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IT-04-74-T D54751 - D54501 18 September 2009

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SF

THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA

Case No. IT-04-74-T Original: English

TRIAL CHAMBER III

Before: Judge Jean-Claude Antonetti, Presiding Judge Arpad Prandler Judge Stefan Trechsel Reserve Judge Antoine Kesia-Mbe Mindua Mr. John Hocking 18 September 2009 THE PROSECUTOR v. JADRANKO PRLI BRUNO STOJI SLOBODAN PRALJAK MILIVOJ PETKOVI VALENTIN ORI BERISLAV PUSI

Registrar: Filed:

PUBLIC _______________________________________________________

REDACTED VERSION OF "MILIVOJ PETKOVIC'S AND SLOBODAN PRALJAK'S SUBMISSION OF THE EXPERT REPORT OF COLONEL MILAN GORJANC", FILED ON 1 SEPTEMBER 2009

________________________________________________________

The Office of the Prosecutor Mr. Kenneth Scott Mr. Douglas Stringer

Counsel for Jadranko Prli Mr. Michael G. Karnavas Ms. Suzana Tomanovi Counsel for Bruno Stoji Ms. Senka Nozica Mr. Karim Khan Counsel for Slobodan Praljak Mr. Bozidar Kovaci Ms. Nika Pinter

Counsel for Milivoj Petkovi Ms. Vesna Alaburi Mr. Nicholas Stewart QC Counsel for Valentin Cori Ms. Dijana Tomasegovi Tomi Mr. Drazen Plavec Counsel for Berislav Pusi Mr. Fahrudin Ibrisimovi Mr. Roger Sahota

Case No. IT-04-74-T

Prosecutor v. Jadranko Prli, et al

18 September 2009

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REDACTED VERSION OF "MILIVOJ PETKOVIC'S AND SLOBODAN PRALJAK'S SUBMISSION OF THE EXPERT REPORT OF COLONEL MILAN GORJANC", FILED ON 1 SEPTEMBER 2009

1. The Petkovic and Praljak Defences hereby submit the public redacted version of the report of their expert military witness Colonel Milan Gorjanc, entitled "The Doctrine of All-people's Defence and Other Military Topics Relevant to Military Actions During the War in Bosnia and Herzegovina" ("the Gorjanc Report"), which was filed on 1 September 2009.

2.

The redacted version of the Gorjanc Report in the BCS language is attached as Annex A and the English translation of the report as Annex B of this filing.

3.

The Curriculum Vitae of the Colonel Milan Gorjanc, including the bibliography, is provided in the BCS and English language in Annex C of this filing.

4.

Mr.Milan Gorjanc is common witness for the Petkovi and Praljak Defences, as indicated in their respective 65 ter (G) lists, submitted on March 31 2008. The Defences agreed that Mr.Gorjanc would testify during the Petkovi Defence case.

Word count: 324

18 September 2009 Respectfully submitted by,

________________________ Vesna Alaburi Lead counsel for Milivoj Petkovi

_____________________

Bozidar Kovaci

Lead counsel for Slobodan Praljak

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ANNEX A

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MILAN GORJANC

IZVJESTAJ VOJNOG EKSPERTA

DOKTRINA OPENARODNE OBRANE I DRUGA VOJNA PITANJA RELEVANTNA ZA POSTUPANJE VOJSKE TIJEKOM RATA U BOSNI I HERCEGOVINI

Ljubljana, srpanj 2009.

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SADRZAJ

1. 2. 3.

UVOD VOJNA KARIJERA KVALIFIKACIJE ZA EKSPERTNOG SVJEDOKA O VOJNIM TEMAMA RATNA ARMIJA Pojam i nacin stvaranja ratne armije Kako se oblikuje ratna armija ako prethodno nije postojala mirnodopska Sto je to (a) manevarska, a sto (b) teritorijalna komponenta ratne armije Da li preteznost teritorijalne komponente u armiji ukazuje na njezin obrambeni karakter? Kako se osigurava logisticka potpora ratnoj armiji Kako se popunjavaju gubici i stvaraju nove postrojbe Sto je to smjenska vojska i kakve su posljedice smjenskog ratovanja na disciplinu vojnika Kakav je odnos izmeñu civilne vlasti i vojnih postrojbi tijekom rata JUGOSLAVENSKA DOKTRINA OPENARODNE OBRANE I DRUSTVENE SAMOZASTITE PRIMJENA DOKTRINE OPENARODNE OBRANE U BOSNI I HERCEGOVINI Ustav i drugi propisi Bosne i Hercegovine Ustav Uredba o obrani Obrana zemlje je pravo i duznost grañana Vojna obrana, radna obveza, civilna obrana, sluzba motrenja i dojavljivanja Obucavanje i osposobljavanje za obranu Obavjestajna djelatnost grañana Uredba sa zakonskom snagom o oruzanim snagama R BiH Sastav oruzanih snaga Armija je udarna obrambena snaga Mobilizacija Vojna obveza Zakljucak Odluke i zapovijedi Djelovanje u pozadini neprijatelja s osloncem na staovnistvo MUSLIMANSKI VOJNICI HVO KAO SIGURNOSNI PROBLEM VOJNO ZNACENJE SREDISNJE BOSNE I SJEVERNE HERCEGOVINE Zemljopisno definiranje prostora Znacenje tog prostora u planovima obrane SFR Jugoslavije

4 5

7 8 8 10 12 14 15 16 17 18

4. 4.1. 4.2. 4.3. 4.4. 4.5. 4.6. 4.7. 4.8. 5.

21

6. 6.1. 6.1.1. 6.1.2. 6.1.2.1. 6.1.2.2. 6.1.2.3. 6.1.2.4. 6.1.3. 6.1.3.1 6.1.3.2. 6.1.3.3 6.1.3.4. 6.1.3.5. 6.2. 6.3. 7. 8. 8.1. 8.2.

30 30 30 30 30 32 36 36 38 38 39 40 41 43 45 50 53

58 58 59

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8.3. 8.4. 8.5. 8.6. 9. 10.

Znacenje tog prostora u vrijeme raspada SFR Jugoslavije Znacenje tog prostora u pocetnom razdoblju rata od sredine 1992. do konca 1993. Komunikacije i promet tijekom 1992. i 1993. godine Zakljucak JE LI POSTOJALA OPSADA MOSTARA? SITUACIJA KAD JE JEDNA DRZAVA NAPADNUTA ILI UGROZENA S TERITORIJA DRUGE DRZAVE VOJNO ZNACENJE BHS POJMOVA «ASANACIJA» I «CISENJE» TERENA PREDPODCINJAVANJE: ZNACENJE I PROBLEMI «OPERATIVNI I NASTAVNI POSLOVI» «STABNI POSLOVI» ZA POTREBE VRHOVNOG ZAPOVJEDNIKA VOJNE OPERACIJE STRATESKE, OPERATIVNE I TAKTICKE RAZINE AKTIVNA, UPORNA I ODSUTNA OBRANA

61 65 75 80 81

88

11.

91 94 97

12. 13. 14.

100

15.

102 105

16.

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1. UVOD

1. Branitelji generala Slobodana Praljka i Milivoja Petkovia obratili su mi se upitom da li bih Sudu, s obzirom na svoje vojno obrazovanje i dugogodisnju vojnu karijeru, mogao objasniti odreñena vojna pitanja vazna za pravilno utvrñenje odgovornosti za zlocine pocinjene u Bosni i Hercegovini u periodu 1992.-94. godina. Upit se posebice odnosio na: organiziranje i funkcioniranje ad hoc ratne armije, jugoslavensku vojnu doktrinu openarodne obrane i ulogu svakog grañanina u obrani zemlje, vojno znacenje podrucja Sredisnje Bosne i Sjeverne Hercegovine.

Objasnjeno mi je da se od mene ne ocekuje ekspertno izvjese cinjenicne naravi, ali da e biti zatrazeno strucno misljenje o odreñenim dogañajima pod pretpostavkom da su tocni podaci sadrzani u dokumentima koji e mi biti predoceni. Receno mi je da bi se ovaj dio mojeg rada posebice odnosio na vrijeme i uzroke kad su se vojnici HVO muslimanske nacionalnosti poceli smatrati opasnosu za sigurnost Hrvatske zajednice Herceg-Bosna, te na ciljeve ofanzivnih djelovanja Armije R BiH s obzirom na teritorije osvojene u borbama protiv HVO i pravce borbenih djelovanja.

2.

U pripremi ovog izvjesa surañivao sam s obranama generala Praljka i Petkovia prvenstveno u pogledu prikupljanja potrebne dokumentacije i preciziranja pitanja koja e biti obuhvaena izvjesem. Sva obrazlozenja i misljenja sadrzana u ovom izvjesu iskljucivo su moja i nitko na mene nije utjecao da misljenje promijenim.

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2. VOJNA KARIJERA

3. Nakon zavrsene gimnazije u Celju (Slovenija), otisao sam na Vojnu akademiju u Beograd (Srbija). Vojne studije sam nastavio u Sarajevu (BiH) na smjeru pjesastvo. Vojnu akademiju sam zavrsio 1965. godine sa odlicnim uspjehom kao IV. u rangu. Prvo sluzbeno mjesto mi je bio Knin (Hrvatska) gdje sam bio zapovjednik pjesacke cete. Nakon godinu dana premjesten sam u Benkovac (Hrvatska), gdje sam bio zapovjednik cete u nastavnom sredistu za obuku desetnika za potrebe tadasnje 4. armijske oblasti. Samo godinu dana kasnije 1967. godine po potrebi sluzbe otisao sam u Sarajevo (BiH) za nastavnika taktike na Vojnoj akademiji, smjer pjesastva. U meñuvremenu sam studirao na Politickoj skoli JNA kao izvanredni slusatelj, koju sam zavrsio u decembru 1967 sa odlicnim uspjehom kao prvi potporucnik u historiji skole. U Sarajevu sam studirao politicke nauke kao izvanredni student na Fakultetu politickih znanosti. Polozio sam sve ispite i stekao uvjete za upis u 3. godinu. Radi odlaska na dalje vojno skolovanje prekinuo sam studije na civilnom univerzitetu. Kao nastavnik u Vojnoj akademiji bio sam do 1972. godine kada sam otisao na dalje vojno skolovanje u Zapovjedno-stozernu akademiju u Beograd (Srbija) koju sam zavrsio 1974. godine sa odlicnim uspjehom kao IV. u rangu. Za vrijeme studija na Zapovjedno-stozernoj akademiji slusao sam i predavanja iz vojno-politickih znanosti na magistarskom studiju na Fakultetu politickih nauka u Beogradu.

4.

Sluzbu sam produzio u Postojni (Slovenija) kao obavjestajni casnik u zapovjednistvu divizije. Nakon toga postavljen sam za zapovjednika pjesacke bojne u Postojni. Tu sam duznost obnasao 2 godine. 1977. godine postao sam nacelnik stozera pjesacke pukovnije u Postojni. 1980. godine premjesten sam u Novo mesto (Slovenija) za zapovjednika pjesacke pukovnije kao najmlañi zapovjednik u cinu majora. Sljedee godine postavljen sam za zapovjednika motorizirane brigade u Ajdovscini (Slovenija). gdje sam bio do 1986. godine. Usporedo sa zapovijedanjem brigadom zavrsio sam i najvise vojne studije na Skoli narodne obrane u Beogradu (Srbija) kao izvanredni slusatelj sa odlicnim uspjehom kao III. u rangu 1983. godine S obzirom da sam do tada u svojoj vojnoj karijeri bio samo na zapovjednim, stozernim i nastavnickim duznostima, moji su nadreñeni ocijenili da mi je za dalje napredovanje potrebna i vojno-politicka duznost. Tako sam postao zamjenik zapovjednika divizije za politicka

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pitanja u Postojni (Slovenija). Istovremeno sam predlozen i izabran u Centralni komitet SKJ. 1988. godine sam postavljen za nacelnika stozera 37. korpusa u Uzicu (Srbija) na mjesto generalmajora. U cin generalmajora trebao sam biti unaprijeñen 22. decembra 1991. godine. Polozio sam prakticni dio ispita i teoretski rad mi je bio prihvaen od strane mentora. 1990. godine zavrsio sam i Visi tecaj openarodne obrane koji je bio najvisi oblik vojno-politickog osposobljavanja istaknutih civilnih politickih rukovoditelja iz cijele tadasnje Jugoslavije.

5.

Izbijanjem oruzanog sukoba u Sloveniji izmeñu JNA i TO Slovenije u lipnju 1991. godine po svom zahtjevu napustio sam sluzbu u JNA (nisam dezertirao) u kolovozu 1991. godine i pridruzio se TO Slovenije kao nacelnik odjeljenja za obuku i

osposobljavanje u tadasnjem Republickom stozeru TO (generalstabu) u Ljubljani na polozaju brigadira. 1993. godine iz politickih razloga premjesten sam u Centar za strateske studije kao savjetnik za doktrinarna pitanja i pitanja oruzanih sukoba na teritoriji nekadasnje Jugoslavije. 1995. godine postavljen sam za direktora toga Centra na polozaju brigadira. Tu sam duznost obnasao veoma kratko vrijeme, jer su me ve u jesen iste godine postavili za direktora Centra vojnih skola Slovenske vojske u Ljubljani (Slovenija) na polozaju brigadira. Na toj sam duznosti bio sve do umirovljenja u svibnju 1999. godine. Pored voñenja i oblikovanja vojnog skolstva Slovenske vojske bio sam i predavac taktike i operatike na Zapovjedno-stozernoj skoli Slovenske vojske.

6.

Za svoj rad odlikovan sam 6 puta, vise puta pohvaljivan i nagrañivan. Sve moje sluzbene ocjene od strane nadreñenih starjesina bile su odlicne ­ «narocito se istice». Tri sam puta prijevremeno unapreñivan (u cin kapetana, majora i pukovnika). 1984. godine primio sam najvisu nagradu oruzanih snaga Jugoslavije za rukovoñenje i zapovijedanje ,,22. decembar". Za uspjesnu suradnju mojih postrojbi sa stanovnistvom i pomoi u izgradnji civilne infrastrukture dobio sam vise priznanja civilnih vlasti, meñi njima i najvise nagrade opina Ajdovscina, Nova Gorica i Crnomelj.

7.

Mada sam bio gotovo 10 godina na sluzbenom polozaju generala na 4 razlicite duznosti u 2 vojske u taj cin nisam unaprijeñen iz iskljucivo politickih razloga.

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3. KVALIFIKACIJE ZA EKSPERTNOG SVJEDOKA O VOJNIM TEMAMA

8. Moje kvalifikacije za svjedocenje u ovom procesu su sljedee: - sveobuhvatno vojno obrazovanje na svim vojnim skolama u nekadasnjoj SRFJ, - dopunsko vojno-politicko obrazovanje u Politickoj skoli JNA, Fakulteti politickih znanosti u Sarajevu ­ dodiplomske studije i Fakulteti Beogradu ­ magistarski studij, - nastavnicka praksa uz izucavanje teorije u Vojnoj akademiji u Sarajevu (5 godina) i na Zapovjedno-stozernoj skoli SV (4 godine), - povremena predavanja na Fakultetu drustvenih znanosti ­ katedra znanosti iz odbrane u Ljubljani, - rad u svojstvu analiticara oruzanih sukoba na Balkanu, posebice u nekadasnjoj Jugoslaviji u razdoblju 1991-1999, za potrebe ministarstva obrane Slovenije, - zapazeno komentiranje oruzanih sukoba na Balkanu i u svetu na obje televizijske kue u Sloveniji (TV Slovenija i POP TV) u razdoblju 1994-2003, - obiman opus rasprava, analiza, komentara i clanaka u nacionalnim medijima, u medijima drzava na tlu nekadasnje Jugoslavije i mnogim svjetskim medijima (bibliografija u prilogu ovog izvjestaja), - izucavanje vojnih doktrina mnogih drzava i izrada prijedloga obrambene doktrine Slovenske vojske 1994. godine, - bogata i uspjesna praksa zapovijedanja postrojbama JNA na razlicitim razinama od cete do korpusa, - veoma dobro poznavanje geografije, obicaja i povijesti prostora nekadasnje Jugoslavije, posebice Hrvatske, Bosne i Hercegovine, Srbije i Slovenije, - osobno poznavanje mnogih osoba na rukovodeim politickim i vojnim duznostima u drzavama na tlu nekadasnje Jugoslavije, posebice u BiH, - prisutnost u najvisem politickom i partijskom vodstvu u svojstvu clana CK SKJ i izvorno upoznavanje sa zbivanjima u nekadasnoj Jugoslaviji pred raspad 1991. godine. politickih znanosti u

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4. RATNA ARMIJA

4.1.

Pojam i nacin stvaranja ratne armije

9.

Ratna armija predstavlja svezu vojske i drugih cimbenika u njenoj potpori, vojnog naoruzanja i opreme uvrstenog u vojne postrojbe, nabave, proizvodnje i distribucije svih potreba za vodjenje oruzane borbe, zivot i rad vojnih postrojbi te opih i politickih ciljeva drzave, nacije ili politicke skupine. Ratnu armiju cine odrasle i sposobne osobe koje su prosle odgovarujuu vojnu naobrazbu i obuku za izvrsavanje opih i posebnih zadaa u boju u okviru postrojbi razlicitih razina. Takodjer se u ratnu armiju ubrajaju i osobe koje izvrsavaju zadae logisticke i druge potpore postrojbi ratne armije, a nisu neposredno uvrstene u vojne postrojbe. Svaki pojedinac pripadnik ratne armije mora imati odgovarajuu opremu za boj i zastitu, pri cemu je najvaznije osobno oruzje. Kolektivno oruzje i oprema namijenjena je na uporabi unutar postrojbi i udruzuje se na razlicitim visim razinama vojnog udruzivanja radi ucinkovitog bojevanja odnosno vodjenja rata.

10.

Drzava i vrhovno zapovjednistvo ve u miru priprema ratnu armiju. U tu pripremu se ubraja: - planiranje ratne popune i evidencija ljudskog potencijala za rasporedjivanje u ratne postrojbe i za izvrsavanje radne obaveze, materijalnih resursa za vodjenje rata i prezivljavanje te rad pucanstva u ratnim uvjetima; - organiziranje i izvodjenje vojne naobrazbe i strukovnog osposobljavanja novaka, pricuvnih vojnika, mirnodopskih postrojbi i pricuvnih postrojbi, skolovanja i strukovnog usposobljavanja aktivnih profesionalnih casnika i docasnika, stozera i zapovjednistava; - planiranje i izvodjenje proizvodnje, nabave, distribucije i cuvanja naoruzanja i druge vojne opreme za popunu postrojbi ratne armije i vodjenje rata; - planiranje i izvodjenje radova na pripremi i uredjenju teritorije za vodjenje rata, pri cemu je teziste na uspostavi sigurnog visekanalnog sustava ratnih komunikacija izmedju zapovjednistava razlicitih razina, izgradnji putnih i drugih transportnih komunikacija te izgradnji objekata za zastitu zapovjednistava, vitalnih sustava naoruzanja kao i objekata za zastitu pucanstva;

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- pripremu cjelokupnog pucanstva i materijalnih mogunosti drustva za vodjenje rata i u tome je teziste na psiholosko-propagandnoj pripremi osoblja ratnih postrojbi, pucanstva i psiholoskom utjecaju na volju i svijest protivnika.

11.

Ratna armija u nacelu se sastoji iz mirnodopskog jedra odnosno postrojbi koje su oblikovane u miru radi obuke novaka i pricuvnog sastava, odnosno za odvraanje od agresivnih namjera protivnika. Mirnodopsko jedro odnosno profesionalni sastav predstavlja temelj oblikovanja ratne armije. U miru su oblikovane skupine za vodjenje i zapovjedanje na razlicitim razinama od Vrhovnog zapovjednistva pa sve do najnizih postrojbi. Sastav i velicina mirnodopskih postrojbi i zapovjednistava u nacelu je bitno manji od ratnog sastava. Neke mirnodopske postrojbe se dopunjavaju manjim brojem pricuvnih vojnika, neke veinom, a najvise ratnih postrojbi se oblikuje uglavnom od pricuvnih vojnika. Narastanjem razine ratne opasnosti drzave ili vladajua elita poveavaju mirnodopsko jedro dopunom mirnodopskih postrojbi pricuvnim sastavom i oblikovanjem novih nizih postrojbi iz pricuve.

12.

Ovisno o vremenu do pocetka rata pricuvni sastav i cjelokupne postrojbe izvode dopunsku obuku od vojnika pa sve do vojnih vjezbi na operativnoj razini. Zapovjedni sustav je posve uspostavljen na najvisim razinama zapovijedanja ­ razini vrhovnog zapovjedanja, operativno-strategijskih sastava i zdruzenih taktickih postrojbi. Sustav komuniciranja, nadzora i uskladjivanja u potrebitom stupnju pocetnog razdoblja rata je organiziran i djelatan. Zapovjednistva razlicitih razina dopunjavaju se casnicima i drugim osobljem iz pricuvnog sastava. Ovisno o razini zapovjedanja popuna se vrsi aktivnim profesionalnim strukovno izobrazenim casnicima, a u manjem dijelu i casnicima iz pricuvnog sastava sa temeljnom casnickom vojnom naobrazbom i dodatnim usposobljavanjem na kraim kursevima i vojnim vjezbama pricuvnog sastava u miru. Na najvise zapovjedne i stozerne duznosti u nacelu se postavljaju strukovno i moralno najsposobniji casnici sa bogatim iskustvom u miru i na vojnim vjezbama.

13.

Ratna armija se u nacelu oblikuje neposredno pred izbijanje rata, izuzetno se oblikuje odmah nakon pocetka agresije. Drzava s agresivnim namjerama da napadne na drugu drzavu u nacelu oblikuje ratnu armiju stanovito duze vrijeme pred pocetak agresije koje moze trajati i do nekoliko mjeseci. Drzave koje su prisiljene da se brane od

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agresije u nacelu oblikuju ratnu armiju nekoliko dana pred samu agresiju ili to cine ve u uvjetima bojevanja i vojne te politicke nadmoi protivnika.

4.2. 14.

Kako se oblikuje ratna armija ako prethodno nije postojala mirnodopska Posve drugacije je oblikovanje ratne armije u uvjetima nepostojanja drzave, mirnodopskog jedra oruzane sile i ratnih pricuva, nepomirljivih antagonizama izmedju vodeih i utjecajnih politickih ili ideoloskih skupina, posebice u medjuetnickim, medjureligijskim i medjurasnim sukobima. Tako se ratna armija oblikuje u uvjetima gradjanskog rata, narodno-oslobodilackih ratova i medjuetnickih, medjureligijskih ili medjurasnih oruzanih sukoba.

15.

Najmanje jedna strana u sukobu ili obje istodobno oblikuju ratnu armiju u izuzetno slozenim uvjetima. Ne postoji mirnodopsko jedro oruzane sile, ve je ono u obliku manjih u pravilu tajnih oruzanih skupina koje se obucavaju uglavnom tajno, u veoma kratkom vremenu, u losim uvjetima i s nedostatnim sredstvima za obuku. I prije pocetka izbijanja oruzanog sukoba, a zasigurno pocetkom sukoba, ove skupine mogu izvoditi manja oruzana dejstva u vidu teroristickih ili diverzantskih akcija. Uspesnost i odjek tih akcija u javnosti, posebice medju neangaziranim pripadnicima skupine u sukobu, znacajno utjecu na narastanje oruzanih skupina. Tijekom bojnih dejstava te se skupine oblikuju u vojne postrojbe sve visih razina. Najcese te postrojbe dobivaju nazive najmanje za stupanj visi od obicajne jacine tih postrojbi1. Mnoge se manje postrojbe oblikuju posve stihijno na lokalnoj razini, cesto van zapovjednog sustava i njihovo bojno djelovanje cesto nije vodjeno s vise razine zapovijedanja.

16.

Pocetkom ratnog sukoba postrojbe su uglavnom vezane za uzi teritorij s kojeg su popunjene ljudstvom. Prosirenjem bojnih dejstava iskazuje se potreba za prijenos bojevanja na podrucja gdje ne postoje oruzane skupine i tako se oblikuje manevarski dio ratne armije, koji sve vise narasta i postaje nosilac bojnih dejstava. Teritorijalna komponenta se s vremenom smanjuje u korist manevarske.

1

Skupina do 300-400 vojnika dobiva naziv brigada, dok toliki broj vojnika predstavlja oslabljenu bojnu. Ti su nazivi temeljeni na propagandnim zahtjevima i poradi utjecaja na moral oruzanih skupina i drugih pripadnika skupina u sukobu.

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17.

Prije izbijanja oruzanog sukoba ne postoji zapovjedni sustav koji bi objedinjavao pojedine oruzane skupine. Zapovijedanje oruzanim skupinama temelji se uglavnom na osobnom poznanstvu i zajednickom politickom ili teroristickom djelovanju prije oruzanog sukoba. Najcese zapovjednici skupina nemaju vojne naobrazbe, a vojno znanje i iskustvo stjecu uglavnom tijekom bojevanja. Tijekom oruzanog sukoba narastanjem postrojbi pristizu i ljudi s vojnim obrazovanjem.

18.

U slucaju raspada prijasnje drzave ili neuspjeha drzavne vojske i politike, na stranu pobunjene skupine pristupaju obrazovani casnici aktivnog, a jos vise pricuvnog sastava. Oni postaju prije svega pomonicima zapovjednika ili stozernim casnicima, a fakticki su planeri ratnih operacija. Tijekom oruzanog sukoba organizira se i posebna naobrazba zapovjednog osoblja van postrojbi, na tecajevima i skolama. Na zapovjedne duznosti se postavljaju ljudi s ugledom u okolini i unutar postrojbe, ali se dogadja da se na odgovorne duznosti postavljaju i ljudi upitnog morala i strucnih mogunosti ili pojedinci zbog njihove stranacka pripadnosti. Sustav veza, nadzora i uskladjivanja uspostavlja se tijekom bojnih dejstava. Pocetkom oblikovanja postrojbi razlicitih razina medjusobne veze, uskladjivanje i nadzor jako su otezani, zapravo nemogui.

19.

Logisticka potpora je posve neorganizirana i stihijna. Opskrba oruzjem, steljivom i drugim bojnim potrebama najcese je iz ratnog plijena, oduzimanjem od suprotne strane. Prije izbijanja oruzanog sukoba tajne oruzane skupine opskrbljuje se ilegalnom nabavom na crnom trzistu, iz privatnih pricuva proslih ratova, ilegalnom obrtnom proizvodnjom i oduzimanjem (krañom) od suprotne strane. Tijekom prosirivanja ratnog sukoba i narastanjem medjunarodne politicke i moralne podpore logisticka podpora je sve bolje organizirana, kako nabavom i pomoi iz inozemstva tako i vlastitom proizvodnjom u industrijskim objektima. Na redovitost opskrbe utjece sigurnost opskrbnih putova, pa radi kontrole tih puteva strane u sukobu u pravilu vode namjenske operacije veih razmjera.

20.

Politicke stranke ili politicki pokret, posebice prevladajui, imaju odlucujui utjecaj na vodjenje rata. Pojedine politicke skupine oblikuju svoje postrojbe koje se ne podcinjavaju jedinstvenom vrhovnom zapovijedanju. Te postrojbe izvode bojna

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dejstva u skladu s parcijalnim interesima politickog vodstva. Dogadja se da se pojedine postrojbe sukobe u odbrani vlastitih parcijalnih politickih interesa.

21.

U veini ad hoc oblikovanih armija u neorganiziranim drzavama znacajan utjecaj imaju ideoloska i religiozna uvjerenja pripadnika skupine u sukobu, odnosno predstavnici stranacke ili religijske hijerarhije. Ova uvjerenja se koriste radi jacanja morala vlastitih postrojbi, a i utjecaja na smanjenje morala protivnika. Cesto mogu na nizim razinama zapovijedanja biti zloupotrebljena i prouzrokovati nezeljeno ponasanje pojedinaca i pojedinih postrojbi u odnosu na protivnika2.

4.3.

Sto je to manevarska, a sto teritorijalna komponenta ratne armije

22.

U veini suvremenih armija ratnu armiju tvore dvije komponente ­ manevarska i teritorijalna. Manevarska komponenta namijenjena je za vodjenje vojnih operacija na cjelokupnom teritoriju drzave, pa cak i na teritoriju protivnika. Manevarske jedinice izvode borbena dejstva na tezistu vojnih operacija protiv najjaceg protivnika i po potrebi se angaziraju u bilo kojem dijelu drzavnog teritorija. Ovaj dio ratne armije u pravilu cine najsposobniji vojnici mlañih godista. Teritorijalna komponenta je namijenjena uglavnom za nadzor i zastitu unutarnjeg dijela drzavne teritorije. Izuzetno se moze angazirati u vojnim operacijama na bojisnici kao pomona snaga manevarskoj komponenti. Cine je vojni obveznici starijih godista. Izuzetno se manevarska komponenta popunjava vojnicima iz teritorijalne komponente.

23.

Za izvodjenje bojnih operacija cjelokupni teritorij drzave podijeljen je na vojnoteritorijalne cjeline ovisno o velicini drzave. Na tim vojno-teritorijalnim podrucjima oblikuju se pojedini strategijski ili operativni sastavi i njihove nize ratne postrojbe. Nize vojno-teritorijalne razine oblikovane su u nacelu kao iskljucivo teritorijalne vojne ustanove sa zapovjednistvima manjeg sastava i postrojbama samo teritorijalne komponente. Te nize razine vojno-teritorijalnog organizovanja ne mogu imati nikakvog zapovjednog utjecaja na postrojbe manevarske komponente i namijenjene su

2

U povijesti poznati su krizarski pohodi krsana iz zapadne Evrope prema istocnim predjelima koji su obilovali zlocninima u ime vjere, dok u suvremenom razdoblju takovu religijsku zaslijepljenost izkazuju postrojbe nekih ratnih armija na Bliskom Istoku u vidu pozivanja na vjerski rat ­ »dzihad«.

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uglavnom njihovoj logistickoj potpori dok te postrojbe borave na njihovoj teritoriji. Vojno-teritorijalna zapovjednistva na operativnoj razini mogu zapovijedati svojim i pridodatim postrojbama manevarske komponente u bojnim dejstvima u svom podrucju odgovornosti. Na zahjev vise razine zapovijedanja obvezatne su uputiti svoje postrojbe u sastav drugog vojno-teritorijalnog zapovjednistva operativne razine i van svog maticnog teritorija. Posve pokretljive na cjelokupnoj ratnoj prostoriji su zdruzene takticke postrojbe ranga divizije i brigade, dok su postrojbe teritorijalne komponente gotovo uvijek vezane za maticni teritorij i oblikovane su u vodove, satnije i bojne odnosno pukovnije.

24.

Vojno-teritorijalna zapovjednistva na operativnoj razini u gotovo svim suvremenim armijama imaju priblizno jednake odgovornosti i zadae: - planiraju, uskladjuju, zapovijedaju i nadziru izvrsenje zadaa podcinjenih postrojbi u pripremi i izvoñenju bojnih dejstava; - prihvaaju i privremeno uvrsuju u svoj sastav dodijeljene postrojbe iz drugih operativnih sastava za izvrsavanje odredjenih konkretnih vojnih operacija, pri tome preuzimaju punu odgovornost za djelovanje tih postrojbi; - obvezatne su na zahtjev vise razine zapovijedanja uputiti svoje postrojbe u sastav drugih operativnih sastava uz potrebne i propisane materijalne pricuve, ali u toj situaciji posve gube zapovjednu ulogu i mogu pratiti izvrsavanje bojnih i drugih zadaa samo preko zapovjednistva kome su postrojbe pridate; - pridate postrojbe koje su u organskom sastavu vise razine zapovijedanja a privremeno su pridate pojedinim nizim operativnim sastavima posve se podreñuju novom privremenom zapovjednistvu, pri cemu vise zapovjednistvo ostvaruje ulogu zapovijedanja i nadzora iskljucivo preko privremenog nizeg zapovjednistva, mogue strukovne upute na izvrsenje zadae mogu upuivati iskljucivo preko privremenog zapovjednistva uz angazovanje strukovnog stozernog organa tog zapovjednistva; - na podrucju odgovornosti organizuju i odgovorna su za sve vojne aktivnosti, dok aktivnost u potpori bojnih operacija van neposredne bojisnice duzna su uskladjivati sa odgovarajuim civilnim vlastima i organima, pri cemu vojne aktivnosti imaju puni prioritet, posebice u neposrednom izvodjenju bojnih djejstava.

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4.4.

Da li preteznost teritorijalne komponente u armiji ukazuje na njezin obrambeni karakter

25.

Gotovo sve suvremene drzave organiziraju obranu nacionalne teritorije posebno organiziranim djelom oruzanih snaga, cije su temeljne znacajke u sljedeem: - ovisno od stupnja ugrozenosti drzave ili nacije odnosno raspolozivih materijalnih i ljudskih resursa te su snage vee ili manje u odnosu na manevarske snage; - manje drzave sa oskudnim materijalnim resursima u nacelu organiziraju brojno vee postrojbe teritorijalne komponente; - ratne armije koje se organiziraju bez mirnodopske osnove (ad hoc) u pocetku nastajanja uglavnom imaju temeljne znacajke teritorijalne komponente; - temeljna zadaa teritorijalne komponente je prije svega obrana nacionalne teritorije; - teritorijalna komponenta ratne armije organizirana je na teritorijalnom principu, postrojbe sacinjavaju u nacelu mjestani jednog sela, grada, opine ili uzeg upravnog podrucja; - postrojbe teritorijalne komponente u nacelu su organizirane i opremljene za zadae osiguranja objekata i stanovnistva, za izradu i postavljanje fortifikacijskih prepreka, za obranu od napada iz zracnog prostora; - postrojbe teritorijalne komponente opremljene su uglavnom laksim oruzjem, izuzetno mogu u njihovom sustavu biti oklopna oruña, krae vrijeme ili za konkretnu bojnu zadau; - teritorijalnu komponentu sacinjava u nacelu velik broj manjih postrojbi koje povezuje uglavnom ideja i teznja obrane svoga doma ili uze okoline, zapovijedanje tom velikom broju manjih postrojbi je izuzetno tesko kako zbog vee meñusobne udaljenosti, razlicitosti zadaa, razlicitog stupnja izravne ugrozenosti i nedostatka tehnickih sredstava komuniciranja; - povezivanje manjih taktickih postrojbi (vod, satnija, bojna) u vise takticke postrojbe (brigada, divizija, korpus) ne znaci i stvaranje zdruzenih taktickih ili operativnih sastava koje bi bile jednake bojne vrijednosti kao ovakvi sastavi manevarskog dijela, te su postrojbe i dalje popunjene ljudstvom na uzem teritorijalnom principu i ne mogu zaprimiti potrebnu meñusobnu koheziju ­ bojnu i moralnu cvrstinu;

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- postrojbe teritorijalne komponente svoje zadae u obrani teritorije izvrsavaju u nacelu nadzorom teritorije i osiguranjem znacajnih objekata infrastrukture i organa vlasti. U slucaju izravnog napada protivnika obranu izvode manjim ofenzivnih akcijama u vidu zasjeda, prepada, napada na manje dijelove protivnickih snaga, izuzetno izvode organiziranu obranu sa fortifikacijskim ureñenjem obrambenih polozaja; - ofenzivne akcije sirih razmjera nemogue je izvoditi sa postrojbama teritorijalne komponente bez prethodne temeljite obuke od pojedinca do postrojbe na operativnoj razini3.

26.

Kao zakljucak slijedi da drzava, nacija ili politicka skupina koja organizira svoju ratnu armiju pretezito na teritorijalnom principu i bojna djelovanja izvodi uglavnom sa postrojbama teritorijalne komponente u biti je obrambena vojska.

4.5.

Kako se osigurava logisticka potpora ratnoj armiji

27.

Logisticka potpora ratne armije je u nacelu posve centralizirana, posebice popuna ljudstvom, naoruzanjem i bojnim potrebama. U tom cilju se ve u miru izvode odgovarajue pripreme za proizvodnju, nabavku i distribuciju naoruzanja i bojnih potreba. Tijekom rata opskrba bojnim potrebama u nacelu ide preko sustava zapovijedanja. Nova sredstva iz proizvodnje ili nabave stizu u centralna skladista

3

Zapovjednistvo 3. korpusa ABiH u travnju 1993 namjerava organizirati sa svim postrojbama korpusa i opinskih stabova u zoni radi osposobljavanja za ofenzivna djelovanja sirih razmjera sto se moze zakljuciti iz nareñenja za organizaciju logorovanja: »odlucio sam, na dostignutim linijama organizovati odsudnu odbranu uz ispoljavanje maksimalne inicijative i izvoñenje aktivnih dejstava ispred p/k (prednji kraj, engl. forward edge of battle area ­ prii. M.G.) i u dubini rasporeda neprijateljskih snaga i u zonama brigada i OG organizovati logorovanja i izvodenje BOiV-a, s ciljem angazujui glavne snage za izvoñenje odbrane i aktivna dejstva nanositi cetnicima sto vee gubitke u zivoj sili i MTS i ne dozvoliti preuzimanje inicijative i ostvarivanje taktickog i operativnog iznenañenja i na taj nacin izvrsiti operativno obmanjivanje, skrivajui nase namjere i pripreme za izvoñenje ofenzivnih dejstava (podvukao M.G.), a sa pomonim snagama organizovati logorovanje sa zadatkom izvoñenja BOiV, jacanja psiho-fizicke izdrzljivosti boraca, starjesina, komandi i jedinica, uzajamnog povjerenja i drugarske solidarnosti i borbene gotovosti u cjelini... U blizem zadatku izvoditi odbranu i aktivna dejstva i organizovati logorovanja i obuku na njim, a u sljedeem izvrsiti operativni razvoj i prihvat snaga koje ucestvuju u napadnoj operaciji.(podvukao M.G.)." ,,...a izvoñenjem logorovanja podii b/g (borbenu spremnost ­ prim. M.G.) na sto vei nivo i biti u spremnosti za prihvat i sadejstvo jedinicama i sastavima koji ucestvuju u napadnoj operaciji." 4D 01473 Odluka komandanta 3. korpusa broj 01/1049-1 od 04.04.1993

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vrhovnog zapovijedanja. Mogu se distribuirati neposredno iz proizvodnje ili inozemstva do zdruzenih taktickih postrojbi samo po odobrenju strukovnih organa vrhovnog zapovijedanja. Izuzetno se mogu niza zapovjednistva opskrbljivati neposredno iz ratnog plijena ili neposrednom nabavom na teritoriji boravka, ako bojna dejstva protivnika naruse ustaljeni lanac opskrbe.

28.

Bitno drugacija je logisticka potpora u ratnoj armiji koja se oblikuje bez mirnodopskih priprema. U pocetnom razdoblju se opskrba bojnim potrebama (streljivo, oruzje, rezervni dijelovi) organizira iz zaplijenjenih sredstava i pricuva protivnika, improviziranom proizvodnjom u tajnim radionicama i tajnom nabavkom u inozemstvu. Stvaranjem slobodnih teritorija i zauzeem protivnikovih proizvodnih kapaciteta organizira se redovita proizvodnja i organizirana distribucija. Stjecanjem politickog priznanja otvaraju se kanali za logisticku potporu iz treih zemalja. Hranom i drugim intendantskim potrebama takva ratna armja opskrbljuje se uglavnom iz mjesnih izvora. Pri tome imaju vojno-teritorijalna zapovjednistva izuzetnu ulogu.

29.

Lijecenje ranjenih i oboljelih vojnika nacelno se organizira u sanitetskim ustanova unutar postrojbe. Izuzetno se upuuju u civilne zdravstvene ustanove, gdje se oblikuju posebni odjeli za vojne osobe koji su pod nadzorom zdravstvenog osoblja na vojnoj obvezi. Ovo osoblje na neposrednoj je vezi sa sanitetskim organima postrojbi odnosno vojno-teritorijalnog zapovjednistva i o stanju izljecenja obvezatno je izvjestavati zapovjednistvo postrojbe. Odmor ljudstva iz postrojbi manevarske komponente vrsi se organizirano unutar postrojbe u vojarnama, privremenim boravisnim objektima i logoristima u zoni bojnih dejstava. Samo manji dio mogue je privremeno pustiti na odmor kod porodica u vrijeme bez bojnih dejstava, da pri tome ne bude narusena bojna spremnost postrojbe. Sanitetska opskrba postrojbi teritorijalne komponente zasniva se uglavnom na civilnim mogunostima.

4.6.

Kako se popunjavaju gubici i stvaraju nove postrojbe

30.

Popuna ljudstvom zbog gubitaka vrsi se na teritorijalnom principu uz dopustenje vise razine zapovijedanja. Posebice je osjetljiva popuna dragovoljcima bez odgovarajue vojne naobrazbe i provjere sigurnosne odnosno moralne podobnosti. Popuna

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casnicima vrsi se sa nerasporedjenim pricuvnim casnicima, uzdizanjem i unapredjivanjem nizih casnika koji su se osobito istakli u boju i zapovijedanju nizim postrojbama i koji su se ocitovali potrebitim strukovnim i moralnim osobinama za novu razinu zapovijedanja. Usposobljavanje novih casnika i u toku rata izvodi se u vojnim ucilistima, kraim tecajevima na razlicitim razinama zapovijedanja i neposredno uz rad u stozerima.

31.

Nove postrojbe ratne armije se oblikuju pozivom na vojnu sluzbu nerasporeñenih obveznika iz pricuve, rasporeñivanjem novaka koji su zavrsili temeljnu vojnu naobrazbu i posebnim sredistima i po skraenom programu te dragovoljcima sa zavrsenom minimalnom vojnom obukom. Zapovjedno osoblje prerasporeñuje se i promice iz ranije oblikovanih postrojbi, a manji postotak mogu ciniti i casnici izravno iz vojnih skola.

4.7.

Sto je to smjenska vojska i kakve su posljedice smjenskog ratovanja na disciplinu vojnika

32.

U milicijskim vojskama oblikovanim na uzem teritorijalnom podrucju poznato je takozvano ,,ratovanje na smjenu". Naime, 1/3 ljudstva nalazi se u bojnom dodiru s protivnom stranom na bojisnici, 1/3 nalazi se na okupu u vojarnama ili pogodnim objektima za smjestaj, u spremnosti za brzu intervenciju ka bojisnici, dok se 1/3 nalazi na odmaranju u kuama u krugu obitelji i na obavljaju nuznih kunih poslova.

33.

Takav oblik angaziranja postrojbi mogu je u sljedeim uvjetima: kada intenzitet bojeva nije visok, na bojisnici vlada zatisje i snage obje strane su iscrpljene, kada i protivnicka strana primjenjuje istovjetan nacin bojevanja, kada vremenski uvjeti i mogunosti smjestaja na bojisnici nisu primjereni za odmor i boravak ljudstva na otvorenom, kada nema mogunosti redovite smjene angaziranih postrojbi sa postrojbama iz drugih sredina,

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-

kada je u obrani svoje teritorije angaziran najvei dio radno sposobnog stanovnistva kojeg dobar dio mora u isto vrijeme obavljati i aktivnosti na opskrbi obitelji i uze zajednice.

34.

Dobre strane sustava: ljudstvo se organizirano odmara u okruzenju obitelji i prijatelja sto znatno doprinosi kako visem moralu vojnika tako obitelji i uze drustvene okoline, odmaranje se vrsi u znatno povoljnijim uvjetima redovite ishrane, higijenske opskrbe i smjestaja, psihicko i fizicko naprezanje vojnika je znatno manje, troskovi opskrbe vojnika su manji kako na bojisnici tako u zaleñu, mogue je angaziranje ljudstva na odmoru u slucaju potrebe i van operacijskog podrucja maticne postrojbe i za osiguranje objekata ope drustvene infrastrukture na teritoriji.

35.

Lose strane sustava: postrojba je na okupu samo povremeno, u slucaju intenzivnijih bojeva, postrojba nije u cjelini uvjezbana za izvrsavanje veih i tezih zadaa, potrebno je znatno vise vremena za prikupljanje i pokretanje postrojbe van maticnog podrucja, veoma tesko je prikupiti ljudstvo na odmoru prije vremena odreñenog za prikupljanje i smjenu, gotovo nemogue je uspostaviti organiziran nadzor nad ljudstvom na odmoru, sto je razlog vojnickoj i grañanskoj nedisciplini u smislu krsenja vojnickih pravila i prekrsaja po civilnoj regulativi, pa cak i pocinjenja krivicnih djela.

4.8.

Kakav je odnos izmeñu civilne vlasti i vojnih postrojbi tijekom rata

36.

Odnos vojnih zapovjednistava i organa civilne, politicke vlasti reguliran je sustavno zakonima i pravilnicima jos u miru. Civilna vlast organizira vojsku, rukovodi vojskom putem vrhovnog zapovijedanja, kontrolira vojsku raznovrsnim sredstvima

demokratske procedure, te definira politicke i strateske ciljeve vojnih aktivnosti.

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37.

