This is a difficult goal to achieve in a situation still characterised by inter-ethnic and politically motivated violence. The development of the justice system according to international standards of human rights is managed by the Department of Justice (DoJ) in close co-operation with OMIK's Human Rights/Rule of Law Department. The DoJ has established or re-established the Supreme Court of Kosovo, five district courts, 22 municipal courts, one commercial court, 22 minor offence courts and 13 offices of the Public Prosecutor. According to the Constitutional Framework, the newly formed ministry of Public Services is responsible for organization and functioning of the courts and the development and maintenance of court and prosecutorial services, while Pillar I (Department of Justice) will continue to exercise control over the majority of responsibilities in the Judicial Sector. A continued high priority for UNMIK is the fight against terrorism and organized crime. To strengthen its capacity in this area, the Department of Justice is setting up three new specialized units: the `Sensitive Information and Operations Unit', that provides elements for prosecution to KFOR and UNMIK police; the `Legal Policy Unit', which will be the focal point for policy-making and liaison with Kosovo-based agencies and the `Victim Advocacy and Assistance Unit', which will provide assistance to witnesses and victims throughout the judicial process. 355 judges, 58 public prosecutors and 544 lay-judges were selected for employment in the Kosovo judicial system. However, the aim of employing multi-ethnic personnel in the courts has not been achieved, with only very few applications from professionals from minority groups. Only 4 of the 16 appointed Kosovo Serb judges and prosecutors serve in Kosovo's courts. There are also 9 Bosniac, 2 Roma and 8 Turkish judges and prosecutors. The `Department of Justice' established the Judicial Integration Section to coordinate a minority recruitment strategy. Although some measures have reduced the risk of ethnic bias in trials for major crimes at the District or Supreme Court level, bias continues to be a serious factor in municipal and minor offence courts. UNMIK established a system by which an international judge is seconded to municipal or minor offences courts that shows signs of bias. Bias extends beyond ethnicity. Trafficking, rape and other sexually related crimes are often not taken 64

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seriously by judges or prosecutors and victims often face bias and discrimination. The involvement of international judges and prosecutors is an important effort to increase impartiality in the courts. In addition UNMIK established the `Judicial Inspection Unit', which conducts disciplinary hearings against Kosovo judges and prosecutors.

Social Affairs

Health and social welfare The main task in the social sector is the transformation of the health system in accordance with international standards. There are six hospitals in Kosovo, five of which are regional facilities serving their local populations. The sixth, the Universitiy of Prishtinë/Pristina, provides complex health services for the entire population of Kosovo. Repair, refurbishment and re-equipment of health-care institutions is carried out by the Department of Health and Social Welfare (DHSW). The Department tries to co-ordinate its activities with NGOs and donors active at the local level of the health service. The Kosovo Drug Regulatory Agency completes a Kosovo-wide inspection of pharmacies, and is authorised to issue licenses and close down establishments that do not comply with legal requirements. In January 2001 responsibility for primary care facilities was transferred to the municipalities and the first community mental health care centre was opened. Full local responsibility for public health activities were assumed in July 2001. Developing local capacity is one of the priorities, as many international non-governmental organisations have reduced their activities in Kosovo. Since there are currently no insurance arrangements in Kosovo, the DHSW has begun to institute co-payments for physician visits and pharmaceuticals. To regulate the supply and distribution of drugs, the Kosovo Drug Regulatory Agency has started issuing licenses to private pharmacies after a verification process. The Licensing Board of Health Professionals screened 750 local health workers for additional training and administered a licensing examination. Similarly, the qualifications of 1,000 specialist doctors were reviewed. Social assistance was paid to about 50,000 families in 2000 through centres of Social Work located in the municipalities. Of special concern is the need to ensure access to health care for minority communities. In 1991-2 the majority of Kosovars left the official educational system. Education continued under the parallel system, but it was difficult for Kosovar teachers to up-date their skills and methods. The Department of Education and Science (DoES) - with approximately 23,000 teachers and 6,000 administrative support staff - comprises a major part of public service in Kosovo. More than 100 new schools were constructed and another 150 rehabilitated by the end of 2001. The reform of the school system in accordance with EU standards is underway, as is the reconstruction of damaged education facilities, and the construction of new ones. An Education Management Information System (EMIS) is currently being set up with the support of the World Bank, to provide students and teachers with data otherwise not available in Kosovo. Regulation 2000/45 grants municipalities new responsibilities for education, and it is foreseen that the handover of these responsibilities from DoES to the municipalities will be completed in September 2001. The Department for Youth promotes projects on tolerance in co-operation with the municipalities and NGOs. A Volunteer Community Service Programme for students has also been launched. In order to tackle the unemployment rate of around 50%, the Ministry for Labour and Employment has established employment offices throughout the province. Services will be especially geared towards unemployed women and young people. Another priority will be the development of an unemployment insurance system. 65

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Economic Affairs

Market economy Reconstruction of the economy has been complicated by the lack of clarity about Kosovo´s final status, which has hindered long-term investments (see also Chapter Three). The current emphasis is on developing a market economy and encouraging the emergence of a productive private sector. Four regulations were adopted between December 2000 and February 2001 in order to establish a legal foundation to assist newly emerging enterprises in Kosovo. Regulation 2001/6 established a legal regime for the formation, maintenance and termination of private business enterprises, partnerships and corporations in Kosovo. Regulation 2000/68 incorporates into Kosovo law the provisions of the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods. Regulation 2001/5 provides for the creation, operation and enforcement of pledges over movable property. And Regulation 2001/3 creates legal guarantees to attract foreign investors. Despite this progress, continued ethnic strife and the unresolved property status of industrial sites and enterprises currently under UNMIK ownership has served to hinder long term economic development, and prolong the existence of a gray economy. Regulations on accounting standards, a pledge filing office, mortgages, competition law and related administrative directions were drawn up in the second half of 2001. Important for economic development of Kosovo's socially owned enterprises has been the leasing of productive assets to new management (see Chapter III). The Central Fiscal Authority (CFA) with its power to set the budget and fiscal policy will exist in parallel with the new ministry of finance and economy and will continue to be responsible for fiscal and financial issues not yet transferred to the new government. The CFA is also responsible for the budget process, treasury functions, revenue analysis, tax collection and customs administration and thus functions as a finance ministry. The international Co-Head is also responsible for maintaining bank accounts for financial transactions linked to the KCB. A value-added-tax was introduced in 2001, followed by a payroll-tax in 2002.

CFA

Consolidated The Kosovo Consolidated Budget for 2002 provides for expenditure of 374 million euro. The budget budget increased funding allocated to public services, labour and social welfare, police service, courts and prison service and fiscal controls administration. In 2002 only 7% will be financed by donor grants, because the CFA has succeeded in raising domestically generated revenues (see Chapter III). This year the provisional government and the municipalities will control nearly three quarters of the budget, and only one quarter remains under UNMIK control. Reconstruction Approximately 80,000 dwellings in Kosovo had been completely destroyed by June 1999, and 40,000 had suffered severe wartime damage. The emergency reconstruction needs of Kosovo have been addressed by the European Agency for Reconstruction (EAfR) in Prishtinë /Pristina, co-ordinated by UNMIK's economic reconstruction pillar. The first priorities were the repair of housing and rebuilding energy, transportation and water infrastructures. UNMIK Regulation 2000/53 of September countered the illegal construction practices by Kosovars, and in November 2000 the Housing and Property Directorate was established to deal with questions of property rights and allocation of housing. Kosovo remains one of the poorest regions in Europe. The Department of Reconstruction has carried out an analysis of investment needs. According to the expenditure plan, 1.4 billion euro are needed in the next 3 years. The Department of Public Utilities is responsible for 50 public enterprises: 46 water and waste companies, three district heating companies and the Power Company of Kosovo 66

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(KEK), most of them subsidised by the Kosovo Budget. Serious difficulties continued with the supply of electricity in 2002. Because of lack of investment over years, electricity had to be strictly rationed. With support of the European Agency for Reconstruction efforts are ongoing to solve this problem. A particular effort was made to improve payment rates for electricity consumption in order to increase the capacity to import power. With donor investment in the infrastructure of the water sector, water shortages were reduced in the second half of 2001. Agriculture and environment Following conflict and wide scale disruption, agricultural production almost came to a standstill in 1999. In 2001, a combination of food aid and measures to promote market recovery were the priorities of the then Department of Agriculture. A set of policies have been adopted to ensure production incentives to farmers with the aim of phasing out donor provided food aid in 2002. Local capacity for environmental protection is being developed and coordinated under the Ministry for Environmental Protection. A monitoring group comprising local and international professionals is tasked with the creation of a Monitoring Network for Air, Water and Soil Pollution. In order to tackle the general lack of environmental protection in Kosovo, a legal framework is being developed by the Ministry and public awareness campaigns are being initiated.

UNMIK Chronology (until July 2001) Kosovo Protection Corps ICG Report on KLA KPS KPS and UNMIK ICG Reports UNMIK Report to UNSC JAN 2002

4. Transfer of Authority and Priorities and Challenges for 2002

Constitutional Framework

The process of transferring responsibility from the JIAS to Kosovars began with the establishment of elected municipal assemblies, following the municipal elections in 2000. A further step was the Constitutional Framework, signed on May 2001, which enumerates the responsibilities that should be transferred to an elected assembly, the president and the newly formed government, as well as the powers that should be reserved for the SRSG. The Framework is the last formal step towards the substantive autonomy promised in Security Council Resolution 1244. Transfer of authority The most important challenge for 2002 remains the further transfer of authority to the provisional self-government institutions and the functioning and strengthening of these institutions. The slow establishment of government after the elections revealed the inexperience of Kosovo's political parties, and highlighted how difficult institution-building is. The future will show whether the government will be democratic and efficient. To guarantee the democratic functioning of the assembly, the OSCE will continue to provide training for assembly members. Recruitment and training of staff is underway with the aim to establish an apolitical and multiethnic civil service and to improve transport and working conditions for minority members.

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After the general election in November 2001, organized by UNMIKs Pillar III, the process of replacing the JIAS by more permanent structures began. After the provisional institutions were in place in early 2002, intensive efforts were made to restructure the mission and transform the former JIAS. According to the Constitutional Framework, the responsibilities of the SRSG decreased. Some of the reserved powers of the SRSG are: the protection of the rights and interests of communities, fiscal and monetary policy, law enforcement, external relations, budget control, judiciary and police and control over the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC). In order to manage these, the following UNMIK directorates have been established: civil protection; administrative affairs; infrastructure affairs; rural affairs. UNMIK created a special task force to establish the administrative service to support the assembly, and the OSCE arranged a week long seminar on the responsibilities of legislators, in which the vast majority of the assembly members participated. The security of minority assembly members and staff remains a matter of concern and therefore the assembly building is currently guarded. Pending the establishment and functioning of the provisional institutions of self government, mechanisms are in place to ensure that there is no legislative vacuum. The IAC has continued to work and will do so until the date of transfer of authority to the new government. According to UNMIK Regulation 2001/19 the 20 departments, which were designed to form the basis of ministries of the Kosovar government were reorganized into nine transitional departments. UNMIKs Pillar II (civil administration) manages seven of them: Agriculture, Forestry and Rural Development; Culture, Youth and Sports; Education, Science and Technology; Labour and Social Welfare; Health, Environment and Spatial Planning; Transport and Communications; Public Service. Pillar IV (economic reconstruction and development) manages two: Trade and Industry; Finance and Economy. In early 2002 the transitional departments became ministries after the establishment of the government. In each ministry a Principal International Officer (PIO) advises the minister on policy development and governance and manages the international staff within the ministry. Until the appointment of ministers, the PIO were officers-in-charge. UNMIK international staff will continue to work inside the ministries for a limited time and will hand over their executive functions to the local civil service as soon as possible. With Regulation 2001/36 UNMIK adopted a civil service law because an apolitical, multi-ethnic civil service accountable to the elected assembly is an important component of any government. Media and external affairs In the field of mass media (para. 5.4), the Provisional Institutions have responsibilities for legislation to prevent defamation and hate speech, and regulation of broadcast media through an independent media commission and a public broadcasting board. The SRSG can appoint international experts to manage boards or commissions of the public broadcaster and independent media regulatory body. Paragraph 5.6 states that the Institutions will have responsibility in a number of areas of external relations, including reaching agreements on international and external cooperation (in coordination with the SRSG), and aligning legislation and practices with relevant European and international standards. The SRSG retains responsibility for all other aspects of external policy.

Other Priorities for 2002

Security and justice Significant progress has been made in resolving the structure deficiencies of the judicial system, but concerns remain about the capacity of the judiciary to apply the reformed legal framework and to ensure impartiality of justice. Another serious concern is that ethnic bias continues to be a factor in some courts. 68

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Organized crime, political violence, terrorism and violence against minorities remain serious challenges for the police and KFOR. Trafficking and organized crime are a region-wide problem and require cross-border co-operation. A step toward co-operation between Kosovo and FRY was made in November 2001. The SRSG and representatives from Serbia signed a Common Document among other things as a basis for a police cooperation for fighting organized crime and terrorism. The transfer of policing responsibilities from UN CIVPOL to KPS will continue throughout 2002. Economy Further steps towards a market economy are planned for this year. A key aim is to secure a sustainable tax base, with the capacity to support the government institutions. Therefore, a value added tax was introduced in 2001, followed by a payroll tax in 2002. Training programmes for elected politicians act to ensure that fiscal discipline is maintained when budgetary power is transferred in 2003. Although the number of serious crimes against members of minorities decreased, a continued high level of protection for minority communities remained necessary. Minorities do not enjoy equal access to basic services such as health care, education and markets. Unemployment among minority members continues to be very high. Another point of concern is the ability of refugees to return to their homes. As of December 2001, only about 2,400 out of the 229,000 registered internally displaced persons had returned to their homes. The main factors that impede the return are concerns about security and freedom of movement as well as employment and service provision. The SRSG established the `Office on Returns and Communities' to act as an oversight body for the management of the return process, as well as working for a better situation of minorities. To ensure an appropriate funding, the Office plans to hold a donor conference in Switzerland in April 2002 to fund the returns in 2002/03. There still is the requirement to integrate the minority communities into the society and to guarantee a live in security without discrimination.

Press Release on Legal Framework Regulation on weapons Budget 2002

Situation of Minorities

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Organigram 2: Provisional Institutions of Self Government (PISG) and UNMIK

Source: ICG Balkans Report No 125, 1 March 2002

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Chapter Six The OSCE Mission in Kosovo (OMIK)

Introduction The OSCE plays an important role in Kosovo, with the Mission co-ordinating activities under the Pillar on institution-building. It also co-operates in the UN-led Pillar on civil administration. This chapter provides an overview of OMIK, describing its background and mandate (section 1), activities in the field of Democratic Governance (section 2), Human Rights and Rule of Law (section 3), and outlines OMIK's challenges for 2002 (section 4).

1. Background and Mandate

Previous OSCE Missions in Kosovo

Missions of long duration The OSCE Mission in Kosovo (OMIK) is the third OSCE mission in the province. The previous two missions were geared towards monitoring minority rights in Kosovo and promoting a political solution to the conflict. The first mission was deployed in August 1992, when the OSCE (then CSCE) decided to station Missions of Long Duration in Kosovo, Sandjak and Vojvodina, the largest minority areas of FRY. The Mission in Kosovo was based in Prishtinë/Pristina (with a permanent presence in Pejë/Pe and Prizren) and a staff of 20. Deployed in a period of relative stability in Kosovo, the missions were tasked with collecting information on human rights violations and assisting in providing information on legislation on human rights, protection of minorities, free media and democratic elections. However, the FRY authorities refused to prolong the missions beyond June 1993. This was partly prompted by OSCE's decision to suspend FRY from the organization because of its role in the Bosnia conflict. After the withdrawal of the Missions in July 1993, the mandate of the Missions of Long Duration remained formally valid until January 2001, when the OSCE Mission to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) was established. Kosovo Verification Mission As Belgrade stepped up its policy of repression in Kosovo in 1998 (see Chapter One), conflict in the province escalated and by mid September the number of displaced persons was estimated at 300,000. On 23 September 1998, after more than six months of fighting between Yugoslav and Serbian forces and the Kosovo Liberation Army, the UN Security Council passed resolution 1199, demanding an immediate cease-fire and calling on the parties to "enter immediately into a meaningful dialogue without preconditions and with international involvement". On the basis of this resolution, US negotiator Richard Holbrooke brokered an agreement with Milosevi on 13 October 1998. The agreement foresaw the deployment of an OSCE Mission in Kosovo, the Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM), composed of up to 2,000 unarmed verifiers, and the creation of an air surveillance system to be operated by NATO, stationed in Macedonia. On 25 October 1998 the OSCE Permanent Council (PC) formally established the KVM (PC.DEC/263), to be led by Ambassador William Walker of the United States. Under the agreement between the OSCE and FRY, the main tasks of the verifiers were to report cease-fire violations, conduct border monitoring, and to facilitate the return of refugees along with ICRC and UNHCR. The Mission established its headquarters and a training centre in Prishtinë /Pristina in October 1998, with five regional centres and 10 field offices. OSCE originally envisaged deploying an international staff of around 2,000, although this