Odnos civilne vlasti i vojnih zapovjednika u ratu bitno se razlikuje ovisno o tome da li se rat odvija na vlastitom teritoriju ili na teritoriju druge drzave. U slucaju da se rat izvodi na vlastitom teritoriju, gdje postoje legalni organi civilne vlasti i druge ustanove i strukture civilne vlasti, taj je odnos temeljen na dosljednom postovanju mirnodopske zakonske regulative, koja moze biti privremeno promijenjena dok traje rat. Te privremene promjene takoñer mogu izvrsiti samo legalno izabrani predstavnici najvise drzavne vlasti ili ustavom odredjeni organi vlasti. Vojni zapovjednici mogu predlagati odredjene izmjene postojeih zakona i propisa, ali ih usvajaju iskljucivo nosioci legalne civilne vlasti. Samo u izuzetnim okolnostima vojni zapovjednici mogu za krae vrijeme i na uzoj teritoriji privremeno donositi zapovjedi koje zadiru u civilnu sferu. O tome su, meñutim, obvezatni u sto kraem vremenu obavijestiti nadredjenog zapovjednika odnosno predstavnike civilne vlasti na tom podrucju.

38.

Na drugoj strani nosioci civilne vlasti nemaju nikakvih ovlasti unutar vojnih postrojbi. Mogue zahtjeve prema pojedinim vojnim zapovjednistvima mogu upuivati izravno preko organa za suradnju i uskladjivanje ili putem visih organa civilne vlasti i zakonodavnih odnosno upravno izvrsnih organa na drzavnoj razini. Opskrbu vojnih postrojbi iz teritorijalnih izvora mogu odobriti samo po zahtjevu viseg organa civilne vlasti ili u neposrednom dogovoru sa zapovjednistvom zdruzene takticke postrojbe kao najnizoj razini takovog uskladjivanja. Visa razina civilne vlasti obvezatna je nizoj refundirati u naturi ili novcano tako dogovorenu opskrbu. Odnos vojnih zapovjednistava i civilnih vlasti odnos je pune suradnje i koordinacije te medjusobnog postovanja i razumijevanja.

39.

Bitno je drugacija situacija ako vojne jedinice izvode bojna dejstva van vlastitog teritorija i osvoje teritorij na kojem su dotad djelovali organi civilne vlasti izabrani odnosno imenovani od protivne strane. Takva se situacija naziva okupacijom, pri cemu nije bitno da li se radi o povratu kontrole nad vlastitim, ranije izgubljenim teritorijem, ili o osvajanju teritorija koji pripada drugoj drzavi. Zapovjednik operativnog sastava jedini je predstavnik svoje drzave (sada okupacione sile) na novoosvojenom teritoriju. On je tzv.vojni guverner i preuzima sve ovlasti civilne vlasti. Ako protivnicka civilna vlast suradjuje i ne bojkotira opravdane zahtjeve, vojni je zapovjednik i dalje obvezatan na suradnju i uskladjivanje. Ako, meñutim, protivnicka civilna vlast ne iskazuje spremnost na suradnju, zapovjednik moze suspendirati takve organe civilne

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vlasti, pa cak i privremeno imenovati nove. U slucaju da oruzane sile bojnim djelovanjem ponovo zauzmu (oslobode) dio teritorije na kome je protivna strana odmah nakon osvajanja uspostavila svoju prethodnu okupacionu vlast, tada ovlasti zapovjednika izuzetno kratko traju i njihova je duznost da sto prije uspostave ili prijasnji sustav vlasti (prije okupacije) ili pomognu uspostaviti novu vlast, dovodei sa sobom legalno izabrane ili od strane zakonodavnog tijela imenovane nosioce vlasti, pri cemu moraju ukljuciti i pojedine nosioce vlasti iz razdoblja okupacije koji su lojalni oslobodilackoj vlasti, pogotovo ako je osloboñeni dio teritorije nacionalno, vjerski i ideoloski mjesovit ili antagonistican.

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5. JUGOSLAVENSKA DOKTRINA OPENARODNE OBRANE I

DRUSTVENE SAMOZASTITE

40. Za potpunije razumijevanje ratnih dogadjanja u nekadasnjoj Jugoslaviji, posebice BiH, potrebno je poznavati zakone i druge propise, odnosno na njima utemeljenu praksu oruzanih snaga SFR Jugoslavije. Rijec je o doktrini openarodne obrane i drustvene samozastite (ONO i DSZ), koja se dosta razlikuje od pravila voñenja rata suvremenih zapadnih armija. Oblikovanje oruzanih snaga pojedinih osamostaljenih republika bise Jugoslavije, kao i nacionalnih skupina u BiH, kasnije i na Kosovu, obilovalo je praksom doktrine ONO i DSZ.

41.

Oruzane snage SFRJ u biti oblikovane su u skladu sa suvremenim gledistima veine suvremenih armija. Medjutim, meñunarodno okruzenje odredjivalo je i mnoge specificnosti oblikovanja ratne armije i vodenja rata. Naime, politicki nesvrstana Titova Jugoslavija nalazila se u potpunom okruzenju drzava koje su pripadale ili NATO paktu odnosno kapitalistickom sistemu ili Varsavskom paktu odnosno ortodoksnom komunistickom sistemu4. Tome je pogodovala i unutarnja ideologija permanentnog vanjskog i unutrasnjeg neprijatelja, sto je bila izlika za jednopartijski ideoloski rezim i unutarnju represiju. Istovremeno je strah od mnostva neprijatelja bio nekakov kohezivni elemenat visenacionalne i visereligijske drzave s razlicitim historijskim i kulturnim korjenima. Tako su cjelokupni napori drzave i vladajue komunisticke partije bili usmjereni na angaziranje svekolikog ljudskog i materijalnog potencijala u obrani drzave i politickog sustava. Svaki gradjanin bio je obvezatan da u skladu sa svojim mogunostima i ulogom u drzavnom i politickom sustavu maksimalno doprinosi ucinkovitoj obrani. Prema Ustavu iz 1974. godine nitko nije imao pravo potpisati i priznati kapitulaciju vojske i drzave, otpor se trebao nastaviti i u uvjetima potpune okupacije drzave i propasti vojske.

42.

Oruzane snage SFRJ bile su sastavljene od Jugoslovenske narodne armije (JNA) kao manevarske komponente i Teritorijalne obrane (TO) kao prostorne komponente, koja

4

Jugoslavija bila je okruzena »BRIGAMA« (engl. troubles, njem. Sorgen, fr. soucis). Pocetna slova susjednih drzava daju rijec »brigama« - Bugarska, Rumunjska, Italija, Grcka, Austrija, Madjarska, Albanija.

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je bila najsiri oblik organiziranog oruzanog openarodnog otpora5. Svim postrojbama i operativno-strategijskim sastavima JNA, kao i operativno-strategijskim sastavima TO, zapovijedalo je Vrhovno zapovjednistvo kojeg je cinilo Predsjednistvo SFRJ ­ po jedan izabrani predstavnik svake republike i pokrajine. Strucnu potporu cinio je Stab Vrhovne komande, u koji je u ratnom stanju ulazilo savezno ministarstvo obrane (Savezni sekretarijat narodne odbrane ­ SSNO). Njemu su bila podredjena vojista kao vojno-teritorijalna zapovjednistva, cije se zone odgovornosti nisu podudarala sa politicko-teritorijalnom podjelom drzave6. Ratno zrakoplovstvo i protuzracna obrana bili su takodjer pod neposrednim zapovjednistvom Vrhovnog zapovjednistva. Ratna mornarica i obrana priobalnog dijela (Istra, Hrvatsko Primorje, Dalmacija, Boka Kotorska i crnogorska obala) bila je pod zapovjednistvom Vojnopomorske oblasti koja je opet bila podredjena vrhovnom zapovijedanju. Vrhovnom zapovjednistvu bili su podredjeni i Republicki stozeri TO kao vojno-teritorijalna zapovjednistva republika.

43.

Zdruzene takticke postrojbe i operativni strategijski sastavi JNA imali su zakonski precizno odredjene ovlasti i nacin koordinacije sa civilnim vlastima u zoni odgovornosti. Taj sustav bio je ve pred rat u Sloveniji posve narusen da bi se raspadom JNA u proljee 1992. godine posve srusio. Zapovjednici postrojbi JNA svoje zahtjeve prema civilnim vlastima i za potrebe vodjenja boja na odredjenoj teritoriji mogli su uputiti izravno ili preko pretpostavljenog zapovjednistva. Uskladjivanje zadaa vrsili su zakonom predvidjeni politicko-izvrsni organi na svim razinama politicko-administrativnog organiziranja od mjesne zajednice preko opine i ratnih kotara do republickih izvrsnih vijea (vlada). To su bili Odbori na ONO i DSZ koje su sacinjavali nosioci izvrsne vlasti odredjene drustveno-politicke zajednice, dok im je na celu bio predsjednik mjesne zajednice, opine, ratnog kotara ili Predsjednistvo republike.

5 6

1D02976 Ustav SFRJ iz 1974., cl.240. 1. vojiste sa sjedistem u Beogradu obuhvatalo je gotovo cijelu Bosnu i Hercegovinu, istocni dio Hrvatske (Slavoniju), Vojvodinu, sredisnju Srbiju i Crnu Goru, zapravo preko 40 % nacionalne teritorije. Do korjenitih promjena doslo je pocetkom 1990. godine kada su ukinute armijske oblasti, cije su se zone odgovornosti u velikom dijelu podudarale sa republickim granicama. Tako su svoja vojno-teritorijalna zapovjednistva izgubile Slovenija, BiH, Makedonija i Crna Gora, dok je Hrvatska podijeljena u tri vojista (5. sa sjedistem u Zagrebu, 1. sa sjedistem u Beogradu i Vojno pomorsku oblast sa sjedistem u Splitu)

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44.

Poseban izraz »ostvarivanja vodeeg utjecaja SK u podrucju obrane« bili su komiteti za ONO i DSZ. Komiteti za ONO i DSZ bili su oblikovani na svim razinama drzavnog odnosno administrativnog sustava - od mjesne zajednice odnosno poduzea do zakljucno s republikom. Zakon i drugi popratni dokumenti predvidjeli su da je predsjednik odnosno rukovoditelj tih komiteta predsjednik ili sekretar partijske organizacije na toj razini partijskog organizovanja. Njemu su kao clanovi komiteta bili podreñeni i legalno izabrani rukovoditelji drzavnih odnosno administrativnih organa kao i drugih politickih ili drustvenih organizacija. Zapovjednik stozera TO, zapovjednik policije i cak zapovjednik postrojbe JNA7 na tom podrucju bili su takodjer clanovi komiteta, i pored svoje posebne linije zapovijedanja. Kao clanovi tih komiteta bili su obvezatni prihvatiti i izvrsiti zadae tog komiteta.

45.

Ti su komiteti bili oblikovani kao politicko i koordinacijsko tijelo za rukovodjenje obranom na odredjenom podrucju i prije svega morali bi osiguravati djelovanje organa i ustanova civilne obrane. Medjutim, zakon, a jos vise popratni propisi, dali su im ovlasti u podrucju zapovijedanja oruzanim bojem u slucaju izravne ugrozenosti i napadaja protivnika. Tako je u Smernicama za obranu SFRJ od agresije, kao temeljnim dokumentom obrambene doktrine, zapisano: »Ako nadlezni organi (stozer TO, p.a.) nisu u mogunosti da izvrsavaju poslove i zadatke iz ONO i DSZ, komiteti za ONO i DSZ preduzimaju aktivnosti i mere da se ti organi osposobe i nastave rad, a kada okolnosti to nalazu, sami organizuju opstenarodni otpor i njim rukovode na svom podrucju (p.a)«.8 U ratu u slucaju prisilnog ostajanja neke postrojbe JNA u okruzenju odnosno po protivniku zauzetom podrucju ona se morala podrediti tom komitetu.

46.

Teritorijalna obrana bila je organizirana na posve specifican nacin, koji druge suvremene vojske nisu poznavale. TO na saveznoj razini nije imala zapovjednog organa, imala je samo koordinativno tijelo u svojstvu Uprave Glavnog staba za TO i pomonika nacelnika GS za TO. Zapovjednici republickih stabova TO bili su clanovi Vojnog savjeta kao najviseg savjetodavnog organa saveznog ministra obrane. Oni su

7

Potcinjavanje postrojbe JNA komitetu za ONO i DSZ bilo je iznimnim situacijama kada se ta postrojba nasla na veoj dubini privremeno zauzete teritorije odnosno u dubljoj pozadini okupiranog podrucja odnosno kad je postrojba JNA bila pridodata veoj postrojbi TO. 8 Smernice za odbranu SFRJ od agresije, Predsednistvo SFRJ, Beograd, srpnja 1983, str. 32.

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linijom zapovijedanja bili podredjeni republickim predsjednistvima, kao najvisem organu politicke vlasti u republici. Sustav zapovijedanja TO odvijao se dvostrukom linijom: prvo, linijom zapovijedanja klasicne vojne organizacije od zapovjednika republickog stozera preko zonskih stozera, opinskih i stozera veih mjesnih zajednica do taktickih postrojbi. Druga linija bila je politicko-izvrsna preko odbora za ONO i DSZ, gdje je predsjednik opine bio u odredjenom smislu i nadredjen zapovjedniku stozera TO. Predsjednik komiteta za ONO i DSZ, koji je istovremeno bio sekretar komiteta SK na svojoj razini partijskog organiziranja, imao je najcese odlucujui utjecaj, narocito u pogledu postavljenja i promicanja zapovjednih i stozernih casnika.

47.

Unutar TO postojale su postrojbe manevarske i prostorne komponente. Manevarske postrojbe bile su organizirane u brigade, a dvije i vise brigada i samostalnih odreda privremeno su bili organizirani cak u operativne grupe. Njima su u nacelu zapovijedali stabovi zona, pokrajina, zajednica opina ratnih kotara, ovisno o unutarnjoj organizaciji u pojedinim republikama. Izuzetno je republicki stab preuzimao izravno zapovijedanje operativnom grupom, pogotovo ako je u njenom sastavu bila i zdruzena takticka postrojba JNA. Prostornu komponentu sacinjavali su vodovi i cete na razini mjesne zajednice, namjenski odredi vodnog ili cetnog sastava (pjesacki, jurisni, protuoklopni, protudesantni, protudiverzantski, pomorski) na razini opina, odredi bataljunskog sastava na razini zone ili zajednice opina. Unutar TO na pojedinim razinama zapovijedanja bile su oblikovane i postrojbe bojne potpore (za vatrenu potporu, inzenjersku potporu, protuzracnu obranu, za protuoklopni boj, postrojbe za izvidjanje i postrojbe vojne policije).

48.

Stozeri TO oblikovali su i postrojbe za logisticku potporu. U nacelu su se stozeri TO opskrbljivali iz pricuva drustveno-politicke zajednice, javnih poduzea za opskrbu, transportnih i gradjevnih poduzea. Sanitetska opskrba bila je posve oslonjena na civilnu zdravstvenu organizaciju. U ratnim uvjetima zaposjedanja veeg dijela teritorija drustveno-politicke zajednice odnosno republike predvidjeno je bilo oblikovanje posebnih logistickih baza na tesko dostupnim podrucjima odnosno na slobodnom teritoriju. U tim bazama su drustveno-politicke zajednice organizirale vlastitu proizvodnju oruzja u vidu improvizacija, popravka osteenog i zaplijenjenog oruzja, te izravnu nabavku izvana.

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49.

Opskrba postrojbi i stozera TO bila je centralizirana iz skladista i pricuva JNA. Medjutim, stozeri TO od opinskih pa navise morali su imati i vlastite pricuve materijalnih sredstava. Financiranje nabave oruzja i vojne opreme bilo je u nadleznosti stozera TO, a financijska sredstva su osigurale u svojim budzetima drustveno-politicke zajednice. Federacija nije osiguravala nikakva financijska sredstva za potrebe republika, niti su republike organizirale nekakve medjusobne solidarnosne fondove. Medjutim, unutar republika cesto su pojedine bogatije opine solidarno izdvajale dio financijskih sredstava za opremanje i djelovanje TO siromasnijih opina9. U ratnim uvjetima je opskrba oruzjem i bojnim potrebama bila takodjer centralizirana i iz saveznih pricuva, tekue ratne proizvodnje, nabave iz inozemstva i saveznicke pomoi kao i ratnog plijena. Republickim vlastima bilo je dozvoljeno da u ratnim uvjetima same nabavljaju oruzje i vojnu oprema iz inozemstva, sta su neke iskoristile u vrijeme izravno pred rat (Slovenija i Hrvatska, djelomicno i muslimanske snage u BiH ­ Patriotska liga i Zelene beretke).

50.

Stabovi TO nisu imali nikakvih ovlasti upravljanja i organiziranja aktivnosti u domeni civilne vlasti. Nadzor pucanstva i prometa u njihovoj zoni odgovornosti u nacelu su izvrsavali civilna policija svojim mirnodopskim i mobiliziranim pricuvnim sastavom i druge zakonom predvidjene ustanove10. Istrazivanje kriminalnih i drugih aktivnosti izvrsavali su istrazni organi pravosudja. Unutar postrojbi TO su ove radnje izvodili organi sluzbe sigurnosti i vojne policije za pripadnike TO, pri cemu su suradjivali s odgovarajuim civilnim organima.

51.

Prostorne postrojbe u nacelu nisu izvodile bojna dejstvovanja van teritorije opine ili kotara. Svoje podrucje napustale su uglavnom prisilno usljed dejstva protivnika. Samo u slucaju izravne opasnosti mogli su visi stozeri privremeno okupljati opinske postrojbe za bojno dejstvovanje na sirem podrucju.

9

U Sloveniji je sredinom 80-tih godina prigranicna opina Tolmin bila prisiljena republickim planom opremanja njene TO izdvajati preko 2% svoga drustvenog prihoda, dok je zakonom bilo predvidjeno do 0,5%, na drugoj strani opina Centar u gradu Ljubljana izdvajala je svega 0,12 % ostvarenog prihoda. 10 U Sloveniji je na temelju iskustva iz narodnooslobodilackog rata 1941.-45. oblikovana posebna organizacija za zastitu objekata, pucanstva i materijalnih dobara, koja je bila djelomicno naoruzana lakim pjesackim oruzjem i bez vojne uniforme uz obvezatnu vidnu oznaku. Ta se organizacija zvala Narodna zastita i bila je pod zapovjednistvom sekretarijata unutarnjih poslova opine te je tijesno suradjivala sa opinskim stozerom TO. U pripremama za osamostaljenje ta je organizacija postala zametak oruzane sile Slovenije jer su stozeri TO jos bili pod nadzorom JNA i njoj vjernih casnika.

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52.

Takodjer postrojbe TO nisu mogle biti podreñene visim postrojbama JNA cija je zona odgovornosti zauzimala i podrucje opine. Zapovjednici JNA su morali uskladjivati boravak i dejstvo postrojbi TO u svojoj zoni odgovornosti preko nadleznog staba TO. Izuzetno su postrojbe TO mogle biti podredjene postrojbi JNA po zapovjedi republickog staba TO. U slucaju prinudnog ili planskog ostajanja postrojbe JNA na podrucju koje je zauzeo protivnik, ona se je morala podciniti stabu TO. U slucaju zajednickog bojnog djelovanja postrojbi JNA i TO uskladjivanje operacija vrsili su nadreñeni stabovi i zapovjednistva, ili su oblikovali privremeno zajednicko zapovjednistvo, sastavljeno od casnika staba TO i zapovjednistva postrojbe JNA.

53.

Pravo drzave na samoobranu bilo je u Jugoslaviju prenijeto na sve njezine grañane (kao i sve organizacije i organe), koji su po Ustavu i zakonu imali neprikosnoveno i neotuñivo pravo i duznost braniti zemlju11. Nitko nije imao pravo sprijeciti grañane da se bore protiv neprijatelja koji napada zemlju12, a svaki grañanin koji je s oruzjem ili na drugi nacin ucestvovao u otporu protiv napadaca smatrao se pripadnikom oruzanih snaga SFR Jugoslavije13. Prema tome, posjedovanje i koristenje oruzja nije bilo jedini kriterij utvrñivanja pripadnistva jugoslavenskim oruzanim snagama. Svaki grañanin, koji je na bilo koji nacin sudjelovao u otporu protiv napadaca, smatrao se pripadnikom oruzanih snaga.

54.

Zakonom je openarodna obrana definirana kao jedinstven sistem organiziranja, pripremanja i aktivnog ucesa grañana i pravnih osoba u: - odvraanju i sprecavanju agresije i drugih opasnosti za zemlju, - oruzanoj borbi i drugim oblicima openarodnog otpora i - izvrsavanju drugih zadataka radi obrane neovisnosti, suvereniteta i teritorijalne cjelokupnosti Jugoslavije i njezinog drustvenog ureñenja.14

11 12

1D02976 Ustav SFRJ 1974., cl. 237. 1D02976 Ustav SFRJ 1974., cl. 238. 13 1D02976 Ustav SFRJ 1974., cl. 240. 4D01470 Zakon o opstenarodnoj odbrani, «Sluzbeni list SFRJ» broj 21/1982., cl. 91., sadrzavao je istovjetnu odredbu, da je pripadnik oruzanih snaga i svaki grañanin koji s oruzjem ili na drugi nacin sudjeluje u otporu protiv neprijatelja. 14 4D01470 Zakon o opstenarodnoj odbrani, «Sluzbeni list SFRJ» broj 21/1982., cl. 3.

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55.

U openarodnoj obrani oruzana borba predstavlja odlucujui oblik suprostavljanja agresiji. Oruzana borba i svi drugi oblici openarodnog otpora predstavljaju jedinstvo.15 U slucaju napada na zemlju svi jugoslavenski grañani, kao i stabovi, komande i drugi organi, bili su duzni odmah, ne cekajui poziv ili zapovijed, izvrsavati svoja prava i duznosti u pogledu obrane zemlje i postupati prema planu odbrane i svom ratnom rasporedu.16

56.

Grañani su imali pravo i duznost: - organizirati i sudjelovati u organiziranju, pripremanju i ostvarivanju openarodne obrane; - obucavati se za openarodnu obranu i za izvrsavanje zadataka u ratu, u slucaju neposredne ratne opasnosti ili drugih izvanrednih situacija; - sudjelovati u oruzanoj borbi i drugim oblicima openarodnog otpora; - sudjelovati u zastiti i spasavanju stanovnistva i materijalnih dobara od ratnih razaranja i drugih opasnosti; - sudjelovati u izvrsavanju drugih zadataka od interesa za obranu zemlje.17

57.

Zakon definira da su sljedea prava i duznosti grañana osnovna: - izvrsavanje vojne obveze, - sudjelovanje u civilnoj zastiti, - obucavanje za openarodnu obranu, - izvrsavanje radne obveze, - izvrsavanje materijalne obveze.18

58.

Jedinice i ustanove JNA i TO popunjavaju se ljudstvom stalnog i rezervnog sastava oruzanih snaga19. Stalni sastav sacinjavaju vojnici, pitomci, aktivne vojne osobe i grañanske osobe na sluzbi u oruzanim snagama20, a rezervni sastav cine vojni obveznici koji su odsluzili vojni rok, vojni obveznici koji su regulirali obvezu sluzenja

15 16 17 18 19 20

4D01470 4D01470 4D01470 4D01470 4D01470 4D01472

Zakon o opstenarodnoj odbrani, «Sluzbeni list SFRJ» broj 21/1982., cl. 10. Zakon o opstenarodnoj odbrani, «Sluzbeni list SFRJ» broj 21/1982., cl. 9. Zakon o opstenarodnoj odbrani, «Sluzbeni list SFRJ» broj 21/1982., cl. 13. Zakon o opstenarodnoj odbrani, «Sluzbeni list SFRJ» broj 21/1982., cl. 17. Zakon o opstenarodnoj odbrani, «Sluzbeni list SFRJ» broj 21/1982., cl.118. Zakon o sluzbi u oruzanim snagama, «Sluzbeni list SFRJ 7/1985., cl.9.

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vojnog roka na drugaciji nacin i zene-vojni obveznici21. Obveza sluzenja u rezervnom sastavu za muskarce nastaje od dana otpustanja sa sluzenja vojnog roka, odnosno od dana kad je obveza sluzenja vojnog roka regulirana na drugi nacin, i traje do kraja kalendarske godine u kojoj vojni obveznik navrsava 60 godina zivota.22 O svim vojnim obveznicima voñena je evidencija prema njihova prebivalista.23

59.

Jedinice i ustanove JNA i TO mogu se popunjavati i dobrovoljcima. Dobrovoljci su osobe koje nemaju vojnu obvezu, a primaju se u oruzane snage na vlastiti zahtjev.24 U nekim republikama (Slovenija) organizirani su i dobrovoljci koji jos nisu odsluzili vojni rok i nisu napunili 19 godina starosti. U omladinske dobrovoljacke postrojbe TO primljeni su sa 16 godina starosti. Ucestvovali su u obuci postrojbi TO i pored vojne obuke po programu srednjoskolske naobrazbe. Istaknutiji dobrovoljci omladinci mogli su stei i vojnicke cinove25.

60.

Mobilizacija se izvrsava u slucaju napada na zemlju, nesporedne ratne opasnosti ili drugih izvanrednih prilika. Mobilizacijom oruzane snage prelaze iz mirnodopske organizacije i stanja na ratnu organizaciju i stanje spremnosti za voñenje openarodnog obrambenog rata. Mobilizacija moze biti opa ili djelomicna, javna ili tajna.26

61.

U doktrini openarodne obrane veliko se znacenje pridaje samozastiti. Samozastita je skup aktivnosti, mjera i postupaka koje poduzimaju grañani i drugi pravni subjekti radi zastite interesa openarodne obrane od svih oblika neprijateljske aktivnosti koji mogu stetiti tim interesima. Posebice je u tom kontekstu znacajno pravovremeno otkrivanje i sprijecavanje djelatnosti koje mogu nanijeti stetu interesima obrane i sigurnosti zemlje.27

21

4D01472 Zakon o sluzbi u oruzanim snagama, «Sluzbeni list SFRJ 7/1985., cl.10. i 4D01471 Zakon o vojnoj obvezi, «Sluzbeni list» broj 64/1985., cl.47. 22 4D01471 Zakon o vojnoj obvezi, «Sluzbeni list» broj 64/1985., cl.48. 23 4D01471 Zakon o vojnoj obvezi, «Sluzbeni list» broj 64/1985., cl.69. 24 4D01471 Zakon o opstenarodnoj odbrani, «Sluzbeni list SFRJ» broj 21/1982., cl.119. 25 Aktualni politicar slovenskog osamostaljenja, ministar obrane iz razdoblja oruzanog sukoba JNA sa TO Slovenije J. Jansa, dobio je cin mlañeg vodnika (corporal) kao omladinac dobrovoljac i zato je odbio sluziti vojni rok u JNA odnosno staziranje u JNA po programu studija obrambenih znanosti. 26 4D01470 Zakon o opstenarodnoj odbrani, «Sluzbeni list SFRJ» broj 21/1982., cl.8. 27 4D01470 Zakon o opstenarodnoj odbrani, «Sluzbeni list SFRJ» broj 21/1982., cl.173. i 174.

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62.

Prema tome, u slucaju napada na zemlju svi vojni obveznici duzni su odmah, ne cekajui poziv ili zapovijed, izvrsavati svoja prava i duznosti u pogledu obrane zemlje i postupati prema planu odbrane i svom ratnom rasporedu. Isto tako, ako je proglasena opa mobilizacija, svi vojni obveznici iz rezervnog sastava duzni su stupiti u oruzane snage i zapoceti s izvrsavanjem svojih vojnih duznosti. U takvim okolnostima svaki vojno sposobni muskarac postaje pripadnikom jugoslavenskih oruzanih snaga i ima pravo i duznost sudjelovati u obrani zemlje. Ako nije zatecen u otvorenoj oruzanoj borbi, neprijatelj treba te vojno sposobne muskarce smatrati potencijalnim borcima, jer su u nekoj drugoj situaciji mogli biti zateceni s oruzjem u ruci.28

28

4D01492 Gavro Perazic, knjiga: Ustavnopoliticki i meñunarodnopravni status odbrane i oruzanih snaga, Beograd 1976, stranice 200 - 201

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6. PRIMJENA DOKTRINE OPENARODNE OBRANE U BOSNI I

HERCEGOVINI

63. Doktrina openarodne obrane, odnosno koncept naoruzanog naroda, bio je primijenjen u Bosni i Hercegovini 90-tih godina. To je vidljivo u propisima o obrani zemlje, ali i nizu vojnih dokumenata, koji ukazuju na jedinstvo armije i stanovnistva u borbi za osloboñenje zemlje.

6.1.

Ustav i drugi propisi Bosne i Hercegovine

6.1.1. Ustav Ustav Republike Bosne i Hercegovine29 definira da oruzane snage BiH cini Armija Republike. U slucaju rata oruzane snage, pored Armije, cine i policija i naoruzani sastavi koji se stavljaju pod jedinstvenu komandu oruzanih snaga Republike i cine jedinstvenu cjelinu (cl.162. st.2.). Svaki grañanin koji s oruzjem ili na drugi nacin sudjeluje u otporu protiv agresora pripadnik je oruzanih snaga Republike (cl. 162. st.3.). Ova je odredba izravno preuzeta iz Ustava SFRJ koji je propisivao da je «svaki grañanin koji s oruzjem ili na drugi nacin ucestvuje u otporu protiv napadaca pripadnik je oruzanih snaga SFRJ.»30 Za pravilno utvrñenje da li je netko pripadnik oruzanih snaga Bosne i Hercegovine nije, prema tome, bitno samo to da li u rukama ima oruzje ili ne. Bitno je da li grañanin na bilo koji nacin sudjeluje u otporu protiv agresora. Dakle, oruzani i neoruzani otpor agresoru su izjednaceni, pa se pripadnikom oruzanih snaga BiH smatra svaki grañanin koji sudjeluje u otporu protiv agresora.

64.

6.1.2. Uredba o obrani31 6.1.2.1. Obrana zemlje je pravo i duznost grañana

65.

Na sjednici odrzanoj 14. maja 1992. godine, Predsjednistvo RBiH donijelo je Uredbu sa zakonskom snagom o obrani, kojom su ureñeni sistem i organizacija obrane, prava i

29 30 31

1D01236 1D02976 4D00408

Ustav Republike Bosne i Hercegovine, prociseni tekst, 1993. Ustav SFRJ iz 1974., cl.240/3 Uredba sa zakonskom snagom o obrani RBiH

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duznosti Republike, opina, poduzea i drugih pravnih osoba, zatim vojna obrana i civilna obrana, inspekcijski nadzor, financiranje i druga pitanja vazna za obranu Republike (cl.1.st.1.). To je, zapravo, bio ranije vazei republicki Zakon o narodnoj odbrani, koji je inoviran sukladno normama suvremenih demokratskih politickih sustava. 66. Utvrñeno je da Republika preko nadleznih ministarstava i drugih republickih organa u oblasti obrane rukovodi narodnim otporom u ratu (cl.5. al.3.), sto pokazuje da je Predsjednistvo BiH usvojilo doktrinu narodne obrane, odnosno narodnog otpora u ratu, koja je bila osnovna karakteristika obrambenog sustava bivse Jugoslavije. 67. I ova Uredba zadrzava pravnu kvalifikaciju iz prijasnjeg jugoslavenskog sustava o ,,pravima i duznostima" grañana u obrani zemlje, pa stoga utvrñuje pravo i duznost grañana da: - izvrsavaju vojnu obvezu, - izvrsavaju radnu obvezu, - izvrsavaju materijalnu obavezu, - ucestvuju u civilnoj zastiti - obucavaju se za obranu (cl.46.). 68. Neizvrsenje pojedinih obveza u obrani zemlje bilo je sankcionirano kao krivicno djelo, odnosno prekrsaj. 69. Osim spomenutih, grañani su po Uredbi imali sljedea prava i duznosti: - da budu rasporeñeni u oruzanim snagama, civilnoj zastiti, sluzbi promatranja i obavjestavanja, jedinicama veze rukovoñenja i kriptozastite, drzavnim organima, poduzeima i drugim pravnim osobama ili na drugim zadacima obrane; - da se odazovu pozivu nadleznog organa, poduzea ili druge pravne osobe za vrsenje obveza u oblasti obrane; - da daju podatke znacajne za obranu koje saznaju ili primijete i najhitnije dostave centru za obavjestavanje ili drzavnim organima; - da daju potrebne podatke za voñenje evidencije u oblasti obrane. (Cl.47.)

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6.1.2.2. Vojna obrana, radna obveza, civilna obrana, sluzba motrenja i dojavljivanja

70.

Vojna obrana je najsiri oblik organiziranja i pripremanja grañana za oruzanu borbu, a obuhvaa: organiziranje, pripremanje, razvoj i rukovoñenje oruzanim snagama, popunu oruzanih snaga ljudstvom i materijalno-tehnickim sredstvima, poslove i zadatke vojne obveze, evidenciju, regrutiranje, popunu, osposobljavanje grañana za voñenje oruzane borbe i mobilizaciju (cl.62.). Radi organiziranja i pripremanja grañana za voñenje oruzane borbe organiziraju se oruzane snage (cl.63.).

71.

Rasporeñivanjem ljudstva i materijalnih sredstava u oruzane snage, rezervnu policiju, civilnu zastitu, sluzbu osmatranja i obavjestavanja, organe drustveno-politickih zajednica, poduzea i druge organizacije i pravne osobe osigurava se ucese svih snaga i sredstava na teritoriji Republike na nacin da se najpotpunije iskoriste strucne i druge sposobnosti grañana za potrebe obrane (cl.66.). Pojedinac, na primjer, moze biti rasporeñen u neku vojnu jedinicu ili u poduzee koje proizvodi municiju ovisno o njegovim znanjima i strucnim kvalifikacijama, na temelju kojih nadlezna drzavna sluzba procjenjuje na kojim e zadaama taj pojedinac dati najvei doprinos potrebama obrane zemlje.

72.

Radnoj obavezi podlijegali su svi radno sposobni grañani s navrsenih 15 godina starosti. Radna obaveza izvrsavala se u organima drzavne uprave, poduzeima i drugim pravnim licima i obavljanjem povremenih radova za potrebe obrane, a uvoñena je u slucaju rata ili izvanrednog stanja (cl.48.). Sa stajalista ucesa grañana BiH u obrani odnosno doprinosa nenaoruzanih grañana izravnoj obrani oruzanih snaga svakako treba utvrditi znacenje pojma ,,obavljanje povremenih radova za potrebe obrane". Povremeni radovi za potrebe obrane predstavljaju angaziranje grañana pod radnom obavezom na izvoñenju fortifikacijskih radova kao sto su izrada rovova i sklonista za ljudstvo i borbena sredstva postrojbi oruzanih snaga, izrada razlicitih prepreka na bojisnici i na putovima, priprema grañe i drugog materijala za fortifikacijske radove, izgradnja privremenih vojnih putova odnosno popravak postojeih za uredno komuniciranje vojnih vozila. Tako zapovjednik 3. korpusa

Armije BiH u svom nareñenju za angaziranje postrojbi radne obaveze precizno

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odreñuje zadae podcinjenih postrojbi u svezi sa postrojbama radne obaveze32. To isto stoji i u nareñenju Zapovjednistva 3. korpusa za angaziranje postrojbi radne obaveze za inzenjerijsku potporu bojnog djelovanja korpusa, u kojem se nareñuje: ,,Odrzavanje puteva u zoni odgovornosti brigade vrsiti sopstvenim snagama uz pomo mjesnih zajednica na terenu."33 Takoñer zapovjednik 4. korpusa Armije BiH posredno potvrñuje da su bile postrojbe radne obaveze angazirane na radovima inzenjerijske potpore u zonama bojnog djelovanja: ,,Jedinice radne obaveze angazovane na inzinjerijskom obezbjeñenju u zonama b/d dovoditi najkraim putevima..."34 73. Takoñer je radna obaveza obuhvaala i izvrsavanje zadaa opskrbe vojnih postrojbi kako na bojisnici tako i na odmaranju u dubini bojisnice u vidu pripreme ili izrade objekata za smjestaj, pripremu, dostavu i podjelu hrane, lijecenje i njegu ranjenih i oboljelih, sahranjivanje poginulih i asanaciju bojisnice. Najizravnije su grañani u radnoj obavezi doprinijeli dostavom streljiva i bojnih sredstava izravno na borbene polozaje na bojisnici. Ovu zadau su uglavnom izvrsavali mlañi ili stariji muskarci. 74. Poradi organiziranog izvoñenja radova za potrebe obrane u mobilizacijskim planovima bile su predviñene namjenske postrojbe ­ radne skupine, vodovi i cete na razini sela, mjesne zajednice i opine. Radne postrojbe mogle su biti ope koje su pruzale iskljucivo fizicku radnu snagu i upotrebljavale uglavnom rucni alat ili lakse masine (motorne pile) ili laksa transportna sredstva (rucna kolica, zaprezna kola, manji traktori). Za obimnije fortifikacijske radove oblikovale su se i specijalizirane radne skupine ili vodovi, koji su upotrebljavali tezu grañevinsku mehanizaciju i transportna sredstva. Za dostavu streljiva i borbenih sredstava pa su se oformile tovarne ili traktorske skupine. Ovakve skupine i postrojbe su se oblikovale i ad hoc, sukladno odlukama vojnih zapovjednika i okolnostima na bojisnici35.

32

4D01494 Order issued by Enver Hadzihasanovic and forwarded by Ramiz Dugalic to Municipal Defence Staff Bugojno, G. Vakuf, D. Vakuf, Zepce, Zavidovici..., re:engagement of work obligation units, ref: 05/633-2, Zenica, 01 March 1993 33 4D01474 Naredjenje za inz. obezbedjenje komande 3. korpusa, str. pov. broj: 02/136-1 od 21.03.1993.godine 34 4D01487 Order issued by Arif Pasalic to the 4th Corps-all units, re: enforcement of security measures, ref: 01-3039/93, Mostar, 14 April 1993 35 U opsjednutom Sarajevu neki su lokalni zapovjednici odvodili na kopanje rovova na bojisnici civile izravno iz vozila gradskog prometa ili sa ulice.

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75.

Dopunama Uredbe o obrani od 23. aprila 1993. godine36 utvrñeno je da grañani koji se po osnovi radne obveze angaziraju u jedinicama radne obveze imaju pravo na novcanu naknadu. Visinu naknade utvrñuje izvrsni odbor opine ako se jedinica radne obveze angazira u vrsenju poslova i zadataka za potrebe oruzanih snaga. Za jedinice radne obveze koje se angaziraju na radovima od znacenja za obranu u drzavnom organu, poduzeu ili drugoj pravnoj osobi, visinu naknade utvrñuju institucije za koje se radove izvode. (Cl.126b.)

76.

Civilna obrana je najsiri oblik organiziranja, pripremanja i osposobljavanja grañana, organa, poduzea i drugih pravnih osoba za: (i) ucese u neoruzanom otporu i (ii) zastitu i spasavanje ljudi i materijalnih dobara od posljedica ratnih djelovanja, elementarnih nepogoda i drugih nesrea (cl.70.).

77.

Civilna obrana sastoji se od: - civilne zastite, - sluzbe promatranja i obavjestavanja, - veze rukovoñenja i kriptozastite, osim za potrebe zapovijedanja oruzanim snagama, - planiranja i obuka, osim obuke pripadnika oruzanih snaga, - obrambene i zastitne priprema organa, poduzea i drugih pravnih osoba. (Cl.71.)

78.

Civilna zastita se organizira, priprema i provodi kao sistem zastite i spasavanja ljudi, materijalnih i kulturnih dobara od ratnih razaranja, elementarnih nepogoda, tehnickotehnoloskih i drugih nesrea i opasnosti miru i ratu (cl.72.). Obavezi sluzenja u civilnoj zastiti podlijegali su svi grañani od navrsene 18. pa do 60. godine starosti muskarci, odnosno 55 godine zene (cl.50.st.1.). Zadae civilne zastite nisu bitno promijenjene u odnosu na mirnodopsko stanje, samo se u vrijeme rata zadaci znatno poveavaju po obimu i slozenosti. Izvrsavanjem tih zadaa posredno se doprinosi i uspjesnosti oruzane obrane, posebice u smislu jacanja morala i opeg raspolozenja kako vojnika na bojisnici tako i svih grañana pa i u ratom nezahvaenim predjelima. Nekadasnja doktrina openarodne obrane predvidjela je angaziranje snaga i sredstava civilne zastite i za potrebe izravne oruzane borbe. Vatrogasne postrojbe gasile su

36

1D01238 Uredba sa zakonskom snagom o izmjenama i dopunama Uredbe sa zakonskom snagom o obrani, 23. april 1993.

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pozare u naseljima pa cak u sumskim predjelima za vrijeme izvoñenja borbi kako bi postrojbe oruzanih snaga mogle opstati na predviñenim polozajima. Sanitetske postrojbe su pruzale hitnu pomo ranjenim vojnicima na bojisnici i evakuirale ih u civilne zdravstvene ustanove. Specijalizirane postrojbe za detekciju i otklanjanje posljedica NHB djelovanja protivnika u zahvatu bojisnice posve su se uvezivale u sustav djelovanja ovih postrojbi oruzanih snaga i obavezne su bile dostavljati podatke koje su prikupili svojim snagama i sredstvima. Zastitom i evakuacijom obitelji vojnika najizravnije su utjecale na njihov moral, kao i djelovanja. 79. Koliko su znacajne bile snage i sredstva civilne zastite za obranu moze se zakljuciti i iz Uredbe sa zakonskom snagom o izmjenama i dopunama uredbe sa zakonskom snagom o obrani37 , koja propisuje da se ,,za vrijeme ratnog stanja, pripadnici civilne zastite (stabova i jedinica) u pogledu prava i duznosti pripadnicima oruzanih snaga" (cl.3.). 80. Obaveza sluzenja u sluzbi motrenja i dojavljivanja organizirana je ve u miru, dok za vrijeme rata dobiva slozenije zadae u funkciji obrane: ,,Sluzba osmatranja i obavjestavanja u Republici osigurava praenje i otkrivanje svih vrsta opasnosti od ratnih dejstava..." (Cl.91. st.2.) Tezisna zadaa ove sluzbe svakako je motrenje zracnog prostora i pravovremena dojava naleta zrakoplova i drugih letjelica za napad iz zracnog prostora. Sustav zracnog motrenja i dojavljivanja civilne sfere posve je bio uvezan u takav sustav oruzanih snaga. Razmjena podataka bila je obavezna za oba sustava. Fakticki je bio civilni motrilacki sustav nadopuna a u nekim situacijama i jedini sustav motrenja zracnog prostora za potrebe pojedinih postrojbi oruzanih snaga. Meñutim, organi te sluzbe svakako e primijetiti i nadolazak kopnenih snaga protivnika, posebice ubacenih dijelova i skupina, kao i djelovanje topnistva i druge aktivnosti suprotne strane. Posve je razumljivo da e o tome dojaviti nadreñenim organima i stozerima civilne zastite i drzavnih organa, a ovisno od situacije i blizine bojisnice dojaviti e izravno zapovjednistvima oruzanih snaga. Time ova posve civilna sluzba postaje obavjestajni organ oruzanih snaga i izravno je u funkciji oruzane borbe.

37

na odlucnost izvoñenja borbenih

u svemu izjednacuju sa

4D01348 Uredba sa zakonskom snagom o izmjenama i dopunama uredbe sa zakonskom snagom o obrani, 19. oktobra 1992., Sluzbeni list Armije BiH, broj 1/1992.

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81.

Na razini mjesne zajednice ili veeg naselja organizirane su osmatracnice sa stalnom posadom do 2-3 osobe i odgovarajuim sredstvima veze. Na znacajnijim pravcima i objektima organiziraju se osmatracke postaje sa stalnom posadom od 5-6 osoba. U svrhu dopune sustava motrenja postavljali su se i osmatraci, koji su dojavljivali opasnost prirucnim sredstvima i optickim signalima. Te su motrilacke posade cinili starije ili mlañe osobe oba spola, koje nisu bile rasporeñene u postrojbe oruzanih snaga ili postrojbe civilne zastite. Sustav motrenja i dojavljivanja u ratnim uvjetima i u zahvatu bojisnice posve je u funkciji uspjesnog izvoñenja oruzane borbe.

6.1.2.3. Obucavanje i osposobljavanje za obranu

82.

Jedna od obaveza grañana BiH bila je obucavanje i osposobljavanje za oruzanu borbu. U clanku 99. Uredbe sa zakonskom snagom o obrani utvrñuju se pravo i duznost obucavanja i osposobljavanja za oruzanu borbu: ,,Radi stjecanja strucnih znanja i vjestina za vojnu (podvukao M.G.) i civilnu obranu, grañani imaju pravo i duznost da se obucavaju i osposobljavaju za obranu." S obzirom da je i ova obaveza istovremeno pravo i duznost, ne mogu je grañani svojevoljno izbjei, a da pri tome ne podlijezu zakonskoj (krivicnoj ili prekrsajnoj) odgovornosti i moralnoj osudi blize i sire drustvene okoline. U clanku 51. spomenuta Uredba propisuje: ,,Pravo i duznost obucavanja za obranu imaju, pod uvjetima propisanim zakonom, grañani od navrsenih 15 do navrsenih 60 godina zivota (muskarci), 55 godina zivota (zene) ako su sposobni za pohañanje obuke..."

6.1.2.4. Obavjestajna djelatnost grañana

83.

Grañani BiH su bili obavezni izvrsavati obavjestajnu djelatnost za potrebe oruzanog otpora. Prema clanku 47. stav 3 Uredbe o obrani grañani BiH imaju i pravo i duznost da: ,,3. daju podatke znacajne za obranu koje saznaju ili primijete i najhitnije dostave centru za obavjestavanje ili drzavnim organima."

84.

Ovo je posebna obaveza kojoj podlijezu svi grañani bez obzira na starost i spol odnosno svoju ulogu i opu zadau u sustavu obrane ili drustvenog zivota uope. Podaci iz centara za obavjestavanje izravno su dostavljani zapovjednistvima oruzanih

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snaga i bili su sukladno znacenju i vaznosti upotrebljavani u funkciji oruzane borbe. U dikciji ,,drzavnim organima" grañani su bili obavezni dojavljivati svoja zapazanja izravno zapovjednistvima oruzanih snaga kao drzavnim organima. 85. U obrambenom sustavu nekadasnje Jugoslavije postojala je sluzba prikupljanja obavjestajnih i sigurnosnih podataka organizirana preko posebne organizacije povjerljivih osoba izravno na terenu zvanom Mjesna izviñacko-obavjestajna sluzba (MIOS). U svakom naselju ili u blizini znacajnih objekata angazirani su pojedini povjerljivi grañani na prikupljanju znacajnih podataka o protivniku ili njegovim suradnicima. Ta se sluzba smjela aktivirati samo u ratu, meñutim pojedini djelatnici vojne sluzbe sigurnosti su koristili ove ratne suradnike za prikupljanje aktualnih sigurnosnih podataka u miru, posebice u podrucjima gdje je bilo ve proturezimskih reakcija i nacionalistickih ispada veeg broja grañana. Krajem 80-tih godina ta je sluzba ukinuta, meñutim njeno aktiviranje bilo je predviñeno u ratu. Suradnici se nisu pridobivali i pripremali za obavjestajni rad u miru, ve iskljucivo u ratu. U sustini, djelovanje ove sluzbe islo je posredstvom civilnih organa i struktura unutarnjih poslova i dobiveni podaci su vojnim sluzbama dostavljani obrañeni i u potrebnom obimu. Ipak, vojni obavjestajci i djelatnici vojne sigurnosne sluzbe organizirali su svoje ljude i kanale. Grañani su u tom radu sudjelovali u smislu prava i duznosti te moralnih osjeaja. Ovi povjerljivi grañani koji su bili u izravnoj vezi sa vojnim obavjestajcima nizeg ranga su na prikupljanju podataka angazirali druge stanovnike u mjestu - susjede, roñake, starije osobe, zene, pa i djecu. Istovjetno djelovanje Armije BiH potvrñuje, meñu ostalim, naredba zapovjednika 3. korpusa Armije BiH za intenziviranje obavjestajne djelatnosti upuena podreñenim obavjestajnim organima u brigadama. U vezi s prikupljanjem obavjestajnih podataka Hadzihasanovi nareñuje ,,kao poseban zadatak imati uvezivanje sa nasim strukturama i simpatizerima na privremeno okupiranoj teritoriji».38

38

4D01475 Nareñenje za intenziviranje obavjestajne djelatnosti komande 3. korpusa, str. pov. broj: 10/887-2 od 23.03.1993. godine

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6.1.3. Uredba sa zakonskom snagom o oruzanim snagama R BiH39

86.

Predsjednistvo RBiH donijelo Uredbu sa zakonskom snagom o oruzanim snagama Republike Bosne i Hercegovine na sjednici odrzanoj 20. maja 1992. godine.

6.1.3.1 Sastav oruzanih snaga

87.

Uredba utvrñuje da oruzane snage RBiH cini Armija Republike, a u slucaju rata i policija i naoruzani sastavi koji se stavljaju pod jedinstvenu komandu oruzanih snaga Republike. Pod naoruzanim sastavima podrazumijevaju se radnici koji rade na poslovima fizickog osiguranja u poduzeima i drugim pravnim osobama, radnici carinske sluzbe i drugih pogranicnih organa (cl.2.).

88.

Uredbom sa zakonskom snagom o izmjenama i dopunama Uredbe sa zakonskom snagom o oruzanim snagama RBIH40 od 18. jula 1992. godine Predsjednistvo RBiH prosirilo je pojam oruzanih snaga RBiH tako da se pripadnicima oruzanih snaga smatraju i naoruzane formacije koje su se samoorganizirale ili organizirale u ilegalne vojne jedinice pod raznim nazivima u snage otpora protiv fasisticke okupacije Bosne i Hercegovine od strane tzv. Savezne Republike Jugoslavije, bivse Jugoslavenske narodne armije, Srpske demokratske stranke i drugih neprijateljskih snaga, u vremenu od 30. aprila 1991. do 15. aprila 1992. godine (cl.1.). Koje se od spomenutih oruzanih formacija smatraju pripadnicima oruzanih snaga RBiH utvrñuje Predsjednistvo RBiH posebnom odlukom (cl.2.).

89.

U kolovozu 1992. Predsjednistvo RBiH ponovno mijenja definiciju pojma oruzanih snaga iz Uredbe sa zakonskom snagom o oruzanim snagama, tako da od tada oruzane snage cini Armija Republike, a njezin sastavni dio cine postrojbe HVO i drugi naoruzani sastavi koji se stave pod jedinstvenu komandu Armije. Za vrijeme ratnog stanja, osim Armije, oruzane snage cine policija, jedinice fizickog osiguranja poduzea

39 40

4D00409 Uredba sa zakonskom snagom o oruzanim snagama Republike Bosne i Hercegovine 1D01240 Uredba sa zakonskom snagom o izmjenama i dopunama Uredbe sa zakonskom snagom o oruzanim snagama RBiH

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i drugih pravnih osoba, jedinice carinske sluzbe i drugi pogranicni organi koji se pretpodcine pod jedinstvenu komandu oruzanih snaga.41

6.1.3.2. Armija je udarna obrambena snaga

90.

Armija se organizira, osposobljava i priprema u miru za voñenje svih oblika oruzane borbe i borbenih djelovanja, kao udarna obrambena snaga Republike, sa zadatkom da sprijeci agresiju i drugu opasnost za Republiku, da vodi oruzanu borbu protiv neprijatelja i sudjeluje u zastiti i spasavanju stanovnistva i materijalnih dobara u ratu, omoguujui time mobilizaciju svih obrambenih snaga Republike (cl.3.)42. Armija, dakle, nije jedina, nego je udarna obrambena snaga, pa nije pravilno Armiju BiH postovjetiti s ukupnim obrambenim snagama BiH.

91.

Armija se organizira u mirdnodopske i ratne jedinice i ustanove. Mirnodopske jedinice i ustanove popunjavaju se kadrovima na profesionalnom radu u Armiji i vojnim obveznicima, koji po osnovi vojne obveze sluze vojni rok. Ratne jedinice i ustanove popunjavaju se vojnim obveznicima iz rezervnog sastava, koji su odsluzili vojni rok ili su na drugi nacin osposobljeni za izvrsavanje zadataka i duznosti na koje su rasporeñeni. (Cl. 4.)

92.

U ratu ili u slucaju izvanrednog stanja jedinice, ustanove i komande Armije popunjavaju se ljudstvom stalnog i ratnog sastava Armije (cl.16.st.1.). Drugim rijecima, u slucaju rata Armiju cine kadrovi na profesionalnom radu u Armiji i vojni obveznici na odsluzenju vojnog roka, te vojni obveznici iz rezervnog sastava, koji su odsluzili vojni rok.

93.

Armija se moze popunjavati i drugim osobama (cl.16. st.2.), koje ne podlijezu vojnoj obvezi, ali su primljene u Armiju na vlastiti zahtjev (cl.16. st.3.). Te se osobe u pogledu prava i obveza izjednacuju s vojnim licima odnosno vojnim obveznicima (cl.16. st.5.), ovisno o statusu u vojnoj hijerarhiji.

41

4D00410 Uredba sa zakonskom snagom o izmjenama o dopunama Uredbe sa zakonskom snagom o oruzanim snagama R BiH, 06.08.1992. 42 4D00409 Uredba sa zakonskom snagom o oruzanim snagama Republike Bosne i Hercegovine

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94.

Pojam vojnih lica definiran je Uredbom sa zakonskom snagom o sluzbi u Armiji Republike Bosne i Hercegovine43, koja je objavljena 1. augusta 1992. godine. Vojna lica su: (i) aktivna vojna lica, (ii) vojnici i (iii) lica u rezervnom sastavu dok se nalaze na vojnoj duznosti u Armiji (cl.3. st.1.) odnosno, drugim rijecima, vojnici u rezervi kad su na vojnoj sluzbi u Armiji (cl.86. st.1.).

95.

Aktivna vojna lica su podoficiri, oficiri i generali (cl.3.st.2.), a vojnici i lica u rezervnom sastavu stupaju na sluzbu u Armiju na osnovi vojne obveze (cl.4. st.2.). Stalni sastav Armije cine aktivna vojna lica, vojnici, radnici u sluzbi i grañani na radu u Armiji (cl.8.), a rezervni sastav Armije cine osobe koje po propisima o vojnoj obvezi podlijezu obvezi sluzenja u rezervnom sastavu Armije.44

96.

Vazno je napomenuti kako i Uredba sa zakonskom snagom o sluzbi u Armiji RBiH razlikuje pojam pripadnika Armije od pojma pripadnika oruzanih snaga, pa tako u odredbama o zdravstvenoj zastiti utvrñuje prava pripadnika Armije, a to su u ratu prava pripadnika oruzanih snaga (cl.60.). Treba, dakle, imati na umu da je pojam pripadnika oruzanih snaga BiH u ratu siri od pojma pripadnika Armije BiH.

97.

To dokazuje i odredba Uredbe sa zakonskom snagom o obrani po kojoj se pripadnicima oruzanih snaga smatraju i grañani koja se za vrijeme rata ili neposredne ratne opasnosti, po osnovi vojne obveze, u organizaciji organa uprave za narodnu obranu, angaziraju na vrsenju kurirsko-pozivarskih poslova radi provoñenja mobilizacije i drugih zadataka za potrebe oruzanih snaga i druge potrebe obrane (cl. 126c.)45.

6.1.3.3 Mobilizacija

98.

U slucaju izvanrednog stanja ili izvrsenog napada na Republiku vrsi se mobilizacija grañana, oruzanih snaga i drugih nosilaca obrane i materijalnih sredstava za potrebe

43 44

4D00412 Uredba sa zakonskom snagom o sluzbi u Armiji Republike Bosne i Hercegovine 4D00412 Uredba sa zakonskom snagom o sluzbi u Armiji Republike Bosne i Hercegovine 45 1D01238 Uredba sa zakonskom snagom o izmjenama i dopunama Uredbe sa zakonskom snagom o obrani, 23. aprila 1993.

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obrane (cl.20. st.1.). Ovom je odredbom, dakle, definirano da nosioci obrane u BiH jesu: 1. grañani; 2. oruzane snage; 3. drugi nosioci obrane.

99.

Mobilizacija moze biti opa ili djelomicna. Opa mobilizacija Armije i drugih nosilaca obrane obuhvaa sve ratne jedinice i ustanove, a djelomicna samo odreñene jedinice i ustanove Armije (cl.22.).

6.1.3.4. Vojna obveza

100.

Uredbom sa zakonskom snagom o vojnoj obvezi46, koju je Predsjednistvo RBiH donijelo na sjednici odrzanoj 1. augusta 1992. godine, utvrñeno je da je vojna obveza neotuñivo pravo i duznost grañana RBiH na obranu domovine, ocuvanje njezine slobode, nezavisnosti, suvereniteta, teritorijalne cjelokupnosti i Ustavom utvrñenog drustvenog ureñenja (cl.1.st.1.). Izvrsavanjem vojne obveze grañani se pripremaju, obucavaju i organiziraju za: (i) voñenje oruzane borbe; (ii) vrsenje drugih duznosti u oruzanim snagama i (iii) sudjelovanje u drugim oblicima openarodnog otpora (cl.1.st.2.).

101.

Iako se u Uredbi ne spominje pravo grañana na oruzani otpor kao posebno pravo, sto je bila pravna norma svojstvena nekadasnjoj jugoslavenskoj doktrini openarodne obrane, nesporno je i u Bosni i Hercegovini bilo priznato pravo i obveza svih grañana da sudjeluju u oruzanoj borbi i drugim oblicima openarodnog otpora. Osim participacije u oruzanim snagama BiH i drugim organiziranim oblicima oruzanog i civilnog otpora, to je svakako podrazumijevalo i svaki drugi oblik otpora kojim su se neprijatelju nanosili gubici i uzrokovala materijalne steta, oruzjem ili bilo kojim drugim sredstvima.

102.

Vojna obveza, kako je propisano Uredbom, sastoji se od tri obveze: (i) regrutne obveze, (ii) obveze sluzenja vojnog roka i (iii) obveze sluzenja u rezervnom sastavu (cl.4. st.1.). Regrutnoj obvezi podlijezu svi drzavljani RBiH, a obvezi sluzenja vojnog roka i obvezi sluzenja u rezervnom sastavu samo oni drzavljani koji su sposobni za vojnu sluzbu (cl.4. st.3.), s tim sto zene ne podlijezu regrutnoj obvezi, ni obvezi

46

4D01030

Uredba sa zakonskom snagom o vojnoj obvezi

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sluzenja vojnog roka, ve se mogu dobrovoljno prijaviti radi vojne obuke (cl.5.). Vojna obveza muskaraca prestaje s navrsenih 60 godina zivota, a zena s navrsenih 50 godina zivota (cl.7. st.1.).

103.

Vojni obveznik postaje vojna osoba stupanjem u vojnu jedinicu, odnosno ustanovu oruzanih snaga, a prestaje biti vojna osoba otpustanjem iz vojne jedinice odnosno ustanove (cl.10.st.1.). Vojni obveznik se za vrijeme izvrsenja vojne obveze po pozivu nadleznog organa izjednacava s vojnom osobom u pogledu prava i duznosti od polaska iz stana do povratka u stan u mjestu prebivalista odnosno boravista (cl.10.st.2.).

104.

Regrutna obveza nastaje pocetkom kalendarske godine u kojoj drzavljanin BiH navrsava 17 godina, dakle s navrsenih 16 godina (cl.11.st.2.), a provodi se u kalendarskoj godini u kojoj regrut navrsava 18 godina (cl.13.st.1.). U slucaju neposredne ratne opasnosti ili ratnog stanja Predsjednistvo RBiH moze narediti da se regrutiraju i osobe koje su navrsile 16 godina (cl.13.st.3.).

105.

Regruti koji su ocijenjeni sposobnima za vojnu sluzbu upuuju se na sluzenje vojnog roka u pravilu u kalendarskoj godini u kojoj navrsavaju 19 godina (cl.20.st.1.), ali za vrijeme ratnog stanja ili u slucaju nesporedne ratne opasnosti Predsjednistvo RBiH moze narediti da se na sluzenje vojnog roka upute i regruti koji su navrsili 17 godina (cl.10.st.5.)

106.

Vojnik ima pravo na redovno i drugo odsustvo tijekom sluzenja vojnog roka (cl.36. st.2.). Iako Uredba ne sadrzi odredbu o statusu vojnika na odsustvu, nesporno je da odustvo ne mijenja status vojnika, tako da odlaskom na odsustvo osoba koja sluzi vojni rok ne gubi status vojnika.

107.

Osoba koja odsluzi vojni rok otpusta se iz Armije RBiH i postaje vojnik u rezervi (cl.36.st.1.).

108.

Obvezi sluzenja u rezervnom sastavu podlijezu vojni obveznici koji su odsluzili vojni rok ili su na drugi nacin regulirali obvezu sluzenja vojnog roka, te zene koje imaju spremu za obavljanje strucnih i tehnickih sluzbi u Armiji RBIH ili su u miru obucene za ratne duznosti u oruzanim snagama (cl.41.) U slucaju rata ili neposredne ratne

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opasnosti obveza sluzenja u rezervnom sastavu izvrsava se stupanjem u oruzane snage i izrsavanjem odreñenih vojnih duznosti (cl.43.st.1.).

109.

Osobe u rezervnom sastavu mogu imati ratni raspored u neku vojnu jedinicu ili ustanovu (cl. 47.st.1.), a mogu imati i raspored izvan oruzanih snaga (cl. 44.st.3.), npr. obveza rada u nekom poduzeu ili ustanovi od vaznosti za obranu zemlje.

110.

Jedinice, ustanove i stabovi oruzanih snaga obvezani su Uredbom da po sluzbenoj duznosti u roku od 15 dana svim vojnim obveznicima ­ regrutima i osobama u rezervnom sastavu izdaju uvjerenja o datumu pristupanja oruzanim snagama Republike, s naznakom da li je vojni obveznik dobrovoljno pristupio ili je mobiliziran u oruzane snage i na kojoj formacijskoj duznosti se nalazio (cl.72.st.4.). Status vojnika priznaje se vojnim obveznicima ­ regrutima i osobama u rezervnom sastavu koja su bila angazirana na radnoj obvezi u jedinicama, ustanovama i stabovima oruzanih snaga Republike (cl.72.st.5.).

111.

Iz ovih odredbi jasno proizlazi da se nakon ope javne mobilizacije svi vojni obveznici (regruti i osobe u rezervnom sastavu), dakle muskarci s navrsenih 18 godina, a u slucaju rata na temelju odluke Predsjednistva RBiH i oni s navrsenih 16 godina, pa do 60 godina starosti, smatraju osobama koje su pristupile oruzanim snagama RBiH.

112.

Odredba po kojoj vojni rok traje sest mjeseci (cl.19. st.1.) dopunjena je 18. jula 1993. Uredbom sa zakonskom snagom o izmjenama i dopunama Uredbe sa zakonskom snagom o vojnoj obvezi47, tako da se za vrijeme ratnog stanja vojnik koji je odsluzio vojni rok prevodi u rezervni sastav i zadrzava u Armiji odnosno oruzanim snagama do donosenja odluke o ukidanju-prestanku ratnog stanja u Republici (cl.4.).

6.1.3.5. Zakljucak

113.

Svi grañani BiH prema pravnoj regulativi imali su pravo i duznost da sudjeluju u obrani zemlje odnosno izravno doprinose njenoj uspjesnosti raznim djelatnostima, bez obzira na spol, starost i status u drustvu. Fakticki je cjelokupno stanovnistvo bilo

47

1D01243 snagom o vojnoj obvezi

Uredba sa zakonskom snagom o izmjenama i dopunama Uredbe sa zakonskom

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stavljeno u funkciju oruzane borbe. U slucaju neizvrsavanja zadaa grañani su bili podvrgnuti krivicnoj i prekrsajnoj odgovornosti.

114.

Svi vojno sposobni muskarci, od 16 do 60 godina starosti u slucaju rata ili neposredne ratne opasnosti, bili su pripadnici aktivnog ili rezervnog sastava oruzanih snaga BiH. Iznimno, ako su nadlezni organi utvrdili da bi njihov doprinos obrani zemlje bio vei njihovim angaziranjem na radu u nekom drzavnom organu, poduzeu ili nekoj drugoj pravnoj osobi, ili u raznim oblicima civilnog obrane, muskarac vojno sposobne dobi nije bio rasporeñen u oruzane snage BiH ve je svoj doprinos obrani zemlje dao radom u toj instituciji odnosno sudjelovanjem u neoruzanim, civilnim oblicima otpora agresoru.

115.

Podsjetimo da su neoruzani, civilni oblici otpora bili u izravnoj funkciji oruzane borbe, a sastojali su se od sljedeih zadaa: (i) u okviru radne obaveze povremeno su izvodili razlicite zemljane (fortifikacijske) radove za potrebe oruzanih postrojbi, osiguravali su ishranu, smjestaj i drugu opskrbu pojedinaca i postrojbi oruzanih snaga, zbrinjavali, lijecili i njegovali oboljele i ranjene pripadnike oruzanih snaga, prenosili ili prevozili su borbene potrebe ­ streljivo i drugu opremu za oruzane postrojbe; (ii) u postrojbama civilne zastite: otklanjali su posljedice borbenih djelovanja protivnika ­ gasenje pozara u naseljima, uklanjanje rusevina na putovima, (iii) zbrinjavanje povrijeñenih vojnika, ukopavanje poginulih, izvoñenje evakuacije obitelji vojnika i drugih zitelja u blizini bojisnice;

u okviru sluzbe motrenja i obavjestavanja: dojavljivali nalet protivnickih letjelica u zracnom prostoru motrili i obavjestavali o pokretima protivnickih snaga kopnom, posebice ubacenih i diverzantskih postrojbi

(iv)

u sustavu obucavanja i osposobljavanja za obranu:

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-

stjecali su znanja i vjestine u rukovanju osobnim oruzjem i postupcima sa ubojnim sredstvima,

-

uvjezbavali se u postupcima pojedinca i manje skupine u borbi, osposobljavali su se u izradi objekata i primjeni prirucnih i mjesnih sredstava za osobnu i kolektivnu zastitu u uvjetima oruzane borbe;

(v)

u sustavu ope obavjestajne djelatnosti: u okviru svoje redovne civilne djelatnosti neprekidno su prikupljali podatke o protivniku i dostavljali ih nadleznim drzavnim organima ili izravno oruzanim postrojbama, povremeno su upuivani prema protivniku s namjerom prikupljanja podataka o njegovim snagama za potrebe vlastitih oruzanih postrojbi.

6.2.

Odluke i zapovijedi

116.

Predsjednistvo RBIH donijelo je na sjednici 8. aprila 1992. Uredbu o ukidanju dosadasnjeg Republickog staba teritorijalne odbrane i obrazovanju Staba teritorijalne odbrane Republike Bosne i Hercegovine48. Time je stvorena pravna osnova za utemeljenje oruzanih snaga Bosne i Hercegovine kao samostalne, od Jugoslavenske armije i sistema obrane SFRJ, nezavisne vojske. Iako je zadrzan termin «teritorijalna obrana» valja naglasiti da se ne radi o konceptu teritorijalne obrane bivse Jugoslavije koja je uz JNA bila dio oruzanih snaga SFR Jugoslavije, ve da se radi o nazivu nove organizacije oruzanih snaga BiH.

117.

Sljedei dan, 9. aprila 1992. Predsjednistvo RBiH donijelo je Odluku o objedinjavanju svih naoruzanih snaga na teritoriji Republike Bosne i Hercegovine49, po kojoj su se svi naoruzani sastavi i pojedinci, osim snaga JNA i snaga MUP-a, bili duzni prijaviti opinskim, okruznim i Gradskom stabu teritorijalne odbrane radi stavljanja pod jedinstvenu komandi. Grupe i pojedinci koji se ne prijave i ne evidentiraju do 15. aprila smatrat e se paravojnim formacijama. /Stoga se 15. aprila smatra danom

48

4D00414 Uredba o ukidanju dosadasnjeg Republickog staba teritorijalne odbrane i obrazovanju Staba teritorijalne odbrane Republike Bosne i Hercegovine 49 4D00411 Odluka o objedinjavanju svih naoruzanih snaga na teritoriji Republike Bosne i Hercegovine, Predsjednistvo RBIH, 9. aprila 1992.

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formiranja Armije Republike Bosne i Hercegovine.50/ Naredbom predsjednika Predsjednistva RBiH Alije Izetbegovia od 23. juna 1992. promijenjen je naziv «Teritorijalna odbrana Republike Bosne i Hercegovine» u naziv «Armija Republike Bosne i Hercegovine» i organizirane su oruzane snage RBiH,51 a 4. jula 1992. godine Predsjednistvo RBiH donijelo je Odluku o organizaciji oruzanih snaga Republike Bosne i Hercegovine52. Odluka je stupila na snagu danom donosenja, a s tim danom su formirane oruzane snage i Armija RBiH (tocka IX.).

118.

Neposredna ratna opasnost na teritoriju Bosne i Hercegovine bila je proglasena odlukom Predsjednistva RBiH od 9. aprila 1992. godine53. Na sjednici odrzanoj 20. juna 1992. godine Predsjednistvo RBiH donijelo je Odluku o proglasenju ratnog stanja54 zbog, kako se navodi u uvodnom dijelu odluke, agresije na Bosnu i Hercegovinu od strane Republike Srbije, Republike Crne Gore, Jugoslavenske armije i terorista Srpske demokratske stranke. Cilj je proglasenja ratnog stanja da se omogui efikasnije angaziranje svih ljudskih i materijalnih potencijala u domovini i inozemstvu radi oslobañanja Republike od agresora, uspostave narusenog pravnog poretka i stvaranja uvjeta za povratak prognanog stanovnistva (tocka 1.). Agresor je do tog trenutka bio okupirao 70% teritorija drzave Bosne i Hercegovine. Oruzane snage Bosne i Hercegovine ovlastene su ovom Odlukom da poduzmu potrebne mjere na organiziranju openarodnog otpora radi ostvarivanja postavljenih ciljeva.

119.

Istoga dana, 20. juna 1992. godine, Predsjednistvo RBiH donijelo je Naredbu o proglasenju opste javne mobilizacije na teritoriji Republike Bosne i Hercegovine55. Nareñena je opa javna mobilizacija svih vojnih obveznika od 18 do 55 godina starosti i utvrñena njihova obveza da se s vojnom opremom i osobnim naoruzanjem odmah jave u najblizu jedinicu Teritorijalne odbrane (tocka I.). Nareñena je, nadalje, opa javna mobilizacija svih ostalih radno sposobnih grañana (muskaraca od 18 do 65 godina starosti, a zena od 18 do 55 godina starosti) i utvrñena njihova obveza da se

50

4D 00409 4D00404 4D00403 P00150 P00274 4D01164

51 52

53 54 55

Uredba sa zakonskom snagom o oruzanim snagama Republike Bosne i Hercegovine, cl. 36. Naredba Alije Izetbegovia od 23. juna 1992. Odluka o organizaciji Oruzanih snaga Republike Bosne i Hercegovine, Predsjednistvo RBIH, 4. jula 1992. Odluka Predsjednistva RBIH o proglasenju neposredne ratne opasnosti Odluka o proglasenju ratnog stanja Naredba o proglasenju opste javne mobilizacije na teritoriji Republike Bosne i Hercegovine

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jave u jedinice civilne zastite, koje e u skladu s Uredbom sa zakonskom snagom o odbrani otpoceti s izvrsavanjem zadataka u obrani zemlje (tocka II.). Od tog trenutka svi vojno sposobni muskarci postaju pripadnici oruzanih snaga BiH. Razumljivo je da zbog nedostatka naoruzanja i opreme, kao i pocetnih problema u osnivanju i organiziranju ratne armije BiH nisu svi vojno sposobni muskarci, vojni obveznici, mogli biti aktivno angazirani u oruzanim snagama. Oni koji nisu bili odmah aktivno ukljuceni u borbena djelovanja, bili su rezervna vojska ili su obavljali druge zadae vazne za obranu zemlje.

120.

Jedinstvo stanovnistva i oruzanih snaga u obrani zemlje posebno je naglaseno ve u Direktivi za odbranu suvereniteta i nezavisnosti Republike Bosne i Hercegovine56, koju je Stab Teritorijalne odbrane RBiH izdao 12. aprila 1992.: «2. Snage TO RBiH i naoruzano stanovnistvo objedinjeni pod jedinstvenom komandom STO RBIH, nastavljaju dalje omasovljavanje, konsolidaciju i uspjesnu odbranu na citavoj teritoriji Republike ...» Odluceno je «odmah izvrsiti mobilizaciju cjelokupnog sastava TO RBiH», a prvu etapu odbrambene operacije treba izvesti uz «masovan oruzan otpor grañana» (t. 4).

121.

Na sjednici 26. juna 1992. godine odrzanoj u Sarajevu Predsjednistvo Republike Bosne i Hercegovine usvojilo je platformu za svoje djelovanje u ratnim uvjetima57. Dijelovi Platforme vazni su za pravilno razumijevanje openarodnog karaktera otpora agresiji koja je otvoreno zapocela neposredno nakon uspostave nezavisnosti Bosne i Hercegovine. «5. Politicka osnova opstenarodnog odbrambenog rata Pravo na zivot, mir i slobodu cini temelj ljudskih prava u civlizovanom svijetu. Otpor agresoru organizovae se i voditi kao opstenarodna odbrambena borba svih grañana i svih naroda za osloboñenje Bosne i Hercegovine. /.../ 6. Apel svim patriotskim snagama Ova platforma je poziv svim grañanima i svim narodima u Bosni i Hercegovini da se aktivno ukljuce u patriotski front borbe za suzbijanje

56

4D01727 1D00942

57

Direktiva za odbranu suvereniteta i nezavisnosti RBiH, Stab Teritorijalne odbrane RBiH, 12. aprila 1992. Platforma za djelovanje Predsjednistva RBiH u ratnim uvjetima

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agresije i uspostavljanje mira i slobode, reda i zakonitosti na cijeloj drzavnoj teritoriji Republike. /.../ (bold by MG) Stab Vrhovne komande OS RBiH izdao je 10. septembra 1992. godine Direktivu58, koja je iznimno vazna za pravilno razumijevanje uloge i znacaja stanovnistva u obrani Bosne i Hercegovine. Jednim od sadrzaja oruzane borbe definirana je diverzantska i protudiverzantska borba: «Neprekidno izvoditi masovna diverzantska dejstva u pozadini agresora, na sprecavanju dovoñenja svjezih snaga i snabdjevanju, nanosei agresoru sto vise gubitaka. U prvoj etapi borbenih dejstava teziste imati na rusenju mostova, tunela, tjesnaca i drugih objekata na komunikacijama koje iz doline r.Drina i r.Lim izvode ka Sarajevu i Tuzli. /.../ U drugoj etapi jos vise intenzivirati diverzantska dejstva, sa tezistem na komunikacijama.» (tocka VI.) Stanovnistvo ima veliku ulogu i u pogledu «obavjestajnoj obezbjeñenja»: «U drugoj etapi, teziste usmjeriti na prikupljanje podataka o neprijatelju u rejonima koncentracije i na pravcima angazovanja jedinica u ofanzivnim dejstvima. Na zadacima obavjestajnog obezbjeñenja angazovati obavjestajne organe i izviñacke jedinice, snage MUP-a i stanovnistvo.» (tocka VII.) Oslonac na stanovnistvo u intendantskom osiguranju vojnih postrojbi (ishrana, kupanje i slicno) bilo je takoñer znacajan doprinos uspjesnom izvrsenju zadaa oruzanih snaga. O tome aspektu doprinosa grañanstva obrani zemlje govori se u tocki VII., podtocka Pozadinsko obezbjeñenje.

122.

123.

Komanda 4. korpusa ABIH sastavila je pocetkom 1993. Uputstvo za izgrañivanje i jacanje borbenog morala Armije RBiH.59 I u tom se dokumentu naglasava jedinstvo Armije i naroda kao znacajan faktor izgradnje i jacanja borbenog morala: «Poseban znacaj za izgradnju i jacanje borbenog morala ima jedinstvo Armije i naroda, zasnovano na tradicijama BiH i naroda. Ono se razvija i ucvrsuje kroz oblike zajednickih priprema naroda i Armije za odbranu zemlje i ispoljava se u: zajednickom aktivnom i povezanom ucesu u odbrambenom ratu; strucnoj pomoi pripadnika Armije drustveno-politickim zajednicama, organizacijama i

58 59

4D01240 4D01603

Direktiva Staba Vrhovne komande OS RBiH, 10. septembra 1992. Uputstvo za izgrañivanje borbenog morala Armije RBiH, 1. veljace 1993.

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radnim kolektivima u pripremi i voñenju rata, angazovanju jedinica i pripadnika Armije u odbrani zivota i imovine grañana, i svestranim naporima i pomoi naroda Armiji, izrazenim u njenom materijalnom obezbjeñenju, zbrinjavanju ranjenika i bolesnika, prikupljanju informacija o neprijatelju, otkrivanju i onemoguavanju neprijateljevih agenata, provokatora i diverzanata na terenu, obezbjeñivanju znacajnih objekata i izvora snabdijevanja, ucesu u fortifikacijskom ureñenju teritorije i u drugim aktivnostima.» U Prijedlogu mjera na organizovanju opstenarodnog oslobodilackog rata60 od 27. maja 1993., nacelnik Staba Vrhovne komande OS R BiH Sefer Halilovi, «podrzavajui stav svoje Vrhovne komande i Predsjednika Predsjednistva o neprihvatljivosti ponuñenog plana /VOPP/, naglasava: «Radikalan zaokret u stavu velikih sila naspram agresije na RBiH jasno dokazuje da se odbrana drzave i naroda mora organizovati i voditi osloncem na vlastite snage. U odnosu na dosadasnje stanje i ponasanje, to podrazumijeva definitivno razbijanje iluzija o eventualnoj spoljnoj vojnoj intervenciji kao presudnom faktoru zaustavljanja agresije na R BiH i sustinski prelazak na ratni model, koji podrazumijeva maksimalnu mobilizaciju svih segmenata i potencijala drzave radi njenog opstanka. /.../ Imajui u vidu sve spomenute elemente i faktore, Stab Vrhovne komande OS BiH predlaze Predsjednistvu slijedee: da se u ovom presudnom trenutku mobilisu i ujedine sve politicke

124.

snage, stranke, udruzenja, pokreti i grañani u patriotski front i da se, umjesto dosadasnje strategije zrtve i trazenja pomoi izvana na toj osnovi, snazan borbeni moral gradi osloncem na sopstvene snage i pruzanju podrske Armiji BiH u borbi za odbranu suvereniteta, teritorijalnog integriteta nase zemlje i spasu naroda od novih pogroma. /.../»

60

4D00766

Stab Vrhovne komande OS R BiH: Prijedlog mjera na organizovanju opstenarodnog oslobodilackog rata, 27.05.1993.

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6.3.

Djelovanje u pozadini neprijatelja s osloncem na stanovnistvo

125.

Prema jugoslavenskoj doktrini openarodne obrane jedan od temeljnih oblika oruzane borbe jest i borba u pozadini protivnika, odnosno na teritoriji koju protivnik smatra zauzetom i okupiranom. Ovaj otpor u nacelu izvodile su posebne postrojbe jakosti od skupine vojnika do brigada. Nacin borbenog djelovanja bio je gerilski, koji je mogao prerasti u borbena djelovanja sirih razmjera, zapravo u partizanski oblik oruzane borbe. Ove postrojbe mogle su biti u pozadinu protivnika ubacene (infiltrirane) preko crte bojisnice ili su se oblikovale od nerasporeñenog stanovnistva koje je ostalo na zauzetom teritoriju. Ove snage u nacelu su izvodile masovne akcije manjih razmjera na cjelokupnom teritoriju u vidu diverzija, zasjeda na putovima, vatrenim prepadima po snagama protivnika, zauzimanjem manjih mjesta ili manjih podrucja. Meta napada ovih snaga su trebali biti i nosioci okupacione vlasti i pojedini simpatizeri okupacionih vlasti iz redova domaeg stanovnistva. Ove akcije su mogle u odreñenim slucajevima poprimiti i znacajke teroristickih akata. Cilj ovih djelovanja je u sustini bio nanosenje gubitaka zivoj sili, stete materijalnim sredstvima, razvlacenje snaga u prostoru, umanjenje morala protivnoj strani i podizanje morala vlastitim snagama i stanovnistvu.

126.

Temeljni preduvjet ovakvom nacinu oruzane borbe je oslonac na stanovnistvo u smislu zbrinjavanja i opskrbe pripadnika oruzanih postrojbi, prikupljanja obavjestajnih podataka, popune postrojbi novim vojnicima, osiguranje tajnosti boravka i kretanja oruzanih skupina. Bez potpore stanovnistva ovakav nacin oruzane borbe nema mogunosti za dugotrajnu i uspjesnu borbu. Upravo zbog te potpore stanovnistva obrana se smatra narodnom, odnosno otpor openarodnim, kako je to zapisano u propisima Bosne i Hercegovine ( i drugih zemalja bivse Jugoslavije).

127.

Dokumenti Armije BiH spomenuti u odjeljku 6.2. potvrñuju da je stanovnistvo bilo vazan oslonac borbenog djelovanja Armije i ostvarivanja njezinih borbenih planova. Potvrñuju to i brojni drugi dokumenti, od kojih kao primjere spominjem sljedee: (i) nacelnik bezbjednosti 42. brdske brigade 4. Korpusa ABiH u svojoj procjeni bezbjednosne situacije od 16. aprila 1993. predlaze i sljedee mjere: (i) da se u selima s muslimanskim stanovnistvom uvedu straze i ostvari puna kontrola sela; (ii) da se preko organa civilne vlasti ostvari kontakt sa svim pripadnicima muslimanskog stanovnistva i zahtijeva puno angaziranje u obrani njihovim

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domova; (iii) da se svi Muslimani pripadnici HVO pozovu da se stave na stranu svog naroda61; (ii) u dokumentu s nazivom «Prijedlog mjera bezbjednosti» od 18. aprila 1993. nacelnik bezbjednosti 42. brdske brigade ABiH meñu ostalim predlaze da se: (i) preko organa civilne vlasti ostvari suradnja sa stanovnistvom Dubrava i Stoca i (ii) «uspostavi suradnja s nasim borcima u HVO»62; (iii) komandant 42. brdske brigade ABiH Bajro Pizovi 18. aprila 1993. u naredbi pripreme za borbena dejstva brigade meñu ostalim nareñuje da organ za moral izradi plan informiranja stanovnistva na teritoriju opstina Mostar, Capljina i Stolac, te vojnika Muslimana koji se nalaze u postrojbama HVO pomenutih opstina»63; (iv) u izvjestaju o stanju i dogañanjima u 42. brigadu ABiH, koji je 2. maja 1993. komandant 4. Korpusa ABiH Arif Pasali dostavio Stabu Vrhovne komande oruzanih snaga BiH, opisuje se razmjestaj brigade, pa se uz ostalo istice kako je «ljudstvo koje se nije nalazilo na prvoj liniji odbrane prema agresoru bilo smjesteno po svojim kuama». Uz opis zadataka koje je dobilo «ljudstvo iz HVO Capljina» /misli se na vojnike HVO muslimanske nacionalnosti ­ op. MG/, Pasali izvjestava da su «sela maksimalno obezbijeñena i uvezana kurirskom vezom».64

128.

Angaziranje civila za potrebe oruzane borbe bilo je kompleksno, cesto i izravno u funkciji voñenja oruzane borbe. Postrojbe Armije BiH uglavnom bile su smjestene u naseljima u blizini bojisnice i radi rastereenja vojnika za osiguranje naselja, postrojbi na odmaranju i stanovnistva angazirani su svi sposobni mjestani. To izmeñu ostalog potvrñuje i nareñenje komande 306. brdske brigade 3. korpusa Armije BiH za osiguranje sela: ,,U mjestima stanovanja (smjestaja postrojbi brigade ­ primjedba M.G.) za obezbjeñenje sela angazovati svo sposobno stanovnistvo. Sve vojne obveznike bez obzira dali su u radnoj obavezi..." 65

61

4D00033 Nacelnik bezbjednosti 42. brdske brigade 4. Korpusa ABiH, Procjena bezbjednosne situacije, 16. April 1993. 62 4D00034 Nacelnik bezbjednosti 42. brdske brigade 4. Korpusa ABiH, Prijedlog mjera bezbjednosti, 18. April 1993. 63 4D00035 Komandant 42.brdske brigade, Naredba priprema za borbena dejstva brigade, 18. april 1993. 64 4D00036 Komandant 4. Korpusa ABiH Arif Pasali, Izvjestaj, 2. maja 1993. 65 4D01476 Nareñenje za obezbjeñenje seoskih podrucja, komanda 306. bbr, broj 02/165-1 od 31.01.1993.godine

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129.

U naredbi za napad komandant 7. motorizirane brdske brigade ABiH Asim Korici takoñer naglasava mogunost da se «tokom dejstva ima neprekidna ... uvezanost s mjesnim stanovnistvom»66.

130.

Diverzantske borbene aktivnosti bile su konstanta ratovanja Armije BiH. Kao primjer se navode diverzantske akcije Armije BiH poduzete sredinom jula 1993. na sirem podrucju Stoca, zbog kojih je dva dana bio blokiran promet na podrucju Dubravske visoravni i odgoñen pocetak operacije HVO poznat pod nazivom JUG.67

66 67

-

2D00473 Zapovijest za napad, komandant Asim Korici Te se diverzantske akcije Armije BiH spominju u brojnim dokumentima, meñu ostalim u: 4D00462 (Official record of Salko Habida's Statement no: 02-4/3-06/4-03-226/93, 14 July 1993, Capljina, signed by Ivica Kraljevic), 4D00910 (Official record issued by Ivica Kraljevic about statement given by Musair Klaric, ref: 02-4/306/4-03-229/93, 15 July 1993), 4D01044 (Information issued by Nedjeljko Obradovic to HVO General Staff Mostar, re: situation in the area of responsibility of 'Knez Domagoj'' Brigade, ref: 1100-01-93-31, 16 July 1993) 4D01096 (Official memo of statement given by Admir Cavra issued by Ivica Kraljevic, ref: 02-4/306/4-03-241/93, 19 July 1993) 4D01101 (Report on questioning issued by Bosko Buntic, re: statement given by Becir Suta, ref: 024/3-06/4-03-234/93, 17 July 1993) 4D01730 (Exhibit from Hadzihasanovic case(P692); Analysis of the combat experience of forces in the 3rd Corps area of responsibility issued by Enver Hadzhasanovic to the Supreme Command Staff of the Armed Forces)

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7. MUSLIMANSKI VOJNICI HVO KAO SIGURNOSNI PROBLEM

131. Postavljeno mi je pitanje da li bi se u trenutku eskalacije sukoba izmeñu HVO i ABiH, pod pretpostavkom postojanja odreñenih okolnosti, muslimanski vojnici HVO mogli opravdano smatrati sigurnosnim problemom.

Trenutak eskalacije sukoba definiran je kao sredina 1993. godine, preciznije 30. juna, do kada je ABIH: ostvarila kontrolu na podrucju Konjica, a snage HVO i hrvatsko stanovnistvo bili izolirani u dvije enklave (jedna na prostoru sela Turija, Zabrñe i Zaslivlje, a druga na podrucju Kostajnice),68 presjekla komunikaciju izmeñu Kiseljaka i Busovace, cime je zapocet proces stvaranja malih hrvatskih enklava na prostoru Srednje Bosne,69 u junu stekla potpunu kontrolu nad podrucjem Travnika,70 u junu stekla potpunu kontrolu na podrucju Kaknja.71

Okolnost koja se smatra pretpostavkom postavljenog mi pitanja jest napad na HVO koji je 30. juna 1993. Armija BiH izvela u suradnji s vojnicima HVO muslimanske nacionalnosti. Tim je napadom Armija BiH stekla kontrolu nad vojarnom HVO «Tihomir Misi», podrucjem Bijelog Polja, Vrapcia i drugih mjesta na prostoru koji se proteze na oko 26 km sjeverno od Mostara.72 Tom je akcijom uspostavljena komunikacija Mostar-Jablanica, cime su stvorene pretpostavke da se jedinice ABIH na podrucju Mostara povezu s jedinicama iz drugih dijelova zemlje, te da se uredno opskrbljuju naoruzanjem, municijom i drugim potrepstinama.73 Otprije poznati ciljevi i

68 69 70 71 72

73

4D01216 Map of Mostar, Jablanica and Konic area, re: situation till 30 June 1993 4D00561 Map of Bosnia and Herzegovina; situation in March-April 1993 4D00562 Map of BiH, situation in June 1993 4D00562 Map of BiH, situation in June 1993 4D01216 Map of Mostar, Jablanica and Konic area, re: situation till 30 June 1993 4D00622 Map of the Mostar region; situation after 30 June 1993 IC01005 Situation in Mostar region after 30 June 1993 IC01006 Situation in Mostar region after 30 June 1993 Komunikaciju izmeñu Mostara i Jablanice dokazuju, na primjer, sljedei dokumenti: - 4D00768 Order issued by Rasim Delic to the 4th and 6th Corps Command, ref:1/297-72, Sarajevo, 27 July 1993; - 4D00545 Excerpt from the book Herzegovinians on the Fiery Gateway of Bosnia, Esad Sejtanic, June 2005. - 2D01389 Information on the combat activities in the area of responsibility of the 1, 2 3, 4, 5 and 6 corps of the BH army

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planovi Armije BiH za stjecanje potpune kontrole teritorija na pravcu JablanicaMostar-Neum, koje je tadasnji nacelnik Glavnog stozera Vrhovne komande Armije S. Halilovi predlozio na zajednickoj sjednici Predsjednistva, Vlade i parlamentarnih stranaka 10. ozujka 1993. godine, bili su na korak do ostvarenja.74 «6. Obijezbediti da luka Ploce i put Ploce ­ Mostar ­ Sarajevo ­ Zenica, bude u neprekidnoj funkciji za potrebe drzave BiH. Ako je nuzno, za ovo angazovati meñunarodne snage, a po potrebi i nasim snagama taj prostor osigurati (podvukao M.G.).«

132.