KVM mandate

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target was never reached: 700 international Mission Members were in place in January, with around 1,400 by March 1999 when the Mission was withdrawn. Withdrawal of KVM Following the break-down of the Rambouillet peace process, the KVM was withdrawn from Kosovo on 20 March 1999 on grounds of security. NATO began its aerial bombardment against the FRY on 24 March 1999. After its withdrawal from Kosovo, KVM sent 350 Mission Members to Skopje to assist UNHCR in its response to the Kosovo Albanian refugee crisis. OSCE staff conducted over 2,500 interviews with refugees in Albania and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, the findings of which were published in an ODIHR report "Kosovo/Kosova: As seen, as told" (Part I) (covering the period October 1998 ­ June 1999). It is difficult to reach a comprehensive and balanced assessment of the KVM. This is partly because of the unavailability of many of the sources, but also because of the ongoing controversy over NATO's humanitarian intervention which immediately followed KVM's activities in Kosovo. Thus assessments of KVM tend to produce conflicting findings. While some commentators emphasise that as an unarmed mission KVM lacked the capacity to tackle the causes of the conflict in Kosovo, others suggest that it could have contributed more extensively to finding a peaceful solution had it been deployed for a longer timeframe. Despite these continuing controversies, the Kosovo experience served to reveal some serious shortcomings and limitations of the OSCE. · KVM was the single biggest challenge for the OSCE at that time, but it never succeeded in deploying the number of personnel originally foreseen. As a consequence of the short-fall, the OSCE Secretariat was reorganised with the introduction of an Operations Centre and a new human resources management system (REACT) which should enable more rapid deployment and better coordination of future OSCE missions. · The OSCE was unable to exert significant influence on the international response, with the Chairman-in-Office not involved in key stages of the political decision-making process. This being said, it should be acknowledged that the OSCE was among the few international organisations (along with, for example, UNHCR) that were on the ground and were able to have some ­ albeit insufficient - impact on the situation. Task Force for Kosovo Following the capitulation of Milosevi and KFOR's entry into Kosovo on 12 June 1999, the KVM was dissolved by PC.DEC/296 of 8 June 1999. On the same date, the OSCE established the transitional Task Force for Kosovo to prepare for the deployment of a future OSCE Mission as part of an international presence in Kosovo.

Missions of Long Duration UNSCR 1199 UNSCR 1244 OSCE PC.DEC/ 263 OSCE PC. DEC/296 OSCE PC. DEC/401 Kosovo/Kosova: As Seen, As Told Part I Kosovo/Kosova: As Seen, As Told Part II

Assessment of KVM

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OMIK's Mandate

Mandate The OSCE Mission in Kosovo (OMIK) was established on 1 July 1999 by PC.DEC/305, for an initial period until 10 June 2000. Referring to UN Security Council Resolution 1244, the OSCE Permanent Council decided that the OSCE Mission in Kosovo should constitute a distinct component of the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) and take a lead role in matters relating to institution- and democracy-building and human rights. Under UNMIK's at that time four pillar structure, the OSCE was to be responsible for the area of institution building, Pillar three. Permanent Council Decision 305 calls upon the OSCE Mission in Kosovo to concentrate its work in the following interrelated areas: · Human resources capacity-building, including the training of a new Kosovo police service within a Kosovo Police School established and operated by OSCE; the training of judicial personnel and civil administrators at various levels, in co-operation with, inter alia, the Council of Europe. Democratisation and governance, including the development of a civil society, nongovernmental organisations, political parties and local media. Organisation and supervision of elections. Monitoring, protection and promotion of human rights, including the establishment of an Ombudsman Institution, in co-operation with, inter alia, the UNHCHR.

Main activities

· · ·

OMIK is the first OSCE mission to form an integral part of a UN operation. The structure of OMIK takes the form of a Senior Management Group consisting of the Head of Mission, Deputy Head of Mission, Directors of the five Departments and of Administration. Ambassador Daan Everts of the Netherlands was appointed as Head of the OSCE Mission in Kosovo in July 1999. He was replaced by former Ambassador Pascal Fieschi (from France) in January 2002. The Head and Deputy Head of Mission are supported by an Office of the Head of Mission, which includes a small Executive Secretariat and a Public Affairs Office. Like the other UNMIK Pillar Heads, former Ambassador Fieschi also serves as one of the Deputy Special Representatives of the UN Secretary General. In order to fulfill its core mandate, OMIK's activities are divided into five departments: Police Training and Education, Democratisation, Human Rights and Rule of Law, Media Affairs and Elections.

UNSCR 1244 OSCE PC.DEC/305 Mission in Kosovo

2. Democratic Governance

Department of Democratisation

The work of the OSCE Democratisation Department is focused in three primary areas: training of civil administrators; political parties; and civil society/non-governmental organisations (NGOs). In order to prioritise areas of activity, in 1999 OMIK carried out a survey of the province to establish civil administration needs, in conjunction with the Council of Europe. The Department currently runs up to six programmes.

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CAS Division The work of the Civil Administration Support (CAS) Division focuses on strengthening local government structures. In February 2000 it established the Institute for Civil Administration (ICA) to provide training for members of Kosovo's civil service in personnel management, principles of local democracy, human rights awareness, budget management and control, and citizens' participation. The ICA's mandate also includes strengthening Kosovo's central administrative structures. As a result, a long term training programme for potential career civil servants was initiated in 2001. The ICA has also been working with hundreds of members who were elected to Kosovo's new municipal assemblies in October 2000. It has organised a number of seminars to familiarise them with the UNMIK Regulation on Municipal Self-Government, which outlines the roles and responsibilities of the assemblies. It is foreseen that management of the Institute will be transferred to Kosovars. PPD Division The Political Party Development (PPD) Division assists political parties in developing their programmes through seminars on public and media relations, political party organisation and platform development, and election campaign training. A network of Political Party Service Centres (PPSCs) provides the logistical basis for Kosovo-wide training programmes. Political party service centres have been established in Gjakovë/Djakovica, Gjilan/Gnjilane, Mitrovicë/Kosovska Mitrovica, Rahovec/Orahovac, Prishtinë/Pristina, Pejë/Pe, Podujevë/Podujevo, Skënderaj/Srbica and Prizren. NGOs and civil society OMIK also supports the development of citizens' groups and local NGOs, and serves as one of the focal points for the donor community. The Mission has established a network of NGO resource centres throughout Kosovo to provide access to office space and training programmes. NGO support centres have been opened in Fushë Kosovë/Kosovo Polje, Gjakovë/Djakovica, Gjilan/Gnjilane, Leposaviq/Leposaviæ, Mitrovicë/Kosovska Mitrovica, Prishtinë/Pristina, Pejë/Pe, Prizren and Shtërpcë/Strpce. In rural areas, the OSCE is assisting in identifying individuals who can develop local initiatives and establish links with NGOs elsewhere in Kosovo. In early 2000 a handbook was published to provide NGOs with all relevant information for formal registration in Kosovo.

NGO Resource Centres Political Party Services

Department of Election Operations

Municipal elections The Department of Election Operations is tasked with organising elections in Kosovo. Its main activity up to date has been the organisation of the municipal elections of October 2000 and provisional assembly elections in November 2001. Two preliminary studies were conducted by the International Foundation for Election Systems (IFES) and representatives of ODIHR in close co-operation with the United Nations, to assess registration needs and existing documentation. Two other major tasks of the Department are to assist and provide information to political entities and to train local individuals to organise elections, so that the OSCE can hand over the organisation of future elections to the people of Kosovo. OMIK has launched media campaigns to educate voters about forthcoming elections, emphasising the importance of citizens' future participation in the political life of Kosovo. The Elections Public Information Division also specifically targets women and youth in cooperation with local NGOs through public presentations on elections. In addition, OMIK provides support to developing the media, has temporary responsibility for regulation and licensing of the media and has assisted in the development of Radio - TV Kosovo. 74

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Central Election Commission

The Central Election Commission (CEC) was established on 18 April by UNMIK Regulation 2000/21, with responsibility for the conduct of elections, including the selection of the electoral system. The CEC set up municipal election commissions and made provision for domestic observers. It adopted rules on the certification of political parties, coalitions, citizens' initiatives, independent candidates, and on the registration of candidates. For the 2000 municipal elections it set up around 1,500 polling stations in 400 polling centres. Over 1,500 international polling supervisors supervised the elections. In the November 2001 assembly elections, the number of supervisors totalled over 13,000.

Department of Election Operations Elections 2000 Elections 2001

Department of Media Affairs

OMIK aims to help create conditions that support freedom of the press and freedom of information in Kosovo, through a number of activities. Independent media support The Media Affairs Department organises training programmes for Kosovar journalists in both Albanian and Serbian, to promote the development of professional and independent media. The Department also carries out a number of projects to help minorities develop their own media and distributes newspapers from Serbia to the Serb community in Kosovo. OMIK has prepared a number of media regulations, covering subjects such as the issuing of licenses and allocation of broadcasting frequencies. On the advice of OMIK, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General issued Regulation 2000/36 on the licensing and regulation of the broadcast media in Kosovo and Regulation 2000/37 on the conduct of the print media in Kosovo. Regulation 2000/36 formally established the Temporary Media Commissioner (TMC) and authorises the TMC to take action against media found in violation of the regulations or the associated codes of conduct for broadcast and print media. This provision has been used on several occasions, including in December 2000 when the Kosovo newspaper Bota Sot was fined for violation of the code of conduct. OMIK has established a new independent public service broadcast corporation in Kosovo. On 26 February the new studios of Radio-Television Kosovo (RTK) were opened. Contracted by OMIK, the European Broadcasting Union (EBU) runs RTK. A radio programme is broadcast in Albanian, Serbian and Turkish, and a daily television programme is broadcast via satellite in Albanian and Serbian. The Office of the Representative on Freedom of the Media (FOM) in Vienna observes media relevant development in all participating States, assuming an early warning function. The Office presents its findings regularly to the Permanent Council. The FOM organised a campaign to encourage young people to produce their own newspapers and organise cultural activities. The project toured the Balkans in the summer of 2001.

Media Code of conduct Licensing Media Report (OSCE 2000-1) OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media

Regulations, laws and standards

Radio-TV Kosovo

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3. Human Rights and Rule of Law

Department of Human Rights/Rule of Law

Human Rights Division OMIK's human rights mandate provides for unhindered access to all parts of Kosovo, in order to investigate human rights abuses and ensure that human rights protection and promotion concerns are addressed. Thirty eight international Mission Members work for the Department of HR/Rule of Law at the OSCE Headquarters in Prishtinë/Pristina and 60 international human rights and rule-of-law officers are deployed in the five UNMIK regions. These officers work closely with a variety of international partners, including UNHCR, IOM, KFOR, the UNMIK Police, and the UN Municipal Administration. One particular area of concern remains the human rights situation of Kosovo's minority communities (see Chapter Three). Human rights officers are also active in improving access to education for minority children, particularly those from the Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian communities. OMIK also engages in activities to promote long term human rights protection, including a wide ranging training programme, the promotion of reconciliation projects, and the integration of human rights issues into emerging institutions. Together with UNHCR OSCE produces regular Assessments of the Situation of Minorities, eight of which have been published to date. LSMS The Division monitors the legal system in Kosovo through its Legal Systems Monitoring Section (LSMS). Specially trained legal systems monitors cover court proceedings from the point of arrest, through pre-trial hearings, to indictment and trial. Two reports on the justice system in Kosovo from a human rights law perspective have been published. The LSMS also monitors trafficking in human beings through its regional Focal Points, and OSCE supports victims of trafficking through its victim assistance programmes. OMIK also facilitated the creation of Standard Operating Procedures to coordinate inter-agency responses for victims of trafficking. It has been conducting roundtables to brief judges and prosecutors on the January 2001 Regulation on the Prohibition of Trafficking in Persons. A further critical area of monitoring is on residential property rights, with OMIK helping to develop a more focused strategy to address the property problems faced by minorities. The Rule of Law Division supports the work of the UN Civil Administration (Pillar Two) in its efforts to establish the rule of law in Kosovo. One of the tasks of the Division is to provide logistical and material support to the courts. OMIK has also contributed to the revision of the Kosovo draft criminal code and the Kosovo draft criminal procedure code, contributing model draft laws to the Joint Advisory Council on Legislative Matters (JAC). Another task of the Division is to create a number of independent judicial institutions: · The Kosovo Judicial Institute (KJI), developed by the OSCE together with the Council of Europe and other partners, is responsible for the training and education of judges and prosecutors. Since becoming fully operational in July 2000, the Institute has organised workshops, seminars and information sessions for judges, prosecutors and defence counsels. Further training is conducted in the field of juvenile issues and international humanitarian law.

Rule of Law Division

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·

The Kosovo Law Centre (KLC) was established in June 2000 as an independent NGO to support the legal community. The KLC is staffed with national and international legal advisers under a joint management scheme (one international and one national co-director). The KLC has conducted seminars and has prepared three compilations of applicable law in English, Albanian and Serbian, with a fourth and fifth compilation currently under preparation. The Centre also publishes its own journal titled "Kosovo Legal Studies". The KLC has provided materials and technical assistance to the law faculty of Prishtinë/Pristina University on subjects including the modernisation of the curriculum and development of student exchange programmes with other European universities.

Ombudsperson

OMIK has been closely co-operating with the Council of Europe and other international and local organisations to develop an Ombudsperson's Institution for Kosovo. The task of the Ombudsperson's Institution is to investigate complaints from any person or entity in Kosovo concerning human rights violations and actions constituting an abuse of authority by the interim civil administration or any emerging central or local institution. It also accepts complaints about alleged abuses by international or internationally guided authorities. Since the Institution became fully functional in November 2000, most cases received have concerned labour disputes, access to social welfare and problems related to property. Serbian and Albanian legal staff support the Ombudsperson in his work. OMIK has also established a Criminal Defence Resource Centre (CDRC), which aims to assist national defence counsel in cases concerning alleged violations of international humanitarian law, and ethnically and politically motivated crimes. It provides access to information and research on international legal instruments, and can assist in the preparation of cases.

Human Rights Division Rule of Law Division Kosovo Law Centre Ombudsperson Institution

CDCR

Department of Police Affairs

Goals OSCE is mandated to develop and provide democratically oriented basic police training, which it does through the specially established Kosovo Police Service School (KPSS). The KPSS provides training for police with the goal of developing a police force that operates on the basis of democratic principles. It is staffed by international police instructors, local support staff and Kosovar legal experts, and located in Vushtrri/Vucitrn. The first eight-week course started in September 1999, with each course consisting of 250 to 500 participants. The course curriculum includes skills training in patrol duties, crimes investigation, gathering forensic evidence, traffic control, use of force and firearms, defensive tactics, first aid, applicable laws and interview techniques. Education on international standards of human rights is integrated into all core subjects. The OSCE Department of Police Education and Development co-operates with UNMIK Police in the processing of applicants for the KPS. Efforts are made to recruit men and women into the local police service who reflect the ethnic diversity within Kosovo. The recruits also represent different age groups, backgrounds and geographical areas within Kosovo. On average the trained groups include 16% women and 13% minority representatives. After the 77

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basic course, candidates undergo a field training of 19 weeks conducted by specially trained UNMIK field training officers (FTOs). The goal of the KPS is to train 10,000 Kosovo Police Service officers. At the end of 2001 the number of KPS officers was 4,392.

Department for Police Affairs UNMIK Police

Co-operation with Other Actors

As part of the UNMIK structure, OMIK participates in the inter-Pillar Joint Planning Committee which co-ordinates Pillar activities. Council of Europe OMIK co-operates closely with the Council of Europe (CoE) on legislative matters in Kosovo, especially with its Venice Commission and the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of Europe (CLRAE). The CoE also assists OMIK in the Judicial Training Section and the further development of the Kosovo Law Centre. As the principal organiser of the 2000 municipal and the 2001 provisional assembly elections, OSCE coordinated the activities of over 13,000 election monitors. OMIK closely co-operates with UNHCR on minorities and human rights, reflected in the joint publication of reports on the situation of minorities in Kosovo. Eight of these reports have been published so far. Links with KFOR are important for providing a secure environment for OSCE activities in Kosovo. These are maintained through KFOR Liaison Officers within OMIK.

Council of Europe Reports on Ethnic Minorities in Kosovo UNHCR KFOR

UNHCR

KFOR

4. Priorities and Challenges for 2002

OMIK has done and will continue to play a critical role within the UNMIK Pillar structure. It has successfully completed a number of important tasks since it was first deployed, including the training of Kosovar police, and the establishment of an electoral system and a civil register that fascilitated the running of the municipal elections in October 2000 and assembly elections in November 2001. Nonetheless, there remains much to be done in the year 2002. Minorities The goal of achieving a peaceful multi-ethnic Kosovo has so far proved elusive, and is unlikely to be achieved in the near future. Nevertheless, OMIK will need to continue to cooperate with other international and local actors to try to diminish inter-ethnic hatred and strife. Priorities in this area remain the situation of the Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian minorities, and especially attempts to de-escalate tensions in the ethnically divided city of Mitrovicë/Kosovska Mitrovica, where OMIK plans to open an inter-ethnic community centre.

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Handover of institutions

Another priority for OMIK in 2002 will be to furtherensure that the transfer of power of policy and management to the people of Kosovo is completed. One example is the newly established Interim Media Commission, administered by Kosovars, which will replace the Temporary Media Commissioner's office as the media regulatory body in Kosovo. However, recent experience has shown that the recurring problem of bias and inflammatory nationalist rhetoric in certain sections of the media will make this a very difficult task. OMIK will also need to continue its activities in promoting democratic principles, transparent government, and respect for the rule of law and human rights. Of special concern remains the fight against trafficking in human beings in Kosovo. Another high priority is the protection of property rights and the development of criminal justice to bring it in line with international human rights standards. In this regard, some of the limitations of the integrated UNMIK structure may well come to surface. While UNMIK is formally in charge of developing the legal framework, OMIK is responsible for institution building, including in the field of the judiciary. This can in some instances lead to duplication and frictions between the two organisations. By contrast, co-operation with the Council of Europe has proven to be very efficient, as in the case of the Ombudsperson Institution. The overall security situation in Kosovo remains of general concern, and has been adversely affected by recent fighting in neighbouring southern Serbia and Macedonia. The deterioration of the security situation has had repercussions for OSCE's activities, and there have been some instances of OSCE staff being the target of violence by some elements of the local population. More generally, OMIK has emphasized three main policy principles which will guide its activities in the areas of democratic governance and justice: promoting autonomy and local ownership of institutions; encouraging the de-politicisation of public institutions, including the police, judiciary, civil service, media and education system; and mainstreaming democratic processes, including promotion of transparency, popular participation and human rights.