Odmah po izbijanju sukoba u BiH u redove HVO stupio je znatan broj pripadnika muslimanske nacionalnosti, posebice u Mostaru. Naime, zajednicki cilj borbe protiv srpske agresije i nepostojanje organizirane obrane od strane Muslimana bili su temeljni razlozi ukljucivanja Muslimana u postrojbe HVO. Organiziranjem Armije BiH cije su postrojbe sacinjavali gotovo posve pripadnici muslimanske narodnosti otpocele su tenzije izmeñu postrojbi Armije BiH i HVO. Oruzani sukobi izmeñu postrojbi Armije BiH i HVO izbili su koncem oktobra 1992. u Prozoru i u januaru 1993. u Gornjem Vakufu i dijelovima Srednje Bosne, a zaustavljeni su relativno brzo nakon izbijanja. Otvoreni sukobi sirih razmjera zapoceli su krajem marta 1993. u Konjicu, a potom sredinom aprila 1993. na sirem podrucju konjicke opine i u Sredisnjoj Bosni. Vrhunac sukoba bio je 30. juna 1993. kada su snage Armije BiH zauzele vojarnu HVO ,,Tihomir Misi" u sjevernom dijelu Mostara, te podrucje od oko 26 km sjeverno od Mostara u pravcu Jablanice, cime su se spojile snage 4. i 6. korpusa Armije BiH.

133.

Gubitak kontrole nad iznimno vaznim podrucjem na lijevoj obali Neretve sjeverno od Mostara bilo je samo po sebi alarmantno za vlasti Hrvatske zajednice Herceg-Bosna, jer je prijetila realna opasnost od potpunog gubitka kontrole nad Mostarom i teritorijem prema moru.75 Cinjenica da je Armija BiH osvojila tako strateski vazno podrucje zahvaljujui i izdaju vojnika HVO muslimanske nacionalnosti, osnovano je ukazala na opasnost da HVO zbog istih razloga izgubi kontrolu i nad drugim podrucjima koja su branile postrojbe HVO u kojima je bilo vojnika muslimanske

74

3D02648 S. Halilovi, Lukava strategija, Sarajevo 1997, str. 151 (e-court stranice BCS p. 65, ET p. 45) 75 P03038 Signed and stamped Proclamation by Jadranko PRLIC, Croatian Defence Council President, and Bruno STOJIC, HVO Defence Department Head, re: Muslim offensive against Croat in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Number: 02-1-765/93

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nacionalnosti. Ranija upozorenja na sigurnosnu opasnost od velikog postotka muslimanskih vojnika u pojedinim postrojbama HVO, kojima ocigledno dotad nitko nije pridavao vee znacenje, pokazala su se osnovanima.76

134.

I dokumenti ABiH o suradnji s muslimanskim vojnicima u HVO-u, uputama da ostanu u HVO radi izvoñenja odreñenih akcija77, kao i druga saznanja o suradnji vojnika HVO muslimanske nacionalnosti sa zapovjednicima i vojnicima Armije BiH, otprije poznata pojedinih sluzbama Herceg-Bosne, dobila su u novim okolnostima dodatno znacenje. Iz mnogih dokumenata Armije BiH razvidno je da su najvisi rukovodioci Armije BiH intenzivno radili na novacenju pripadnika HVO muslimanske nacionalnosti u redove Armije BiH i istovremeno na njih racunali kao unutarnjega saveznika u predstojeem oruzanom sukobu, sto se na kraju zbilo u Mostaru 30. juna 1993. godine u povodu napada na vojarnu ,,Tihomir Misi" i podrucje sjeverno od istocnog Mostara. Tako je, na primjer, sugerirao nacelnik uprave vojne sigurnosti

76

P01438 P02223 P02231

4D00920 P02562 2D01379 P03355 P04699

77

Signed and stamped report issued by Nojko MARINOVIC to Miljenko LASIC re: Croatian Defence Council 1st Brigade. Ref. 3155-01-01-93-1. Signed and stamped document from the Chief of HVO Security and Information Service Stjepan Radic Brigade Safety Report for 07-05-93. Ref:No.09-1029/93 Handwritten report by Ivica PUSIC, assistant for HVO Security and Information Service, to the commander of the Croatian Defence Council 3rd Brigade, re. security situation in the Croatian Defence Council 3rd Brigade area of responsibility Report for period from 09.05 - 13.05. 1993 issued by SIS (Information and Security Service) 3rd HVO Brigade, Mostar, 13 May 1993 Stamped Report re: Order Ref. No: 01-3159/93 dated 27.05.1993 of JIH Zone of Operations, signed by Marinko BOSNJAK. Ref: 02-1023-2/93. Report on the work of the security intelligence service in the period from January till June 1993 by Ivica Lucic Report on the number of Defence Departments for the period January to June 1993. Ref. 02-1/184/93. Report on activities of the Croatian Defence Council HZHB for the period January to June 1993 Defence Department, SIS, Official Note of Informative Talk, No 19-3-22. 19 September 1992 Official record issued by Ivica Kraljevic regarding situation and relations between Croats and Muslims in Stolac Municipality. No: 02-4/03-6/2-10-21/93, 30 March 1993. Security situation valuation, Army RBiH, 4th corps, 42nd Mountain Brigade, 16 April 1993, no 06-1019/93, signed by Huso Maric Security measures proposition, Army RBiH, 4th corps, 42nd mountain Brigade, 18 April 1993, no: 06-186/93, signed by Huso Maric Order on preparation for brigade combat operations, Army RBiH, 4th corps, 42nd Mountain Brigade,18 April 1993, no: 01-1025/93, signed by Bajro Pizovic Report about conditions and events in 42nd Mountain Brigade, Mostar, 02 May 1993, no: 013573/93, signed by Arif Pasalic Tasks issued by Fikret Muslimovic to the Chief of the Military Security Service, Command of the 4th Corps, ref: 03/35-68, Sarajevo, 16 April 1993 Response from Bajro Pizovic addressed to Command of Knez Domagoj Brigade, Ref:011024/93, 18 April 1993 No. 01/213, Command of Brigade "Bregava", The analysis of our forces combat experiences; signed by Commander Mr. Bajro Pizovic No. 03/35-68, SUBJECT: Assignments, Armed Forces Supreme Command Headquarters Security Department; Head Fikret Muslimovic

4D01461 4D00469 4D00033 4D00034 4D00035 4D00036 4D00568 4D00473 2D00281 2D00288

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Armije BiH F. Muslimovi, covjek od izuzetnog povjerenja predsjednika Predsjednistva BiH A. Izetbegovia, u zadaama svome podcinjenom organu u stozeru 4. korpusa:78 ,,To zbog toga sto je realno ocekivati dalje zaostravanje odnosa pa cak i opstu vojnu konfrontaciju Armije RBiH i HVO. Veoma je bitno da se za takvu situaciju maksimalno pasiviziraju Muslimani koji se nalaze u HVO i da se utice na njihov prelazak iz HVO u Armiju RBiH."

135.

Poslije izbijanja oruzanog sukoba izmeñu Armije BiH i HVO u travnju 1993. godine zapovjednik 42. brigade ,,Bregava" usmeno je izdao zapovjed podcinjenim zapovjednicima:79 ,,..izvrseno je uvezivanje sa nasim ljudima u HVO-u... ...Ljudstvo (Muslimani, prim. M.G.) iz HVO Capljina ima zadatak da zauzme s. Tasovcie s ciljem da ne dozvoli dovoñenje snaga iz pravca Metkovi. - sela (muslimanska, prim. M.G.) su maksimalno obezbijeñena i uvezana kurirskom vezom, - zauzimanje grada Stolac sa nasim snagama u HVO-u, - zauzimanje punktova i s. Prenj, Nakovanj i Aladinii. - kontrola mosta na r. Bregava u s. Prenj i sprecavanje uvoñenja snaga HVO iz pravca Krusevo- Prenj i Svitava ­ Prenj - zatvoriti put prema s. Drinovac i s.Krusevo - MB 60 i 82 mm postavljeni za dejstvo prema HVO, - lanseru dati ciljevi i na desnoj obali Neretve.»

136.

U kontekstu spomenute zapovjedi je i prijedlog mjera koji je nacelnik bezbjednosti 42. brigade Armije BiH predlozio svom zapovjedniku:80 ,,u selima sa muslimanskim narodom uvesti straze i ostvariti punu kontrolu sela:

78

2D00288 No. 03/35-68, SUBJECT: Assignments, Armed Forces Supreme Command Headquarters Security Department; Head Fikret Muslimovic

4D00036 Report about conditions and events in 42nd Mountain Brigade, Mostar, 02 May 1993, no: 01-

79 80

3573/93, signed by Arif Pasalic

4D00033 Security situation valuation, Army RBiH, 4th corps, 42nd Mountain Brigade, 16 April 1993, no 06-1019/93, signed by Huso Maric

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- preko organa civilne vlasti ostvariti kontakt sa svim pripadnicima muslimanskog stanovnistva i zahtjevati puno angazovanje u odbrani svojih domova; - pozvati sve Muslimane, pripadnike HVO-a da se stave na stranu svog naroda.»

137.

Na sirem podrucju Capljine i Stoca u martu 1993. je formiran i odred ABiH Capljina od iskljucivo pripadnika muslimanske nacionalnosti. S obzirom da je u postrojbama HVO na tom podrucju bio velik broj pripadnika muslimanske nacionalnosti koji je izrazavao zelju za prelazak u spomenuti odred receno im je "da su oni nama (Armiji BiH) potrebniji i tamo gdje se nalaze."81 Kako je prelazak bio mogu samo uz pristanak zapovjednistava HVO to su mnogi pripadnici HVO muslimanske nacionalnosti samovoljno napustali postrojbe HVO i presli u postrojbe Armije BiH sto se vidi iz zahtjeva zapovjednika 1. brigade ,,Knez Domagoj" zapovjedniku 42. brigade ,,Bregava" da mu dostavi na uvid suglasnosti za prelazak veeg broja vojnika pri cemu izrazava sumnju da su dezertirali82.

138.

Moje je misljenje da je pod opisanim pretpostavkama osnovano i s vojnog stajalista potpuno opravdano smatrati da postoji opasnost od novih izdaja od strane vojnika HVO muslimanske nacionalnosti i da HVO zbog toga moze izgubiti kontrolu i nad drugim podrucjima. Svaki vojni zapovjednik mora u takvim okolnostima donijeti zapovijed da se prema vlastitim vojnicima nacionalnosti protivnicke strane poduzmu mjere praenja ponasanja u boju, nedostupnosti do povjerljivih informacija, neupuivanja na znacajne bojne zadae, ukljucujui i drasticnu mjeru razoruzanja i izolacije u slucaju pojedinacnog neadekvatnog ponasanja, a u slucaju neadekvatnog ponasanja (dezertiranja, kolektivnog otkazivanja poslusnosti) veeg broja pripadnika nacionalnosti protivnicke strane mogu se te mjere poduzeti prema veini odnosno svim pripadnicima nacionalnosti protivnicke strane u vlastitim redovima. Samo tako je mogue sprijeciti gubitke u vlastitim redovima, poraz i gubitak vlastite teritorije.

81

4D01477 Formiranje odreda »Capljina« u Capljini ­ izvjestaj komandi 4. korpusa, odred Capljina od 15.03.1993 82 4D01478 Dostavljanje suglasnosti na uvid i kontrolu, - zahtjev, Prva brigada HVO »Knez Domagoj«, broj 1100-01-01-93-220 od 16.03.1993

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8.

VOJNO

ZNACENJE

SREDISNJE

BOSNE

I

SJEVERNE

HERCEGOVINE

139. Postavljeno mi je pitanje da li se stjecanje kontrole Armije BiH nad podrucjem Konjica, Novog Travnika, Fojnice, Bugojna, Kaknja i Varesa, te nad podrucjem od Jablanice do Mostara i juznije prema Jadranskom moru tijekom 1993. godine moze protumaciti kao planirano osvajanje komunikacijski i privredno znacajnih teritorija, te da li je taj prostor imao neko posebno znacenje u koncepcijama obrane SFR Jugoslavije.

8.1. 140.

Zemljopisno definiranje prostora Prostor Sredisnje Bosne i Sjeverne Hercegovine obuhvaa sredisnji dio Bosne i Hercegovine koga mozemo omeñiti planinskim masivima Borja ­ Ravan ­ Zvijezda ­ Ozren ­ Romanija ­ Jahorina ­ Bjelasnica ­ Prenj ­ Velez ­ Mostarsko blato - Trtla Cincar ­ Vitorog ­ Lisina ­ Cemernica odnosno teritoriju nekadasnjih opina Jajce, Donji Vakuf, Bugojno, Gornji Vakuf, Travnik, Novi Travnik, Vitez, Zenica, Zepce, Busovaca, Fojnica, Kresevo, Kiseljak, Visoko, Kakanj, Vares, Breza, Ilijas, Hadzii, Konjic, Jablanica, Prozor, Sarajevo u cIjelosti i sjeverne dijelove opina Livno,

Tomislavgrad, Posusje, Siroki brijeg i Mostar kao i juzne predjele opina Skender Vakuf, Kotor Varos, Tesli i Tesanj.

141.

Geografski se prostorija moze definirati i gornjim i srednjim tokom rijeka Bosne i Vrbasa koje od dinarskog razvoña teku prema sjeveru i pripadaju savskom (crnomorskom) slivu i slivu rijeke Neretve, koja se ulijeva u Jadransko more. Reljef prostorije je pretezito planinski sa vise visokih planinskih masiva meñu kojim se istiu planine Vlasi (1933m), Bjelasnica (2067m), Jahorina (1916m), Vranica (2110m), Bitovnja (1700m), Prenj (2155m), Velez (1969m), Cabulja (1776m), Cvrsnica (2228m), Vran (2074m), Radusa (1956m). Planinski masivi su ispresijecani dubokim dolinama, mjestimice i klisurama. Izmeñu planinskih masiva protezu se siroka polja i udoline od koji su najvei Uskoplje (sredisnji tok Vrbasa), Lasvanska dolina (izmeñu Travnika i Viteza), dolina rijeke Lepenice i sredisnjeg toka rijeke Fojnice kod Kiseljaka, dolina rijeke Usore sa sirom prostorijom opina Tesli i Tesanj,

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Sarajevsko polje donjeg toka rijeka Miljacke i Zeljeznice te izvorista rijeke Bosne. Na sirem podrucju nalaze se i najvea kraska polja na balkanskom poluotoku Kupresko, Suicko, Duvanjsko, Mostarsko blato.

142.

Najvee rijeke teku smjerom jug ­ sjever (Bosna i Vrbas) odnosno sjever ­ jug (Neretva). Njihove pritoke uglavnom teku smjerom zapad ­ istok (Lasva, Usora na Bosni) i (Trebizat na Neretvi). Dolinama rijeka vode i glavni komunikacijski pravci iz Panonske nizine do Jadranskog mora. Dinarsko razvoñe predstavlja najveu prepreku brzom prometu, pri cemu su najznacajniji planinski prijelazi Ivan sedlo (959m) na smjeru Sarajevo ­ Mostar, Makljen (1123m) na smjeru Jajce ­ Jablanica ­ Mostar, Kupreska vrata (1348m) na putu Bugojno ­ Livno. Izmeñu sliva rijeke Vrbas i rijeke Bosna vodi put preko prijevoja Komar (927m).

143.

Ukupna povrsina podrucja Sredisnje Bosne i Sjeverne Hercegovine obuhvaa oko 16.000 km2 odnosno skoro 1/3 teritorije BiH. Prosjecna nadmorska visina iznosi preko 800 m. Planinski predjeli uglavnom su pokriveni visokom sumom, dok su nizinski dijelovi, kotline i polja uglavnom obradiva.

8.2.

Znacenje toga prostora u planovima obrane SFR Jugoslavije

144.

Vanjska politika tadasnje Jugoslavije je zagovarala aktivnu neutralnost ­ nesvrstanost, sto se na unutarnjem planu odrazavalo na neprekidnom odrzavanju napetosti i prijetnje agresije oba vodea svjetska bloka. Na tom temelju je oblikovana i obrambena doktrina tzv. openarodne obrane i drustvene samozastite, cije su glavne odrednice: oslonac na vlastite snage, sudjelovanje cjelokupnog ljudskog potencijala u oruzanom boju, partizansko i gerilsko ratovanje i stvaranje permanentne slobodne teritorije u brdovitom dijelu Jugoslavije, tzv. bastiona obrane83 koji je obuhvaao podrucje dijelova Hrvatske (brdovito podrucje nekadasnje «Republike Srpske Krajine» bez dijela u Slavoniji), cjelokupnu BiH bez Posavine i Semberije, Crnu Goru i zapadnu Srbiju. U tom bastionu je sredisnje mjesto zauzimala upravo Sredisnja Bosna i Sjeverna Hercegovina.

83

4D01486

Karta, Obrambeni bastion SFRJ

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145.

Zbog toga je u Sredisnjoj Bosni koncentrirana velika vojna mo nekadasnjih oruzanih snaga, napose JNA, koja se manifestirala u slijedeem: - na podrucju Sredisnje Bosne i Sjeverne Hercegovine84 je izgrañeno mnogo objekata vojne industrije85, u kojima se proizvodilo tesko naoruzanje (»Bratstvo« ­ Novi Travnik), eksploziv i baruti (»Slobodan Princip ­ Seljo« ­ Vitez), municija, mine, upaljaci i lako protuoklopno oruzje (»Slavko Rodi« ­ Bugojno), popravak i odrzavanje telekomunikacijskih ureñaja (»Remontni zavod« ­ Travnik), odjea i obua (»Borac« - Travnik); - mada podrucje Sredisnje Bosne i Sjeverne Hercegovine nije bilo neposredno ugrozeno moguim ratnim djelovanjima u pocetnoj fazi rata, tu su bile locirane znatne snage JNA: 1 mehanizirana brigada, 2 motorizirane brigade, 1 brdska brigada, 2 partizanske (lake pjesacke) brigade, 3 topnicke pukovnije, 1 protuoklopna topnicka pukovnija, 1 raketna pukovnija PZO), a i snage TO:86 6 okruznih stozera, 30 opinskih stozera, 13 brigada TO (laka pjesacka); - na tom podrucju je bio i vei broj skladista87 ratnih pricuva postrojbi, operativnih sustava i vrhovnog zapovjednistva, mnoge ratne pricuve su se nalazile i unutar poduzea vojne industrije; ukupno je bilo 13 tehnickih skladista u kojima su bile smjestene velike kolicine municije, naoruzanja i drugih tehnickih sredstava, - relativno veliki broj stanovnika u Sredisnjoj Bosni predstavljao je izvor popune postrojbi na drugim vojistima, posebno sjeverozapadnom, kako u smislu upuivanja manjih grupa za popunu ili oblikovanja kompletnih novih postrojbi tako i upuivanja na bojisnicu izvan Sredisnje Bosne; - preko Sredisnje Bosne i Sjeverne Hercegovine vodile su najznacajnije prometnice koje su omoguavale relativno sigurnu opskrbu operativnostrategijskih grupacija i manevar snagama na perifernim vojistima u slucaju

84

U nekadasnjoj Jugoslaviji bila su 3 znacajna vojnoindustrijska regiona ­ dolina Lasve (Travnik, Novi Travnik, Vitez) okolina Sarajeva (Vogosa, Stup, Pale, Konjic) i Zapadna Srbija (Uzice, Lucani, Cacak, Valjevo). Sva tri regiona su u slucaju potrebe bila samodostatna. 85 4D01485 Karta, Vojna industrija Sredisnje Bosne 86 4D01484 Karta, Lokacija ratnih jedinica JNA i TO u Sredisnjoj Bosni 87 4D01491 Karta, Lokacija logistickih ustanova

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zauzimanja ravnicarskog dijela Jugoslavije sjeverno od Save88. Radiorelejno cvoriste na Vlasiu bilo je jedno najznacajnijih u sustavu radiorelejnih veza JNA.

146.

U vrijeme Titove Jugoslavije Sredisnja Bosna i Sjeverna Hercegovina imaju posebno znacenje za cjelokupnu tadasnju jugoslavensku drzavu. To je podrucje bilo sredisnji dio obrambenog bastiona i posljednji oslonac postojanja drzave u slucaju invazije.

8.3.

Znacenje toga prostora u vrijeme raspada SFR Jugoslavije

147.

Teritorij BiH bio je do 1989. godine gotovo u cjelini u zoni odgovornosti tadasnje 7. armijske oblasti sa zapovjednistvom u Sarajevu. Od 1987. godine pa do kraja 1988. godine 7. armijska oblast je rasformirana i podrucje BiH podijeljeno je manjim dijelom (Cazinska krajina) u 5. vojiste sa sjedistem u Zagrebu, a najveim dijelom pod 1. vojiste sa sjedistem u Beogradu. 1. vojiste je pored teritorija veeg dijela BiH obuhvaalo podrucje Slavonije u Hrvatskoj, Vojvodine i sjevernog dijela Srbije i cijelu Crnu Goru. To znakovito ukazuje na teznju jugoslavenskog Generalstaba da spoji sve teritorije na koje pretendira velikosrpska politika. Zapadne granice beogradskog vojista gotovo u cjelini poklapaju se za zapadnom granicom tzv. Velike Srbije.

148.

Popriste prvih pokusaja oruzane intervencije protiv teznji za osamostaljenjem i odcjepljenjem od jugoslavenske zajednice bila je Sredisnja Bosna i Sjeverna Hercegovina. Tako je u ozujku 1991. godine upuena na Kupres oklopna bojna iz sastava 325. oklopne brigade iz Banjaluke koju su sacinjavali vojnici na sluzenju vojnog roka. Svakog mjeseca su se posade smjenjivale iz sastava drugih oklopnih brigada. Ova je bojna imala zadau intervenirati u Zapadnoj Hercegovini ili Dalmaciji odnosno sacuvati prostoriju Kupreske visoravni za dolazak veih operativnih postrojbi. Poslije velikih prohrvatskih demonstracija u Splitu u kojima je poginuo vojnik JNA, JNA u BiH i u Dalmaciji pripremala se za moguu vojnu intervenciju. Tako je u svibnju 1991. godine propao pokusaj proboja mehanizirane kolone iz Mostara prema Sirokom brijegu koju su zaustavili nenaoruzani mjestani sela Prolog.

88

U tom kontekstu je izgradjen i kabalski komunikacioni sistem ,,Central" duz cijele nekadasnje Jugoslavije, koji je povezivao Strumicu u Makedoniji (kao najudaljeniju jugoistocnu tacku) preko Sredisnje Bosne sa Postojnom u Sloveniji (kao najudaljeniju sjeverozapadnu tocku)

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Ova je kolona poslije nekoliko dana stigla na Kupres uz politicku intervenciju iz Sarajeva.

149.

Sve ove aktivnosti JNA na tom prostoru bile su u svojstvu uvodnih proigravanja scenarija iz veljace 1991. godine, kada je Generalstab OS SFRJ usvojio novi plan obrane u slucaju agresije sa Zapada, tzv. plan »S-2«89. Plan je predviñao obranu od agresije zemalja NATO, zapravo je bio plan angaziranja snaga JNA u intervenciji prema Hrvatskoj i Sloveniji. Fakticki je plan intervencije sredisnjih snaga JNA iz Srbije i BiH razrañen od 1. do 3. jula 1991., poslije prvog neuspjelog primirja u Sloveniji. Plan je poslije Brijunskog sastanka 8. jula 1991. godine napusten, da bi ga modificirali koncem jula, a ostvarili djelomice sredinom septembra. Sredisnja Bosna i skoro cijela Hercegovina bile su sada u zoni odgovornosti 4. korpusa sa sjedistem u Sarajevu.

150.

Za podrucje Sredisnje Bosne i Sjeverne Hercegovine posebice je znacajna uloga i zadaa 37. korpusa JNA90, cija je temeljna zadaa u obje varijante ratnog plana bila obrana Zapadne Srbije, od rijeke Kolubare na sjeveru do Metohije na jugu, rijeke Drine na zapadu i rijeke Ibar na istoku. U veljaci 1991. godine promijenjen je plan obrane od invazije NATO pakta, zona obrane posve je izmijenjena i 37. korpusu dodijeljena je zona u slivu rijeke Neretve i na podrucju Zapadne Hercegovine,91 koju je u ranijim planovima imao 4. korpus ­ sarajevski.

151.

Na temelju tog plana je u vrijeme prvog prekida vatre u oruzanom sukobu u Sloveniji razrañen, u punoj tajnosti, uz angaziranje iskljucivo najpouzdanijih oficira iz komandi korpusa, novi plan smirivanja i intervencije prema Hrvatskoj i Sloveniji odnosno Hrvatima u BiH, ali taj plan nije dozivio temeljitu razradu a ni ostvarenje. Novi plan92 je razrañen za 37. korpus koncem jula 1991. godine i temeljne znacajke tog plana su bile slijedee:

89

Plan obrane od napada sa Istoka (Varsavskog pakta) »S-1« napusten je ve u 1990. godini kao suvisan, Generalstab je procijenio da Jugoslaviji ne prijeti agresija sa Istoka, sta je bilo posve opravdano poslije »perestrojke« u Sovjetskom Savezu i pada Berlinskog zida. 90 Autor je u to vrijeme bio nacelnik staba korpusa ujedno zamjenik zapovjednika. Taj je plan primio iz zapovjednistva vojista iz Beograda. Kriticki ga je modificirao i prilagodio uvjetima mogue bojisnice u Zapadnoj Hercegovini. 91 4D01483 Karta, Plan intervencije JNA u Zapadnoj Hercegovini i Dalmaciji 92 Razradom ovog plana rukovodio je autor kao nacelnik staba 37. korpusa izravno pred odlazak iz JNA.

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- poslije mobilizacije istih postrojbi korpus marsira pravcem: Kraljevo ­ Uzice ­ Visegrad ­ Foca ­ Gacko ­ Nevesinje ­ Mostar; - glavnina snaga se razmjesta na sirem podrucju Nevesinja u spremnosti za intervenciju ka Mostaru i Metkoviu, dok 10. mehanizirana brigada drzi sire podrucje grada Mostara; - zadaa korpusa je bila da sprijeci zauzee grada Mostara i zadrzi komunikacije prema moru i ne dozvoli tada jos udruzenim hrvatskim i bosnjackim snagama zauzimanje lijeve obale rijeke Neretve od Jablanice do mora i izolira hrvatske snaga na sirem dubrovackom podrucju.

152.

Plan je djelomice ostvaren u septembru 1991. godine, ali su se postrojbe iz Srbije ubrzo povukle u Srbiju93. Kasnije su taj plan ostvarivali s postrojbama nekadasnjeg 13. korpusa (rijeckog) i 2. korpusa (titogradskog). Postrojbe su popunjene rezervistima iz Istocne Hercegovine i zapadnog dijela Crne Gore.

153.

Iz svih planova angaziranja 37. korpusa u Sredisnjoj Bosni i Sjevernoj Hercegovini moze se zakljuciti da je vojni vrh JNA planirao oruzanu intervenciju prema Hrvatima u Dalmaciji i Zapadnoj Hercegovini. To potvrñuju neke indicije i stavovi: - mars cjelokupnih snaga korpusa kroz Sredisnju Bosnu na Kupresku visoravan imao je za cilj zaplasiti Hrvate u Sredisnjoj Bosni i ohrabriti Srbe i Muslimane u Istocnoj Bosni i Sjevernoj Hercegovini; - razmjestaj glavnine korpusnih snaga na Kupreskoj visoravni osigurao je nesmetan boravak i obuku postrojbi u okruzenju stanovnistva pretezito srpske i muslimanske nacionalnosti; - sa Kupreske visoravni vode kvalitetni putovi prema Splitu, prema Imotskom i dalje ka Makarskoj, prema Ljubuskom i dalje ka Metkoviu, prema Posusju i dalje ka Mostaru i mogue je relativno brzo intervenirati u sredisnjoj Dalmaciji; - razmjestajem logistickih postrojbi osigurali bi se objekti vojne industrije u Bugojnu, Travniku i Novom Travniku;

93

Rezervisti topnicke pukovnije iz Valjeva (oko 700) koncem septembra 1991. ukrcali su se u vucna vozila, ostavili orudja i osobno oruzje i otisli domovima u Srbiju.

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- korpusna rezerva jakosti borbene grupe s podrucja Donjeg Vakufa mogla je brzo intervenirati ka Travniku i Lasvanskoj dolini odnosno preko Makljena u srednji tok rijeke Neretve ka Jablanici i dalje ka Mostaru; - neposjedanje obrambenih zona, neizvoñenje fortifikacijskih radova i pripreme polozaja prije pocetka invazije, kao i odsustvo potpore vojisnog topnistva i zrakoplovnih snaga u vrijeme invazije i neangaziranje snaga Teritorijalne obrane, koja je tada bila popunjena pretezito Hrvatima, ukazuje da je taj plan zapravo bio plan intervencije prema neposlusnim Hrvatima u sredisnjoj Dalmaciji i Zapadnoj Hercegovini i plan zastrasivanja Hrvata u Sredisnjoj Bosni i Sjevernoj Hercegovini.

154.

Autoru ovog rada je iz osobnih saznanja poznato da su se poslije okoncanja oruzanog sukoba u Sloveniji i Hrvatskoj, postrojbe JNA iz ove dvije republike povukle uglavnom na prostor BiH94.

155.

Prema tome, uoci raspada Jugoslavije podrucje Sredisnje Bosne i Sjeverne Hercegovine bilo je, zapravo, svojevrsno polaziste za intervenciju prema sredisnjoj Dalmaciji i Zapadnoj Hercegovini. U intervenciji su trebale ucestvovati postrojbe koje su uglavnom sacinjavali Srbi iz Srbije i Istocne Hercegovine, a djelomicno i Crnogorci i dio pouzdanih Muslimana iz Istocne Hercegovine. Angaziranje 37. korpusa JNA iz Srbije trebalo je, osim intervencije prema Hrvatima, imati ucinak zastrasivanja Hrvata i Muslimana u Sredisnjoj Bosni odnosno ohrabrivanja Srba u velikim gradovima Sredisnje Bosne i Sjeverne Hercegovine. Takoñer je jedan od ciljeva bio osigurati nesmetan rad vojne industrije na tom prostoru i nesmetano komuniciranje u unutrasnjosti Jugoslavije ka srednjem dijelu Jadranskog mora. U konacnici, cilj je bio i odrzanje obrambenog bastiona s juga, sto se kasnije ispostavilo kao obrana podrucja naseljenih Srbima odnosno od posebnog interesa za Srbe u BiH.

94

Ove postrojbe su sacinjavali iskljucivo casnici srpske, crnogorske, muslimanske nacionalnosti, jer casnici slovenske, hrvatske i albanske nacionalnostri su veinom napustili JNA prilikom oruzanog sukoba u Sloveniji. Vojnici na sluzenju vojnog roka su uglavnom otpusteni kuama ili premjesteni na dalje sluzenje u svojim republikama. Od oruzja i opreme uspjeli su izvui manji dio. Tek dolaskom u BiH su se ove postrojbe djelimicno popunile pricuvnim vojnicima srpske nacionalnosti iz BiH. Ove postrojbe nisu predstavljale znacajnu vojnu snagu.

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8.4.

Znacenje tog prostora u pocetnom razdoblju rata od sredine 1992. do konca 1993.

156.

Na podrucju Sredisnje Bosne i Sjeverne Hercegovine nakon 2. svjetskog rata bivsa Jugoslavija razmjestila je znacajne proizvodne kapacitete za proizvodnju naoruzanja i vojne opreme. Ti su objekti bili pred izbijanje rata u BiH opremljeni suvremenim strojevima i u njima je bio zaposlen veliki broj vrhunskih strucnjaka. Najvei dio tih poduzea imao je i vlastite razvojne odjele. Pregled kapaciteta vojne industrije u Sredisnjoj Bosni i Sjevernoj Hercegovini95

157.

1.

Naziv

Lokacija

Proizvodi

Zaposl.

2.

»Slavko Rodi«

Bugojno

topnicki i minobacacki upaljaci rucne bombe mine i sredstva za zaprecavanje topnicke kapsule

3.450

3.

»Borac«

Travnik

Uniforme, cizme i druga osobna oprema za vojnike

4.

Elektrotehnicni remontni zavod

Travnik

popravak sredstava za veze i drugih elektronickih sredstava i sklopova

5.

»Bratstvo«

Novi Travnik

minobacaci 60-120 mm topnicka oruña od 90-155 mm visecjevni bacaci raketa 128-260 mm razlicita hidraulika

1.450

6.

»Slobodan Princip ­ Vitez Seljo«

nitroglicerinski i raketni baruti eksplozivi

780

7.

Zeljezara

Zenica

specijalni odljevci

8.

»Pretis«

Vogosa

topnicka municija raketni projektili aviobombe

4.700

95

Podaci o vojnoj industriji dobiveni su po knjizi prof. dr. Aleksandra Stamatovia »Vojna privreda druge Jugoslavije (1945.-1991.), izdanje VIZ, Beograd 2001. godine. A. Stamatovi je bio general JNA i pomonik saveznog sekretara za obranu za vojnoprivredni sektor, poslije umirovljenja bio je redovni profesor beogradskog univerziteta.

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laka prijenosna protuoklopna oruzja

9.

»Zrak«

Sarajevo

dvogledi, nisanske sprave, daljinomjeri opticki i elektronicki sklopovi za sisteme navoñenja raketnog oruzja i sistema upravljanja ognjem

2.150

10.

»Bosnalijek«

Sarajevo

lijekovi i drugi sanitetski potrosni materijal za vojne potrebe medicinska oprema

11.

»Famos«

Hrasnica

gusjenicka oklopna vozila, specijalne transmisije za tenkove i teska vozila

1.200

12.

»Igman«

Konjic

municija za lako pjesacko oruzje svih kalibara od 4,5 do 14,5 mm

1.350

13.

Tehnicki zavod

remontni Hadzii

popravak tehnickih sredstava KoV: (pjesacko i topnicko oruzje, oklopna i gusjenicka vozila, motorna vozila, sredstva za veze) izrada rezervnih dijelova za strojeve i motorna vozila

700

14.

»Soko«

Mostar

bojni zrakoplovi G-4, Kraguj, Orao laki helikopter Gazela

2.630

15.

Zavod

za

remont Koran (Pale)

popravak inzenjerijskih strojeva i

naprava

inzenjerijskih sredstava i opreme

16.

Zrakoplovni »Orao«

zavod Rajlovac

popravak zrakoplova,

klipnih

i

turbomlaznih

proizvodnja turbomlaznih motora

17.

»Energoinvest« IRCA

Sarajevo

sanitetski kompleti

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158.

U drugoj polovini 70-tih godina dalje u BiH izgrañuju se mnoga manja industrijska poduzea u potpori namjenske vojne industrije. U gotovo svakom opinskom sjedistu ili veem mjestu izgrañeni su manji pogoni. Nosioci izgradnje i razvoja ovih poduzea bila su tri velika industrijska kompleksa u BiH. Najznacajniji je bio »Energoinvest«, koji je udruzivao tvornice za proizvodnju strojne i druge opreme za energetska postrojenja. Njegovi proizvodni kapaciteti razmjesteni su uglavnom oko Sarajeva i u Posavini. Na podrucju Hercegovine takav je industrijski gigant bio »Soko« Mostar, s mnostvom tvornica od Posusja do Trebinja. Vojna industrija je u najveem dijelu bila udruzena u sustav UNIS (Udruzena namjenska industrija Sarajevo), sa sjedistem u Sarajevu. UNIS-ovi proizvodni kapaciteti bili su razmjesteni uglavnom u sredisnjoj Bosni kao manji pogoni ili podruznice veih tvornica namjenske vojne industrije.

159.

U toku raspada Jugoslavije JNA je uspjela znatan dio kadrova (srpske nacionalnosti i casnika JNA tehnicke naobrazbe) i opreme za proizvodnju pravovremeno prenijeti na sigurnija mjesta u Srbiji ili na teritorij BiH pod vlasu Srba (Republika Srpska). Na primjer, Zrakoplovni remontni zavod »Orao« u Rajlovcu kraj Sarajeva u pocetku je bio premjesten u Bijeljinu (Republika Srpska), a zatim u Pancevo (Srbija). Meñutim, kadrovi bosnjacke i hrvatske nacionalnosti u najveem su broju ostali u mjestima u blizini lokacije tvornica i prikljucili su se politickim pokretima svojih naroda. Istovremeno je u pogonima namjenske industrije ostalo mnogo strojeva i opreme za proizvodnju, sirovina i polusirovina, pa i nedovrsenih proizvoda, posebice tezeg oruzja.

160.

Oruzane formacije Bosnjaka i Hrvata u BiH u vrijeme stvaranja (1992. ­ 1993.) nabavljale su oruzje, streljivo i drugu vojnu opremu na tri osnovna nacina: a/ od Republike Hrvatske, koja je i HVO i ABiH opskrbljivala opremom, naoruzanjem i streljivom, te na druge nacine pomagala stvaranje i borbeno djelovanje tih oruzanih formacija; b/ nabavkom ilegalnim kanalima, jer je na snazi bio embargo UN na uvoz oruzja u drzave bivse Jugoslavije, i dopremom preko Slovenije i Hrvatske; c/ preuzimanjem opreme i naoruzanja iz skladista, tvornica i objekata JNA, koje JNA pri povlacenju nije uspjela preseliti na teritorij pod kontrolom Srba; d/ vlastitom proizvodnjom u preuzetim objektima namjenske proizvodnje streljiva, oruzja i eksploziva;

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e/

improviziranom proizvodnjom u obrtnim radionicama

161.

Bosnjacka i hrvatska strana su pokusavale stvoriti i vlastitu proizvodnju oruzja i streljiva. Koliko je znacenje proizvodnji za vojne potrebe pridavala bosnjacka strana moze se znakovito uociti ve u temeljnim dokumentima s vojnog savjetovanja zapovjednika i visokih casnika Patriotske lige96 7. i 8. februara 1992. godine u selu Mehurii na periferiji Lasvanske doline u blizini Travnika. Osnova za raspravu bio je dokument »Zadaci RVS«, koji je koncem 1991. godine razradio jedan od inicijatora Patriotske lige, kasniji nacelnik Glavnog staba Armije BiH Sefer Halilovi, i kojeg je tada razaslao svim stabovima na terenu. U tom je dokumentu zapisano97: »6. U referatu posebno obraditi namjensku-vojnu industriju, vrstu proizvodnje i objasniti kakve su nase pozicije i plan. 7. Obraditi kakve su mogunosti male privrede na proizvodnji formacijskih i prirucnih sredstava (bombe, mine, itd.) uz odgovarajuu dokumentaciju. 8. Mogunosti uskladistenja i cuvanja veih kolicina oruzja i MES98.

162.

Na tom je vojnom savjetovanju usvojena i »Direktiva za odbranu suvereniteta«, u kojoj je u tocki 4. zapisano slijedee99: »...Odreñenim snagama, brzim i energicnim prepadnim dejstvima zauzeti skladista i magacine municije, MES-a i naoruzanja JA, blokirati

kasarne...Glavne snage imati u Centralnoj Bosni, a pomone u cazinskoprijedorskom i regionu Tuzle (podvukao M.G.).«

163.

Realizirajui ovu Direktivu bosnjacka strana otpocela je proizvodnju za vojne potrebe u tri faze. U prvoj fazi je bila proizvodnja prirucnih sredstava, popravak zaplijenjenog oruzja, konstruiranje i proizvodnja improviziranih ubojnih sredstava i oruzja odnosno kako to opet Halilovi pise100:

96

Patriotska liga zametak je kasnije Armije BiH. To je u stvari bila vojna organizacija bosnjackog naroda koju su oblikovali i organizirali uglavnom nekadasnji aktivni casnici JNA bosnjacke nacionalnosti. U vrijeme formiranja i spomenutog savjetovanja ona je bila izvan Teritorijalne obrane, koja je u to vrijeme bila jedina vojna organizacija Republike BiH (JNA je, naime, bila jugoslavenska vojna organizacija, a teritorijalne obrane su bile organizirane u republikama bivse Jugoslavije). 97 3D02648 S. Halilovi, Lukava strategija, Sarajevo 1997, str. 164 i 165 (e-court stranice BCS 68-69 i ET 49-50) 98 MES - minsko-eksplozivnih sredstva 99 3D02648 S. Halilovi, Lukava strategija, Sarajevo 1997, str. 168 (e-court stranice BCS 70 i ET 53) 100 4D01488 S. Halilovi, Lukava strategija, Sarajevo 1997, str. 92-94

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»Diljem bosanske drzave na stotinu mjesta pocinje kuna vojna proizvodnja. Niko ne pita od cega i kako: svaka ideja preko noi postala je stvarnost. U vrijeme ratno, sve je vise no dobro doslo, narocito kada smo izolovani sa dvije strane ­ od dva agresora.«

164.

Druga je faza bila ve organizirana proizvodnja u tvornicama gdje su se ranije proizvodili proizvodi siroke potrosnje101. »Tako su nastale vojne fabrike i tamo gdje nisu nikad bile ­ u Bihau, Travniku, Zenici, Tuzli, Tesnju i drugim gradovima, cak i u Srebrenici... U Sarajevu je formirana brigada Centra namjenske proizvodnje ... u kojoj su okupili impozantan broj vojnih strucnjaka.«

165.

Trea faza vojne proizvodnje otpocinje koncem oktobra 1992. godine kada se pri Ministarstvu privrede i energetike oblikuje sektor za namjensku proizvodnju. Ova je proizvodnja bila posve organizirana na temelju nekadasnje vojne industrije, posebice u Sredisnjoj Bosni102. »Do tada smo proizvodili rucne bombe, tromblone, zapaljive smjese i ono sto su inace mogle proizvoditi vojne fabrike u Konjicu, Gorazdu, Bugojnu, Travniku, Novom Travniku i sarajevskom Zraku.«

166.

Kolike je razmjere imala ova donekle improvizirana proizvodnja opet kazuje S. Halilovi103: »Samo u prvoj godinu i po rata (od travnja 1992. do listopada 1993. ­ prim. M.G.), u okupiranom Sarajevu je proizvedeno oko 25.000 minobacackih i drugih artiljerijskih projektila, a bombi i tromblona vise od 200.000 komada.«

167.

Nakon povlacenja JNA s teritorija BiH pod nadzorom Muslimana i Hrvata u aprilu i maju 1992. godine104, snage Armije BiH zauzele su najznacajnija postrojenja vojne

101 102

4D01488 S. Halilovi, Lukava strategija, Sarajevo 1997, str. 92-94 4D01488 S. Halilovi, Lukava strategija, Sarajevo 1997, str. 92-94 103 4D01488 S. Halilovi, Lukava strategija, Sarajevo 1997, str. 92-94 104 Vrhovna komanda donijela je odluku o povlacenju postrojbi JNA iz BiH 4. svibnja sa rokom izvrsenja 19. svibnja 1992. godine. Fakticki je 2.armija otpocela je povlacenje sa teritorije BiH ve u travnju demontazom vojne industrije, raseljavanjem skladista i ratnih pricuva, stvarno povlacenje postrojbi otpocelo je u maju kada su paravojne snage Muslimana izvrsile teske zlocine u Sarajevu i Tuzli. Najvei dio naoruzanja, opreme i drugih

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industrije u BiH. Bosnjaci su zauzeli tvornice namjenske proizvodnje «Zrak» i «Bosnalijek» u Sarajevu, «Famos» u Hrasnici, «Slavko Rodi» u Bugojnu, «Borac» i «Tehnicki remontni zavod» u Travniku, «Bratstvo» u Novom Travniku. Tvornica pjesackog streljiva u Konjicu posve je bila u rukama Armije BiH i fakticki je kontinuirano proizvodila. Tvornica u Gorazdu proizvodila je nitroglicerinske barute, razlicite kapsule i malokalibarsko streljivo. Posebice je bila znacajna tvornica tezeg oruzja u Novom Travniku, koju su ABiH i HVO zauzeli zajedno prvih dana rata i u njoj zatekli znatne kolicine nedovrsenih topnickih oruña.

168.

U rukama HVO ostale su tvornice eksploziva «Slobodan Princip ­ Seljo» u Vitezu i posve ispraznjene tvornicke hale tvornice zrakoplova «Soko» u Mostaru. Proizvodnju je nastavila samo tvornica u Vitezu, dok proizvodnju zrakoplova nije bilo mogue organizirati jer su jugoslavenske vlasti demontirale i odvezle u Srbiju najvei dio strojeva i repromaterijala.

169.

Prema procjeni vrijednosti vojne industrije prije rata, Muslimani su zadrzali objekata i opreme u vrijednosti 1,844.300.000 USD105. K tome treba dodati i vrijednost objekata zrakoplovnog remontnog zavoda »Orao« u Rajlovcu pokraj Sarajeva, iz kojeg je opremu i reprodukcijski materijal JNA premjestila na teritoriju RS i dalje preselila u Srbiju. Hrvati su uspjeli zadrzati vojne industrije fakticki u vrijednosti 713.900.000 USD, jer vrijednost tvornice zrakoplova «Soko» posve je zanemariva s obzirom da je JNA iza sebe ostavila prazne tvornicke dvorane.

170.