Independent Commission

Rule of law and human rights

Security

Guiding principles

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Organigram 3: OSCE Mission in Kosovo - Headquarters

Head of Mission

Deputy Head of Mission

Chef de Cabinet´s Office Field Coordinator Press & Public Information Internal Information Liaison with KFOR Legal Affairs Situation Room

JIAS Department

Democratic Governance & Civil Society

Administration & Support

Communications & IT

Department of Police Education and Development

Community Liaison Operating Police School

Human Rights Division

Legal Systems Monitoring Judicial Support Legal Community Support

Department of Democratisation

Political Party Development Civil Administration Support NGO/Civil Society

Department of Media Affairs

Independent Media Support Media Monitoring Media Regulation, Laws & Standards

Department of Elections

Elections Operations CEC Secretariat

Kosovo Police Service School Ombudsperson Institution; Judicial Institute; Institute for Civil Administration Political Party Service Centres

Interim Media Commission; Radio-TV Kosovo

Central Election Commission; Municipal Elections Commission; Election Complaints and Appeals Sub-Commission.

Rule of Law Division

- HR Training and monitoring - Protection and promotion of minority rights

Kosovo Law Centre; Criminal Defence and Resource Centre.

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Box 4: OSCE Mission in Kosovo - Regional Structure Offices of the OSCE Mission in Kosovo

In the light of the general election of 17 November 2001 the OSCE has undergone a comprehensive restructuring. The most visible result of this is a change in its field structure, previously consisting of 21 field offices and regional centres across Kosovo. There will now be nine offices, each covering a number of municipalities, as well as a satellite office in Dragash/Dragas. The offices of the OSCE Mission will be located in the following municipalities and cover the following geographic regions: Gjilan/Gnjilane Mitrovicë/Mitrovica Leposaviq/Leposavi Lipjan/Lipljan Rahovec/Orahovac Pejë/Pe Prishtinë/Pristina Prizren Shtërpce/Strpce covering also Kamenice/Kamenica, Novo Berde/Novo Brdo and Viti/Vitina; covering also Skënderaj/Srbica and Vushtrri/Vucitrn; covering also Zubin Potok and Zveçan/Zvecan; covering also Shtime/Stimlje and Ferizaj/Urosevac; covering also Gjakove/Djakovica and Malisheve/Malisevo; covering also Decan/Decani, Istog/Istok and Klinë/Klina; covering also Gllogovc/Glogovac, Fushë Kosovë/Kosovo Polje, Obiliq/Obilic and Podujevë/Podujevo; covering also Suhareke/Suva Reka and Dragash/Dragas; covering also Kaçanik/Kacanik.

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Annex 1 List of International Activities by Area

This Annex provides a list of some of the projects that have recently been, or are being carried out by international organisations and NGOs active in Kosovo. Projects are listed under eight main areas that are likely to be of most interest to members of OSCE missions: democratisation, elections, media development, human rights and rule of law, police development, education, gender and minorities.

Democratisation

Organisation

OMIK

Department

Democratisation

Project

Supporting democratic governance and civil society

Timing

Ongoing

Location

Kosovo-wide

OMIK

Democratisation (together with ICA)

Training of civil administrators

Ongoing

Kosovo-wide

OMIK

Elections

Training for political parties

Ongoing

Kosovo-wide

OMIK

Democratisation

Seminar "The role of opposition political parties in municipal governance"

May 2001

Pristina

CIDA

Strengthening of civil society

Completed March 2001

Kosovo-wide

NDI

Citizen political participation

Ongoing

Kosovo-wide

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Elections

Organisation

OMIK

Department

Elections and Democratisation

Project

Electoral seminars for Kosovo's Serb community

Timing

Since April 2001

Location

Leposavic and Gracanica (so far)

OMIK

Elections

Electoral seminars for Kosovo Serb leaders

Since April 2001

Leposavic (start)

OMIK

Through CEC

Seminars on electoral systems for Kosovo opinion leaders

Since March 2001

Kosovo-wide

IFES

Election assistance programmes

Completed 2001

Kosovo-wide

Human Rights and Rule of Law

Organisation

OMIK

Department

Human Rights Division

Project

Human rights monitoring and promotion

Timing

Ongoing

Location

Kosovo-wide

OMIK

Human Rights Division Human Rights and Rule of

Action against trafficking in human beings

Ongoing

Kosovo-wide

OMIK

Law (together with ICA and UNMIK

Human rights workshops for Communities Committees

May 2001

Prizren (start)

OMIK

Support to the Ombudsperson Institution

Ongoing

Kosovo-wide

OMIK

Together with Ombudsperson

Workshop for NGOs on the work of the Ombudsperson Institution

March 2001

Pristina

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CIDA

Local Initiatives Program

Promotion of human and minority rights and strengthening the capacities of local institutions

Until March 2001

Kosovo-wide

OMIK

Human Rights and Rule of Law

Support to the KLC

Since June 2000

Kosovo-wide

OMIK

Through KLC

Legal training for law students

April 2001

Pristina

OMIK

Through KLC

Workshop "The Jurisdiction between Housing and Property Directorate and the Kosovo Courts"

March 2001

Pristina

OMIK

LSMS

Review of the criminal justice system

Ongoing

Kosovo-wide

OMIK

Through KLC

Seminar on alternative resolution of family disputes

February 2001

Pristina

OMIK

Rule of Law Division

Support to the KJI

Ongoing

Kosovo-wide

OMIK

Through KJI

Seminar on alternatives to prison sentences

April 2001

Pristina

CIDA

Support to correctional service

Until March 2001

Kosovo-wide

CoE

Venice Commission

Participation in the Working Group on the interim Legal Framework

Since Mar 2001

Kosovo-wide

USAID

Through ABA-CEELI

Judicial reform, legislative assistance, and legal education

Ongoing

Kosovo-wide

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USAID

Through NCSC and DPK Consulting

Court administration

Ongoing

Kosovo-wide

Police Development

Organisation

OMIK

Department

Police Education

Project

Police training

Timing

Since September 1999

Location

Vucitrn

CoE

Directorate General of Human Rights

Police and human rights programme

Since 1999

Kosovo-wide

Education

Organisation

SEEDUCOP

Department

Through various organisations

Project

Links to projects in the field of education

Timing

Various

Location

Various

CoE

Cooperation and Technical Assistance Division

Support to the University of Pristina

June 2000-May 2002

Pristina

Gender

Organisation

OMIK

Department

Project

Seminar "Women in Politics"

Timing

May 2001

Location

Pristina

UN

UNIFEM

Empowerment of Kosovar women

Ongoing

Kosovo-wide

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UNHCR

KWI

Several projects

2001-2002

Kosovo-wide

ADAB

Dignity to the women

Ongoing

Kosovo-wide

World Learning

STAR Network

Women's Leadership Program for Democratic Social Change in SEE

Ongoing

Kosovo-wide

Media Development

Organisation

OMIK

Department

Media Affairs

Project

Support to TMC, Radio-TV Kosovo, and others

Timing

Ongoing

Location

Kosovo-wide

SEERECON

Support to Radio-TV Kosovo

Since 2000

TMC

Elections media monitoring

Fall 2000 and 2001

Kosovo-wide

USAID

Through IREX (ProMedia)

Support to independent media

Ongoing

Kosovo-wide

CIDA

Through Réseau Liberté

Training of Kosovar broadcast and print journalists

Until March 2001

Kosovo-wide

IFJ

Media For Democracy in South-Eastern Europe

2000-2003

SEE (incl. Kosovo)

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Minorities

Organisation

OMIK/UNHCR Assessment of the Situation of ethnic minorities

Department

Project

Timing

Ongoing

Location

Kosovo-wide

OMIK

Training for young Roma journalists

Since May 2001

Pristina

MAI

Multi-ethnic humanitarian radio programmes in Kosovo 2

Ongoing

Kosovo-wide

CoE

Cultural heritage of Prizren

Since September 2000

NRC

Providing legal aid to refugees and IDPs

Ongoing

Bosnia and Kosovo

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Annex 2 Further Links and Resources

This Annex provides further links and resources on Kosovo, enabling the reader to access information on issues that could not be dealt with in depth in the Mission Information Package. The Annex does not contain information on international organisations dealing with Kosovo or their activities, which are dealt with in Chapters Four, Five and Six and in Annex 1. The listing of web-sites in this Annex does not imply CORE endorsement of or responsibility for the contents or the views expressed.

A

1.