Proizvodnja je bila mogua u skladu s raspolozivim zalihama reprodukcijskog materijala i energijom. U novembru 1992. godine muslimanska strana otpocinje proizvodnju artiljerijskih granata, ali je glavni problem bio nedostatak eksploziva (podvukao M.G.). Preko 200.000 razlicitih vrsta artiljerijske municije cekalo je eksploziv106, sto je cak mnogo vise od broja granata trazenih u zahtjevu od 7. travnja

sredstava JNA je predala novonastaloj vojsci Republike Srpske. Takoñer su gotovo svi pripadnici JNA (vojnici, docasnici, casnici i grañanska lica na sluzbi u JNA) porijeklom iz BiH prestupili u Vojsku RS. Fakticki JNA se i nije povukla iz BiH, ve se samo povukla sa podrucja pod nadzorom Muslimana i Hrvata. Mnoge postrojbe JNA koje su se ranije povukle sa teritorije Slovenije i Hrvatske u BiH i bile su popunjene pricuvnim osobljem srpske nacionalnosti samo su se preimenovale u postrojbe Vojske RS. Na podrucju Istocne Hercegovine ostale su neke postrojbe Podgorickog korpusa sve do decembra 1992. godine. 105 Vojnoindustrijski kompleks SFRJ, S. Kovacev, Z. Matijasci, J. Petrovi, Polemos 9, Zagreb, UDK: 355.1(497.1):338:341.2 106 4D01488 S. Halilovi, Lukava strategija, Sarajevo 1997, str. 92-94

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1993107. Tvrdnja nacelnika Glavnog staba Armije BiH S. Halilovia izrecena na vojnom savjetovanju 21. i 22. augusta 1993.108 znakovito govori o ciljevima Muslimana u rano proljee iste godine: ,,Da bi zaokruzili vojnu industriju, nama je potrebno rijesiti dva problema: hitno zauzeti tvornicu eksploziva u Vitezu i planirati i izvrsiti operaciju Zunovnice109, kao znacajnog skladista repromaterijala i naravno, municije." 171. Gotovo svakodnevno je Stab Vrhovne komande (ranije Glavni stab Armije BiH) zahtijevao od Predsjednistva i Vlade BiH potporu u smislu nabave reprodukcijskog materijala, posebice eksploziva za nastavak proizvodnje streljiva. Tako 5. februara 1993. godine predlaze izmeñu ostalog110:

»Sto prije osiguraju potrebne kolicine municije, lijekova, sanitetskog materijala za Armiju BiH. To podrazumijeva i otvaranje koridora kroz Hercegovinu i centralnu Bosnu pod kontrolom HVO (podvukao M.G.).«

172.

Tako opet Stab Vrhovne komande upuuje Vladi R BiH i Ministarstvu obrane 2. marta 1993. informaciju o kriticnoj situaciji u voñenju oruzane borbe111:

»Narocito kriticna sa sredstvima za POB (protuoklopnu borbu), pjesadijske municije kalibra, 7,9 mm, 7,62 mm i 5,54 mm, te artiljerijska municija kalibra 120-155 mm. Sadasnje rezerve svedene su na 0,5 b/k (borbenog kompleta)... Zakljucak: kriticno je stanje snabdjevenosti municijom Armije BiH.«

173.

Mjesec dana kasnije, 7. aprila 1993. godine opet Stab Vrhovne komande uputio je Predsjednistvu i Vladi R BiH te Ministarstvu obrane zahtjev za nabavku materijalnotehnickih sredstava u kojem trazi112 »Izracunate kolicine municije za pjesadijsko naoruzanje 3 b/k... 4. Metak 7,62 mm x 39 78,000.000

107

1D01062 S. Halilovi, Lukava strategija, Sarajevo 1997, str. 212 i 213 (e-court stranice BCS 46-47 i ET 46-47) 108 1D01062 S. Halilovi, Lukava strategija, Sarajevo 1997, str. 239 (e-court stranice BCS 73 i ET 70) 109 Zunovnica je mjesto u blizini Hadzia gdje je bio kompleks skladista JNA i u kome su bila uskladistena uglavnom ubojna sredstva. Siru okolinu Hadzia i pomenuta skladista drzali su Srbi. 110 1D01062 S. Halilovi, Lukava strategija, Sarajevo 1997, str. 196 (e-court stranice BCS 30 i ET 31) 111 1D01062 S. Halilovi, Lukava strategija, Sarajevo 1997, str. 197 (e-court stranice BCS 31 i ET 32) 112 1D01062 S. Halilovi, Lukava strategija, Sarajevo 1997, str. 212 i 213 (e-court stranice BCS 46-47 i ET 46-47)

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28. Granata za haubicu 122 mm 31. Tenkovska granata 100 mm ... 174.

1.500 13.000

Na sjednici Predsjednistva RBiH, odrzanoj 25. marta 1993. godine nacelnik Staba Vrhovne komande S. Halilovi zapao je u zestok verbalni duel s clanom Predsjednistva Konjicijom kada je ostrim rjecnikom zamjerio Predsjednistvu:113 »I, osigurajte municiju, mi emo sve vratiti u tri dana... ...zadnja minimalna kolicina municije nam je dosla 15. novembra 1992. godine... ...vi niste, kao drzava, nista osigurali...«

175.

Nekoliko dana kasnije je S. Halilovi na sjednici Predsjednistva RBiH od 10. marta 1993. godine predlozio:114 »6. Obezbijediti da luka Ploce i put Ploce ­ Mostar ­ Sarajevo ­ Zenica, bude u neprekidnoj funkciji za potrebe drzave BiH. Ako je nuzno, za ovo angazovati meñunarodne snage, a po potrebi i nasim snagama taj prostor osigurati.«

176.

U gotovo isto

vrijeme je predsjednik Predsjednistva RBiH Alija Izetbegovi na

sarajevskoj TV izjavio115: ,,Uspjeli smo dokopati se 30.000 pusaka i strojnica, 20 milijuna metaka, 37.000 mina, 46.000 protutenkovskih raketa, 20.000 rucnih granata, 90.000 vojnih uniformi i 120.000 pari cizama."

177.

Ova tvrdnja svakako je u koliziji sa zahtjevom Staba Vrhovne komande o osiguranju 3 b/k /borbena kompleta/ streljiva. Naime, Bosnjaci svakako u dvadesetak dana nisu uspjeli potrositi tolike kolicine streljiva. Izjava A. Izetbegovia je najvjerojatnije bila politicko-propagandnog znacenja u smislu zastrasivanja protivne strane i iznuñivanja pregovora odnosno otvaranja putova opskrbe, posebice hrvatske. Zacijelo su Bosnjaci

113 114

4D01490 S. Halilovi, Lukava strategija, Sarajevo 1997, str. 156 3D02648 S. Halilovi, Lukava strategija, Sarajevo 1997, str. 151 (e-court stranice BCS 65 i ET 45) P08632 Lord David OWEN, knjiga: Balkanska Odiseja, str. 127(e-court str. BCS 162 i ET 83)

115

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i pored pojacanog nadzora prometa i tereta prokrijumcarili znatne kolicine streljiva, oruzja i vojne opreme. Sefer Halilovi o tome pise:116 »Grupa u Glavnom stabu (kasnije Stab VK) na celu sa Mirzom Pinjom i Raifom Dzigalom razradila je nacin ubacivanja repromaterijala u BiH: ve smo imali ogromno iskustvo, mjesecima smo ubacivali municiju iz Visokog u bocama za kiseonik, kasnije kad je to otkriveno, preko cetnicke teritorije prenosili smo naoruzanje, municiju i repromaterijal u kontejnerima za humanitarnu pomo.«

178.

Zanimljiva je i cinjenica da su Bosnjaci kupovali streljivo i kod svojih protivnika. Tako opet S. Halilovi kazuje117: »Istodobno, nesto malo naoruzanja i oko milion i po metaka kupili smo od cetnika i ustasa... ...Bilo je to koncem aprila 1993. godine.«

179.

Autoru je u aprilu 1994. godine u vrijeme privatne posjete u Ljubljani nekadasnji nacelnik stozera 5. korpusa Ramiz Durakovi ispricao kako je on osobno pakirao streljivo u vree s brasnom i kontejnere s prehrambenim artiklima u Zagrebu, koji su zatim upuivani u opkoljenu Cazinsku krajinu kao humanitarna pomo.

180.

Drugi visoki zapovjednik Armije BiH M. Alagi, koji je zapovijedao Operativnom grupom »Bosanska krajina«, koja je bila razmjestena u Lasvanskoj dolini, zapisao je:

118

»Crno trziste cvjetalo je ­ tamo je bilo i municije i hrane... ...donio sam odluku da se ide na trgovinu sa cetnicima na prostoru Meokrnja119...«

181.

Muslimani su uspjeli i pored velikih poteskoa u proljee 1993. nabaviti izvjesne kolicine streljiva za lakse oruzje, ali najvjerojatnije nisu uspjeli nabaviti vee kolicine topnickog streljiva. Istodobno, bilo je izrañeno preko 25.000 komada topnickih granata

116 117

4D01488 S. Halilovi, Lukava strategija, Sarajevo 1997, str. 92-94 4D01488 S. Halilovi, Lukava strategija, Sarajevo 1997, str. 92-94 118 3D02638 N. Lati i Z. Isakovi, Rat u Srednjoj Bosni, Ratna sjeanja generala Alagia, BEMUST, Zenica 1997,str. 32(E-court stranice BCS 15, ET 8) 119 Meokrnje je planina sjeveroistocno oko 20 km od Travnika tada na crti dodira muslimanskih i srpskih snaga. Nalazi se na sumskom putu koji je tada povezivao Travnik i Kotor Varos.

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bez eksplozivnog i barutnog punjenja. Taj se materijal mogao nabaviti samo u tvornici «Slobodan Princip ­ Seljo« u Vitezu, koja je bila pod kontrolom HVO.

182.

Bosnjacko vodstvo nije imalo jedinstveni stav o stvaranju uvjeta za rad vlastite vojne industrije. To, naime, potvrñuje odgovor zamjenika ministra obrane Hasana Cengia nacelniku Glavnog staba ABiH Seferu Haliloviu na njegovo inzistiranje za vlastitom proizvodnjom streljiva:120 «To sto vi radite, to se ne isplati. Mnogo je jeftinije kupovati municiju i oruzje vani, nego to proizvoditi u Bosni.»

183.

Da je u bosnjacka strana imala znatan broj strucnjaka vojne industrije svjedoci i cinjenica da su poslali veu skupinu u Iran ve u 1993. godini, gdje su organizirali i upravljali obnovom i modernizacijom 1200 iranskih tenkova T-55 sovjetske proizvodnje na zapadne tehnicke standarde. U tom velikom i isplativom poslu pored BiH (osoblje iz Remontnog zavoda Hadzii) sudjelovali su i Slovenija (Remontni zavod Bregana i Iskra ­ Fotona iz Ljubljane) te Srbija (Remontni zavod Cacak)121. U tom se poslu spominje tadasnji zamjenik ministra obrane u Vladi R BiH Hasan Cengi.

184.

Iz naprijed iznijetog mogu se izvui slijedei zakljucci: - Armija BiH nije imala dovoljno streljiva za sve vrste oruzja, posebice pjesacko i minobacacko, - sredisnji sustav logisticke potpore Armije BiH nije bio djelotvoran, - zbog oskudice u sirovinama i reprodukcijskom materijalu, posebice eksplozivu za punjenje topnickog streljiva i nitroglicerinskih baruta, u zauzetim objektima i postrojenjima vojne industrije nije bila mogua proizvodnja streljiva za potrebe Armije BiH, - puteve opskrbe iz Hrvatske, koji su vodili preko Sjeverne Hercegovine i Sredisnje Bosne, kontrolirao je HVO, sto je islo na ruku sredisnjim bosnjackim politickim vlastima koje su se svjetskoj javnosti mogle prikazati kao zrtva koja se ne moze naoruzati,

120 121

4D01488 S. Halilovi, Lukava strategija, Sarajevo 1997, str. 92-94 4D01493 "Nacional", naslov: Amerikanci zele sprijeciti modernizaciju 1200 ruskih tenkova T-55 koje u Iranu obnavljaju bosnjacki inzenjeri, 13 studeni 1996

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- pomanjkanje redovite opskrbe streljivom umanjivalo je borbene mogunosti Armije BiH.

8.5. Komunikacije i promet tijekom 1992. i 1993. godine122

185.

Na podrucju Sredisnje Bosne i Sjeverne Hercegovine sijeku se najznacajniji prometni pravci koji iz Panonske nizine vode ka Jadranskom moru odnosno iz Sredisnje Evrope ka istocnom i juznom dijelu Balkanskog poluotoka i dalje prema Aziji. Svi se ti pravci sijeku na prostoru Sredisnje Bosne.

186.

Upravni pravac Banjaluka ­ Jajce ­ Bugojno ­Gornji Vakuf ­ Prozor - Jablanica ­ Mostar (broj 1) vodi dolinom rijeke Vrbasa preko prijevoja Makljen i dalje dolinom rijeke Rame i rijeke Neretve. Zbog granatiranja Vojske Republike Srpske promet na dijelu glavne prometnice Jablanica-Mostar bio je nesiguran, pa je preusmjeren kod Prozora na pravac s.Rumboci-s.Orasac-Lipa-Tomislavgrad-Livno-Hrvatska. Manja vozila mogla su se koristiti i alternativnim pravcem Jablanica-Sovii-Blidinje-Posusje. Dionicu puta Prozor-Orasac-Lipa preko Vran planine izgradila je grañevinska operativa HVO ujesen 1992. godine. Dio puta Banja Luka-Jajce-Donji Vakuf bio je pod stalnim nadzorom srpske vojske, a preostali dio puta kontrolirali su Hrvati i Muslimani.

187.

Upravni pravac Zepce ­ Zenica ­ Vitez ­ Novi Travnik ­ Bugojno ­ G. Vakuf ­ Prozor-Rumboci-Orasac-Lipa- Tomislavgrad-Hrvatska nazvan je »put spasa«. Ovaj pravac sadrzi ranije spomenuti pravac koji je bio pod kontrolom Hrvata i Muslimana (od Bugojna, preko Livna, do Hrvatske). Postojao je i krai alternativni pravac za dionicu od Novog Travnika do Gornjeg Vakufa, koji je veim dijelom bio makadamski i uzak, ali se ipak cesto koristio. Postojao je i sporedni put na dijelu Novi Travnik ­ Gornji Vakuf koji je vodio preko visoravni i prijevoja Rostovo (1025 m) koji je asfaltiran iz pravca Novog Travnika, a od Rostova do G. Vakufa je makadamski i uzak. U drugoj polovini 1992. godine u turistickim objektima na Rostovu bio je centar za obuku diverzantskih postrojbi Armije BiH.

122

4D01482

Map, Roads of the traffic Muslim and Croats during the war 1992-1993

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188.

Upravni pravac Doboj ­ Zenica ­ Kakanj ­ Visoko- Sarajevo ­ Tarcin - Ivan Sedlo ­ Konjic ­ Jablanica ­ Mostar ­ Metkovi (u Hrvatskoj) vodi dolinom rijeke Bosne preko Sarajevskog polja, dolinom rjecice Zujevina preko Ivan Sedla i od Konjica dalje dolinom rijeke Neretve, te se kod Jablanice spaja s pravcem br.1. Ovim pravcem, kao i pravcem broj 1, vodi kvalitetna cesta s asfaltiranom podlogom sirine 7-8 m. Zbog blokade Sarajeva ovaj je pravac preusmjeren na dionici Visoko-Kiseljak-KresevoTarcin. Dionica Kresevo-Tarcin je dorañeni sumski put. Kako su Srbi kontrolirali podrucje Doboja i okoline Sarajeva, Muslimani i Hrvati su, dakle, koristili pravac Zenica-Kakanj-Visoko-Kiseljak-Kresevo-Tarcin-Konjic-Jablanica-Mostar-Metkovi.

189.

Na spomenuti upravni pravac tijekom rata je uspostavljen novi cestovni koridor: Kakanj-Vares-Rijeka-Ribnica-Busovaca-Tuzla. Najvei dio pravca vodi sumskim putovima, promet je bio otezan, narocito zimi, ali je to bio jedini pravac za opskrbu stanovnika u tuzlanskoj regiji i juznom dijelu Posavine.

190.

Izmeñu Kiseljaka i Jablanice postojao je cestovni pravac: Kiseljak ­ Fojnica ­ Dusina ­ Neretvica ­ Ostrozac koji je bio ogranicenih mogunosti prometovanja zbog uskog kolovoza, makadamske podloge i uske klisuraste doline rjecica Gvozdanke i Neretvice. Taj je put bio najveim dijelom bio pod kontrolom Armije BiH, posebice kada su Bosnjaci u lipnju 1993. zauzeli Fojnicu i protjerali Hrvate s podrucja Dusine.

191.

Rokadni pravac Travnik ­ Lasva ­ Kakanj ­ Vares, a obilaznim pravcem BusovacaKiseljak-Visoko-Podlugovi-Breza-Vares, je glavni putni pravac u sredisnjoj Bosni u smjeru zapad-istok. Pravac je na vise mjesta bio pod kontrolom ABiH, odnosno HVO. Nakon incidenata na tom pravcu od jeseni 1992. godine, ABiH i HVO otvoreno su se sukobili u drugoj polovici 1993. godine.

192.

Kako je prijevoj Komar bio neprekidno u rukama Vojske RS komuniciranje izmeñu Uskopaljske kotline i Lasvanske doline mogue je bilo u cestom Bugojno ­ Novi Travnik koja je cijelo vrijeme bila pod nadzorom bosnjackih snaga.

193.

Prometovanje cestama u Sredisnjoj Bosni i Sjevernoj Hercegovini bio je jako otezano za sve strane u sukobu, posebice za bosnjacku i hrvatsku stranu. Za Bosnjake bilo je

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otvaranje prometnica ka Hercegovini od zivotnog znacenja i morali su ih otvoriti svim moguim sredstvima, cak i po cijenu oruzanog sukoba sa Hrvatima. U odnosu na Republiku Hrvatsku i HZ-HB bi Hrvati Sredisnje Bosne i Tuzlanske regije najvjerojatnije bili nekakvi taoci. To se moze razumjeti iz rijeci zapovjednika OG »Bosanska krajina« M. Alagia cija je zona odgovornosti bila upravo Lasvanska dolina kada je pripremao operaciju zauzimanja Viteza i progona Hrvata iz Sredisnje Bosne123: »Mene je konkretno mucilo pitanje: kud sa civilima ako uñem u Vitez? Da li stvoriti uvjete za predaju, ili omoguiti njihovo kretanje prema jugozapadu, bila je druga dilema. I trea varijanta bila je drzati ih u okruzenju i pritiskati kako nam priticanja iz Hrvatske ne bi sasvim prestala (podvukao M.G.). Gledajui ukupnu situaciju opredijelili smo se za ovu posljednju procjenu i, umjesto da oslobodimo Vitez, ostavili smo ga da nam sluzi kao strategijski ventil za opskrbljivanje drugih dijelova Bosne (podvukao M.G.).«

194.

Otvaranje unutarnjih prometnica bilo je takoñer veoma znacajno za Hrvate. U tom kontekstu trebalo je otvoriti blokade i odstraniti nadzorne tocke kod Kacuna i Bilalovca i na Rostovu. Naime, blokadom prometa prekinuta je redovita opskrba i komuniciranje izmeñu pojedinih dijelova hrvatske enklave u Sredisnjoj Bosni, a takoñer i redovita opskrba iz zaleña Hercegovine cime bi se povezali Hrvati u podrucju Kreseva, Dusine i Kiseljaka s podrucjem Busovace, pa zatim s podrucjem Vitez ­ Novi Travnik i zatim dalje ka Bugojnu i G. Vakufu. Ova je prometnica bila znacajna i za opskrbu postrojbi HVO u odbrani Bugojna, kao i za manevar pricuvama odnosno mobilnim snagama ka ugrozenim hrvatskim naseljima unutar Lasvanskolepenicke doline.

195.

Nije bilo politicke volje na najvisem nivou na obadvije strane da se prometovanje uspostavi pregovorima i suradnjom. Stab Vrhovne komande Armije BiH je 5. februara 1993. godine uputio Predsjednistvu R BiH zahtjev za energicnijim angaziranjem u

123

3D02638 N. Lati i Z. Isakovi, Rat u Srednjoj Bosni, Ratna sjeanja generala Alagia, BEMUST, Zenica 1997, str. 26, (e-court stranice BCS 12, ET 7)

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rjesavanju slozene vojne situacije, gdje se gotovo imperativno i ucjenjivacki zahtijeva da se124: »...Sto prije obezbijede potrebne kolicine municije, lijekova, sanitetskog materijala i hrane za potrebe Armije BiH. To podrazumijeva i otvaranje koridora kroz Hercegovinu i centralnu Bosnu pod kontrolom HVO (podvukao M.G.).

Preduzimanjem gore navedenih mjera obijezbedit e se Armiji BiH povoljni uslovi za odbranu i prosirenje slobodne teritorije (podvukao M.G.). U protivnom, Armija BiH nee odgovarati za mogue negativne posljedice.«

196.

Ponovo 2. marta 1993. godine Stab vrhovne komande Armije BiH uputio je Vladi BiH i Ministarstvu obrane informaciju o kriticnoj situaciji u voñenju oruzane borbe u kojem okrivljuje ove organe vlasti za eventualni neuspjeh i poraz postrojbi Armije BiH125: »Organi ministarstva obrane i Vlade R BiH nadlezni su i odgovorni za nabavku i dostavu naoruzanja i vojne opreme u logisticke centre Armije BiH. Cinjenica je da se u logistickom centru Armije BiH ne nalaze potrebna sredstva za uspjesno voñenje oruzane borbe i da nemamo nikakvih podataka sta su Ministarstvo obrane i Vlada RBiH ucinili po ovom pitanju i da je uspjesnost oruzane borbe zavisna i od raspolozivog naoruzanja i municije. Evidentno je da e za eventualan neuspjeh u borbi sa agresorom, punu odgovornost snositi i nadlezni organi Ministarstva obrane i Vlade RBiH. (podvukao M.G.)«

197.

Tako je 10. marta 1993. godine nacelnik Staba Vrhovne komande S. Halilovi na zajednickoj sjednici Predsjednistva, Vlade i parlamentarnih stranaka iznio prijedlog126: 4. Sa Republikom Hrvatskom, na politickom planu, konacno razrijesiti najvaznije pitanje, a to je logistika za potrebe R BiH, odnosno oruzanih snaga.

124 125 126

1D01062 S. Halilovi, Lukava strategija, Sarajevo 1997, str. 196 (e-court stranice BCS 30 i ET 31) 1D01062 S. Halilovi, Lukava strategija, Sarajevo 1997, str. 197 (e-court stranice BCS 31 i ET 32) 3D02648 S. Halilovi, Lukava strategija, Sarajevo 1997, str. 151 (e-court stranice BCS 65 i ET 45)

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5. Na meñunarodnom planu animirati sve prijateljske zemlje da izvrse pritisak na Republiku Hrvatsku da odustane od podrske »Herceg-Bosni« i raditi aktivno na njenom dokidanju. 6. Obijezbediti da luka Ploce i put Ploce ­ Mostar ­ Sarajevo ­ Zenica, bude u neprekidnoj funkciji za potrebe drzave BiH. Ako je nuzno, za ovo angazovati meñunarodne snage, a po potrebi i nasim snagama taj prostor osigurati.« U daljem izlaganju je S. Halilovi upozorava prisutne127: »...posto zahtjevi za vase aktivnije angazovanje koje smo mi poslali prema Vladi i Predsjednistvu, do sada nisu dosli na dnevni red, da vas kratko podsjetim na njih, da vas i ovom prilikom zamolim da ih sto prije ozbiljno uzmete u razmatranje...Meñutim, misljenja smo da na sadasnju, veoma slozenu situaciju na ratistima i problemima koji se javljaju u organizovanom suprotstavljanju agresoru RBiH, Predsjednistvo i vlada, vlast u opinama, ne reaguju organizovano i dovoljno energicno, sto moze dovesti do negativnih posljedica sa nesluenim razmjerama (podvukao M.G.).«

198.

199.

Mogu se izvui sljedei zakljucci: - glavne cestovne veze su bile posve prekinute zbog fizickog zauzea i nadzora Vojske RS, - dio cestovnih prometnica bio je pod povremenim ognjem topnistva Vojske RS, posebice cesta Novi Travnik ­ Bugojno i Capljina-Mostar-Jablanica, - djelomicni nadzor Armije BiH i HVO nad pojedinim dionicama temeljnih cestovnih pravaca prouzrokovao je ceste prekide prometovanja na vise dana i otvaranje prometovanja zahtijevalo je cesta pregovaranja posredstvom

UNPROFOR, - uspostavljanje nadzornih tocaka na znacajnijim raskrsima od strane pripadnika Armije BiH i HVO prouzrocilo je mnoge tenzije i ozbiljne incidente koji su cesto prerasli u oruzane sukobe128, - poseban problem je predstavljalo prometovanje u zimi 1992/1993 zbog visokog snijega,

127 128

4D01489 S. Halilovi, Lukava strategija, Sarajevo 1997, str .152 4D01479 Humanitarni konvoji UNHCR su od Zagreba do Sarajeva morali proi 90 cestovnih nadzornih tocaka i na svakoj voditi pregovore. - www.unhcr.ba/publications/state_refugees_bih.pdf

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- obje strane spremale su se da uporabe oruzje i oruzanu silu jedne protiv druge radi otvaranja prometnica i uspostave prometovanja odnosno opskrbe svojih vojski i stanovnistva.

8.6.

Zakljucak

200.

S obzirom na gospodarsko i prometno znacenje Sredisnje Bosne i Sjeverne Hercegovine vojno bi bilo opravdano da Armija BiH: (i) osigura potpunu kontrolu nad podrucjem Konjica koje je iznimno vazno zbog

sljedeih okolnosti: 1/ u zaleñu je Sarajeva i stoga iznimno vazno za pripreme i izvoñenje bilo kakve vojne operacije osloboñenja Sarajeva; 2/ zbog blizine Sarajeva, vojne infrastrukture iz vremena Jugoslavije i komunikacijskih pravaca podrucje Konjica bilo je najpovoljnije za smjestaj vojnog zapovjednistva koje bi rukovodilo vojnim operacijama; 3/ Konjic je bio najvaznija komunikacijska tocka na pravcu SarajevoJablanica-Mostar-Jadransko more; 4/ u Konjicu je postojala tvornica IGMAN, u kojoj se proizvodila municija za lako pjesacko oruzje; (ii) osvoji Vitez i iznimno vaznu tvornicu eksploziva u tom gradu koristi za potrebe vlastitog naoruzanja; (iii) ostvari punu kontrolu nad gradovima u kojima se nalaze znacajni objekti vojne industrije ­ Bugojno, Travnik, Novi Travnik; (iv) ostvari punu kontrolu nad komunikacijskim pravcem iz Srednje Bosne preko Jablanice i Mostara do Jadranskog mora i tako osigura uvjete za kontinuirano i nesmetano opskrbu.

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9. JE LI POSTOJALA OPSADA MOSTARA?

201. Postavljeno mi je pitanje da li se s vojnog aspekta moze smatrati da je Istocni Mostar poslije 30. juna 1993. godine bio pod opsadom ako je (a) pod kontrolom Armije BiH bilo podrucje od oko 50 km na lijevoj obali Neretve (dio sjeverno a dio juzno od Istocnog Mostara)129 i ako je (b) postojala komunikacija Jablanica-Istocni Mostar (s tim sto je nekoliko kilometara bila planinska staza), putem koje je jedinicama Armije BiH u Istocnom Mostaru i okolnim podrucjima pristizala pomo i putem koje je Armiji BiH dostavljano oruzje i municija, a kojom je i civilno stanovnistvo moglo otii prema Jablanici.

202.

Spomenute (a) i (b) pretpostavke potvrñuju sljedei dokumenti: (i) Informacija Staba Vrhovne komande OS BiH o toku borbenih dejstava na teritoriji R BiH za period od 24 sata dana 30.06.1993., u kojoj se navodi da je Armija BiH «zauzela vazna uporista i to: Sjeverni Logor, Rastane, Vrapcie, Bijelo Polje, Salakovac i Rosci. Pored ostalog u nasim rukama se nalaze sve HE na Neretvi, izuzev HE Capljina. /.../ Prema izvjestaju komande 4.K. jedinice ovog korpusa su se jucer spojile sa snagama 6. Korpusa, sto e imati pozitivan uticaj na dalji tok b/d.»130 (Napomena M.G. ­ zona odgovornosti 4. korpus ABiH je mostarsko podrucje, a 6. korpusa podrucje Jablanice i Konjica.); (ii) Nareñenje komandanta ABiH Rasima Delia od 27. jula 1993. kojom se Namik Dzankovi upuuje na teritorij zone odgovornosti 4. i 6. korpusa131; (iii) UNPROFOR press release od 21. augusta 1993. u kojem se navodi kako je zapovjednik ABiH u Mostaru Sulejman Budakovi izjavio da e pristati na prekid vatre, ali da se mora zadrzati koridor prema Jablanici132; (iv) [Redigirano]133;

Prikazano na dokumentima 4D00625, IC01005, IC01006 2D01389 Informacija Staba Vrhovne komande OS BiH o toku borbenih dejstava na teritoriji R BiH za period od 24 sata dana 30.06.1993, br. 02/1-182 od 01.07.1993. 131 4D00768 Order issued by Rasim Delic to the 4th and 6th Corps Command, ref:1/297-72, Sarajevo, 27 July 1993 132 P03858 UNPROFOR Operational updates and press releases for the period 16 Aug 93 to 22 Aug 93. 133 [Redigirano]

130

129

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(v)

Naredba zamjenika komandanta Staba Vrhovne komande OS RBiH Stjepana Sibera od 4. septembra 1993. u kojoj se uvodno ocjenjuje da je «ekstremno krilo HVO i HV» spremno za ofanzivu na pravcu Prozor-Jablanica, te da bi time bio blokiran pravac Mostar-Jablanica-Sarajevo134;

(vi)

Nareñenje nacelnika Glavnog staba Vrhovne komande ABiH Sefera Halilovia od 6. septembra 1993., u kojem se spominje angaziranje izviñackodiverzantske brigade «Zulfikar» «na pravcu s.Vrdi-s.Goranci prema Mostaru», a zapovjedniku te jedinice nareñuje da zajedno s direktorom poduzea Hidroelektrane na Neretvi regulira nacin i vrijeme pustanja nivoa vode iz jezera HE Salakovac135;

(vii)

Dokument zapovjednika 4. korpusa ABiH Arifa Pasalia od 7. septembra 1993. u kojem se navodi da u zonu odgovornosti 4. korpusa, dakle na podrucje Mostara, trebaju po dogovoru biti upuene 1-2 cete iz sastava 7. muslimanske brigade 3.korpusa Armije RBiH136;

(viii) Izvjestaj nacelnika staba 4. korpusa ABiH od 14. oktobra 1993. o stanju u zoni odgovornosti Operativne grupe Sjever-1 sadrzi podatke o vojnim jedinicama i njihovim polozajima sjeverno od Istocnog Mostara. Meñu ostalim se navodi da «veliki problem komandi OG predstavlja transport civilnog stanovnistva i ostalih koji marsuju u pravcu sjevera i juga», a da su «veliki problemi u transportu ranjenika i ostalog za grad». «Velik je problem oko snabdijevanja ove jedinice hljebom zbog toga sto se moraju drva za pekaru voziti u Mostar, a hljeb iz Mostara za Bijelo Polje dok istovremeno u Vrapciima postoji pekara koja bi uz male popravke mogla da funkcionise», navodi se u izvjestaju. Vei dio izvjestaja posveen je problemu nadleznosti nad tovarnim vodom koji je koristen za prijevoz robe na planinskom dijelu puta Mostar-Jablanica, a spominje se da se «prilikom transporta nafte koja kapa po konjima javljaju velike rane i izbacuju /konji/ iz stroja».137

134

4D00780 Signed and stamped order issued by Stjepan Siber to the 6th Corps Command, re: measures for stabilization of defence, ref: 02/1075-1, Sarajevo, 04 September 1993 135 3D 00939 Command issued by Sefer Halilovi, 6 September 1993 136 3D 00932 EXHIBIT FROM HALILOVIC, REPLY/REPORT SIGNED BY ARIF PASALIC, No. 838-06 od 7. septembra 1993. 137 4D00179 Signed and stamped report issued by Esad Ramic, re: situation found during inspection of responsibility zone of Operational Group 'NORTH-1', ref: 03-81/93, 14 October 1993

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(ix)

Zapovijest za napad zapovjednika brigade «Zulfikar» Alispage Zulfikara od 11. septembra 1993. u kojoj se iznosi ocjena da su «agresorske snage dijela HVO i HV» dobile zadatak da «doñu u posjed HE na slivu Neretve»138;

(x)

Naredba zapovjednika Staba Vrhovne komande ABiH Rasima Delia od 12. septembra 1993. u kojoj se spominju planirana borbena dejstva u pravcu Prozora i Mostara139;

(xi)

Prijedlog borbenih djelovanja na frontu od Gornjeg Vakufa do Mostara, koji je 20. septembra 1993. sastavila ekipa u sastavu Sefer Halilovi, Vehbija Kari, Rifat Bilajac i Ziro Suljevi140;

(xii)

Odgovor nacelnika GS ABiH Sefera Halilovia zapovjedniku Rasimu Deliu na njegov upit od 25. septembra 1993. (u vezi s telegramom Arifa Pasalia), u kojem se uz ostalo navodi da je «poslao 4 nareñenja ­ cak i molbe da doñe helikopter zbog teskih ranjenika i prebacivanja jedne cete u rejon Bijelog polja», te da je nakon intervencije Halilovia i Delia «ceta jacine 150 ljudi prebacena u Bijelo Polje radi pomoi Mostaru»141 ;

(xiii) Nareñenje zapovjednika 4. korpusa ABiH Arifa Pasalia od 25. septembra 1993. iz kojeg je vidljivo da podrucje sjeverno i juzno od Istocnog Mostara drze pod kontrolom jedinice ABiH, da istocni dio cijelog tog podrucja pod kontrolom drzi Vojska Republike Srpske («cetnici»), a da HVO («ustase») drzi pod kontrolom zapadni dio toga podrucja142; (xiv) [Redigirano]143;

138

3D02155 HAL-1-208, ORDER TO ATTACK ISSUED BY ALISPAGO ZULFIKAR, OPERATION DEFENCE OF THE PEOPLE'S RIGHTS VRDI 93 139 4D01113 Order issued by Rasim Delic to the Chief of Supreme Command Staff and to the Commander of the 6th Corps Command, re: reexamine the decision regarding planned combat actions towards Prozor and Mostar, ref: 01/47-245, 12 September 1993 140 3D00737 HAL-1-203, EXHIBIT FROM HALILOVIC CASE, REPORT OF THE INSPECTION TEAM, HALILOVIC, KARICBILAJAC, SULJEVIC, 20 September 1993 141 4D00798 Telegram with explanation to Arif Pasalic and Rasim Delic issued by Sefer Halilovic, re: document no. 337 of 25 september 1993 142 4D00711 Order issued by Arif Pasalic, re: reorganization for the purpose of forming the Operative Groups for conducting combat activities, ref:03-09/93, 25 September 1993 143 [Redigirano]

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(xv)

Naredba komandanta 4. korpusa ABiH Sulejmana Budakovia od 19. decembra 1993. u kojoj se uvodno spominju obavjestajni podaci o pripremama HVO za napad na Dreznicu, sa ciljem presijecanja komunikacije MostarJablanica144;

(xvi)

izvadak iz knjige Esada Sejtania «Na ognjenim vratima Hercegovine» u kojem ovaj zapovjednik ABiH u Mostaru istice: «Situacija u gradu i okolini je bila sve teza. Glad je ozbiljno harala na sve strane. Ono malo hrane sto je iz Jablanice preko Glogova ulazilo u Mostar, dijelilo se na kapaljku, i ponovo je veliki broj stanovnika zelio otii za Jablanicu i dalje za Bosnu. Represivnim mjerama, nazalost, sprijecili smo isticanje stanovnistva, i smanjili smo svaki pokret na najnuzniju mjeru».145

(xvii) Izvjese SPABAT-a od 19. jula 1993. da je UNHCR Metkovi otkazao sve konvoje humanitarne pomoi zato sto je HVO inzistirao da bude informiran o postotku pomoi koja se dodjeljuje stanovnistvu svake od sukobljenih strana146;

203.

Za pojasnjenje mogue opsade Mostara od strane HVO potrebno je utvrditi temeljne znacajke suvremene vojne opsade. Pri tome emo se posluziti pravilima voñenja oruzanog boja u urbanim sredinama po nacelima americke vojske, koja u biti nisu nista drugacija od opstih nacela drugih suvremenih vojski. Definicija opsade147: Opsada je pojam koji oznacava vojnu operaciju osvajanja grada ili drugog mjesta opkoljavanjem i blokiranjem komunikacija i opskrbe, koje moze, ali ne mora biti praeno artiljerijskim napadima i bombardiranjem. Time se vojska protivne strane prisiljava na predaju ili njene vlasti na politicke ustupke. Takoñer se opsadom mogu vezivati protivnicke snage i time im sprijeciti angaziranje na drugim pravcima odnosno osigurati vlastite snage na drugim pravcima.

204.

4D00720 Signed and stamped order issued by Sulejman Budakovic, re: taking measures for combat readiness, ref: 03-641, 19 December 1993 145 4D00545 Excerpt from the book Herzegovinians on the Fiery Gateway of Bosnia, Esad Sejtanic, June 2005 146 P03547 UNPROFOR HQ BH Kiseljak daily infsum for 19 July 1993 147 To surround a city or enemy army, cutting off supplies, in order to force surrender.

144

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205.

Temeljno nacelo opsade ili blokade je potpuna izolacija okruzenih protivnickih snaga od drugih vlastitih snaga izvana, sto pretpostavlja da napadac nadzire i sprecava bilo kakav kontakt sa snagama izvan blokade. U suvremenoj vojnoj teoriji izolacija moze biti: - fizicka ­ zaposjedanjem cvrstog obruca oko opkoljenih protivnickih snaga, vatrenim djelovanjem topnistva i zrakoplovstva u slucaju pomanjkanja snaga ili nedostupnosti dijela obruca i neprekidnim i odlucnim nadzorom podrucja blokade i sireg podrucja; - elektronska ­ ofenzivnim informatickim djelovanjem u vidu intenzivnog ometanja elektronskih sredstava veza, elektronskih sredstava javnog informiranja (TV, radio, telefon, internet), intenzivnim praenjem elektronskih sredstava protivnicke strane; - psiholoska ­ s djelovanjem civilnih poslova, bojnim djelovanjem, elektronskim djelovanjem, posebice obmanama i propagandnim i psiholoskim djelovanjem na moral pojedinaca i okruzenih postrojbi u cjelini, te neprijateljski raspolozenog stanovnistva u okruzenju i van njega uz istovremeno ohrabrivanje stanovnistva naklonjenog napadacu.

206.

Takoñer treba imati u vidu i mnoge cinjenice u eventualnoj opsadi Istocnog Mostara od strane HVO. U kom je stupnju bila ostvarena fizicka blokada Istocnog Mostara od strane HVO moze se ustvrditi kroz nekoliko cinjenica: grad Istocni Mostar nije bio blokiran, jer je cijeli prostor na podrucju lijeve obale Neretve sjeverno i juzno od grada bio pod kontrolom Armije BiH, i to u duzini od oko 50 km (od Jablanice do Bune); Podvelezje, odnosno podrucje istocno od Istocnog Mostara drzala je pod kontrolom Vojska Republike Srpske; HVO je pod svojom kontrolom imao podrucje zapadno od polozaja Armije BiH. Ove nesporne cinjenice potvrñuju da Istocni Mostar nije bio u okruzenju jedinica HVO, odnosno da HVO nije fizicki blokirao Istocni Mostar.

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207.

Opskrba bojnim potrebama (oruzjem, streljivom) nije bila prekinuta tako da je Armija BiH ne samo drzala polozaje na crti razdvajanja uspostavljenoj jos u aprilu 1993. godine, nego je i izvodila borbene akcije veih razmjera.

208.

Kriticna je bila opskrba brojnog stanovnistva (mjestani i izbjeglice) zivotnim namirnicama. Zahvaljujui mogunosti proizvodnje hrane na podrucjima sjeverno i juzno od Istocnog Mostara, dopremi hrane iz pravca Jablanice i aktivnostima humanitarnih organizacija Istocni Mostar nije ostao bez hrane. Vei zastoj u opskrbi od strane UNHCR i meñunarodnih organizacijama trajao je oko mjesec i i pol dana u ljeto 1993. godine.

209.

Prema tvrdnjama uprave gradskog vodova opskrba vodom bila je dostupna i stanovnicima u istocnom dijelu Mostara preko nekoliko improviziranih vodova sa smanjenim kapacitetom. Na smanjenje dovoda vode utjecala su bojna djelovanja obje strane, zastarjelost vodovodne mreze i naprava i smanjene kolicine na izvoristima radi visokih ljetnih vruina i nedostatka padavina148.

210.

Takoñer je istocni dio Mostara bio opskrbljen i elektricnom energijom jer su hidrocentrale na Neretvi proizvodile iskljucivo za potrebe Muslimana, dok su dalekovodi prema Mostaru isli lijevom obalom Neretve. Iz pojedinih dokumenata spomenutih u paragrafu 202. vidljivo je da su hidrocentrale bile pod kontrolom Armije BiH.

211.

U pogledu radijskih i televizijskih programa situacija se nije promijenila u odnosu na 1992. godinu, kada je Vojska Republike Srpske unistila repetitor na Velezu i time onemoguila praenje programa Radio-televizije Sarajevo, s tim sto su radijski programi bili dostupni na srednjem valnom opsegu. Lokalni mediji koje su osnovale muslimanske vlasti nesmetano su djelovali.149

148

3D00723 P02611

149

1D01569 1D01567 2D00448

Izvjese o stanju vodopskrbe u razdoblju 1992.-1994, Vodovod d.o.o Stamped request re: Solution of water supply system on the left bank of the city of Mostar, addressed to United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and THW, signed by Arif Pasalic. Ref: 01-11/93 Report on the problems re: damaged pipeline at Studenac water spring Report on the problems in the water supply in the city of Mostar Arif Pasalic speech on the War radio BiH on June 30th. 1993 at 11.00

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212.

Stacionarne kablirane telefonske linije bile su u prekidu radi osteenja mostova na rijeci Bijeloj i Neretvi kod Aleksin Hana. Zapovjednistva ABiH su raspolagala satelitskim mobilnim vezama.150 Zapovjednistva unutar istocnog dijela Mostara imala su pouzdane meñusobne radio veze. Takoñer je zapovjednistvo 4. korpusa sa stabom Vrhovne komande komuniciralo bez poteskoa izazvanih djelovanjem HVO.151

213.

Iako su se obje strane koristile propagandom za ostvarenje svojih ciljeva, ne moze se rei da je se HVO koristio mjerama psiholoske izolacije koje bi bile usmjerene kako prema pripadnicima Armije BiH tako i prema stanovnistvu.

214.

Iz navedenih cinjenica se moze zakljuciti da istocni dio Mostara u smislu suvremene vojne teorije nije bio pod opsadom: grad Istocni Mostar imao je slobodu komunikaciji sa sirim prostorom sjeverno i juzno od grada, - Muslimani su imali otvoren put prema svojoj strani u centru BiH, - s istocne strane iz Podvelezja Muslimanima nije prijetila oruzana opasnost jer su taj dio bojisnice drzali Srbi koji su u to vrijeme prekinuli oruzana djelovanja prema Muslimanima, - opskrba bojnim potrebama bila je otezana, ali ne i onemoguena, - opskrba stanovnistva istocnog Mostara bila je otezana, ali nije bila u potpunosti prekinuta.

150

3D01836 IL-2-387, REQUEST SENT BY SALIM SABIC TO MR. HADZIOSMANOVIC RE:STELLITE PHONE INSTALLED IN THE OFFICES OF THE MOSTAR MUNICIPAL BOARD OF THE SDA 151 3D02591 R68-3-191, SPECIAL REPORT FROM 21 SEPTEMBER 1993 BY APOLLO ON ZUKA AND ALIJA IZETBEGOVIC CONVERSATION

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10. SITUACIJA KAD JE JEDNA DRZAVA NAPADNUTA ILI UGROZENA S TERITORIJA DRUGE DRZAVE

215. Postavljeno mi je pitanje da li je Republika Hrvatska s vojnog aspekta imala pravo uputiti svoje vojne jedinice na teritorij Bosne i Hercegovine radi obrane svoga teritorija od JNA i kasnije vojske Republike Srpske, koje su napadale Dubrovnik i druge gradove na hrvatskoj obali s teritorija BiH.152

216.

U clanku 51 Povelje UN zapisano je da svaka drzava ima prirodno pravo na samoodbranu sve dok Vijee sigurnosti UN ne poduzme drugacije ucinkovite mjere smirivanja sukoba odnosno odvraanja i prekida agresije. Nijedna rezolucije Vijea sigurnosti o ratu u bivsoj Jugoslaviji nije se odnosila na konkretan slucaj oruzanih djelovanja u juznoj Hrvatskoj ­ sire podrucje Dubrovnika i jugoistocnoj Hercegovini. Shodno Povelji UN Hrvatska je imala prirodno pravo na samoobranu u slucaju upada snaga tadasnje SRJ na njenu teritoriju i oduprijeti se zauzimanju tog prostora, rusenju naselja (Cepikue, Cavtat, Dubrovnik) i progonu nesrpskog stanovnistva (Hrvata i Muslimana). Nista u ovoj Povelji ne umanjuje prirodno pravo na individualnu ili kolektivnu odbranu u slucaju oruzanog napada na clana Ujedinjenih nacija dok Vijee sigurnosti ne preduzme mjere potrebne za ocuvanje mira i sigurnosti u svijetu. O mjerama koje preduzmu clanovi koristei se ovim pravom na samoodbranu bie odmah obavijesteno Vijee sigurnosti i ove mjere ni na koji nacin nee dovesti u pitanje ovlasti i odgovornosti Vijea da u skladu sa ovom Poveljom preduzme u svako doba akciju koju smatra nuznom u cilju obezbjeñivanja i odrzanja mira i sigurnosti u svijetu.