General Collections of Links and Materials on Kosovo

International

INCORE Guide to Internet Sources on Conflict and Ethnicity in Kosovo

This Northern Ireland based Initiative on Conflict Resolution and Ethnicity (INCORE) established in 1993 offers in its Version 4 (November 2000) lists of web-links on prime sources, email lists and newsgroups, news sources, special news reports, non-governmental organisations, governmental organisations, academic articles and documents, various sources and maps. Transatlantic Internet Seminar Series Kosovo (TISK 2000) This seminar series "Contending Approaches to International Peace and Conflict Resolution: The Kosovo/a Conflict" , sponsored by the Bosch-Foundation, offered a 14 week internet course on the Kosovo conflict and international approaches in 2000. The syllabus contains extensive lists of suggested further reading and links to web-sites on various aspects of the Kosovo crisis. An updated version for 2001 is also available on the same site, and the version for 2002 is forthcoming. The Balkans Pages. Kosovo ­ Kosova Crisis Collection of materials prior to the NATO air campaign, which still contains useful further links. Mario's Cyberspace Station on the Kosovo Crisis Large collection of various sources and links to different aspects of the conflict in Kosovo until the end of 1998, including news archives, maps, background articles and documents. Federation of American Scientists. Military Analysis Network. Target Kosovo This web-site of the Federation of American Scientists (FAS) was last updated in June 2000 but nevertheless contains useful links and background information, especially on the military aspect of the Kosovo crisis. Kosovo Conflict 1999: Special Study Section Still useful compilation of extensive resources on Kosovo for high school students, including links to sources for news, country and historical information, international organizations, languages, ethnic groups, religion, biography, culture and arts.

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The Centre for Peace in the Balkans This Toronto based Centre offers a wide range of materials on the Balkans including Kosovo, with news, links, and background articles from a perspective that is critical towards NATO. Balkania.net. Premier Balkan Source for Investigative Journalism Anti-Western collection of materials on Kosovo in English, covering the historical, social and political background, legal issues, terrorism and organised crime, military and intelligence, geo-strategy.

2.

Serb

Kosovo.com. The Focal Webpoint for Kosovo and Metohia Issues

Official web-site of the Serbian Orthodox Diocese of Raska and Prizren in English with daily news and further links to background information on politics, history and Serb orthodoxy in Kosovo. Beta News Agency: Kosovo On-Line This Serb news-agency offers short background articles in Serb and English on various aspects of the Kosovo problem, presenting both the Serb and the Kosovar Albanian point of view.

3.

Albanian

Kosova Crisis Center

This web-site has not been updated since October 1999, but still contains useful links and information on the history and culture of Kosovo from an Albanian perspective.

B

1.

News

E-Mail Lists and Newsgroups

Balkan Academic News

Balkan Academic News (BAN) is an email group linking scholars, activists, government officials, students and others dealing with or interested in the Balkans. BAN serves as a network for the exchange of academic information on the Balkans. It distributes calls for papers, conference announcements, book reviews, queries and encourages academic discussion on the region. Balkan Human Rights List Since February 2000 the Balkan Human Rights List has been functioning as a distribution list for news on human and minority rights in South Eastern Europe (Balkans). AlbaNews AlbaNews is a mailing list dedicated to the distribution of news and information related to Albania, Kosovo, the Albanian populated regions in FYR of Macedonia and Montenegro, as well as the Albanian diaspora world-wide. It has archives going back to August 1995. 89

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2.

News on South Eastern Europe (including Kosovo)

Alternative Information Network

The Alternative Information Network (Alternativna Informativna Mreza, Rrjeti Informativ Alternativ) (AIM) covers all of the states which made up the SFRY, as well as Albania, Bulgaria and Greece. It has editorial boards in Athens, Banja Luka, Belgrade, Ljubljana, Podgorica, Pristina, Sarajevo, Skopje, Sofia, Tirana and Zagreb. Institute for War & Peace Reporting: Balkan Crisis Reports Founded in 1991 the London based Institute for War & Peace Reporting (IWPR) covers among others the conflicts in South Eastern Europe through its biweekly Balkan Crisis Reports since February 1999. RFE/RL Newsline Southeastern Europe Concise information from Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) on politically relevant events in South Eastern Europe every weekday in English. Archives date back until April 1997. RFE/RL Balkan Report More detailed report by the same publishers as above on events in South Eastern Europe every Tuesday and Friday in English. Archives date back until July 1997. RFE/RL South Slavic Report The South Slavic Report offers weekly background articles in English on this region dating from December 1999, by the same publishers as above. Hellenic Resources Network: Balkan News by Date The US based Hellenic Resources Institute set up the Hellenic Resources Network (HR-Net) in order to collect news and information relevant to Greek interests. It offers daily Balkan News in English from over 30 news sources with archives dating back to February 1996.

3. 3.1

News on Kosovo International

Yahoo! New. World Full Coverage. Kosovo Peacekeeping

Daily worldwide news stories on Kosovo in English with further links to sources, background information, and related web-sites.

3.2

Serb

SerbiaInfo: Kosovo & Metohia

Official news-server of the Serbian Government with information on current affairs, economy and culture in Kosovo in English.

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Serbian National Council of Kosovo and Metohija Communiques of the Serbian National Council of Kosovo and Metohija (SNC-KM) which is presided over by the Bishop of Raska and Prizren, Artemije, in English. Borba Online Daily news-server in English and Serbian on events in Serbia with a special section on Kosovo.

3.3

Albanian

Kosova Live

Prishtinë/Pristina based news agency providing almost daily information on political events in Kosovo in Albanian and English with archives dating back to October 2000. Kosova-Info-Line Kosova-Info-Line brings daily news and background reports from various sources in German. Radio Televizioni 21 Radio Televizioni 21 provides daily information about events in and related to Kosovo in Albanian and English. The web-site has no archiv.

C

1.

Selected Issues in Kosovo

Human Rights

Humanitarian Community Information Centre

The Humanitarian Community Information Centre (HCIC) is administered by the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). The web-site gathers information about humanitarian assistance projects (who does what where) in Kosovo, link-lists and maps. The Balkans Human Rights Web Pages. Kosovo This Greek based web page contains news, reports and background articles from various sources on the human rights situation in Kosovo and other Balkan countries, including links to other human rights organisations. US Department of State. Human Rights Report on Kosovo 2000 Released in February 2001 this report describes the situation in Kosovo in the fields of respect for human rights, civil liberties, political rights, etc. Human Rights Watch The US Human Rights Watch (HRW) is one of the most influential human rights NGOs covering the whole world. Information about Kosovo can be found inter alia in their human rights world reports or through a search function. 91

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Humanitarian Law Centre ­ Fond za Humanitarno Pravo The Belgrade based Humanitarian Law Centre (HLC) of Serb human rights activist Natasa Kandi provides information on human rights concerns in Yugoslavia, including Kosovo, in English, Serb and Albanian. Council for the Defence of Human Rights and Freedoms (CDHRF)/ Këshilli për Mbrojtjen e të Drejtave e të Lirive të Njeriut (KMDLNJ) This Prishtinë/Pristina based Kosovar Albanian human rights organisation offers the latest information on the human rights situation in Kosovo and the possibility to subscribe to a news sheet. Kosova Helsinki Committee As member of the International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights (IHF-HR) the Kosova Helsinki Committee (KHC) reports on the human rights situation in Kosovo. HOMEPAGE of Wolfgang Plarre Collection of links, resources and news especially on humanitarian and human rights issues in Kosovo. Human Rights Archives on the Genocide in Bosnia (and the attempted genocide in Kosovo) This web-page on Kosovo contains information on a number of human rights reports, ethnic and cultural cleansing, and further links. Balkan Human Rights Network The website of the Balkan Human Rights Network, a coalition of human rights NGOs from the Balkans, offers a wide range of materials related to human rights in general and to Balkan affairs in particular.

2.

Ethnic Minorities

UNHCR/OSCE Assessments on the Situation of Ethnic Minorities in Kosovo

Since June 1999 UNHCR and OSCE have published regular reports (bi-monthly) assessing the situation of ethnic minorities in Kosovo. MINELRES. Country Information. Serbia-Montenegro Links related to human rights and minorities, legislation, NGOs etc. inter alia on Kosovo. The Minority Electronic Resources (MINELRES) homepage contains in addition useful information and links on all aspects related to national minorities. European Roma Rights Center: Roma in the Kosovo Crisis The Budapest based European Roma Rights Center (ERCC) updates on a regular basis information about the situation of the different Roma populations in Kosovo. 92

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3.

Media

South East Europe Media Organisation: About Kosovo/Kosova

The website of the South East Europe Media Organisation (SEEMO) - a non-governmental, non-profit network of editors, media executives and leading journalists from newspapers, magazines, radio, TV, internet, news media and news agencies in South Eastern Europe - contains background information about media developments in Kosovo, relevant media regulations, addresses and links. Press Now Since April 1993 Press Now, a Dutch based NGO, has been supporting independent media in BosniaHerzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia (incl. Kosovo and Vojvodina) and Slovenia. The web-site offers qualitative media analysis on Kosovo every two weeks, plus link lists.

D

1.

Official Documents

UN Documents

UNMIK Regulations UN SC Resolution 1244 (10 June 1999) UN SC Resolution 1239 (14 May 1999) UN SC Resolution 1207 (17 November 1998) UN SC Resolution 1203 (24 October 1998) UN SC Resolution 1199 (23 September 1998) UN SC Resolution 1160 (31 March 1998) UN SC Resolution 855 (9 August 1993)

2.