217.

Washingtonski ugovor koji je pravni temelj NATO-a predviña mogunost kolektivne obrane u slucaju napada na jednu od clanica, sto stoji u clanku 5: Potpisnice smatraju da se oruzani napad na jednu ili vise njih, u Europi ili Sjevernoj Americi, treba smatrati napadom na sve njih i zato se slazu da e u slucaju takvog oruzanog napada, svaka od njih, pozivajui se na pravo

152

Takvo djelovanje HV spominje se, meñu ostalim, u dokumentu 4D01240: Direktiva Staba Vrhovne komande oruzanih snaga RBiH od 10.09.1992.

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individualne ili zajednicke samoobrane iz clanka 51. Povelje Ujedinjenih Naroda, pomoi potpisnici ili potpisnicama koje su napadnute, poduzimajui odmah, same i u skladu s drugim potpisnicama, korake koji se smatraju potrebnima, ukljucujui uporabu oruzane sile, da bi povratile i odrzale sigurnost Sjevernoatlantskog podrucja.

Svaki takav oruzani napad i mjere poduzete kao rezultat tog napada moraju se odmah prijaviti Vijeu sigurnosti. Takve mjere moraju se zaustaviti kada Vijee sigurnosti poduzme mjere potrebne za ponovnu uspostavu i odrzavanje meñunarodnog mira i sigurnosti.

218.

U suvremenoj praksi poslije 2. svjetskog rata ova odredba cesto je koristena za vojnu intervenciju prema mnogim zemljama koje nisu ni napale neku od clanica NATO pakta, ali su svojim politickim djelovanjem odnosno upotrebom svoje oruzane snage ugrozile politicke, ekonomske ili vojne interese neke od clanica, u pravilu ponajvise SAD kao vodee clanice. Vojne intervencije izvedene su izvan maticne teritorije bilo koje od clanica odnosno van teritorije koja se opredjeljuje u clanku 7. Takav je slucaj u ratovima u Hrvatskoj (bombardiranje aerodroma Udbina 1994.), u ratu u BiH (bombardiranje objekata i pripadnika VRS u BiH 1995.), u ratu u SRJ (zracni napadi na Srbiju 1999. godine).

219.

Ustav Republike Hrvatske propisivao je clankom 7. da oruzane snage stite suverenitet i neovisnost Republike Hrvatske, te brane njenu teritorijalnu cjelovitost.153

220.

Svaka drzava ima pravo braniti se od napada na njezinu teritoriju i njezino stanovnistvo. To pravo na samoobranu ukljucuje i eliminiranje izvora napadackih akcija. Ako se bojeva oruña i vojne jedinice koje vrse napad nalaze na teritoriju druge drzave, tada napadnuta drzava ima pravo izvesti napad na podrucje na kojem se nalazi neprijateljska vojska.

221.

Sire podrucje Dubrovnika od delte Neretve do Prevlake bilo je napadnuto od strane Vojske Jugoslavije, cije su postrojbe bile popunjene pricuvnim sastavom iz Crne Gore i Istocne Hercegovine, a djelomice iz Srbije (37. uzicki korpus). Polazna osnovica tim

153

1D02912

Ustav Republike Hrvatske, 22. decembar 1990.

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snagama bila je teritorija Republike BiH pod jurisdikcijom Republike Srpske (sire zaleñe Popova Polja i Nevesinjskog Polja). Mada su progoni muslimanskog i hrvatskog stanovnistva poceli ve prije dolaska postrojbi Vojske Jugoslavije, njihovim dolaskom doslo je do masovnog progona tog stanovnistva. Odmah po dolasku ove su snage SRJ izvrsile oruzani prepad na zaleñe Dubrovnika.

222.

Ustavna obaveza RH i prirodno pravo na samoobranu po meñunarodnom ratnom pravu bile su pravni temelj ofenzive hrvatskih snaga iz dubine drzavne teritorije. Kada su invazijske snage bile protjerane sa teritorije RH, opasnost po drzavu jos nije bila otklonjena. Nacela ratovanja nalazu da se protivnik mora progoniti ili do unistenja ili do kapitulacije ili do postizanja politickog sporazuma u vidu primirja sve dok postoji opasnost za drzavu. Taj je progon nastavljen i na teritoriju R BiH. Ulazak jedinica HV na teritoriju R BiH bio je nuzan i s aspekta taktickog operativnog polozaja u smislu ucinkovite obrane osloboñenog podrucja dubrovackog zaleña. Svako zaustavljanje HV na granicama Hrvatske stetilo bi interesima kako same Hrvatske (plitka obrana) kao i interesima R BiH - hrvatskom i muslimanskom narodu u Hercegovini koji su bili neposredno ugrozeni u Mostaru i donjem toku rijeke Neretve.

223.

HV je bila duzna i imala prirodno pravo da protjera invazijske snage SRJ sa svoje teritorije i da ulaskom na teritoriju susjedne BiH sprijeci mogui ponovni napad. Napad na snage Vojske RS posve je opravdan jer su te snage bile saveznik snagama Vojske Jugoslavije i omoguile im stacioniranje na svojoj teritoriji.

224.

Sa vojnog aspekta je bojno djelovanje HV u jugoistocnoj Hercegovini bio posve opravdano i nuzno.

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11. VOJNO ZNACENJE BHS POJMOVA «ASANACIJA» I «CISENJE» TERENA

225. Postavljen mi je upit o znacenju pojma «asanacija» i «cisenje» terena, koji se koriste u brojnim dokumentima HVO i Armije BiH.154

226.

Asanacija bojisnice predstavlja organizirano poduzimanje mjera radi uklanjanja posmrtnih ostataka poginulih pripadnika vojske obiju strana i civila, poginulih domaih i divljih zivotinja, bioloskih otpadaka i drugih moguih izvorista zaraznih bolesti na bojisnici ili u naseljima155.

227.

Termin asanacija bojisnice specifican je u jugoslavenskoj vojnoj terminologiji i druge ga armije kao takvog ne poznaju, meñutim gotovo sve suvremene armije poduzimaju ove mjere i angaziraju na tome logisticke organe.

228.

Nacelno se odreñuju posebne postrojbe za izvrsenje asanacije bojisnice i udruzuju u ekipe ili odrede. Ove privremene sastave formira zapovjednik cija je postrojba nosilac bojnog djelovanja na odreñenom podrucju. U slucaju visokog intenziteta bojevanja, kada imaju vojne postrojbe visok tempo pokreta, asanaciju bojisnice mogu preuzeti i posebne postrojbe koje oblikuje vojno-teritorijalno zapovjednistvo, pri cemu se angaziraju specijalizirane ili ad hoc formirane skupine od pripadnika teritorijalne komponente vojske i postrojbi civilne zastite.

229.

Skupine odnosno odrede za asanaciju bojista sacinjavaju sanitetski organi (vojni ili civilni) radi odreñivanja uzroka smrti, veterinarski organi radi odreñivanja uzroka uginua domaih i divljih zivotinja i moguih zarazni zivotinjskih bolesti, personalni organi radi odreñivanja identiteta poginulih, inzenjerijska postrojba sa strojevima za zemljane radove odnosno izradu masovnih grobnica, sveenici religija veeg dijela poginulih, fizicka radna snaga.

154

Na primjer, u dokumentu 4D01240: Direktiva Staba Vrhovne komande oruzanih snaga RBiH od 10.09.1992., govori se o asanaciji bojista. 155 Vojna enciklopedija ­ 2. izdanje, tom I, str. 266, Beograd 1970

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230.

Asanacija terena obvezno se provodi nakon vojnih akcija. Ako pripadnici vojne jedinice koja se nalazi na terenu na kojem treba izvrsiti cisenje trebaju biti angazirani na nekom borbenom zadatku, poslove cisenja mogu obaviti jedinice civilne zastite.

231.

Cisenje terena je pojam koji oznacava detaljan pregled bojisnice prije boja, tijekom boja i po zavrsetku boja i obuhvaa detaljan pregled zone odgovornosti, uklanjanje prirodnih i umjetnih objekata i predmeta koji bi mogli znacajno utjecati na voñenje boja odnosno boravka postrojbi u zoni odgovornosti. Cisenje terena je siri pojam od pojma asanacija bojisnice, pri cemu je ovaj pojam samo jedan, ali najznacajniji dio.

232.

Prije boja cisenje terena obuhvaa detaljan pregled, uklanjanje niskog raslinja i drvea ispred prednje obrambene linije svake postrojbe, uklanjanja moguih prepreka na pravcima kretanja uzmicanja i protunapada. Temeljito se pregledaju i ociste izvorista pitke vode, odnosno oznacavaju se sa zabranom upotrebe. Prije boja cisenje terena izvode u nacelu postrojbe koje organiziraju obranu.

233.

Cisenje terena nakon boja je zadaa postrojbe koja zaposjedne odgovarajui teren zauzimanjem u boju, prispijeem nakon boja ili po posebnoj zapovjedi. Cisenje terena nakon boja mogu izvoditi vojne postrojbe, postrojbe vojno-teritorijalnih zapovjednistava i postrojbe civilne zastite. U nacelu se oblikuju kombinirane ekipe ili odredi i sacinjavaju ih inzenjerijske postrojbe sa odgovarajuim grañevnim strojevima i specijalnim kompletima, postrojbe NBC zastite, specijalizirane ekipe civilnih ustanova infrastrukture (elektro, vodovod, telefonija i dr.) i radna snaga.

234.

Cisenje terena nakon boja obuhvaa: rascisavanje i uklanjanje rusevina, najnuzniji popravak putova i drugih objekata infrastrukture, pronalazenje, obiljezavanje i uklanjanje neeksplodiranih eksplozivnih tijela (topnickih granata, avionskih bombi, mina), pronalazenje, obiljezavanje i razminiranje polja, prikupljanje zaostale, odbacene vojne vlastitih i protivnickih minskih opreme i naoruzanja, NBC

dekontaminacija predmeta, objekata i zemljista, pregled izvorista pitke vode i sprijecavanje suvisnog otjecanja iz osteenih vodova i rezervoara, pregled i iskljucivanje izvora napajanja elektricnom energijom, pregled objekata i naprava koje bi mogle prouzrociti naknadne stete i zrtve (brane vodnih akumulacija i sl.). Teziste je na pronalazenju, obiljezavanju i uklanjanju neeksplodiranih eksplozivnih tijela i

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minskih polja. Ovaj pojam ukljucuje i cisenje terena od zaostalih pripadnika neprijateljske vojske (zarobljavanjem, ranjavanjem ili ubijanjem, ovisno o otporu koji pruzaju). Oni mogu ostati na zauzetom prostoru, jer se usljed dinamike boja nisu uspjeli pravovremeno izvui sa glavninom snaga ili su planski ostavljeni radi usporavanja snaga napadaca svojim otporom, odnosno drzanjem znacajnih objekata. Mogu biti naoruzani i u vojnim odorama, a mogu se pojedinci i presvui u civilno odijelo radi izbjegavanja zarobljavanja ili ilegalnog djelovanja. Ovaj aspekt vojnog pojma cisenje (clear up, clean up) terena poznat je i pod engleskim pojmom «mop up» ili «mopping up» operacija.

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12.

235.

PREDPODCINJAVANJE: ZNACENJE I PROBLEMI

Postavljeno mi je pitanje o znacenju pojma «predpodcinjavanje» i o vrstama predpodcinjavanja.

236.

Vojne postrojbe nacelno su organizirane i oblikovane tako da mogu veinu bojnih zadaa izvrsavati samostalno bez ojacanja dugim postrojbama. Meñutim, suvremeno bojevanje obiluje specificnostima u smislu razlicitosti protivnika (oruzje, oprema, osposobljenost), posebnosti zemljista (planina, suma, kras, grad) i vremenskih uvjeta (zima, ljeto, padavine). Bojno oblikovanje ­ formiranje bojnog rasporeda ovisno je i od konkretne bojne zadae koja moze zahtijevati posebne snage ojacanja i bojne potpore.

237.

Udruzivanje razlicitih postrojbi u namjensku postrojbu za izvrsenje odreñene bojne zadae nacelno pocinje na razini bataljuna, izuzetno na razini cete. Ovo udruzivanje moze biti u smislu pridavanja odnosno ojacanja ili u smislu oblikovanja posebne bojne skupine u vidu borbene (BG), takticke (TG) ili operativne grupa (OG). Osnovica za oblikovanje privremenih sastava je organska postrojba ­ za BG bataljun ili ceta, za TG pukovnija ili brigada, za OG brigada ili divizija.

238.

Postrojbe ojacanja ili pridavanja su u organskom sastavu neke druge postrojbe iste razine ili u organskom sastavu postrojbi koje su neposredno podreñene postrojbi vise razine. Ove postrojbe su posebno u odnosu na postrojbu koja cini osnovicu oblikovanja. Ovaj odnos naziva se u jugoslavenskoj vojnoj terminologiji predpodcinjavanje. U terminologiji vojske SAD ovakvo udruzivanje za izvrsenje konkretne bojne zadae naziva se Task Forces.

239.

Predpodcinjavanje moze se definirati kao podreñivanje postrojbe nize razine iz organskog sastava druge postrojbe iste ili vise razine zapovjednistvu postrojbe koja je nosilac izvrsenja konkretne bojne zadae.

240.

Predpodcinjavanje nacelno je ograniceno po bojnoj zadai (izvrsenje zadae u cijelosti ili dijela odnosno faze), po vremenu (za izvrsenje konkretne bojne zadae ili za

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vrijeme drugih nebojnih radnji ili do opoziva), po mjestu (u izravnom sastavu ili na odvojenom mjestu) i po statusu zapovijedanja (potpuno ili djelomice).

241.

U odnosu na bojnu zadau predpodcinjavanje oklopne postrojbe pjesackoj kao nosiocu zadae moze biti za izvrsenje napada u cjelini ili samo za eksploataciju uspjeha po proboju. U odnosu na vrijeme moze biti neka postrojba predpodcinjena samo za trajanje izvoñenja obrane ili i za vrijeme uzmaka i povlacenja i prijelaza na nove obrambene polozaje. Predpodcinjavanje se moze zavrsiti i po opozivu od strane nadreñenog zapovjednistva. Predpodcinjena postrojba moze bojno djelovati izravno u sastavu vise postrojbe kojoj se predpodcinjava ili djeluje na izdvojenom pravcu odnosno cak iz pozadine protivnika. Prema statusu zapovijedanja moze postrojba biti predpodcinjena u cijelosti ili samo disciplinski, logisticki i dr.

242.

Predpodcinjavanje zapovijeda zapovjednik nadreñene postrojbe kako u smislu postrojbe koja prima tako i u smislu postrojbe koja daje predpodcinjenu postrojbu. O tome svojom zapovjedi obavjestava oba podreñena zapovjednika, pri cemu precizno regulira meñusobne odnose, nacin i vrijeme predpodcinjavanja. Zapovjednik podreñene postrojbe prenosi svojoj postrojbi koja se predpodcinjava odluku viseg zapovjednika o predpodcinjavanju. Takoñer mora poduzeti sve mjere popune ljudstvom, oruzjem i bojnim i drugim potrebama u skladu sa normama i postrojbu predati u punoj bojnoj spremnosti. Po zapovjedi nadreñenog zapovjednika ili na zahtjev zapovjednika koji prima postrojbu moze uputiti strucne casnike iz svoga zapovjednistva za pomo, ali ne i za zapovijedanje.

243.

Zapovjed predpodcinjavanja precizno definira meñusobne odnose, trajanje i nacin predpodcinjavanja. Zapovjednik predpodcinjene postrojbe u svemu je podreñen novom zapovjedniku, ukoliko nije drugacije precizirano. U smislu bojne upotrebe predpodcinjena postrojba u nacelu je posve podreñena novom zapovjedniku i ima isti status i obaveze kao postrojbe iz organskog sastava. Zapovjednik postrojbe koja prima predpodcinjavanje ne smije ni u kom smislu ciniti razlike i prekomjerno optereivati predpodcinjenu postrojbu. Niti smije zapovjednik predpodcinjene postrojbe zahtijevati poseban status ili olaksice. Za vrijeme predpodcinjavanja veza sa maticnom postrojbom ide iskljucivo preko zapovjednistva postrojbe koja je primila

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predpodcinjavanje. Eventualni izravni kanali mimo znanja i odobrenja novog zapovjednika smatraju se tezim oblikom krsenja vojne discipline.

244.

Predpodcinjavanjem se mijenja nadreñeni zapovjednik predpodcinjene vojne jedinice. Zapovjednik kojem je vojna jedinica predpodcinjena preuzima sva prava i obveze nadreñenog zapovjednika tijekom predpodcinjavanja, odnosno za odreñeni zadatak ako se radi o djelomicnom predpodcinjavanju.

245.

Ako je tijekom predpodcinjavanja pripadnik predpodcinjene vojne postrojbe povrijedio neko pravilo vojne stege, o njegovoj odgovornosti odlucuje zapovjednik postrojbe, odnosno ustanove u kojoj se pocinitelj nalazi u doba kad se utvrñuje njegova stegovna odgovornost.156

246.

U uvjetima ratovanja na smjenu, kakav je slucaj bio kod sve tri zaraene strane u ratu u BiH, cesto je dolazilo do predpodcinjavanja postrojbi ranga cete ili bataljuna. Kako su te postrojbe bile popunjavane na teritorijalnom principu iz jedne opine ili uze sredine, a predpodcinjene zapovjednistvu postrojbe iz posve druge sredine, dolazilo je do tezih povreda odnosa subordinacije. Bojna spremnost predpodcinjenih postrojbi nije bila poznata novom zapovjednistvu i zadavane su im vee i zahtjevnije zadae prema njihovim mogunostima.

247.

Predpodcinjavanje je slozena vojna radnja i zato je treba izbjegavati. Posebice je slozena ako se predpodcinjavanjem oblikuju nove privremene postrojbe iz vise visih postrojbi i oblikuje i novo privremeno zapovjednistvo. Predpodcinjavanje odnosno oblikovanje bojnih skupina bataljunske razine nacelno treba oblikovati iz postrojbi iste brigade ili pukovnije.

156

Tako, na primjer, Propisnik o vojnoj stezi HZHB (P00293) u clanku 20. propisuje: «Odlucivanje o odgovornosti za stegovnu pogresku ucinjenu u prijasnjoj vojnoj jedinici odnosno vojnoj ustanovi (u daljnjem tekstu: 'jedinica, odnosno ustanova'), u ovlasti je zapovjednika jedinice, odnosno ustanove u kojoj se pocinitelj nalazi u doba kad se utvrñuje njegova stegovna odgovornost. Casnik koji je po odredbama stavka 1. ovog clanka izrekao stegovnu mjeru, o tome izvjesuje zapovjednika prijasnje jedinice odnosno ustanove pocinitelja.»

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13. «OPERATIVNI I NASTAVNI POSLOVI»

248. U intervjuu objavljenom u HRVATSKOM VOJNIKU broj 10 od 24.04.1992. tadasnji predsjednik RH dr.Franjo Tuñman je rekao: «.... Glavni stozer je samo dio Ministarstva obrane za operativne i nastavne poslove, isto tako kao sto postoji, primjerice, IPD sluzba, Vojna policija, Kontraobavjestajna sluzba itd. Sve su to sastavni djelovi Ministarstva u cjelini. U demokratskom drustvu, kakav mi danas izgrañujemo u Hrvatskoj, za izgradnju oruzanih snaga u cjelini odgovoran je ministar obrane Vladi, Saboru i predsjedniku Republike.»157 Zatrazeno je da objasnim pojam «operativnih i nastavnih poslova».

249.

Svaka postrojba od bataljuna navise ima svoj stozer (staff). Sastav i broj uposlenih casnika ovisi od velicine postrojbe. Unutar svakog stozera nalazi se operativni casnik ili operativni odsjek ili operativni odjeljak ovisno od velicine postrojbe. Unutar stozera operativni organ nacelno je najbrojniji i predstavlja okosnicu zapovjednistva U armiji SAD ovaj organ naziva se u Stozerna skupina za usklañivanje (Coordinating staff group). U svim armijama ova skupina je najznacajniji zapovjednikov organ pomoi u donosenju odluka, njihovom provoñenju i u zapovijedanju i upravljanju postrojbom. Izravno je podreñen nacelniku stozera. Nacelno ovaj organ obavlja dvije vrste najznacajnijih stabnih poslova ­ osposobljavanje (training) i planiranje bojnog djelovanja (Operations and plans). Pored toga je odgovoran sa razvoj i osuvremenjivanje postrojbe (Force development and modernization), za stozerno planiranje i nadzor (Staff planning and supervision) i usklañivanje stozernih poslova posebne stozerne skupine (Coordination of staff responsibility for the special staff officers). U stozernoj organizaciji JNA ove posljednje funkcije bile su obuhvaene u pojmu operativni poslovi, dok je funkcija osposobljavanja nazvana nastavni poslovi.

250.

Operativni poslovi u uzem smislu rijeci obuhvaaju pripremu, planiranje, usklañivanje, praenje i analizu bojnog djelovanja. Siri opis ovih poslova sadrzi ove radnje i postupke:

157

4D01330

- HRVATSKI VOJNIK br. 10 od 24.04.1992., intervju s dr.Franjom Tuñmanom

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- priprema, usklañivanje, provjeravanje, izrada i dostava planova i zapovjedi i drugih nareñenja za sve stozerne odjeljke, - planiranje, usklañivanje i nadzor vjezbi, - ucese u izboru ciljeva (targeting), - pregled planova podreñenih postrojbi, - usklañivanje bojnog djelovanja sa drugim stozerima, - pregled cjelokupnog plana i zapovjedi radi potpunog usklañivanja i kompletiranja, - posmatranje bojnog djelovanja, - osiguranje uvjeta bojne potpore, - usklañivanje upotrebe postrojbe za uspostavu civilne vlasti, - usklañivanje sa obavjestajnim organom u izradi priloga po izviñanju i odreñivanju prioriteta obavjestajnog djelovanja i preporuka za upotrebu tehnickih sredstava, - integriranje ognjene potpore u cjelokupno bojno djelovanje, - planiranje pokreta postrojbi: izbor pravaca kretanja, odreñivanje prioriteta, odreñivanje odmora, izrada zapovjedi za pokret, - planiranje i rasporeñivanje raspolozivog vremena, - planiranje, podjela i odreñivanje mjesta za dostavu i privremeno skladistenje streljiva, - predviñanje moguih gubitaka u ljudstvu i oruzju i predlaganje sprijecavanje i popunu, - suradnja sa obavjestajnim organom i organom za usklañivanje vatrene potpore u provoñenju plana bojnog djelovanja i predlaganje dopuna ili promjena pocetnog plana, - predlaganje lokacije zapovjednih mjesta, - predlaganje oblikovanja bojnog rasporeda i grupiranja snaga odnosno predpodcinjavanja. mjera za

251.

Nastavni poslovi obuhvaaju planiranje, organiziranje i izvoñenje obuke vojnika, casnika, zapovjednistava i postrojbi u cjelini: - izrada plana i programa obuke u zapovjednistvima i postrojbama, - priprema i nadzor izvrsenja osposobljavanja u podreñenim postrojbama, - priprema naputaka i prirucnika za osposobljavanje,

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- planiranje, priprema, organizacija i izvoñenje pokaznih i drugih vjezbi za zapovjedne casnike i zapovjednistva, - ucese u oblikovanju i osposobljavanju posebnih postrojbi i postrojbi za izvrsenje za konkretne bojne zadae, - koordinacija u planiranju i izvoñenju osposobljavanja sa drugim organima u stozeru i sa podreñenim zapovjednistvima. - stvaranje povoljnih uvjeta za osposobljavanje ­ planiranje materijalnih sredstava i izgradnja nastavnih objekata, - organizacija i voñenje unutarnjih oblika osposobljavanja - skola, tecajeva i dr., - planiranje i izvrsenje nadzora osposobljavanja, provjeravanje i ocjenjivanje, - odrzavanje bojne spremnosti svake podreñene postrojbe, - voñenje evidencije osposobljavanja i izvjesivanje nareñenih zapovjednistava,

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14. «STABNI POSLOVI» ZA POTREBE VRHOVNOG ZAPOVJEDNIKA

252. U Uredbi o oruzanim snagama HZHB utvrñeno je da se radi obavljanja stabnih i drugih strucnih poslova za potrebe Predsjednistva HZHB u Odjelu obrane osniva Glavni stozer.158 Zatrazeno je da objasnim pojam «stabnih i drugih strucnih poslova».

253.

Generalstab u miru je strucni organ Ministarstva obrane, a preko njega i vrhovnog zapovjednika za pripremu oruzanih snaga za obranu zemlje i drugih drzavnih organa i ustanova koje imaju udio u oruzanoj obrani zemlje, dok je odnos u ratu dosta razlicit u nekim zemljama. U drzavama parlamentarne demokracije sa izrazenom ulogom izvrsne vlasti i manjom ulogom predsjednika, generalstab je izravno podreñen ministarstvu obrane i sa vrhovnim zapovjednikom komunicira posredstvom odnosno sa odobrenjem ministra. U zemljama gdje je predsjednik drzave dominantan nosilac vlasti i istovremeno i prvi covjek izvrsne vlasti taj je odnos izravniji ­ predsjednik moze i smije komunicirati sa generalstabom izravno uz asistenciju ministarstva obrane. U drzava autokratskog oblika vladavine generalstab je izravno podreñen predsjedniku kao vrhovnom zapovjedniku.

254.

U SFRJ bio je generalstab strucni ­ operativni organ ministarstva obrane koje je bilo i vrhovni stab obrane i izravno podcinjen vrhovnom zapovjednistvu odnosno Predsjednistvu SFRJ kao nosiocu suvereniteta. U ratu vlada nije imala nikakvih izravnih ingerencija prema ministarstvu obrane odnosno prema generalstabu.

255.

U miru generalstab za potrebe vrhovnog zapovijedanja izvrsava operativno-planske poslove u domeni izgradnje, pripreme i upotrebe oruzanih snaga, u skladu sa vojnopolitickim ciljevima zemlje.

256.

U ratu veina generalstabova postaje stab vrhovne komande i kao takav: - prati i proucava situaciju na ratistima i vojistima, - priprema i provodi odluke (planove, nareñenja, direktive i naputke) za izvoñenje operacija i bojnog djelovanja, - nadzire realizaciju direktiva vrhovnog zapovijedanja,

158

4D00521

Uredba o oruzanim snagama HZHB, 17.10.1992, cl. 11.

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- analizira i uopava ratna i bojna iskustva i saznanja iz domene ratne doktrine, organizacije, zapovijedanja, uporabe i djelovanja vidova i rodova oruzanih snaga, - priprema prijedloge i usklañuje izvrsenje popune gubitaka, uvoñenje novih oruzja i opreme.

257.

U svim vojskama generalstab nema ovlasti izravnog zapovijedanja operativnostrategijskim ili operativnim sastavima. Za odreñene manje znacajne zadae moze vrhovno zapovjednistvo prenijeti svoje ovlasti i na generalstab.

258.

Zadae gotovo svih glavnih stozera (generalstaff) u gotovo svim drzavama su jednaki i obuhvaaju djelatnosti u miru i u ratu.

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15. VOJNE OPERACIJE STRATESKE, OPERATIVNE I TAKTICKE

RAZINE

259. Postavljeno mi je pitanje o znacenju pojma «vojna operacija» i zatrazeno da objasnim razliku izmeñu vojnih operacija na strateskoj, operativnoj i taktickoj razini.

260.

U rjecniku Ministarstva obrane SAD Operacija je vojna akcija ili vrsenje strateske, operativne ili takticke radnje odnosno radnje vojnih sluzbi, obuke ili administrativne sluzbe. Postoji i druga definicija ­ operacija je izvoñenje boja ukljucujui pokret, opskrbu, napad, obranu i manevar radi postizanja ciljeva borbe ili bitke. A military action or the carrying out of a strategic, operational, tactical, service, training, or administrative military mission. The process of carrying on combat, including movement, supply, attack, defense, and maneuvers needed to gain the objectives of any battle or campaign.

261.

Prema Vojnoj enciklopediji JNA Operacija kao borbena djelatnost oznacava cjelokupnost uporednih (jednovremenih) i uzastopnih dejstava, koja se izvode

koordinirano, organizovano i po jedinstvenoj zamisli i planu, na jedinstvenom prostoru i u odreñenom vremenskom razdoblju radi postizanja operativnih ili strategijskih ciljeva.

262.

Prema americkom tumacenju pojam operacija oznacava svaku vojnu radnju bez obzira na cilj, vrstu snaga koje je izvode i razinu zapovijedanja. Po jugoslavenskom tumacenju pojam operacija izrazava vojnu radnju zdruzenih sastava vojske na siroj prostoriji u duzem vremenskom razdoblju i na stretegijskoj ili operativnoj razini zapovijedanja. Na taktickoj razini zapovijedanja vojne aktivnosti nazivaju se borbom ili bojem.

263.

Obzirom da su casnici u vojskama i ratovima na tlu nekadasnje Jugoslavije zavrsili vojne skole uglavnom u JNA u daljem e biti pojasnjeni pojmovi operacije na strateskoj i operativnoj razini.

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264.

Operacija na operativnoj razini je skup borbi i bojeva vise zdruzenih taktickih postrojbi (pukovnija, brigada, divizija), podrzanih taktickim postrojbama

(pukovnijama, brigadama) avijacije ili mornarice (u priobalnom pojasu), topnistva, topnicko-raketnih postrojbi protuzracne obrane, inzinjerstva i drugih rodova vojske. Ova operacija se izvodi u trajanju od 4-10 dana izuzetno i vise dana u 2-3 faze. U odnosu na prostor ona se organizira i izvodi na ogranicenom dijelu drzavne teritorije i zavisno od velicine angaziranih snaga i vrste operacije (napadna ili obrambena) moze obuhvatiti prostoriju od 100 ­ 500 km2 . Ponekad se mogu borbe i bojevi voditi i odvojeno po prostoru, u razlicito vrijeme sa pojedinim zdruzenim taktickim postrojbama, ali po jedinstvenoj zamisli i jedinstvenom cilju. Takve operacije izvode ojacani formacijski operativni sastavi (korpus ili armija) ili privremeno oblikovani sastavi u vidu Operativne grupe (1-3 divizije ili 3-5 brigada) kada se oblikuje i posebno zapovjednistvo samo za zapovijedanje u odreñenoj operaciji. Operacijska zona obuhvata prostor zadrzavanja vlastitih i protivnickih snaga, pri cemu protivnicke snage mogu biti zdruzene takticke ili operativne razine.

265.

U ratu u BiH kao primjer operacije na operativnoj razini moze biti operacija Neretva93 koju je poduzela Armija BiH na prostoru sjeverne Hercegovine.

266.

Strategijska operacija je skup operacija na operativnoj razini i bojeva koje izvode operativno-strategijski sastavi po jedinstvenoj zamisli vrhovnog zapovijedanja i sa ciljem postizanja odlucujueg rjesenja u nekoj od faza rata. Ove operacije izvode armije ili grupe armija kopnenih snaga koje mogu biti podrzane operativnim sastavima zrakoplovstva (1-2 divizije borbenih zrakoplova, 1-2 pukovnije lovackih zrakoplova, do divizije PZO) korpus i mornarice u priobalnom pojasu (1-2 TG borbenih brodova, 1-2 brigade pomorskog pjesastva).

267.

Strategijska operacija traje duze vremena, od 1 i vise mjeseci, i obuhvaa znatan dio ratista odnosno drzavne teritorije, pa cak i teritorije napadaceve drzave odnosno drzave koja daje napadacu svoju teritoriju kao polaznu osnovicu za voñenje rata.

268.

Strategijska operacija se odvija u vise etapa, pri cemu 1-2 etape cine 1-3 operacije operativne razine.

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269.

Velike sile i velike vojske mogu izvoditi i strategijske operacije u kojima su nosioci bojnog djelovanja samo snage zrakoplovstva (napad NATO-a na SRJ 1999.) ili samo mornarice odnosno kombinirano uz minimalno ucese snaga kopnene vojske.

270.

Na taktickoj razini bojna djelovanja nazivaju se bojem, koga izvode zdruzene takticke postrojbe (brigada, divizija, ojacana takticka grupa) po jedinstvenoj zamisli za krae vrijeme i traju 2-3 dana. Boj moze biti samostalan ili u sklopu izvoñenja jedne od faza operacije na operativnoj razini.

271.

U ratu u BiH kao primjer strategijske operacije je oslobañanje jugozapadnog dijela BiH 1995. godine, pri cemu su sudjelovale udruzene snage 5. i 7. korpusa Armije BiH, 3 gardijske brigade HVO i 3 gardijske brigade i dio snaga Operativne zone Split Hrvatske vojske. Operacija je izvedene u dvije operacije na operativnoj razini ­ operacija Maestral i operacija Juzni potez.

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16.

272.

AKTIVNA, UPORNA I ODSUTNA OBRANA

U dokumentima HVO i Armije BiH cesto se koriste pojmovi: aktivna, uporna i odsudna obrana, pa je od mene zatrazeno da objasnim te pojmove. Obrana159 je vid bojnog djelovanja gdje se kombinacijom vatre, aktivnih djelovanja i vjestim koristenjem zemljista i ucinkovitim manevrom lomi, odbija, zadrzava ili usporava napad protivnika. Cilj odbrane moze biti: - nanosenje gubitaka nadmonijem protivniku, - zadrzavanje, usporavanje ili potpuno zaustavljanje protivnika u napadu, - ocuvanje odreñenih objekata i zemljisnih prostorija. - dobitak u vremenu, - cuvanje vlastitih snaga od prekomjernih gubitaka.

273.

274.

Obrana moze imati razlicit stupanj upornosti, zilavosti i pokretljivosti i moze biti vise ili manje odsudna, ili vise ili manje zadrzavajua. Prirucnik americke kopnene vojske obrambenu operaciju definira kao160: ,,Vojska se brani dok ne postigne dovoljno snage za napad. Obrana pobjeñuje neprijateljski napad, kupuje vrijeme, cuva snage ili stvara povoljne uvjete za prelazak u napad. Samo obranom se normalno ne postize konacno rjesenje. Njena je svrha stvaranje uvjeta za protunapad koji omoguava da snage postignu inicijativu. Mada se cesto ocekivani rezultati postizu samo napadom, ponekad je potrebno se i braniti za odreñeno vrijeme. Zapovjednici organiziraju obranu da dobiju na vremenu, zadrze zemljiste, olaksaju druga bojna djelovanja, vezuju neprijatelja i umanjuju njegove mogunosti."

275.

(Army forces defend until they gain sufficient strength to attack. Defensive operations defeat an enemy attack, buy time, economize forces, or develop conditions favorable for offensive operations. Alone, defensive operations

159 160

Vojna enciklopedija, tom 6, str. 251c, Beograd 1973 4D01481 Article from GlobalSecurity.org, re: Defensive Operations, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/army/fm/3-0/ch8.htm#par3

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normally cannot achieve a decision. Their purpose is to create conditions for a counteroffensive that allows Army forces to regain the initiative. Although offensive operations are usually required to achieve decisive results, it is often necessary, even advisable at times, to defend. Commanders defend to buy time, hold terrain, facilitate other operations, preoccupy the enemy, or erode enemy resources).

276.

Po americkim gledistima obrana moze biti pokretna (mobile defense), pri cemu branilac mora postii veu pokretljivost protivnika i zadaje mu poraz vatrom i manevrom jakih snaga. Za ovaj tip odbrane karakteristicno je da su pozicijskoj obrani (ukopani i utvrñeni) manji dijelovi, a da glavninu snaga predstavljaju pokretljive snage za protunapad uz jaku vatrenu potporu. Takoñer moze obrana biti organizirana kao obrana podrucja (area defense), gdje branilac sa razlicitim stupnjem upornosti brani odreñeni objekt ili zonu. U tom slucaju glavninu obrambenih snaga predstavljaju dobro nacelno utvrñene pjesacke postrojbe, dok su manje oklopne ili mehanizirane postrojbe namijenjene za izvoñenje manjih protunapada. Drzanje objekta ili zona moze biti za odreñeno vrijeme ili do pristizanja snaga za napad ili za uredno i pravovremeno povlacenje glavnih snaga. Odbrana podrucja moze biti i u okruzenju od strane protivnika. Poseban tip obrane je i obrana unazad (retrograde), koja se izvodi kao izvlacenje (withdrawal) ili zadrzavanje (delay) ili povlacenje (retirement). U jugosloveskoj vojnoj terminologiji ovaj tip obrane naziva se i odstupanjem i obuhvaao je dvije faze ­ izvlacenje i povlacenje.

277.

Kada usporedimo jugoslavensko i americko poimanje obrane mozemo zakljuciti da u biti nema znacajnih razlika.

278.

Odsudna obrana znaci odluku zapovjednika da se odreñeni objekti ili polozaji zadrze do izvrsenja ope bojne zadae odnosno zadae vise postrojbe po svaku cijenu uz najvee gubitke i u uvjetima potpunog okruzenja. Bez odobrenja nadreñenog zapovjednika se obrambeni polozaji ne smiju napustiti niti se postrojba smije predati. Primjer takve obrane u povijesti ratovanja je odbrana industrijske zone Staljingrada od strane Crvene armije u zimu 1942/43. godinu.

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279.

Termini aktivna i uporna odbrana ne oznacavaju tip obrane, to su zapravo temeljne znacajke obrane. Svaka obrana mora biti aktivna u smislu preuzimanja inicijative iz ruku napadaca, prisiljavanja napadaca da mijenja pocetne odluke, da modificira napad. Aktivnost se postize protunapadima (counterattack), ispadima (spoiling attack), bojnim djelovanjem manjih snaga u pozadini napadaca (ubacene, planski ostavljene ili okruzene snage), djelovanjem topnistva i zrakoplovstva, dopunskim zaprecivanjem, poduzimanjem neocekivanih postupaka (iznenadno izvlacenje) i drugo. Upornost znaci ustrajanje u drzanju objekata, polozaja ili zone, sto se postize utvrñivanjem, zaprecivanjem, aktivnim djelovanjima, hrabrosu pojedinaca i postrojbe u cijelosti i mjerama psiholoskog bojevanja.

280.

Odsudna obrana pretpostavlja krajnju upornost i aktivnost manjim snagama za krae vrijeme i na kraoj razdaljini. Naime, protunapadi su namijenjeni uglavnom rastereenju vlastitih snaga i razvlacenju napadacevih snaga sa tezista napada. U odsudnoj obrani aktivna djelovanja poduzimaju susjedne postrojbe i postrojbe vise razine zapovijedanja.

281.

U zadrzavajuoj obrani teziste je na aktivnosti dok je upornost u smislu drzanja objekata i polozaja manje izrazena. Termini aktivna i uporna obrana, kao sto je ve receno, izrazavaju samo postupanje u obrani, ali ne i tip obrane.

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ANNEX B

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MILAN GORJANC

MILITARY EXPERT REPORT

THE DOCTRINE OF ALL-PEOPLE'S DEFENCE AND OTHER MILITARY TOPICS RELEVANT TO MILITARY ACTIONS DURING THE WAR IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

Ljubljana, July 2009

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. 2. 3. INTRODUCTION MILITARY CAREER QUALIFICATIONS AS AN EXPERT WITNESS ON MILITARY SUBJECTS WARTIME ARMY Concept of wartime army and method of creation How is a wartime army formed when no peacetime army exists? What are (a) the manoeuvre component and (b) the territorial component of a wartime army? Does the dominance of the territorial component in an army point to its defensive character? How is logistics support for a wartime army ensured? How are losses compensated and new units created? What is a shift army and what are the consequences of shift combat on the discipline of soldiers? What is the relationship between the civilian authorities and military units during war? YUGOSLAV DOCTRINE OF ALL-PEOPLE'S DEFENCE AND SOCIAL SELF-PROTECTION APPLICATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF ALL-PEOPLE'S DEFENCE IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA Constitution and Laws of Bosnia and Herzegovina Constitution Decree Law on defence Defence of the country is a right and obligation of citizens Military defence, labour service, civilian defence and observation and reporting service Training and acquiring of skills for defence Intelligence activities by citizens Decree law on the armed forces of the RBH Composition of the armed forces The Army is the strike defence force Mobilisation Compulsory military service Conclusion Decisions and orders Operations behind enemy lines relying on the population HVO MUSLIM SOLDIERS AS A SECURITY PROBLEM 4 5 8

4. 4.1. 4.2. 4.3. 4.4. 4.5. 4.6. 4.7. 4.8.

10 10 12 15 17 19 20 21 22

5.

25

6. 6.1. 6.1.1. 6.1.2. 6.1.2.1. 6.1.2.2. 6.1.2.3. 6.1.2.4. 6.1.3. 6.1.3.1. 6.1.3.2. 6.1.3.3. 6.1.3.4. 6.1.3.5. 6.2. 6.3. 7.

35 35 35 35 35 37 42 43 44 45 46 48 48 51 53 59 62

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8. 8.1. 8.2. 8.3. 8.4. 8.4. 8.5. 8.6. 9. 10.

MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE OF CENTRAL BOSNIA AND NORTHERN HERZEGOVINA Geographic definition of the territory The significance of that territory in defence plans of the former SFR Yugoslavia The significance of that territory at the time of the collapse of the SFR Yugoslavia The significance of that territory in the initial period of the war from mid-1992 to late 1993 Routes and traffic during 1992 and 1993 Conclusion WAS MOSTAR BESIEGED? POSITION WHERE A STATE IS ATTACKED OR THREATENED FROM THE TERRITORY OF ANOTHER STATE MILITARY MEANING OF THE BCS TERMS "ASANACIJA" AND "CISENJE" RESUBORDINATION: MEANING AND DIFFICULTIES "OPERATIONS AND TRAINING" "STAFF AFFAIRS" FOR THE NEEDS OF THE SUPREME COMMANDER MILITARY OPERATIONS AT THE STRATEGIC, OPERATIONAL AND TACTICAL LEVELS ACTIVE, PERSISTENT AND DECISIVE DEFENCE

68 68 70 71 76 87 93 95

103

11.

107 110 114

12. 13. 14.

117

15.

119 122

16.

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1. INTRODUCTION

1.

The defence teams of Generals Slobodan PRALJAK and Milivoj PETKOVI asked me whether I could explain to the Tribunal, in view of my military education and long military career, certain military matters important for properly establishing responsibility for crimes committed in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1992-1994. The request referred in particular to the following: The organisation and functioning of an ad hoc wartime army. The Yugoslav military doctrine of all-people's defence and the role of each citizen in the defence of the country. The military significance of the area of Central Bosnia and Northern Herzegovina. I was told that I was not expected to produce an expert report of a factual nature, but that an expert opinion would be requested about certain events on the assumption that information contained in documents that would be shown to me is correct. I was told that this part of my work would especially refer to the period when HVO /Croatian Defence Council/ soldiers of Muslim ethnicity were started to be seen as a threat to the security of the Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna and the causes of this, as well as the goals of offensive operations by the RBH /Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina/ Army taking into account the territory captured in battles against the HVO and the axes of combat operations.

2.

While preparing this report, I cooperated with the defence teams of Generals PRALJAK and PETKOVI primarily with regard to gathering the necessary documentation and specifying the issues covered in the report. All explanations and opinions presented in this report are solely mine and nobody has influenced me to change my opinions.

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2. MILITARY CAREER

3.

After finishing grammar school in Celje (Slovenia), I went to the Military Academy in Belgrade (Serbia). I continued military studies in Sarajevo (BH), specialisation infantry. I graduated from the Military Academy in 1965 with excellent marks and 4th in my class. My first official post was in Knin (Croatia), where I was commander of an infantry company. After one year, I was transferred to Benkovac (Croatia), where I was a company commander at a school centre for lance corporals serving the needs of the then 4th Army District. Just one year later, in 1967, I transferred to Sarajevo (BH) as required by the service to teach tactics at the Military Academy, specialisation infantry. Meanwhile, I studied part-time at the JNA /Yugoslav People's Army/ Political School, which I finished in December 1967 with excellent marks as the first 2nd lieutenant in the history of the school. I studied political sciences part-time in Sarajevo at the Faculty of Political Sciences. I passed all exams and met the conditions to enrol in the 3rd year. In order to continue to pursue military studies, I stopped my studies at the civilian university. I was a lecturer at the Military Academy until 1972 when I continued my military education at the Command Staff Academy in Belgrade (Serbia), from which I graduated in 1974 with excellent marks (4th in my class). During my studies at the Command Staff Academy, I also attended lectures in military political sciences at the master's programme of the Faculty of Political Sciences in Belgrade.

4.