OSCE Documents

OSCE PC.DEC/382 (20 November 2000) OSCE PC.DEC/354 (8 June 2000) OSCE PC.DEC/343 (9 March 2000) OSCE PC.DEC/342 (24 February 2000) OSCE PC.DEC/341 (10 February 2000) OSCE PC.DEC/333 (15 December 1999) OSCE PC.DEC/317 (7 October 1999) OSCE PC.DEC/305 (1 July 1999) OSCE PC.DEC/296 (8 June 1999) OSCE PC.DEC/286 (18 February 1999) OSCE PC.DEC/285 (18 February 1999)

3.

Other Documents

Military Technical Agreement between KFOR and the Governments of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia (9 June 1999) "Helsinki Agreement" on Russian Participation in KFOR (18 June 1999) Undertaking of Demilitarisation and Transformation by the UCK (20 June 1999)

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E

Maps

Balkan Region Kosovo KFOR Deployment Kosovo Municipalities Municipality Names in Albanian, Serbian, Turkish Towns and Villages in Albanian, Serbian Mitrovicë/Kosovska Mitrovica (March 2000) Maps on Populations in Kosovo Presevo, Bujanovac, Medveda: Ethnic Minorities, Border Crossings (March 2000) Damaged Orthodox Churches in Kosovo Who is Doing What Where (April 2000) Demining in Kosovo

F

1.

Academic Resources

Research Institutions

International Crisis Group: Balkans Program

The International Crisis Group (ICG) is an international NGO working in the fields of conflict prevention and post conflict prevention. With a presence on the ground, ICG provides policy advice for political decision-makers through its reports on Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia.

European Centre for Minority Issues: Kosovo/a Civil Society Project The goal of this project run by the European Centre for Minority Issues (ECMI) is to enhance dialogue between the different ethnic minorities in Kosovo.

2.

Books, Reports and Articles

There is a still growing body of literature on various aspects of the Kosovo crisis, much of which can be accessed in electronic form via the internet. This Mission Information Package cannot provide an exhaustive list of these sources, but has listed some of the most useful. Below, the reader will find books or articles which are accessible in the internet and which have already been referred to in the MIP or which provide essential information on issues of primary interest to prospective Mission members. The sources are listed in reverse chronological order. The Kosovo Report of the Independent International Commission on Kosovo (October 2000) Initiated by Swedish Prime Minister Göran Persson in 1999, and endorsed by UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, the Independent International Commission on Kosovo chaired by Richard Goldstone of South Africa, presented its report on 23 October 2000, recommending "conditional independence" for Kosovo, and also concluding that the NATO air campaign was illegal but morally legitimate. Albrecht Schnabel and Ramesh Thakur (Eds.), Kosovo and the Challenge of Humanitarian Intervention. Selective Indignation, Collective Intervention, and International Citizenship , March 2000 (Peace and Governance Programme of the United Nations University)

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Kosovo/Kosova. As Seen, As Told, Part I: October 1998 to June 1999 (December 1999) Part II: 14 June to 31 October 1999 (December 1999) U.S. State Department Report, Erasing History: Ethnic Cleansing in Kosovo , May 1999 Stefan Troebst, Conflict in Kosovo: Failure of Prevention? An Analytical Documentation, 1992-1998 , May 1998 (ECMI Working Papers, 1) Noel Malcom, Kosovo. A Short History, Chapter I. Orientation: Places, Names and Peoples 1998 Janet Reineck, Seizing the Past, Forging the Present: Changing Visions of Self and Nation among the Kosova Albanians (Anthropology of East Europe Review, Vol 11, Nos. 1-2, Autumn, 1993, Special Issue: War Among the Yugoslavs)

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Annex 3 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244

United Nations S/RES/1244 (1999) RESOLUTION 1244 (1999) Adopted by the Security Council at its 4011th meeting, on 10 June 1999 The Security Council, Bearing in mind the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, and the primary responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security, Recalling its resolutions 1160 (1998) of 31 March 1998, 1199 (1998) of 23 September 1998, 1203 (1998) of 24 October 1998 and 1239 (1999) of 14 May 1999, Regretting that there has not been full compliance with the requirements of these resolutions, Determined to resolve the grave humanitarian situation in Kosovo, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and to provide for the safe and free return of all refugees and displaced persons to their homes, Condemning all acts of violence against the Kosovo population as well as all terrorist acts by any party, Recalling the statement made by the Secretary-General on 9 April 1999, expressing concern at the humanitarian tragedy taking place in Kosovo, Reaffirming the right of all refugees and displaced persons to return to their homes in safety, Recalling the jurisdiction and the mandate of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Welcoming the general principles on a political solution to the Kosovo crisis adopted on 6 May 1999 (S/1999/516, annex 1 to this resolution) and welcoming also the acceptance by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia of the principles set forth in points 1 to 9 of the paper presented in Belgrade on 2 June 1999 (S/1999/649, annex 2 to this resolution), and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia's agreement to that paper, Reaffirming the commitment of all Member States to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the other States of the region, as set out in the Helsinki Final Act and annex 2, Reaffirming the call in previous resolutions for substantial autonomy and meaningful selfadministration for Kosovo,

10 June 1999

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Determining that the situation in the region continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security, Determined to ensure the safety and security of international personnel and the implementation by all concerned of their responsibilities under the present resolution, and acting for these purposes under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, 1. Decides that a political solution to the Kosovo crisis shall be based on the general principles in annex 1 and as further elaborated in the principles and other required elements in annex 2; Welcomes the acceptance by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia of the principles and other required elements referred to in paragraph 1 above, and demands the full cooperation of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in their rapid implementation; Demands in particular that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia put an immediate and verifiable end to violence and repression in Kosovo, and begin and complete verifiable phased withdrawal from Kosovo of all military, police and paramilitary forces according to a rapid timetable, with which the deployment of the international security presence in Kosovo will be synchronized; Confirms that after the withdrawal an agreed number of Yugoslav and Serb military and police personnel will be permitted to return to Kosovo to perform the functions in accordance with annex 2; Decides on the deployment in Kosovo, under United Nations auspices, of international civil and security presences, with appropriate equipment and personnel as required, and welcomes the agreement of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to such presences; Requests the Secretary-General to appoint, in consultation with the Security Council, a Special Representative to control the implementation of the international civil presence, and further requests the Secretary-General to instruct his Special Representative to coordinate closely with the international security presence to ensure that both presences operate towards the same goals and in a mutually supportive manner; Authorizes Member States and relevant international organizations to establish the international security presence in Kosovo as set out in point 4 of annex 2 with all necessary means to fulfil its responsibilities under paragraph 9 below; Affirms the need for the rapid early deployment of effective international civil and security presences to Kosovo, and demands that the parties cooperate fully in their deployment; Decides that the responsibilities of the international security presence to be deployed and acting in Kosovo will include: Deterring renewed hostilities, maintaining and where necessary enforcing a ceasefire, and ensuring the withdrawal and preventing the return into Kosovo of Federal and Republic military, police and paramilitary forces, except as provided in point 6 of annex 2; Demilitarizing the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and other armed Kosovo Albanian groups as required in paragraph 15 below;

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

(a)

(b)

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(c)

Establishing a secure environment in which refugees and displaced persons can return home in safety, the international civil presence can operate, a transitional administration can be established, and humanitarian aid can be delivered; Ensuring public safety and order until the international civil presence can take responsibility for this task; Supervising demining until the international civil presence can, as appropriate, take over responsibility for this task; Supporting, as appropriate, and coordinating closely with the work of the international civil presence; Conducting border monitoring duties as required; Ensuring the protection and freedom of movement of itself, the international civil presence, and other international organizations; Authorizes the Secretary-General, with the assistance of relevant international organizations, to establish an international civil presence in Kosovo in order to provide an interim administration for Kosovo under which the people of Kosovo can enjoy substantial autonomy within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and which will provide transitional administration while establishing and overseeing the development of provisional democratic self-governing institutions to ensure conditions for a peaceful and normal life for all inhabitants of Kosovo; Decides that the main responsibilities of the international civil presence will include: Promoting the establishment, pending a final settlement, of substantial autonomy and selfgovernment in Kosovo, taking full account of annex 2 and of the Rambouillet accords (S/1999/648); Performing basic civilian administrative functions where and as long as required; Organizing and overseeing the development of provisional institutions for democratic and autonomous self-government pending a political settlement, including the holding of elections; Transferring, as these institutions are established, its administrative responsibilities while overseeing and supporting the consolidation of Kosovo's local provisional institutions and other peace-building activities; Facilitating a political process designed to determine Kosovo's future status, taking into account the Rambouillet accords (S/1999/648); In a final stage, overseeing the transfer of authority from Kosovo's provisional institutions to institutions established under a political settlement; Supporting the reconstruction of key infrastructure and other economic reconstruction; Supporting, in coordination with international humanitarian organizations, humanitarian and disaster relief aid;

(d)

(e)

(f)

(g) (h)

10.

11. (a)

(b) (c)

(d)

(e)

(f)

(g) (h)

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(i)

Maintaining civil law and order, including establishing local police forces and meanwhile through the deployment of international police personnel to serve in Kosovo; Protecting and promoting human rights; Assuring the safe and unimpeded return of all refugees and displaced persons to their homes in Kosovo; Emphasizes the need for coordinated humanitarian relief operations, and for the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to allow unimpeded access to Kosovo by humanitarian aid organizations and to cooperate with such organizations so as to ensure the fast and effective delivery of international aid; Encourages all Member States and international organizations to contribute to economic and social reconstruction as well as to the safe return of refugees and displaced persons, and emphasizes in this context the importance of convening an international donors' conference, particularly for the purposes set out in paragraph 11 (g) above, at the earliest possible date; Demands full cooperation by all concerned, including the international security presence, with the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia; Demands that the KLA and other armed Kosovo Albanian groups end immediately all offensive actions and comply with the requirements for demilitarization as laid down by the head of the international security presence in consultation with the Special Representative of the SecretaryGeneral; Decides that the prohibitions imposed by paragraph 8 of resolution 1160 (1998) shall not apply to arms and related matériel for the use of the international civil and security presences; Welcomes the work in hand in the European Union and other international organizations to develop a comprehensive approach to the economic development and stabilization of the region affected by the Kosovo crisis, including the implementation of a Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe with broad international participation in order to further the promotion of democracy, economic prosperity, stability and regional cooperation; Demands that all States in the region cooperate fully in the implementation of all aspects of this resolution; Decides that the international civil and security presences are established for an initial period of 12 months, to continue thereafter unless the Security Council decides otherwise; Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Council at regular intervals on the implementation of this resolution, including reports from the leaderships of the international civil and security presences, the first reports to be submitted within 30 days of the adoption of this resolution; Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.

(j) (k)

12.

13.

14.

15.

16.

17.

18.

19.

20.

21.

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Annex 1 Statement by the Chairman on the conclusion of the meeting of the G-8 Foreign Ministers held at the Petersberg Centre on 6 May 1999 The G-8 Foreign Ministers adopted the following general principles on the political solution to the Kosovo crisis: Immediate and verifiable end of violence and repression in Kosovo; Withdrawal from Kosovo of military, police and paramilitary forces; Deployment in Kosovo of effective international civil and security presences, endorsed and adopted by the United Nations, capable of guaranteeing the achievement of the common objectives; Establishment of an interim administration for Kosovo to be decided by the Security Council of the United Nations to ensure conditions for a peaceful and normal life for all inhabitants in Kosovo; The safe and free return of all refugees and displaced persons and unimpeded access to Kosovo by humanitarian aid organizations; A political process towards the establishment of an interim political framework agreement providing for a substantial self-government for Kosovo, taking full account of the Rambouillet accords and the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the other countries of the region, and the demilitarization of the KLA; Comprehensive approach to the economic development and stabilization of the crisis region.

-

-

-

-

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Annex 2 Agreement should be reached on the following principles to move towards a resolution of the Kosovo crisis: 1. 2. An immediate and verifiable end of violence and repression in Kosovo. Verifiable withdrawal from Kosovo of all military, police and paramilitary forces according to a rapid timetable. Deployment in Kosovo under United Nations auspices of effective international civil and security presences, acting as may be decided under Chapter VII of the Charter, capable of guaranteeing the achievement of common objectives. The international security presence with substantial North Atlantic Treaty Organization participation must be deployed under unified command and control and authorized to establish a safe environment for all people in Kosovo and to facilitate the safe return to their homes of all displaced persons and refugees. Establishment of an interim administration for Kosovo as a part of the international civil presence under which the people of Kosovo can enjoy substantial autonomy within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, to be decided by the Security Council of the United Nations. The interim administration to provide transitional administration while establishing and overseeing the development of provisional democratic self-governing institutions to ensure conditions for a peaceful and normal life for all inhabitants in Kosovo. After withdrawal, an agreed number of Yugoslav and Serbian personnel will be permitted to return to perform the following functions: Liaison with the international civil mission and the international security presence; Marking/clearing minefields; Maintaining a presence at Serb patrimonial sites; Maintaining a presence at key border crossings. Safe and free return of all refugees and displaced persons under the supervision of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and unimpeded access to Kosovo by humanitarian aid organizations. A political process towards the establishment of an interim political framework agreement providing for substantial self-government for Kosovo, taking full account of the Rambouillet accords and the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the other countries of the region, and the demilitarization of UCK. Negotiations between the parties for a settlement should not delay or disrupt the establishment of democratic self-governing institutions.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

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9.

A comprehensive approach to the economic development and stabilization of the crisis region. This will include the implementation of a stability pact for South-Eastern Europe with broad international participation in order to further promotion of democracy, economic prosperity, stability and regional cooperation. Suspension of military activity will require acceptance of the principles set forth above in addition to agreement to other, previously identified, required elements, which are specified in the footnote below.1 A military-technical agreement will then be rapidly concluded that would, among other things, specify additional modalities, including the roles and functions of Yugoslav/Serb personnel in Kosovo:

10.

Withdrawal Procedures for withdrawals, including the phased, detailed schedule and delineation of a buffer area in Serbia beyond which forces will be withdrawn;

Returning personnel Equipment associated with returning personnel; Terms of reference for their functional responsibilities; Timetable for their return; Delineation of their geographical areas of operation; Rules governing their relationship to the international security presence and the international civil mission.

1

Other required elements: A rapid and precise timetable for withdrawals, meaning, e.g., seven days to complete withdrawal and air defence weapons withdrawn outside a 25 kilometre mutual safety zone within 48 hours; Return of personnel for the four functions specified above will be under the supervision of the international security presence and will be limited to a small agreed number (hundreds, not thousands); Suspension of military activity will occur after the beginning of verifiable withdrawals; The discussion and achievement of a military-technical agreement shall not extend the previously determined time for completion of withdrawals. 102

-

-

-

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Annex 4 Mandate of the OSCE Mission in Kosovo

Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe PC. DEC/305, 1 July 1999 Permanent Council Original: ENGLISH _________________________________________________________________________________ 237th Plenary Meeting PC Journal No. 237, Agenda item 2 Decision No. 305 The Permanent Council, Referring to United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244 of 10 June 1999 and to the report by the Secretary-General of the United Nations of 12 June 1999 (S/1999/672), Determined that the OSCE will contribute to the implementation of UNSC Resolution 1244, in particular the relevant parts of operative paragraph 11 of this resolution, Decides that: The transitional OSCE Task Force for Kosovo, established by the Permanent Council on 8 June (PC.DEC/296) will cease to exist from 1 July 1999; The OSCE Mission in Kosovo is established from the same date.

The OSCE Mission in Kosovo will constitute a distinct component within the overall framework of the United Nations Interim Administration in Kosovo (UNMIK). The OSCE Mission in Kosovo will, within this overall framework, take the lead role in matters relating to institution- and democracy-building and human rights. It will co-operate closely with other relevant organizations ­ intergovernmental and, as appropriate, non-governmental ­ in the planning and implementation of its tasks. The OSCE Mission in Kosovo will concentrate its work in the following interrelated areas: 1. Human resources capacity-building, including the training of a new Kosovo police service within a Kosovo Police School which it will establish and operate, the training of judicial personnel and the training of civil administrators at various levels, in co-operation, inter alia, with the Council of Europe; Democratization and governance, including the development of a civil society, nongovernmental organizations, political parties and local media; Organization and supervision of elections; Monitoring, protection and promotion of human rights, including, inter alia, the establishment of an Ombudsman institution, in co-operation, inter alia, with the UNHCHR;

2.

3. 4.

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5.

Such tasks which may be requested by the Secretary-General of the United Nations of his Special Representative, which are consistent with the UNSC Resolution 1244 and approved by the Permanent Council.

The OSCE Mission in Kosovo will in its work be guided by the importance of bringing about mutual respect and reconciliation among all ethnic groups in Kosovo and of establishing a viable multiethnic society where the rights of each citizen are fully and equally respected. The OSCE Mission in Kosovo will be established for an initial period until 10 June 2000, with the possibility of prolongations as decided by the Permanent Council. The Head of the OSCE Mission in Kosovo will be appointed by the Chairman-in-Office and will report to the Chairman-in-Office and to the Permanent Council in accordance with established OSCE rules and procedures. The Head of Mission will assist the Special Representative of the SecretaryGeneral of the United Nations in his tasks. The Permanent Council requests the Secretary General urgently to present a budget proposal for the OSCE Mission in Kosovo. Pending a decision on the budget for the OSCE Mission in Kosovo, the Permanent Council tasks the Secretary General to take all measures necessary for the closure of the OSCE Task Force, and authorizes him to transfer resources previously allocated to the OSCE Task Force to the OSCE Mission in Kosovo and: (a) To incur obligations to the extent required for the fulfilment of the tasks of the OSCE Mission, but not exceeding the residual portion of the spending authority previously granted, following the implementation of all necessary measures to close the OSCE Task Force; To continue making use of the existing Post Table authorized by Permanent Council Decisions Nos. 266 and 282; To make use of the physical assets previously acquired for the use of the OSCE Task Force.

(b)

(c)

104

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