I continued my service in Postojna (Slovenia) as an intelligence officer at division command. After that I was appointed commander of an infantry battalion in Postojna. I performed that duty for two years. In 1977, I became chief of staff of an infantry regiment in Postojna. In 1980, I was transferred to Novo mesto (Slovenia) to be commander of an infantry regiment, as the youngest commander with the rank of major. The following year, I was appointed commander of a motorised brigade in Ajdovscina (Slovenia), where I stayed until 1986. At the same time as commanding a brigade, I also completed advanced military studies at the School of People's Defence in

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Belgrade (Serbia) as a part-time student with excellent marks as 3rd in class in 1983. Since I had only performed command, staff and teaching duties until then in my military career, my superiors thought that a military political duty was also necessary for further promotion. That is how I became division deputy commander for political affairs in Postojna (Slovenija). At the same time, I was nominated and chosen for the Central Committee of the SKJ /League of Communists of Yugoslavia/. In 1988, I was appointed chief of staff of the 37th Corps in Uzice (Serbia), a post for a major general. I was due to be promoted to the rank of major general on 22 December 1991. I passed the practical part of the exam and my theoretical paper was accepted by the mentor. In 1990, I also completed the Advanced Course of All-People's Defence, which was the most advanced form of military political training of prominent civilian political leaders from the entire Yugoslavia.

5.

When an armed conflict broke out in Slovenia between the JNA and the TO /Territorial Defence/ in June 1991, I quit service in the JNA at my own request (I did not desert) in August 1991 and joined the TO of Slovenia as the chief of the training department in the then Republican TO Staff (General Staff) in Ljubljana in the rank of brigadier. In 1993, I was transferred for political reasons to the Centre for Strategic Studies as an advisor for doctrinal matters and military conflicts in the territory of the former Yugoslavia. In 1995 I was appointed director of that centre in the rank of brigadier. I performed that duty for a very short time, because already in the autumn of that year, they appointed me director of the Military Schools Centre of the Slovenian Army /SV/ in Ljubljana (Slovenia) in the rank of brigadier. I remained at that post until retirement in May 1999. In addition to managing and shaping military education in the Slovenian Army, I also taught tactics and operations at the Command Staff School of the Slovenian Army.

6.

I was decorated six times for my work, and commended and rewarded several times. All of my official appraisals by superior officers were excellent ­ "excels". I got early promotions on three occasions (to the ranks of captain, major and colonel). In 1984, I received the highest award of the armed forces

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of Yugoslavia for command and control ­ "the 22nd of December". I received acknowledgments on several occasions from civilian authorities for successful cooperation between my troops and the population in building civilian infrastructure, including the most prestigious awards of the municipalities of Ajdovscina, Nova Gorica and Crnomelj.

7.

Although I spent almost ten years at the level of a general at four different posts in two armies, I was never promoted to that rank, solely for political reasons.

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3.

QUALIFICATIONS AS

AN EXPERT

WITNESS ON

MILITARY

SUBJECTS

8.

My qualifications for testifying in this trial are the following: Comprehensive military education at all military schools in the former SFRY /Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia/. Additional military political education at the JNA Political Schools, the Faculty of Political Science in Sarajevo ­ pre-degree studies and the Faculty of Political Science in Belgrade ­ master's studies. Teaching practice and studies of theory at the Military Academy in Sarajevo (five years) and at the Command Staff School of the SV. Occasional lectures at the Faculty of Social Sciences ­ Defence Science Department in Ljubljana. Work as an analyst of armed conflicts in the Balkans, especially in the former Yugoslavia in the period from 1991 to 1999, for the needs of the Ministry of Defence of Slovenia. Well-regarded commentary on the armed conflicts in the Balkans and the world for both TV stations in Slovenia (TV Slovenia and POP TV) in the period from 1994 to 2003. A large volume of discussions, analyses, editorials and articles in the national media, media of the countries in the territory of the former Yugoslavia and many international media (bibliography is attached to this report). Research of the military doctrines of many states and the preparation of a proposal for the defence doctrine of the Slovenian Army in 1994. Varied and successful career in commanding JNA units at different levels from company to corps. A very good knowledge of the geography, traditions and history of the regions of the former Yugoslavia, especially Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia and Slovenia. Personal knowledge of many persons in political and military leadership positions in the countries of the former Yugoslavia, especially in BH.

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-

Presence in the highest political and party leaderships as a member of the CK SKJ /Central Committee of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia/ and first-hand knowledge of the events in the Yugoslavia before the breakup in 1991.

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4. WARTIME ARMY

4.1.

Concept of wartime army and method of creation

9.

A wartime army is the conjunction of the army and other factors supporting it, military weapons and equipment assigned to military units, the procurement, production and distribution of all necessities required for waging armed combat, the life and work of military units, and the general and political goals of a country, nation or political group. A wartime army is made up of adult and able persons who have received the appropriate military education and training in order to perform general and specific tasks in combat within units at different levels. A wartime army also includes persons performing various logistics or other support tasks for the wartime army, but who are not directly incorporated in military units. Each individual member of a wartime army must have adequate equipment for combat and protection, where small arms are the most important. Collective weapons and equipment intended for use within units are grouped at various higher levels of military organisation in order to wage war effectively.

10.

The state and the supreme leadership prepare the wartime army in peacetime already. This preparation includes the following: Planning of wartime mobilisation and registration of human resources for assignment to war units and for labour service, and material resources for waging war and for the survival and work of the population in war conditions. Organisation and conduct of military education and specialised training of recruits, reserve soldiers, peacetime units and reserve units, and the education and specialised training of active professional commissioned and non-commissioned officers, staffs and commands. Planning and execution of the production, procurement, distribution and storage of weapons and other military equipment for replenishing units of the wartime army and for waging war.

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-

Planning and conduct of work to prepare and organise the territory for waging war, with a focus on establishing a secure multichannel system of war communications between commands at different levels, building roads and other communications, and building facilities for protecting commands and critical weapons system, as well as the population.

-

Preparation of the entire population and material resources of society for waging war. The focus here is on psychological and propaganda preparation of the personnel of war units and the population, and psychological influence on the will and awareness of the opponent.

11.

The wartime army generally consists of a peacetime core, or, rather, units formed in peacetime in order to train recruits and the reserve force, and to deter opponents from any aggressive intentions. The peacetime core, or, rather, the professional force, is the basis for forming the wartime army. Command and control groups are formed in peacetime at different levels, from the supreme command to the lowest-level units. The composition and strength of peacetime units and commands are generally much smaller than the wartime composition. Some peacetime units are supplemented by a small number of reserve soldiers, some with a majority, and most war units are formed mostly from reserve soldiers. As the threat of war grows, states or ruling elites increase the peacetime core by supplementing peacetime units with reserve forces and establishing new lower-level units from the reserve force.

12.

Depending on the time until the beginning of war, reserve forces and entire units carry out additional training from soldier level to military exercises at the operational level. The command system is fully established at the highest command levels ­ the level of the supreme command, operational and strategic forces and joint tactical units. The communication, control and coordination system is organised and active at the required level in the initial stage of the war. Commands at different levels are reinforced by reserve officers and other personnel. Depending on the command level, recruitment covers active professional officers with specialised education, and to a smaller extent also reserve officers with a basic officer military education and additional training

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at short courses and military exercises of reserve forces in peacetime.

13.

A wartime army is generally formed right before the outbreak of war, and exceptionally right after the beginning of aggression. A state with aggressive intentions to attack another state generally forms a wartime army a certain longer time before the beginning of aggression, up to several months. States forced to defend themselves against aggression generally form a wartime army several days before aggression or do that in circumstances of combat and the enemy's military and political superiority.

4.2.

How is a wartime army formed when no peacetime army exists?

14.

A wartime army is formed in a completely different way when there is no state peacetime core of the armed forces or war reserves, and when there is irreconcilable antagonism between leading and influential political or ideological groups, especially in interethnic, interreligious and interracial conflicts. A wartime army is then formed in conditions of a civil war, war of national liberation and interethnic, interreligious and interracial conflicts.

15.

At least one party to the conflict or both form a wartime army in exceptionally complex conditions. There is no peacetime core of the armed forces, but rather a number of small, usually secret armed groups which are mostly trained in secret, in a very short time, in poor conditions and with insufficient training equipment. Even before the start of an armed conflict, and certainly at the beginning of a conflict, these groups can carry out small armed operations in the form of terrorist or sabotage action. The success and public response to these operations, especially among group members who are not engaged in the conflict, have a significant impact on the growth of armed groups. During combat operations those groups grow into military units at increasingly higher levels. Those units usually get names which are at least one level higher than

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usual for units of that strength.1 Many smaller units are formed entirely spontaneously at the local level, often outside the command system, and their combat activities are often not directed by higher command levels.

16.

At the beginning of an armed conflict, units are mostly tied to the territory from which their members are recruited. With the spreading of combat operations, the need arises to expand combat operations to areas where there are no combat groups and the mobile component of the wartime army is formed, which continues to grow and becomes the key element in combat operations. The territorial component gradually becomes smaller to the benefit of the mobile component.

17.

Before the outbreak of an armed conflict, there is no command system which could integrate individual armed groups. Command over armed groups is mostly based on personal relations and common political or terrorist activities before the armed conflict. Commanders of groups usually have no military education, and they acquire military knowledge and experience mostly in combat. During a military conflict, as units grow people with military education also arrive.

18.

In the case of a collapse of the state or the failure of the state army or politics, educated active, or, more commonly, reserve officers join the rebel group. They become primarily assistant commanders or staff officers, and in practice they plan combat operations. During an armed conflict, special education of command personnel is also organised outside units, at courses and schools. People who command respect in the area and in the units are appointed to command posts, but there are also instances when people of questionable ethics and skill are appointed to senior positions, or individuals with party connections. The communication, control and coordination system is established during combat operations. At the beginning of the forming of units at different levels, communication, coordination and control are very difficult,

1

A group of up to 300-400 soldiers is called a brigade, while that number of soldiers represents a weakened battalion. Those names stem from propaganda needs and the need to influence the morale

13

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in fact impossible.

19.

Logistics support is totally disorganised and spontaneous. Supplies of weapons, ammunition and other ordnance mostly come from war booty, by capturing it from the opposing side. Before the beginning of an armed conflict, armed groups equip themselves through illegal procurement on the black market, from private reserves from previous wars, illegal production and confiscation (theft) from the opposing side. As the war spreads and international political and moral support grows, logistics support becomes increasingly well organised, both through procurement and aid from abroad and through own production in industrial plants. The regularity of supplies is affected by the security of supply routes, so the warring sides usually wage dedicated large-scale operations in order to gain control of those routes.

20.

Political parties or a political movement, especially those that are dominant, have a decisive impact on the waging of war. Some political groups form their own units, which are not subordinated to the integrated supreme command. Those units carry out combat operations in line with the partial interests of the political leadership. Individual units sometimes clash in defence of their partial political interests.

21.

In most ad hoc armies in unorganised states, ideological and religious beliefs of the members of groups involved in the conflict, especially members of a party or religious hierarchy, have a significant effect. These beliefs are used in order to strengthen the morale of own units, and to weaken the morale of the enemy. They can often be abused at lower command levels and cause unwanted behaviour by individuals and individual units toward the enemy2.

of armed groups and other members of groups in the conflict. 2 Well-known in history are the Crusades by Christians from Western Europe toward eastern regions that abounded in crimes in the name of religion, while in modern times, such religious zeal is

14

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4.3.

What are (a) the manoeuvre component and (b) the territorial component of a wartime army?

22.

In most modern armies, the wartime army is formed by two components ­ the mobile and the territorial. The manoeuvre component is intended for carrying out military operations in the entire territory of the state, even in enemy territory. Manoeuvre units carry out combat operations at the point of main effort of military operations against the strongest opponent and are deployed in any part of the state territory as needed. This part of the wartime army is generally composed of the most capable younger soldiers. The territorial component is intended for controlling and protecting the interior of the state territory. In exceptional cases, it can be used in military operations at the front as an auxiliary force for the manoeuvre component. It is composed of older conscripts. In exceptional cases, soldiers from the territorial component are recruited into the manoeuvre component.

23.

For the purpose of carrying out combat operations, the entire territory of the state is divided into military territorial districts, depending on the size of the country. Individual strategic or operational districts and their lower-level war units are formed in these military territorial areas. Lower military territorial levels are generally formed as exclusively territorial military entities with smaller commands and units belonging only to the territorial component. These lower levels of military territorial organisations cannot have any command responsibility for units in the manoeuvre component and are mostly intended for providing logistics support for these units while they are in their territory. Military territorial commands at the operational level can command their own and attached units from the manoeuvre component in combat operations in their area of responsibility. At the request of a higher command level they must send their units to join another military territorial command at the operational level outside their own territory. Joint tactical units of division and brigade level are fully mobile in the entire theatre of war. By contrast,

demonstrated by the units of some wartime armies in the Middle East when they call for a religious war ­ "the jihad".

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units in the territorial component are almost always tied to their own territory and are formed into platoons, companies and battalions or regiments.

24.

Military territorial commands at the operational level in almost all modern armies have broadly the same responsibilities and tasks:

-

Planning, coordinating, commanding and supervising the execution of tasks of subordinate units in the preparation and conduct of combat operations.

-

Accepting and occasionally incorporating attached units from other task forces for the purpose of carrying out specific concrete military operations, when they assume full responsibility for the activities of these units.

-

At the request of higher command levels, they must send their units to other task forces along with the necessary and prescribed material reserves, but in that situation they completely lose their command role and can follow the execution of combat and other tasks only through the commands to which the units are attached.

-

Attached units which are part of the establishments of higher-level commands, but are occasionally attached to individual lower-level task forces, are fully subordinated to the new temporary command; the higherlevel command exercises the command and control role exclusively through the temporary lower-level command, and they may submit any specialised instructions for the execution of tasks exclusively through the temporary command with the engagement of the specialised staff organ of that command.

-

They organise and are responsible for all military activities in the area of responsibility, and they must coordinate activities in support of combat operations away from the front with the appropriate civilian authorities and organs; military activities have full priority in this, especially in the conduct of combat operations.

16

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4.4.

Does the dominance of the territorial component in an army point to its

defensive character?

25.

Almost all modern states organise the defence of their national territory using a specially organised part of the armed forces, which has the following basic characteristics: Depending on the degree of threat to the state or nation, or, rather, the available material and human resources, those forces are larger or smaller than manoeuvre forces. Small states with limited material resources generally organise numerically stronger units in the territorial component. Wartime armies which are organised without a peacetime basis (ad hoc) at the beginning of their formation mostly have the basic characteristics of the territorial component. The basic task of the territorial component is primarily the defence of national territory. The territorial component of the wartime army is organised on the territorial principle, and units are generally made up of the inhabitants of one village, town, municipality or basic administrative unit. Units of the territorial component are generally organised and equipped for tasks of securing facilities and the population, for building and erecting fortified obstacles, and for defence from air attacks. Units of the territorial component are equipped mostly with light arms, and in exceptional circumstances, they can also have armoured equipment for a short period of time or for a concrete combat task. The territorial component is generally made up of a large number of small units which are mostly bound by the idea and desire to defend their homes or immediate surroundings; commanding this large number of small units is very difficult because of the large distance between them, difference of tasks, different degrees of direct threat and lack of technical means of communication. Integration of small tactical units (platoon, company, battalion) into larger tactical units (brigade, division, corps) does not represent the creation of

17

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joint tactical units or task forces, which would have equal combat value, because these units are still manned on a territorial principle and cannot acquire the necessary cohesion ­ combative and morale firmness. Units of the territorial component execute their tasks in the defence of the territory in principle by controlling the territory and securing important infrastructure features and organs of the authorities. In the event of a direct enemy attack, they mount a defence with small offensive operations in the form of ambushes, raids, attacks on small parts of enemy forces, and exceptionally they mount an organised defence and fortify defensive positions. It is impossible to carry out large-scale offensive operations with units of the territorial component without previous thorough training from the individual to the unit at the operational level3.

26.

It follows as a conclusion that a state, nation or political group which organises a wartime army mainly on the territorial principle and carries out combat operations mostly using units of the territorial component is essentially a defensive army.

3

In April 1993, the Command of the ABH 3rd Corps intended to organise training for all corps units and municipal staffs in its zone for large-scale offensive operations, which may be concluded from the order to organise a camping: "I have decided to organise decisive defence on all lines attained; show maximum initiative and carry out active operations in front of the p/k (forward line, English: forward edge of battle area ­note by M.G.) and in the rear of the enemy combat formation; in the zones of brigades and OGs /operations groups/ organise camping and BOiV /combat training and exercises/ with the following goal: by engaging main forces for defence and active operations, inflict the largest possible losses in personnel and MTS /materiel and technical equipment/ on the Chetniks and do not allow them to take initiative and achieve tactical and operational surprise, thus achieving operational deception and concealing our intentions and preparations for offensive operations (underlined by M.G.), and with auxiliary forces organise camping with the task of conducting BOiV, strengthening the mental and physical stamina of fighters, officers, commands and units, mutual trust and solidarity among comrades and combat readiness in entirety... In the immediate task, carry out defence and active operations and organise camping and training, and in the next task, carry out operational deployment and reception of forces taking part in the attack operation (underlined by M.G.)." "...by carrying out camping raise b/g (combat readiness ­ note by M.G.) to the highest degree possible and be at the ready to receive and coordinate with units and formations taking part in the attack operation." 4D01473 Decision of the commander of the 3rd Corps, number 01/1049-1 of 4 April 1993.

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4.5.

How is logistics support for the wartime army ensured?

27.

Logistics support for the wartime army, especially recruitment and replenishment with weapons and combat supplies is generally fully centralised. For that purpose, the appropriate measures for the production, procurement and distribution of weapons and combat supplies are carried out already in peacetime. During the war, replenishment with combat supplies generally goes through the command system. New supplies from production or procurement arrive at central depots of the supreme command. They can be distributed directly from production or from abroad to joint tactical units only with the approval of specialised organs of the supreme command. Lower-level commands can be supplied exceptionally from war booty or by direct procurement in the deployment area if enemy combat operations undermine the regular supply chain.

28.

Logistics support in a wartime army which is formed without peacetime preparations is significantly different. In the initial period, replenishment with combat supplies (ammunition, weapons, spare parts) is organised from equipment and reserves captured from the enemy, improvised production in secret workshops and secret procurement from abroad. With the creation of free territories and capture of enemy manufacturing facilities, regular production and organised distribution is organised. With political recognition, channels for logistics support from third countries are created. Such a wartime army mostly obtains food and other quartermaster necessities from local sources. Military territorial commands have a significant role in this.

29.

Medical treatment of wounded and sick soldiers is generally organised in medical institutions inside the unit. In exceptional cases, they are sent to civilian health institutions, where special departments for military personnel are created that are under the supervision of conscripted medical personnel. These personnel are in direct contact with the medical organs of units, or, rather, the military territorial command, and must report to the unit command on the medical condition. Rest and recuperation for personnel from units of the

19

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manoeuvre component is organised in the units, in barracks, temporary accommodation premises and campsites in the zone of combat operations. It is possible to release only a small part on leave with their families during period without combat operations without undermining the combat readiness of the unit. Medical support for units of the territorial component is based mostly on civilian resources.

4.6.

How are losses compensated and new units created?

30.

Recruitment of personnel due to losses is based on the territorial principle with the approval of the superior command. Recruitment of volunteers without adequate military training and a background check of their security or moral suitability is especially sensitive. Recruitment of officers is carried out from among unassigned reserve officers and by promoting junior officers who have excelled in combat and command of lower-level units and who have demonstrated specialist and ethical traits required for the new command level. Training of new officers is also carried out during the war in military schools, at short courses for various command levels and through hands-on work in staffs.

31.

New units of the wartime army are formed by calling up for military services unassigned conscripts from the reserve, assigning recruits who have completed basic military training in special centres according to a shortened programme and volunteers who have completed minimal military training. Command personnel are reassigned and promoted from units formed earlier, and a small share can be made up of officers straight out of military schools.

20

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4.7.

What is a shift army and what are the consequences of shift combat on the discipline of soldiers?

32.

In militia armies formed in a narrow territorial area, the so-called "shift war" is well known. One third of personnel are in combat contact with the enemy at the front, one third are in barracks or suitable accommodation premises, ready for rapid intervention at the front, and one third are resting at home with their families and carrying out the necessary household tasks.

33.

This kind of engagement of units is possible in the following conditions: When the intensity of combat is not high, there is a lull at the front and the forces of both sides are exhausted. When the enemy uses the same type of combat. When weather conditions and accommodation possibilities at the front are not suitable for rest and accommodation in the open. When there are no possibilities for regular replacement of engaged units with units from other areas. When the majority of the working-age population is engaged in defending their territory and a large number of them must carry out activities to support their families and community at the same time.

34.

Advantages of the system: Personnel rest in an organised way with their families and friends, which significantly contributes to higher morale among soldiers and their families and the community. Rest takes place in significantly better conditions with regular food, hygiene and accommodation. The mental and physical strain suffered by soldiers is much lower. The costs of supplies for soldiers are smaller, both at the front and in the rear. If necessary, it is also possible to deploy personnel who are resting outside the operations area of their own unit and use them for the protection of

21

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general infrastructure facilities in the territory.

35.

Disadvantages of the system: The unit is assembled only occasionally, in the event of intense combat. The unit is not fully trained to carry out large-scale and difficult tasks. It takes much more time to assemble and transfer the units outside its own area. It is very difficult to assemble personnel who are resting before the time specified for assembly and rotation. It is almost impossible to establish organised supervision of personnel who are resting, which is a cause for military and civilian indiscipline in the form of violations of military rules and offenses against civilian regulations, and even crimes.

4.8.

What is the relationship between the civilian authorities and military units during war?

36.

Relations between military commands and the civilian political authorities are already regulated in accordance with the laws and rules in peacetime. The civilian authorities organise the army, direct the army through the supreme command, control the army by using various means of democratic procedure, and define the political and strategic goals of military activities.

37.

Relations between the civilian authorities and military commanders in war vary significantly depending on whether the war is taking place in own territory or in the territory of another state. When the war is taking place in own territory, these relations are based on consistent adherence to peacetime legal provisions, which may be changed temporarily while the war is ongoing. These temporary changes can be made only by the legally elected representatives of the highest state authorities or by organs of the authorities prescribed by the Constitution and laws. Military commanders may propose certain amendments to existing laws and regulation, but they are adopted

22

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exclusively by the legal civilian authorities. Only in exceptional circumstances can military commanders temporarily issue orders, for a short period of time and in a restricted territory, which interfere in the civilian domain. However, they must notify the superior commander, or representatives of the civilian authorities, as soon as possible.

38.

On the other hand, representatives of the civilian authorities have no authority in military units. They can deliver any requests to individual military commands directly through organs for cooperation and coordination or through higher-level organs of the civilian authorities and legislative or executive organs at the state level. They can approve supplies for military units from territorial sources only at the request of a higher-level organ of the civilian authorities or in direct agreement with the command of a joint tactical unit as the lowest level of such coordination. The higher-level civilian authorities must refund the lower-level authorities in goods or money for any supplies agreed in this way. Relations between military commands and civilian authorities are characterised by full cooperation and coordination and mutual respect and understanding.

39.

The situation is significantly different if military units are carrying out combat operations outside their own territory and capture territory in which the civilian authorities elected or appointed by the opposing side were previously active. This situation is called an occupation, and it is irrelevant whether control is regained of own, earlier lost territory, or whether territory belonging to another state is conquered. The task force commander is the only representative of his state (now an occupying power) in the newly-captured territory. He is the so-called military governor and takes over all powers of the civilian authorities. If the enemy civilian authorities cooperate and do not boycott justified requests, the military commander still has the obligation to cooperate and coordinate. If, however, the enemy civilian authorities do not demonstrate readiness for cooperation, the commander may suspend such civilian authorities, and even temporarily appoint new ones. If the armed forces recapture (liberate) in combat part of the territory in which the enemy

23

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had established their occupation authorities immediately after capturing it, the powers of the commander last for a very short time and their duty is to restore as soon as possible either the previous authorities (from before the occupation) or help establish new authorities, bringing with them representatives of the authorities who are legally elected or appointed by the legislative branch. In doing this, they must also include individual representatives of the authorities from the period of occupation who are loyal to the liberating authorities, especially if the liberated territory is ethnically, religiously or ideologically mixed or antagonistic.

24

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5. YUGOSLAV DOCTRINE OF ALL-PEOPLE'S DEFENCE AND SOCIAL

SELF-PROTECTION

40.

In order to gain a more complete understanding of war events in the former Yugoslavia, especially in BH, it is necessary to be familiar with the laws and other regulations, or, rather, the practice of the armed forces of the SFR /Socialist Federative Republic/ of Yugoslavia that is based on them. The subject is the doctrine of All-people's Defence and Social Self-protection (ONO i DSZ), which differs significantly from the rules of waging war of modern western armies. The forming of the armed forces of individual independent republics of the former Yugoslavia, as well as ethnic groups in BH, and later in Kosovo as well, was abundant in the practice of the doctrine of ONO i DSZ.

41.

The armed forces of SFR Yugoslavia were essentially formed in accordance with the modern principles of most modern armies. However, the international environment also determined many specific characteristics in the forming of a wartime army and the waging of war. Politically non-aligned, Tito's Yugoslavia was completely surrounded by states which belonged either to the NATO pact and the Capitalist system or the Warsaw pact and orthodox Communist system4. This was also influenced by an internal ideology of a permanent internal and external enemy, which was an excuse for a single-party ideological regime and internal repression. At the same time, fear from a multitude of enemies was also a kind of cohesive element in a multi-ethnic and multi-religious state with different historical and cultural roots. Thus, the overall efforts of the state and ruling Communist party were aimed at engaging all human and material resources in defence of the state and the political system. Each citizen was obliged to contribute to the maximum to effective defence in accordance with his capabilities and his role in the state and political system. According to the 1974 Constitution, nobody had the right to sign or recognise the capitulation of the army or state, and resistance was

25

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supposed to continue even in conditions of a total occupation of the state and destruction of the army.

42.

The armed forces of the SFRY consisted of the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) as the manoeuvre component and the Territorial Defence (TO) as the territorially based component, which was the broadest form of organised allpeople's defence5. All units and operational and strategic forces of the JNA, as well as operational and strategic forces of the TO, were under the command of the Supreme Command, which consisted of the SFRY Presidency ­ with one elected representative from each republic and province. Specialised support was provided by the Supreme Command Staff, which during a state of war included the federal ministry of defence (Federal Secretariat of National Defence ­ SSNO). Subordinated to it were theatres of war, in the form of military territorial commands, whose areas of responsibility did not correspond to the administrative division of the country.6 The air force and anti-aircraft defence were also under the direct command of the Supreme Command. The navy and defence of the coast (Istria, Hrvatsko Primorje /Croatian Seaside/, Dalmatia, Boka Kotorska and the Montenegrian coast) were under the command of the Naval District, which was subordinated itself to the Supreme Command. Republican TO staffs as well as the military territorial commands of the republic were also subordinated to the Supreme Command.

43.

Joint tactical units and operational and strategic forces of the JNA had legally prescribed powers and manner of coordination with the civilian authorities in their areas of responsibility. That system was already completely undermined before the war in Slovenia, and with the break-up of the JNA in the spring

4

Yugoslavia was surrounded by "BRIGAMA" (in English troubles, in German sorgen, in French soucis) /as printed/. The first letters of the names of neighbouring countries form the word "brigama" ­ Bulgaria, Romania, Italy, Greece, Austria, Hungary and Albania. 5 1D 02976, SFRY Constitution from 1974, Article 240. 6 The 1st Theatre of War based in Belgrade covered almost all of Bosnia and Herzegovina, eastern parts of Croatia (Slavonia), Vojvodina, Central Serbia and Montenegro, in effect about 40% of state territory. Thorough changes took place at the beginning of 1990, when army districts, whose areas of responsibility largely corresponded to the borders of the republics, were abolished. Slovenia, BH, Macedonia and Montenegro thus lost their military territorial commands, while Croatia was divided into three theatres of war (the 5th based in Zagreb, the 1st based in Belgrade and the Naval District based in Split).

26

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1992, it collapsed fully. Commanders of JNA units could submit their requests to civilian authorities and for the needs of conducting combat operations in a certain territory directly or through the superior command. Tasks were coordinated by legally prescribed political and executive organs at all levels of political and administrative organisation, from local communes through municipalities and wartime districts, to republican executive councils (governments). These were Committees for ONO i DSZ which were made up of representatives of the executive authorities of a local commune, municipality, wartime district or presidency of the republic.

44.

Committees for ONO i DSZ were a special expression of "the exercising of the leading role of the SK /League of Communist/ in the area of defence". Committees for ONO i DSZ were formed at all levels of the state and administrative system ­ from the local commune and the company to the republic. The law and accompanying documents envisaged that the presidents or chairmen of these committees were the presidents or secretaries of the party organisation at that level of party organisation. Subordinated to it, as committee members, were legally elected heads of state and administrative organs, as well as other political and social organisations. The commander of the TO staff, the police commander and even the commander of the JNA7 unit in that area were also committee members, in addition to their separate chain of command. As members of these committees, they were obliged to accept and carry out tasks assigned by this committee.

45.

These committees were formed as a political and coordination body with the task of commanding defence in a certain area, and their primary task is to protect the activities of civilian defence organs and institutions. However, the law, and accompanying regulations even more so, gave them powers of command in armed combat in the event of an imminent threat or enemy attack. Thus, the Guidelines for Defending the SFRY from Aggression, as the basic document of defensive doctrine, state the following: "If the competent organs

27

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(TO staff, author's note) are not able to carry out ONO and DSZ duties and tasks, committees for ONO i DSZ shall carry out activities and take measures to activate these organs and allow them to continue their work, and when the circumstances require, they organise themselves all-people's resistance and command it in their area (author's emphasis)"8 During war, if a JNA unit was surrounded, or stranded in an area captured by the enemy, it had to subordinate itself to that committee.

46.

The Territorial Defence was organised in a very specific way, which other modern armies did not know. The TO had no command organ at the federal level, other than a coordination body in the form of a GS /General Staff/ Administration for the TO and an Assistant Chief of the GS for the TO. Commanders of TO republican staffs were members of the Military Council as the highest advisory organ of the federal minister of defence. In their chains of command they were subordinated to republican presidencies, as the highest organs of political authority in the republics. The TO command system had a dual chain: first, a chain of command of a classic military organisation from commander of the republican staff to zone staffs and the staffs of municipalities and large local communes to tactical units. The second chain was the political executive through committees for ONO i DSZ, where the president of the municipality was in a certain sense superior to the commander of the TO staff. The president of the committee for ONO i DSZ, who was in the same time the secretary of the SK /League of Communist/ committee at his level of party organisation, usually had a decisive influence, especially with respect to granting commissions and promotions to command and staff officers.

47.

Within the TO there were units of both the manoeuvre and the territorially based component. Manoeuvre units were organised into brigades, and two or

7

JNA units were subordinated to the Committee for ONO i DSZ in exceptional situations when that unit ends a long way inside temporarily occupied territory, or in the depth of occupied territory, or when an JNA unit is attached to a large TO unit. 8 Guidelines for Defending the SFRY from Aggression, SFRY Presidency, Belgrade, July 1983, page 32.

28

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more brigades and independent detachments were temporarily organised even into operations groups. They were generally commanded by the staffs of zones, provinces and communities of municipalities of war districts, depending on the internal organisation in individual republics. In exceptional cases, the republican staff assumed direct command of an operations group, especially if it also included a JNA joint tactical unit. The territorially based component was made up of platoons and companies at the level of the local commune, dedicated detachments of platoon or company composition (infantry, assault, anti-armour, anti-landing, anti-sabotage, naval) at the level of municipalities and detachments of battalion composition at the level of a zone or community of municipalities. Combat support units (for fire support, engineering support, anti-aircraft support and anti-armour combat, as well as reconnaissance and military police units) were also formed in the TO at certain command levels.

48.

TO staffs also formed logistics support units. TO staffs were generally supplied from the reserves of the socio-political community, public supply companies and transport and construction companies. Medical support fully relied on civilian health organisations. In wartime conditions when a large part of the territory of a socio-political community or republic was occupied, it was envisaged that special logistics bases would be formed in inaccessible areas and in free territory. Socio-political communities organised in these bases their own manufacture of weapons by improvising, repairing damaged and captured weapons and procuring them from elsewhere.

49.

Supplies for TO units and staffs were sourced centrally from JNA depots and reserves. However, TO staffs from municipal to higher levels also had to have their own reserves of materiel. TO staffs were responsible for financing the procurement of weapons and military equipment, and socio-political communities' ensured funds in their budgets. The Federation did not ensure any funds for the needs of the republics, nor did the republics organise any mutual solidarity funds. However, within republics certain richer

municipalities often allocated out of solidarity some funds for the equipment

29

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and functioning of the TOs of poorer municipalities9. In wartime conditions, supply of weapons and combat equipment was also centralised and came from federal reserves, current wartime production, procurement from abroad and help from allies, as well as war booty. Republican authorities were allowed in wartime conditions to procure weapons and military equipment from abroad, which some of them took advantage of just before the war (Slovenia and Croatia, and partly the Muslim forces in BH ­ the Patriotic League and the Green Berets).

50.

TO Staffs had no powers of administration and organisation of activities in the domain of the civilian authorities. Control of traffic and the population in their zones of responsibility were generally performed by the civilian police using their peacetime and mobilised reserve forces and other legally envisaged institutions10. Crimes and other activities were investigated by investigation organs of the judiciary. Within TO units, these activities were carried out by organs of the security service and the military police, and they cooperated with the relevant civilian organs.

51.

Territorially based units generally did not carry out combat operations outside the territory of their municipality or district. They left their area mostly when they were forced to by enemy operations. Only in the event of an imminent threat could higher-level staffs temporarily gather municipal units for combat operations in a broader area.

52.

In addition, TO units could not be subordinated to higher-level JNA units whose areas of responsibility covered the territory of the municipality. JNA

9

In Slovenia in the mid-80s, the border municipality of Tolmin was forced by the republican plan to allocate over 2% of its revenues for equipment for its TO, while the law prescribed a maximum of 0.5%, and on the other hand the municipality of Centar in the City of Ljubljana allocated only 0.12% of its revenues. 10 Based on the experience of the people's liberation war of 1941-1945, a special organisation was formed in Slovenia for the protection of facilities, the population and material goods. It was partly armed with light infantry weapons with no military uniform and obligatory visible insignia. This organisation was called the National Protection and it was under the command of the municipal secretariat of the interior and worked closely with the municipal TO staff. During preparations for independence, that organisation became the embryo of the armed forces of Slovenia, because TO staffs were still under the control of the JNA and officers loyal to it.

30

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commanders had to coordinate the stay and operations of TO units in their areas of responsibility through the competent TO staff. In exceptional cases, TO units could be subordinated to a JNA unit at the command of the republican TO staff. If a JNA unit was planned to or forced to remain in an area captured by the enemy, it had to be subordinated to the TO staff. In the event of joint combat operations by JNA and TO units, the superior staffs and commands coordinated operations or formed a temporary joint command consisting of TO staff officers and the command of the JNA unit.

53.

The right of the state to self-defence was transferred in Yugoslavia to all its citizens (as well as all organisations and organs), which had the inviolable and inalienable right and duty to defend the country.11 Nobody had the right to prevent citizens from fighting an enemy who attacked the country12, and each citizen who participated in the resistance to the enemy with arms or in some other way was deemed to be a member of the armed forces of the SFR Yugoslavia13. Therefore, possession and use of weapons was not the only criterion for determining membership of the Yugoslav armed forces. Each citizen who participated in any way to the resistance against the enemy was deemed a member of the armed forces.

54.

All-people's defence was defined by law as a unified system of organisation, preparation and active participation of citizens and legal entities in: Deterrence and prevention of aggression and other threats to the country. Armed combat and other forms of all-people's resistance. Execution of other tasks for the purpose of defending the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Yugoslavia and its social order.14

11 12

1D 02976 Constitution of the SFRY, 1974, Article 237. 1D 02976 Constitution of the SFRY, 1974, Article 238. 13 1D 02976 Constitution of the SFRY, 1974, Article 240. 4D 01470 Law on All-People's Defence, Official Gazette of the SFRY, number 21/1982, Article 91, contained the same provision that each citizen who participated in the resistance to the enemy with a weapon or in any other way was also a member of the armed forces. 14 4D 01470 Law on All-People's Defence, Official Gazette of the SFRY, number 21/1982, Article 3.

31

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55.

In all-people's defence, armed combat was the decisive form of resistance to aggression. Armed combat and all other forms of all-people's defence ensure unity15. In the event of an attack on the country, all Yugoslav citizens, as well as staffs, commands and other organs, were obliged immediately, without waiting for a call or command, to exercise their rights and obligations with regard to the defence of the country, and to act in accordance with the defence plan and their wartime assignment.16

56.

Citizens had the right and the duty: Organise and participate in organising, preparing and implementing allpeople's defence. Train for all-people's defence and for carrying out tasks in war, a state of imminent threat of war or other emergency situations. Participate in armed combat and other forms of all-people's resistance. Participate in the protection and rescue of the population and material goods from war destruction and other dangers. Participate in carrying out other tasks of interest for the defence of the country.17

57.

The law defines the following basic rights and obligations of citizens: Military service. Participation in the civilian protection. Training for all-people's defence. Work obligation. Requisition of resources.18

58.

JNA and TO units and institutions recruit personnel from the regular force and the reserve of the armed forces.19 The active force is made up of soldiers,

4D 01470 21/1982, Article 10. 16 4D 01470 21/1982, Article 9. 17 4D 01470 21/1982, Article 13. 18 4D 01470 21/1982, Article 17.

15

Law on All-People's Defence, Official Gazette of the SFRY, number Law on All-People's Defence, Official Gazette of the SFRY, number Law on All-People's Defence, Official Gazette of the SFRY, number Law on All-People's Defence, Official Gazette of the SFRY, number

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cadets, active military personnel and civilians serving in the armed forces20, and the reserve force is made up of conscripts who have completed their compulsory military service, conscripts who have fulfilled the obligation to perform compulsory military service in a different way and female conscripts21. For men the obligation to serve in the reserve begins on the day when they are released from compulsory military service, or from the day when the obligation to perform compulsory military service is fulfilled in a different way, and lasts until the calendar year in which the conscript turns 60 years of age.22 Records of all conscripts were kept in accordance with their place of residence.23

59.

JNA and TO units and institutions can also recruit volunteers. Volunteers are persons who do not have a military obligation and are admitted to the armed forces at their own request.24 In some republics (Slovenia), volunteers who had not yet completed compulsory military service and had not turned 19 were also admitted. They were admitted to youth volunteer units of the TO at the age of 16. They took part in the training of TO units in addition to military training according to the secondary school curriculum. Successful young volunteers could also receive junior non-commissioned officer ranks25.

4D 01470 Law on All-People's Defence, Official Gazette of the SFRY, number 21/1982, Article 118. 20 4D 01472 Law on Service in the Armed Forces, Official Gazette of the SFRY, number 7/1985, Article 9. 21 4D 01472 Law on Service in the Armed Forces, Official Gazette of the SFRY, number 7/1985Article 10. and 4D 01471 Law on Compulsory Military Service, Official Gazette of the SFRY, number 64/1985, Article 47 22 4D 01471 Law on Compulsory Military Service, Official Gazette of the SFRY, number 64/1985, Article 48. 23 4D 01471 Law on Compulsory Military Service, Official Gazette of the SFRY, number 64/1985, Article 69. 24 4D 01471 Law on All-People's Defence, Official Gazette of the SFRY, number 21/1985, Article 119. 25 J. JANSA, an active politician when Slovenia gained independence and defence minister in the period of armed conflict between the JNA and the TO of Slovenia, received the rank of corporal as a youth volunteer and thus refused to perform compulsory military service in the JNA and an internship in the JNA pursuant to the curriculum of the defence science studies.

19

33

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60.

Mobilisation is carried out in the event of an attack on a country, an imminent threat of war or other emergency circumstances. When they are mobilised, the armed forces move from a peacetime organisation and state to a wartime organisation and state of readiness for waging an all-people's defensive war. Mobilisation can be general or partial, public or secret.26

61.

In the doctrine of all-people's defence, great significance is attributed to selfprotection. Self-protection is a set of activities, measures and procedures carried out by citizens and other legal entities in order to protect the interests of all-people's defence from all forms of enemy activities which may damage those interests. In that context, timely detection and prevention of activities which may damage the defence interests and the security of the country is especially significant.27

62.

Therefore, in the event of an attack on the country, all conscripts must immediately, not waiting for a call or an order, exercise their rights and obligations with respect to the defence of the country and act in accordance with the defence plan and their wartime assignment. Likewise, if a general mobilisation is declared, all conscripts from reserve forces must join the armed forces and start to carry out their military duties. In these circumstances, each male fit for military service becomes a member of the Yugoslav armed forces and has the right and duty to participate in the defence of the country. If he is not found in open armed combat, the enemy should consider these men fit for military service as potential fighters, because in a different situation they could have been found bearing weapons.28

4D 01470 Law on All-People's Defence, Official Gazette of the SFRY, number 21/1985, Article 8. 27 4D 01470 Law on All-People's Defence, Official Gazette of the SFRY, number 21/1985, Articles 173 and 174. 28 4D01492 Gavro Perazic's book: Statute of Defence an Armed Forces in Constitution and International Law, Beograd 1976, pages 200-201

26

34

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6. APPLICATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF ALL-PEOPLE'S DEFENCE IN

BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

63.

The doctrine of all-people's defence, or, rather, the concept of an armed people, was applied in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the nineties. That is visible in regulations on the defence of the country, but also in a number of military documents, which point to the unity of the army and the population in the fight to liberate the country.

6.1.

Constitution and Laws of Bosnia and Herzegovina

6.1.1. Constitution The Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina29 prescribes that the armed forces of BH are made up of the Army of the Republic. In the event of war, in addition to the Army, the armed forces also consist of the police and armed units, which are put under the unified command of the armed forces of the Republic and constitute a unified whole (Article 162, paragraph 2). Every citizen who with arms or otherwise participates in resistance to an aggressor shall be considered a member of the armed forces of the Republic (Article 162, paragraph 3). This provision was taken directly from the Constitution of the SFRY which prescribed that "any citizen who with arms or otherwise participates in resistance to an aggressor shall be considered a member of the armed forces of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia".30 For properly ascertaining whether someone is a member of the armed forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina, it is not, therefore, only important whether he bears a weapon or not. The important thing is whether the citizen is participating in any way in resistance to an aggressor. Armed and unarmed resistance to an aggressor are

64.

29 30

1D01236 1D02976

Constitution of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, revised text, 1993. 1974 SFRY Constitution, Article 240/3

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thus made equal, so each citizen who takes part in resistance to the aggressor is deemed to be a member of the armed forces of BH.

6.1.2. Decree Law on defence31

6.1.2.1. Defence of the country is a right and obligation of citizens

65.

At a session held on 14 May 1992, the RBH Presidency adopted a decree law on defence, which regulated the system and organisation of defence, the rights and obligations of the Republic, municipalities, companies and other legal entities, military defence and civilian defence, inspection, funding and other matters important for the defence of the Republic (Article 1, paragraph 1). That was in fact the earlier SRBiH Law on National Defence, which was modernised in accordance with the standards of modern democratic political systems.

66.

It was defined that the Republic, through the competent ministries and other republican organs in the area of defence, controls the national resistance in war (Article 5, subparagraph 3), which shows that the BH Presidency adopted the doctrine of national defence, or, rather national resistance in war, which was the main characteristic of the defence system of the former Yugoslavia.

67.

This decree also retains the legal qualification from the previous Yugoslav system on "the rights and obligations" of citizens in the defence of the country, and so it defined the rights and obligations of citizens to: Perform compulsory military service. Perform compulsory work. Comply with the requisition of resources. Participate in civilian protection. Train for defence (Article 46).

36

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68.

Failure to carry out parts of duties in the defence of the country was sanctioned as a crime or misdemeanour.

69.

In addition to those mentioned above, according to the decree, citizens had the following rights and obligations: To be assigned to the armed forces, civilian protection, monitoring and information service, control communication and cryptographic protection units, state organs, companies and other legal entities, or other defence tasks. To respond to a call-up by the competent organ, company or other legal entity to perform duties in the area of defence. To provide information of significance for defence that they obtain or observe, and submit it as soon as possible to the information centre or state organs. To provide the necessary data for the purpose of keeping records in the area of defence. (Article 47)

6.1.2.2. Military defence, compulsory labour service, civilian defence and observation

and reporting service

70.

Military defence is the broadest form of organisation and preparation of citizens for armed combat: organisation, preparation, mobilisation and control of the armed forces, recruitment of personnel into the armed forces and replenishment with materiel and technical equipment, duties and tasks of compulsory military service, registration, recruitment, replenishment, training of citizens for armed combat and mobilisation (Article 62). In order to organise and prepare citizens for armed combat, armed forces are organised (Article 63).

71.

Assigning personnel and materiel to the armed forces, police reserves, the civilian protection, the monitoring and information service, organs of socio-

31

4D00408

Decree law on defence of the RBH /Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina/.

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political communities, companies and other organisations and legal entities, ensures participation of all forces and resources in the territory of the Republic and the fullest use of specialised and other capabilities of citizens for defence needs (Article 66). An individual, for instance, can be assigned to a military unit or company producing ammunition, depending on his knowledge and professional qualifications, based on which the competent state service assesses the tasks on which that individual will contribute the most to the defence needs of the country.

72.

All citizens capable of working who have turned 15 were subject to the compulsory labour service. This labour service could be fulfilled in state administration organs, companies and other legal entities and by carrying out occasional work for defence needs, and it was introduced in the event of a war or state of emergency (Article 48). With respect to the participation of BH citizens in the defence, or, rather, the contribution of unarmed citizens to direct defence by the armed forces, it is necessary to determine the meaning of the concept of "carrying out occasional work for defence needs". Occasional work for defence needs means the engagement of citizens who were subject to the compulsory labour service on building fortifications, such as trenches and shelters for personnel and combat operations of units of the armed forces, erecting various obstacles on the battlefield and roads, preparing construction and other material for fortifications and building temporary military roads, or repairing existing ones to allow unimpeded movement of military vehicles. Thus, in his order for engagement of labour service units, the commander of the 3rd Corps of the BH Army defined precisely the tasks of the subordinated units in connection with the labour service units. 32 The same is also contained in the order of the Command of the 3rd Corps of the BH Army for engagement of labour service units for engineering support of the Corps' combat operations, by which it was ordered: "Maintaining roads in the area of responsibility of the brigade is to be carried out by own forces with the

32

4D01494 Order issued by Enver Hadzihasanovic and forwarded by Ramiz Dugalic to Municipal Defence Staff Bugojno, G. Vakuf, D. Vakuf, Zepce, Zavidovici..., re:engagement of work obligation units, ref: 05/633-2, Zenica, 01 March 1993

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assistance of local communities in the field."33 The commander of the 4th Corps of the BH Army also confirmed indirectly that labour service units were engaged in engineering support work in areas of combat operations: "Labour service units engaged for engineering support in areas of combat operations to be transported using the shortest roads available..."34

73.

Compulsory labour service also included tasks of supplying military units, both on the battlefield and during rest in the rear, in the form of preparing or building accommodation facilities, preparing, delivering and distributing food, providing medical treatment and care for the wounded and sick, burying the dead and clearing up the terrain. Citizens under the labour service gave the most direct contribution by delivering ammunition and ordnance directly to combat positions on the battlefield. This task was mostly performed by young or elderly men.

74.

For the purpose of carrying out organised work for defence needs, mobilisation plans envisaged special purposes units ­ work groups, platoons and companies at the level of villages, local communities and municipalities. Labour service units could be general, which would provide only physical strength and use mostly manual tools or light machines (chainsaws) or light transportation vehicles (wheelbarrows, animal-drawn carts, small tractors). Specialised work groups or platoons, which used heavy construction machines and means of transportation, were used for larger fortification work. Transportation or tractor groups were formed for the delivery of ammunition and combat equipment. These groups and units were also formed ad hoc, in accordance with the decisions of military commanders and circumstances on the battlefield35.

33

4D01474 Order for engineering support of the Command of the 3rd Corps, strictly confidential no. 02/136-1 of 21 March 1993. 34 4D01487 Order issued by Arif Pasalic to the 4th Corps-all units, re: enforcement of security measures, ref: 01-3039/93, Mostar, 14 April 1993 35 In besieged Sarajevo some local commanders took civilians to dig trenches directly from public transportation vehicles or from the street.

39

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75.

Amendments to the decree on defence of 23 April 199336 prescribed that citizens who are engaged in labour service units on the basis of a work obligation are entitled to financial compensation. The amount of compensation is determined by the municipal executive committee if a work obligation unit is engaged in carrying out work and tasks for the needs of the armed forces. For labour service units engaged in work of significance for defence in a state organ, company or other legal entity, the amount of compensation is determined by the institutions for which the work is carried out. (Article 126b)

76.

Civil defence is the broadest form of organisation, preparation and training of citizens, organs, companies and other legal entities for: (i) participation in unarmed resistance and (ii) protection and rescue of people and material goods from the consequences of war destruction, natural disasters and other disasters (Article 70).

77.

Civil defence consists of: Civilian protection. The monitoring and information service. Control communications and cryptographic protection, except for the needs of command of the armed forces. Planning and training, except for the training of members of the armed forces. Defence and protection preparations of organs, companies and other legal entities. (Article 71)

78.

The civilian protection is organised, prepared and implemented as a system for the protection and rescue of people and material and cultural goods from war destruction, natural disasters, technical and technological disasters and other disasters and dangers in peace and war (Article 72). All citizens between the ages of 18 and 60 for men and 55 for women had the obligation to serve in the civilian protection (Article 50, paragraph 1). The tasks of the civilian protection do not change significantly compared to peacetime, but in wartime

36

1D01238

Decree law on amendments to the decree law on defence, 23 April 1993.

40

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the volume and complexity of tasks increases significantly. Execution of these tasks indirectly contributes to the success of armed defence, especially with regard to boosting morale and the general spirit of soldiers on the battlefield and all citizens, even in areas not engulfed in war. The earlier doctrine of allpeople's defence also envisaged the engagement of civilian protection forces and equipment for the needs of direct armed combat. Fire brigades fought fires in inhabited areas and even in forests during combat so that units of the armed forces could stay at the planned positions. Medical units provided first aid to wounded soldiers on the battlefield and evacuated them to civilian medical institutions. Specialised units for the detection and removal of the consequences of NHB /nuclear-chemical-biological/ operations by the enemy in the general area of the battlefield were completely integrated in the operations systems of these units of the armed forces and were obliged to submit information which they gathered using their forces and equipment. By protecting and evacuating the families of soldiers, they influenced their morale in the most direct way, as well as their will to carry out combat operations.

79.

The extent to which civilian protection forces and equipment were important for defence can also be determined from the decree law on amendments to the decree law on defence,37 which prescribes that "during a state of war, members of the civilian protection (staffs and units) are equal in all respects to members of the armed forces with regard to their rights and obligations" (Article 3).

80.

The duty to serve in the monitoring and information service is established already in peacetime, and in war it gets more complex tasks for the purposes of defence: "The monitoring and information service in the Republic ensures the monitoring and detection of all types of danger caused by war activities..." (Article 91, paragraph 2) The primary task of this service is to monitor the airspace and report promptly on flights of aeroplanes and other aircraft attacking from the airspace. The air

37

4D01348 Decree law on amendments to the decree law on defence u referencing je drugacije, 19 October 1992, Official Gazette of the BH Army, number 1/1992.

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surveillance and warning system of the civilian sphere was fully integrated in that system of the armed forces. Exchange of information was mandatory for both systems. The civilian surveillance system was in practice a supplementary, and in some cases the only air surveillance system for the needs of some units of the armed forces. However, the organs of that service would certainly also notice the advance of enemy ground forces, especially inserted elements and groups, as well as artillery attacks and other enemy activities. It is fully understandable that they would inform of this the competent organs of the civilian protection and state organs, and depending on the situation and the proximity of the battlefield, they would also notify directly commands of the armed forces. This purely civilian service thus becomes an intelligence organ of the armed forces and directly serves the purposes of armed combat.

81.

Observation posts with permanent crews of up to two or three persons and the appropriate means of communication are established at the level of a local commune or large inhabited area. On important axes and features, observation posts with permanent crews of five to six persons are organised. Observers, who reported danger using portable equipment and optical signals, were also deployed in order to supplement the monitoring system. These monitoring crews consisted of elderly or young persons of both sexes who were not assigned to units of the armed forces or civilian protection units. The monitoring and information system in wartime and in the general area of the battlefield completely serves the purposes of armed combat.

6.1.2.3. Training and acquiring of skills for defence

82.

One of the obligations of BH citizens was training and acquiring of skills for armed combat. Article 99 of the decree law on defence prescribes rights and obligations with regard to training and acquiring of skills for armed combat: "In order to acquire professional knowledge and skills for military (underlined by M.G.) and civilian defence, citizens have the right and duty to

42

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train and acquire skills for defence." Since this obligation is also simultaneously a right and a duty, citizens cannot avoid it of their own will without being subject to legal (criminal or misdemeanour) responsibility and moral condemnation by the local or broader community. Article 51 of the decree prescribes: "Citizens between the ages of 15 and 60 (men), and 55 (women), have the right and duty to train for defence, under the conditions prescribed by law, if they are fit for training..."

6.1.2.4. Intelligence activities by citizens

83.

BH citizens had the duty to perform intelligence activities for the needs of armed resistance. According to Article 47, paragraph 3, of the decree on defence, BH citizens also have the right and duty to: "3. Provide any information of importance for defence that they find out or observe and submit it urgently to the information centre or state organs."

84.

This is a special obligation to which all citizens are subject regardless of their age and sex, or their role and general task in the defence system or society in general. Information from information centres was submitted directly to commands of the armed forces and was used for the purposes of armed combat in accordance with their significance and importance. In their reports to "state organs", citizens were obliged to report their observations directly to commands of the armed forces as state organs.

85.

In the defence system of the former Yugoslavia, there was a service for gathering intelligence and security information that was organised through a special organisation of trustworthy persons in the field that was called the Local Reconnaissance and Intelligence Service (MIOS). Individual

trustworthy citizens were engaged in each inhabited area or in the vicinity of important installations on gathering information on the enemy or his collaborators. That service could be activated only in war, but individual

43

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officers of the military security service used these wartime collaborators for gathering current security-related information in peacetime, especially in areas where there were anti-regime reactions or nationalistic incidents involving a large number of citizens. In the late eighties, that service was abolished, but its activation was envisaged in wartime. Collaborators were not recruited and prepared for intelligence work in peacetime, only in war. In essence, the activities of this service were carried out through civilian organs and internal affairs structures, and the gathered information was submitted to military services in a processed form and to the extent necessary. Nevertheless, military intelligence officers and military security service officers organised their own people and channels. Citizens participated in that work in view of their rights and obligations and moral attitudes. These trustworthy citizens who were in direct contact with lower-level intelligence officers engaged other residents in their places ­ neighbours, relatives, elderly persons, women, and even children, for information gathering. Equal behaviour by the BH Army is confirmed, among other things, by an order of the commander of the BH Army 3rd Corps to intensify intelligence activities that was submitted to subordinate intelligence organs in brigades. With regard to the gathering of intelligence information, HADZIHASANOVI ordered: "a special task is to link up with our structures and sympathisers in temporarily occupied territory".38

6.1.3. Decree law on the armed forces of the RBH39

86.

The RBH Presidency adopted a decree law on the armed forces of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina at a session held on 20 May 1992.

4D01475 Order to intensify intelligence activities of the 3rd Corps Command, strictly confidential number: 10/887-2 of 23 March 1993. 39 4D00409 Decree Law on the Armed Forces of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

38

44

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6.1.3.1. Composition of the armed forces

87.

The decree prescribes that the armed forces of the RBH are made up of the Army of the Republic, and in the event of war, also by the police and armed forces which are placed under a unified command of the armed forces of the Republic. Armed forces are security personnel in companies and other legal entities and the personnel of the customs service and other border organs (Article 2).

88.

With the decree law on amendments to the decree law on the armed forces of the RBH40 of 18 July 1992, the RBH Presidency expanded the concept of the armed forces of the RBH so that self-organised armed formations or those organised into illegal military units under different names as part of the forces resisting the fascist occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by the so-called Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the former Yugoslav People's Army, the Serbian Democratic Party and other enemy forces, between 30 April 1991 and 15 April 1992, were also considered to be members of the armed forces (Article 1). The RBH Presidency determines by a special decision which of the above-mentioned armed formations are considered to be members of the RBH armed forces (Article 2).

89.

In August 1992, the RBH Presidency again changed the definition of the concept of armed forces in the decree law on the armed forces, so from that moment on, the armed forces consisted of the Army of the Republic, and its components were HVO units and other armed groups which put themselves under the unified command of the Army. During a state of war, in addition to the Army, the armed forces consist of the police, physical security units of companies and other legal entities, customs service units and other border organs who resubordinate themselves under the unified command of the armed forces.41

1D01240 the RBH. 41 4D00410 RBH, 6 August 1992.

40

Decree Law on Amendments to the Decree Law on the Armed Forces of Decree law on amendments to the decree law on the armed forces of the

45

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6.1.3.2. The Army is the strike defence force

90.

The Army is organised, trained and prepared in peacetime to conduct all forms of armed combat and combat operations, as the strike defence force of the Republic, with the task of preventing aggression and other danger to the republic, to conduct armed combat against the enemy and participate in the protection and rescue of the population and material goods in war, enabling thus the mobilisation of all defence forces of the Republic (Article 3).42 The Army, therefore, is not the only, but is rather the strike defence force, so it is not correct to equate the BH Army with the entire defence forces of BH.

91.

The Army is organised into peacetime and wartime units and institutions. Peacetime units and institutions are manned by personnel working professionally in the Army and conscripts who perform compulsory military service. Wartime units and institutions are manned by conscripts from the reserve, who have completed compulsory military service or have been trained in other ways for the tasks and duties to which they are assigned. (Article 4)

92.

In war or a state of emergency, Army units, institutions and commands are manned by personnel from the active and wartime forces of the Army (Article 16, paragraph 1). In other words, in the event of a war, the Army is made up of personnel working professionally in the army and conscripts performing compulsory military service, as well as conscripts from the reserve who have completed compulsory military service.

93.

The Army can also be manned by other persons (Article 16, paragraph 2) who are not liable for military service, but have been admitted to the Army at their own request (Article 16, paragraph 3). Those persons have the same rights and obligations as military personnel and conscripts (Article 16, paragraph 5), depending on their status in the military hierarchy.

42 4D00409 Herzegovina.

Decree Law on the Armed Forces of the Republic of Bosnia and

46

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94.

The concept of military personnel is defined by the decree law on service in the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina43, which was published on 1 August 1992. Military personnel are: (i) active military personnel, (ii) soldiers and (iii) reserve personnel while they are on duty in the Army (Article 3, paragraph 1), or, in other words, reserve soldiers while they are serving in the Army (Article 86, paragraph 1).

95.

Active military personnel are non-commissioned officer, officers and generals (Article 3, paragraph 2), while privates and reserve personnel perform compulsory military service in the Army (Article 4, paragraph 2). The Army regular force is made up of active military personnel, soldiers, workers employed by the Army and civilians working in the Army (Article 8), while the Army reserve is made up of persons who are liable for service in the Army reserve based on regulations on compulsory military service.44

96.

It is important to observe that the Decree law on service in the RBH Army distinguishes between the term members of the Army and the term members of the armed forces, so provisions on health care prescribe the rights of Army members, and in wartime these are the rights of members of the armed forces (Article 60). It is necessary, therefore, to bear in mind that the term member of the armed forces of BH in wartime is broader than the concept of member of the BH Army.

97.

This is also confirmed by the Decree law on defence according to which citizens who are engaged during war or an imminent threat of war, pursuant to their obligation for compulsory military service, through organs of the national defence administration, on courier call-up tasks for the purpose of carrying out a mobilisation and other tasks for the needs of the armed forces and other

43

4D00412 Herzegovina. 44 4D00412 Herzegovina.

Decree law on service in the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Decree law on service in the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and

47

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defence needs, are also considered to be members of the armed forces (Article 126c)45.

6.1.3.3. Mobilization

98.

In the event of a state of emergency or an attack on the Republic, citizens, the armed forces and other defence elements and materiel for defence needs are mobilised (Article 20, paragraph 1). This provision, therefore, defines the following elements of defence in BH: 1. citizens, 2. the armed forces, 3. other defence elements.

99.

Mobilisation can be general or partial. A general mobilisation of the Army and other defence elements includes all wartime units and institutions, and a partial one includes only individual Army units and institutions (Article 22).

6.1.3.4. Compulsory military service

100.

The Decree law on compulsory military service46, which was adopted by the RBH Presidency at a session held on 1 August 1992, prescribed that compulsory service was an inalienable right and duty of RBH citizens to defend the homeland, protect its freedom, independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and constitutionally defined social order (Article 1, paragraph 1). By performing compulsory military service, citizens are prepared, trained and organised for: (i) armed combat, (ii) other duties in the armed forces, (iii) participation in other forms of all-people's resistance (Article 1, paragraph 2).

101.

Although the decree does not mention the right of citizens to armed resistance as a specific right, which was a legal norm that was typical of the former

45 46

1D01238 4D01030

Decree law on amendments to the decree law on defence, 23 April 1993. Decree Law on Compulsory Military Service.

48

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Yugoslav doctrine of all-people's defence, there is no doubt that Bosnia and Herzegovina also recognised the right and duty of all citizens to take part in armed combat and other forms of all-people's resistance. Apart from participation in the armed forces of BH and other organised forms of armed and civilian resistance, this also included any other form of resistance which inflicted losses on the enemy and caused material damage, using weapons or any other means.

102.

Compulsory military service, as prescribed by the decree, consists of three duties: (i) compulsory recruitment, (ii) compulsory military service, and (iii) compulsory service in the reserve (Article 4, paragraph 1). All RBH citizens are liable for recruitment, but only those citizens who are fit for military service are liable for compulsory military service and service in the reserve (Article 4, paragraph 3). Women are not liable for recruitment or compulsory military service, but can volunteer for military training (Article 5). Compulsory military service for men ends when they turn 60, and for women when they turn 50 (Article 7, paragraph 1).

103.

Conscripts become military personnel when they join a military unit or institutions of the armed forces, and they stop being military personnel when they are discharged from a military unit or institution (Article 10, paragraph 1). During compulsory military service pursuant to a call-up by a competent organ, conscripts are equal to military personnel with regard to their rights and obligations, from the moment of departure from home until they return home in their places of residence (Article 10, paragraph 2).

104.

Compulsory recruitment starts at the beginning of the calendar year in which a BH citizen turns 17, therefore, at the age of 16 (Article 11, paragraph 2), and is carried out in the calendar year in which the recruit turns 18 (Article 13, paragraph 1). In the event of an imminent threat of war or a state of war, the RBH Presidency can order the recruitment of persons who have turned 16 (Article 13, paragraph 3).

49

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105.

Recruits who are judged to be fit for military service are sent to perform compulsory military service in the calendar year in which they turn 19 (Article 20, paragraph 1), but during a state of war or an imminent threat of war, the RBH Presidency can order persons who have turned 17 to be sent to perform compulsory military service (Article 10, paragraph 5).

106.

A soldier is entitled to regular and other leave while performing compulsory military service (Article 36, paragraph 2). Although the decree does not contain a provision on the status of soldiers on leave, there is no doubt that leave does not change the soldier's status, so a person performing compulsory military service does not lose the status of soldier by going on leave.

107.

A person who completes compulsory military service is discharged from the RBH Army and becomes a reserve soldier (Article 36, paragraph 1).

108.

Conscripts who have completed compulsory military service or have fulfilled their obligation to perform compulsory military service in a different way, as well as women who are qualified for performing professional or technical services in the RBH Army or have been trained in peacetime for wartime duties in the armed forces, are liable for service in the reserve (Article 41). In the event of war or an imminent threat of war, compulsory service in the reserve is performed by joining the armed forces and performing specific military duties (Article 43, paragraph 1).

109.

Reserve personnel can have a wartime assignment in a military units or institution (Article 47, paragraph 1), but they can also have an assignment outside the armed forces (Article 44, paragraph 3), for instance, the obligation to work in a company or institution of interest for defence of the country.

110.

Units, institutions and staffs of the armed forces are obliged pursuant to the decree to issue ex officio within 15 days certificates on the date of joining the armed forces of the Republic to all conscripts ­ recruits and reserve personnel, indication whether the conscript volunteers or was mobilised into the armed

50

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forces and which establishment posts he occupied (Article 72, paragraph 4). The status of soldier is granted to conscripts ­ recruits and reserve personnel engaged on work obligation in units, institutions and staffs of the armed forces of the Republic (Article 72, paragraph 5).

111.

It follows clearly from these provisions that after a general public mobilisation, all conscripts (recruits and reserve personnel), therefore men who have turned 18, or, in the event of war and pursuant to a decision by the RBH Presidency, those who have turned 16 as well, until the age of 60, are considered to be persons who have joined the armed forces of the RBH.

112.

The provision according to which compulsory military service lasts six months (Article 19, paragraph 1) was amended on 18 July 1993. The Decree law on amendments to the Decree law on compulsory military service47, so during a state of war, a soldier who has completed compulsory military service is transferred to the reserve and retained in the Army or the armed forces until a decision is adopted to end the state of war in the Republic (Article 4).

6.1.3.5. Conclusion

113.

Pursuant to legal regulations, all BH citizens had the right and duty to participate in the defence of the country, or, rather, to contribute directly to its success through various activities, regardless of their sex, age or status in society. In practice the entire population served the purposes of armed combat. If they failed to carry out their tasks, citizens were subject to criminal and misdemeanour responsibility.

114.

In the event of war or an imminent threat of war, all men liable for military service from the ages of 16 to 60 were members of the active or reserve force of the armed forces of BH. In exceptional cases, if the competent organs

47

1D01243

Decree law on amendments to the decree law on compulsory military

service.

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determined that their contribution to the defence of the country would be greater if they worked in a state organ, company or other legal entity, or in various forms of civil defence, a man of military age was not assigned to the armed forces of BH, but rather contributed to the defence of the country by working in that institution, or by participating in unarmed, civilian forms of resistance to the aggressor.

115.

Let us reiterate that unarmed, civilian forms of resistance directly served the purposes of armed combat, and consisted of the following tasks: (i) as part of work obligation: - Occasionally they carried out various (fortification) work for the needs of the armed forces. - They provided food, accommodation and other supplies to individuals and units of the armed forces. - They sheltered, cared for and treated sick and wounded members of the armed forces. - They carried out or transported combat supplies ­ ammunition and other equipment for armed units. (ii) in civilian protection units: - They dealt with the effects of enemy combat operations ­ fighting fires in inhabited areas, removing rubble on roads. - They took care of wounded soldiers. - They buried the dead. - They evacuated the families of soldiers and other residents in the vicinity of the battlefield. (iii) in the monitoring and information service: They reported flights of enemy aircraft in the airspace. They monitored and reported movement of enemy forces on land, especially inserted and sabotage units. (iv) in the system of training and acquiring skills for defence: They acquired knowledge and skills in handling personal arms and procedures for handling ammunition and explosives. They practiced individual and group combat procedures.

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-

They acquired skills in building /combat/ features and using makeshift and local means of personal and collective protection in conditions of combat operations.

(v) in the system of general intelligence activities: During their regular civilian activities, they gathered continuously information on the enemy and submitted them to the competent state organs or directly to armed units. They were sent occasionally toward the enemy with the intention of gathering information on his forces for the needs of own armed units.

6.2.

Decisions and orders

116.

At a session held on 8 April 1992, the RBH Presidency adopted a decree to abolish the previous republican territorial defence staff and establish the Territorial Defence Staff of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina48. This creates the legal basis for establishing the armed forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina as an independent army, separate from the Yugoslav Army and the defence system of the SFRY. Although the term "territorial defence" was retained, it is necessary to stress that this was not the same concept of the territorial defence of the former Yugoslavia, which, together with the JNA, was part of the armed forces of the SFR Yugoslavia, but rather the name of the new organisation of armed forces of BH.

117.

Next day, on 9 April 1992, the RBH Presidency issued a Decision on the Integration of all Armed Forces on the Territory of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina49 according to which all armed units and individuals, with the exception of JNA and MUP forces were obliged to report to municipal, district and the City staff of territorial defence in order to be put under a unified

4D00414 Decree to abolish the previous republican territorial defence staff and establish the Territorial Defence Staff of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. 49 4D00411 Decision on the Integration of all Armed Forces on the Territory of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Presidency of the RBH, 9 April 1992.

48

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command. Groups and individuals who do not report and register by 15 April will be considered paramilitary formations (for this reason 15 April is considered to be the day of establishment of the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina50). Pursuant to an order of RBH President Alija IZETBEGOVI of 23 June 1992, the name "Territorial Defence of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina" was changed to "Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina" and the armed forces of the RBH were organised,51 and on 4 July 1992, the RBH Presidency adopted a decision to organise the armed forces of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina52. The decision entered into force on the day of its adoption, and on that day the armed forces and the RBH Army were formed (item IX).

118.

A state of imminent threat of war was declared in the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina by a decision of the RBH Presidency of 9 April 199253. At a session held on 20 June 1992, the RBH Presidency adopted a decision to declare a state of war54 because of, as stated in the introduction, the aggression on Bosnia and Herzegovina by the Republic of Serbia, the Republic of Montenegro, the Yugoslav Army and the terrorists of the Serbian Democratic Party. The goal of declaring a state of war was to enable more effective engagement of all human and material resources in the homeland and abroad in order to liberate the Republic from the aggressor, restore the rule of law and create conditions for the return of displaced persons (item 1). The aggressor had already occupied 70% of the territory of the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina by that time. The armed forces of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina were authorised by this decision to undertake the necessary measures to organise all-people's resistance in order to achieve the set goals.

4D00409 Decree Law on the Armed Forces of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Article 36. 51 4D00404 Order, Alija IZETBEGOVI, 23 June 1992. 52 4D00403 Decision to organise the armed forces of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, RBH Presidency, 4 July 1992. 53 P00150 Decision of the RBH Presidency to declare an imminent threat of war. 54 P00274 Decision to declare a state of war.

50

54

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119.

That same day, 20 June 1992, the RBH Presidency issued an order to declare a general public mobilisation in the territory of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina55. A general public mobilisation of all conscripts between the ages 18 to 55 was ordered and they were obliged immediately to report with military equipment and small arms to the nearest Territorial Defence unit (item I.). Furthermore, a general public mobilisation of all other able-bodied citizens (men of 18 to 65 years of age and women of 18 to 55 years of age) was ordered and they were obliged to report to civilian protection units, which would start to carry out tasks in the defence of the country in accordance with the decree law on defence (item II.). From that moment on, all men became members of the armed forces of BH. It is understandable that due to a shortage of weapons and equipment, as well as initial problems in establishing and organising a BH wartime army, not all men fit for military service and conscripts could be actively engaged in the armed forces. Those who were not immediately actively engaged in combat operations were in the reserve or performed other tasks important for the defence of the country.

120.

Unity of the population and the armed forces in the defence of the country is specifically stressed already in the Directive on the Defence of the Sovereignty and Independence of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina56, which was issued by the Staff of the Territorial Defence of the RBH on 12 April 1992:

"2. Forces of the RBH TO and armed civilians united under single command of the RBH STO /Territorial Defence Staff/, continue to spread, consolidate and successfully defend the whole Republic..."

It was decided to "immediately carry out a mobilisation of all forces of the RBH TO", and the first stage of the defence operation was supposed to be carried out with "mass armed resistance by citizens" (item 4).

55

4D01164 Order to declare a general public mobilisation in the territory of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. 56 4D1727 Directive on the Defence of the Sovereignty and Independence of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Staff of the Territorial Defence of the RBH, 12 April 1992.

55

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121.

At a session held on 26 June 1992 in Sarajevo, the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina adopted a platform for its activities in wartime conditions57. Parts of the platform are important for properly understanding the all-people's character of resistance to aggression, which started openly immediately after the Bosnia and Herzegovina established independence. "5. Political basis for all-people's defence war The right to life, peace and freedom is the foundation of human rights in the civilised world. Resistance to the aggressor shall be organised and carried out as an all-people's defensive struggle by all citizens and all peoples for the liberation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. (...) 6. Appeal to all patriotic forces This platform is a call to all citizens and peoples in Bosnia and Herzegovina to take part actively in the patriotic front of the struggle to repel the aggression and establish peace and freedom, order and the rule of law in the whole state territory of the Republic. (...) (bold by MG)

122.

The Supreme Command Staff of the OS /Armed Forces/ of the RBH issued on 10 September 1992 a directive58, which is exceptionally important to understand the role and significance of the population in the defence of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Sabotage and anti-sabotage operations were defined as one of the elements of armed combat: "Continuously carry out sabotage operations in the aggressor's rear and prevent him from bringing in fresh forces and supplies, inflicting as many losses on the enemy as possible. In the first stage of combat operations, focus on destroying bridges, tunnels, canyons and other features on roads leading from the valley of the River Drina and the River Lim to Sarajevo and Tuzla. /.../ In the second stage, intensify further sabotage operations, focusing on roads." (Item VI)

57

1D00942

Platform for the activities of the RBH Presidency in wartime conditions.

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The population also has a big role with regard to "intelligence support": "In the second stage, focus on gathering information on the enemy in areas of concentration and on axes of engagement of units in offensive operations. Engage intelligence organs and reconnaissance units, MUP forces and the population on intelligence support tasks." (Item VII) Reliance on the population in quartermaster support for military units (food, bathing, etc.) was also a significant contribution to the successful execution of the tasks of the armed forces. Item VII, sub-item Logistics Support, talks about this aspect of the contribution of the population. The Command of the 4th Corps of the ABH /Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina/ prepared at the beginning of 1993 The instructions for building and strengthening the combat morale of the RBH Army59. This document also emphasises the unity of the Army and the people as an important factor in building and strengthening combat morale: "Unity of the Army and the people, based on the traditions of BH and the people, is of special significance for building and strengthening combat morale. It is developed and reinforced through forms of joint preparations of the people and the Army for the defence of the country, and is manifested in: joint active and interconnected participation in the defence war; expert assistance by Army members to socio-political communities, organisations and work collectives in the preparation and waging of war; engagement of Army units and members in the defence of the lives and property of citizens; and comprehensive efforts and assistance by the people to the Army, expressed in material support, care for the wounded and sick, gathering of information on the enemy, detection and disabling of enemy agents, provocateurs and saboteurs in the field, protection of significant

123.

58

4D01240 September 1992. 59 4D01603 1993

Directive of the Supreme Command Staff of the OS of the RBH, 10 Instructions for building the combat morale of the RBH Army, 1 February

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features and supply sources, participation in fortifying the territory and other activities." In a proposal of measures for organising an all-people's war of liberation60 of 27 May 1993, the Chief of the Supreme Command Staff of the OS of the RBH, Sefer HALILOVI, "in support of the position of his Supreme Command and the President of the Presidency regarding the unacceptability of the offered plan (VOPP /Vance-Owen Peace Plan)", stressed: "The radical u-turn in the position of the great powers with regard to the aggression against the RBH clearly proves that the defence of the state and the people must be organised and carried out relying on own forces. Compared to the current situation and behaviour, this means a definitive crushing of illusions on any external military intervention as a decisive factor in stopping the aggression against the RBH and a fundamental transition to a war mode, which means maximum mobilisation of all segments and resources of the country in order for it to survive. (...) Bearing in mind all of the above-mentioned elements and factors, the Supreme Command Staff of the OS of BH proposes the following to the Presidency: - At this crucial moment, to mobilise and unite all political forces, parties, associations, movements and citizens into a patriotic front and, instead of the current strategy of victimhood and asking for help abroad on that basis, build strong combat morale by relying on own forces and providing support for the BH Army in the defence of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of our country and the salvation of the people from new pogroms . (...)"

124.

60

4D00766 Supreme Command Staff of the OS of the RBH: Proposal of measures for organising an all-people's war of liberation, 27 May 1993.

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6.3.

Operations behind enemy lines relying on the population

125.

According to the Yugoslav doctrine of all-people's defence, one of the primary forms of armed combat is combat behind enemy lines, or, rather, in territory which the enemy considered to be occupied. This resistance was generally carried out by units the strength of a group of soldiers to brigades. The Combat operations were guerrilla style and could grow into larger-scale combat operations, or indeed into a partisan form of armed combat. These units could be inserted behind enemy lines (infiltrated) across the frontline or were formed from among unassigned residents who stayed behind enemy lines. These forces generally carried out numerous smaller-scale operations in the entire territory in the form of sabotages, ambushes on roads, shooting raids on enemy forces and conquests of small places or small areas. The targets of these attacks were supposed to be representatives of the occupying authorities and individual sympathisers of the occupying authorities in the local population. These operations could also assume the characteristics of terrorist acts in some cases. The objective of these operation was essentially to inflict losses in manpower, destroy materiel, stretch forces in the territory, undermine the enemy's morale and boost the morale of own forces and the population.

126.

The fundamental precondition for this kind of armed combat was to rely on the population to take care of and provides supplies to members of the armed forces, gather intelligence information, provide new soldiers for units and ensure secrecy with regard to the stay and movement of armed groups. Without the support of the population this kind of armed combat has no possibilities for long-term and successful combat. It is precisely because of this support by the population that defence is considered to be all-people's, or, rather, resistance is all-people's, as stated in the regulations of Bosnia and Herzegovina (and other countries of the former Yugoslavia).

127.

The documents of the BH Army mentioned in section 6.2. confirm that the population was an important pillar for the Army's combat operations and

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achievement of its combat plans. Numerous other documents also confirm that, and I will mentioned just the following as examples: (i) The Chief of Security of the 42nd Mountain Brigade of the 4th ABH Corps, in his assessment of the security situation on 16 April 1993, also proposes the following measures: (i) to introduce guards in villages with a Muslim population and establish full control of villages; (ii) to make contact through the civilian authorities with all members of the Muslim population and request full engagement in the defence of their homes; (iii) to call on all Muslim members of the HVO to join the side of their people61. (ii) In a document called "Proposed Security Measures" of 18 April 1993, the Chief of Security of the 42nd Mountain Brigade of the 4th ABH Corps, among other things, also proposes: (i) to establish cooperation through the civilian authorities with the populations of Dubrave and Stolac, and (ii) "to establish cooperation with our fighters in the HVO"62. (iii)The Commander of the 42nd Mountain Brigade of the ABH 4th Corps, Bajro PIZOVI, on 18 April 1993, in an order on combat operations of the brigade, among other things ordered the organ for morale to prepare a plan for informing the population in the territories of the municipalities of Mostar, Capljina and Stolac, as well as Muslim soldiers in the HVO units of these municipalities63. (iv) In a report on the situation and events in the ABH 42nd Brigade, which the Commander of the ABH 4th Corps, Arif PASALI, submitted to the Supreme Command Staff of the Armed Forces of BH on 2 May 1993, he described how the brigade was accommodated, and among other things, he stressed that "troops who were not at the front line of defence facing the aggressor were staying at their homes". In addition to a description of tasks received by "men from the Capljina HVO" (the reference is to HVO soldiers of Muslim ethnicity ­ remark by MG), PASALI reports that

61

4D00033 Chief of Security, 42nd Mountain Brigade, ABH 4th Corps, Assessment of the Security Situation, 16 April 1993. 62 4D00034 Chief of Security of the 42nd Mountain Brigade of the ABH 4th Corps, Proposed Security Measures, 18 April 1993. 63 4D00035 Commander, 42nd Mountain Brigade, ABH 4th Corps, Order, Preparation for Brigade Combat Operations, 18 April 1993.

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"villages have maximum security and are linked by courier".64

128.

The engagement of civilians for the needs of armed combat was complex, frequent and directly served the purposes of the conduct of armed combat. BH Army units had accommodation in inhabited areas near the battlefield and in order to lessen the burden on soldiers, all able-bodied villagers were engaged for providing security for inhabited areas, units that were resting and the population. This is also confirmed by an order of the Command of the 306th Mountain Brigade of the BH Army 3rd Corps to provide security in villages: "Involve all able-bodied residents to secure the villages in which they live (in which brigade units are staying ­ note by M.G.). Engage all conscripts, regardless of whether they have work obligation ..."65 In an order to attack, the Commander of the ABH 7th Motorised Mountain Brigade, Asim KORICI, also stressed the possibility "during combat operations to achieve constant ... connection with the local population"66.

129.

130.

Sabotage combat operations were a constant feature of warfare by the BH Army. One example are sabotage operations by the BH Army in mid-July 1993 in the general area of Stolac, due to which traffic was blocked for two days in the area of the Dubrave plateau and the beginning of the HVO operation known as SOUTH was postponed.67

64 65

4D00036 ABH 4th Corps Commander, Arif PASALI, Report, 2 May 1993. 4D01476 Order, Securing rural areas, No. 02/165-1, 306th bbr /Mountain Brigade/ Command, 31 January 1993. 66 2D 00473 Command for attack, Commander Asim KORICI. 67 These sabotage operations by the BH Army are mentioned in numerous documents, including: - 4D 00462 (Official record of Salko Habida's Statement no: 02-4/3-06/4-03-226/93, 14 July 1993, Capljina, signed by Ivica Kraljevic). - 4D 00910 (Official record issued by Ivica Kraljevic about statement given by Musair Klaric, ref: 02-4/3-06/4-03-229/93, 15 July 1993). - 4D 01044 (Information issued by Nedjeljko Obradovic to HVO General Staff Mostar, re: situation in the area of responsibility of 'Knez Domagoj'' Brigade, ref: 1100-01-93-31, 16 July 1993). - 4D 01096 (Official memo of statement given by Admir Cavra issued by Ivica Kraljevic, ref: 024/3-06/4-03-241/93, 19 July 1993). - 4D 01101 (Report on questioning issued by Bosko Buntic, re: statement given by Becir Suta, ref: 02-4/3-06/4-03-234/93, 17 July 1993).

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7. HVO MUSLIM SOLDIERS AS A SECURITY PROBLEM

131.

I was asked whether Muslim soldiers of the HVO could justifiably be considered a security problem when the conflict between the HVO and the ABH escalated, assuming the existence of certain circumstances.

The moment when the conflict escalated is defined as the middle of 1993, or more precisely 30 June, by which time the ABH: a) Established control of the Konjic area, and HVO forces and the Croatian population were isolated in two enclaves (one in the area of the villages of Turija, Zabrñe and Zaslivlje, and the other in the Kostajnica area).68 b) Cut the road between Kiseljak and Busovaca, thereby beginning the process of creating small Croatian enclaves in the area of Central Bosnia.69 c) Established full control of Travnik in June.70 d) Established full control of Kakanj in June.71

An occurrence that is considered to be an assumption for the question is the attack on the HVO carried out by the BH Army on 30 June 1993 in cooperation with HVO soldiers of Muslim ethnicity. With this attack, the BH Army gained control of the Tihomir Misi HVO barracks, the area of Bijelo Polje, Vrapcii and other places in an area stretching for 26 kilometres north of Mostar.72 This action established communication between Mostar and Jablanica, which created the preconditions for ABH units in the Mostar area to link up with units from other parts of the country, and to receive regular supplies of weapons, ammunition and other necessities.73 Previously known

4D 01730 (Exhibit from Hadzihasanovic case(P692); Analysis of the combat experience of forces in the 3rd Corps area of responsibility issued by Enver Hadzhasanovic to the Supreme Command Staff of the Armed Forces). 68 4D 01216 Map of Mostar, Jablanica and Konic area, re: situation till 30 June 1993. 69 4D 00561 Map of Bosnia and Herzegovina; situation in March-April 1993. 70 4D 00562 Map of BiH, situation in June 1993. 71 4D 00562 Map of BiH, situation in June 1993. 72 4D 01216 Map of Mostar, Jablanica and Konic area, re: situation till 30 June 1993. 4D 00622 Map of the Mostar region; situation after 30 June 1993. IC 1005 Situation in Mostar region after 30 June 1993. IC 1006 Situation in Mostar region after 30 June 1993. 73 Communication between Mostar and Jablanica is substantiated, for instance, by the following documents:

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BH Army goals and plans to gain full control of the territory on the JablanicaMostar-Neum axis, proposed by the then Chief of the Main Staff of the Army Supreme Command, S. HALILOVI, at a joint session of the Presidency, Government and parliamentary parties on 10 March 1993, were one step away.74 "6. Make sure that the port of Ploce and the Ploce ­ Mostar ­ Sarajevo ­ Zenica road are in continuous operation for the needs of the state of BH. If necessary, engage international forces for this, and also use our own forces as necessary to secure that area (underlined by M.G.)."

132.

Immediately after the outbreak of the conflict in BH, a significant number of Muslims joined HVO ranks, especially in Mostar. The common goal in the fight against the Serbian aggression and the nonexistence of organised defence by Muslims were the basic reasons for Muslims to join HVO units. With the organisation of the BH Army, the units of which consisted almost exclusively of Muslims, tensions appeared between BH Army and HVO units. Armed clashes between BH Army and HVO units broke out at the end of October 1992 in Prozor and in January 1993 in Gornji Vakug and parts of Central Bosnia, but they were ended a relatively short time after they started. Open clashes of larger proportions started at the end of March 1993 in Konjic and then in mid-April 1993 in the general area of Konjic Municipality and in Central Bosnia. The conflict culminated on 30 June 1993 when BH Army forces captured the HVO Tihomir Masi barracks in the northern part of Mostar, and an area of around 26 kilometres north of Mostar in the direction of Jablanica, thereby linking up the forces of the 4th and 6th Corps of the BH

74

4D 00768 Order issued by Rasim Delic to the 4th and 6th Corps Command, ref:1/297-72, Sarajevo, 27 July 1993. 4D 00545 Excerpt from the book Herzegovinians on the Fiery Gateway of Bosnia, Esad Sejtanic, June 2005. 2D 01389 Information on the combat activities in the area of responsibility of the 1, 2 3, 4, 5 and 6 corps of the BH army. 3D02648 S. HALILOVI, Cunning Strategy, Sarajevo, 1997, page 151.

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Army.

133.

Loss of control over an exceptionally important area on the left bank of the Neretva north of Mostar was in itself alarming for the authorities of the Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna, because there was a real threat of a total loss of control over Mostar and the territory toward the coast.75 The fact that the BH Army captured a strategically important area owing also to betrayal by HVO soldiers of Muslim ethnicity, justifiably highlighted the danger that the HVO could lose control for the same reason over other areas defended by HVO units which had soldiers of Muslim ethnicity. Earlier warnings of a security threat posed by the large number of Muslim soldiers in some HVO units, which were obviously not considered important by anyone until then, turned out to be justified.76

134.

ABH documents on cooperation with Muslim soldiers in the HVO, instructions to stay in the HVO in order to carry out certain operations77, as

75

P 03038 Signed and stamped Proclamation by Jadranko PRLIC, Croatian Defence Council President, and Bruno STOJIC, HVO Defence Department Head, re: Muslim offensive against Croat in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Number: 02-1-765/93.

P01438 Signed and stamped report issued by Nojko MARINOVIC to Miljenko LASIC re: Croatian Defence Council 1st Brigade. Ref. 3155-01-01-93-1. P02223 Signed and stamped document from the Chief of HVO Security and Information Service Stjepan Radic Brigade Safety Report for 07-05-93. Ref:No.09-1029/93 P02231 Handwritten report by Ivica PUSIC, assistant for HVO Security and Information Service, to the commander of the Croatian Defence Council 3rd Brigade, re. security situation in the Croatian Defence Council 3rd Brigade area of responsibility 4D00920 Report for period from 09.05 - 13.05. 1993 issued by SIS (Information and Security Service) 3rd HVO Brigade, Mostar, 13 May 1993 P02562 Stamped Report re: Order Ref. No: 01-3159/93 dated 27.05.1993 of JIH Zone of Operations, signed by Marinko BOSNJAK. Ref: 02-1023-2/93. 2D01379 Report on the work of the security intelligence service in the period from January till June 1993 by Ivica Lucic P03355 Report on the number of Defence Departments for the period January to June 1993. Ref. 02-1/1-84/93. P04699 Report on activities of the Croatian Defence Council HZHB for the period January to June 1993

76

77

4D 01461 Defence Department, SIS, Official Note of Informative Talk, No 19-3-22. 19 September 1992 4D 00469 Official record issued by Ivica Kraljevic regarding situation and relations between Croats and Muslims in Stolac Municipality. No: 02-4/03-6/2-10-21/93, 30 March 1993. 4D 00033 Security situation valuation, Army RBiH, 4th corps, 42nd Mountain Brigade, 16 April 1993, no 06-1019/93, signed by Huso Maric. 4D 00034 Security measures proposition, Army RBiH, 4th corps, 42nd mountain Brigade, 18 April 1993, no: 06-186/93, signed by Huso Maric.

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well as other information on cooperation between HVO soldiers of Muslim ethnicity with BH Army commanders and soldiers, known to some services of Herceg-Bosna even earlier, gained in significance in the new circumstances. It is visible in many BH Army documents that the most senior BH Army commanders worked intensely to recruit HVO members of Muslim ethnicity into the BH Army and at the same time counted on them as an internal ally in the upcoming armed conflict, which eventually took place in Mostar on 30 June 1993 with the attack on the Tihomir Misi barracks and the area north of East Mostar. This if, for example, what the Chief of the Military Security Administration of the BH Army, F. MUSLIMOVI, a man in whom the President of the BH Presidency, A. IZETBEGOVI, had exceptional confidence, suggested in tasks issued to his subordinate organ in the 4th Corps Staff:78 "This is because it is realistic to expect a further deterioration of relations and even a general military confrontation between ARBiH and HVO. It is very important for such a situation to make Muslims within HVO as passive as possible and to influence their transfer from the HVO to the ARBiH."

135.

After the start of the armed conflict between the BH Army and the HVO in April 1993, the Commander of the Bregava 42nd Brigade issued an oral order to subordinate commanders:79 "...linking up with our men in the HVO was carried out;

4D 00035 Order on preparation for brigade combat operations, Army RBiH, 4th corps, 42nd Mountain Brigade,18 April 1993, no: 01-1025/93, signed by Bajro Pizovic. 4D 00036 Report about conditions and events in 42nd Mountain Brigade, Mostar, 02 May 1993, no: 01-3573/93, signed by Arif Pasalic. 4D 00568 Tasks issued by Fikret Muslimovic to the Chief of the Military Security Service, Command of the 4th Corps, ref: 03/35-68, Sarajevo, 16 April 1993. 4D 00473 Response from Bajro Pizovic addressed to Command of Knez Domagoj Brigade, Ref:01-1024/93, 18 April 1993. 2D 00281 No. 01/213, Command of Brigade "Bregava", The analysis of our forces combat experiences; signed by Commander Mr. Bajro Pizovic. 2D 00288 No. 03/35-68, SUBJECT: Assignments, Armed Forces Supreme Command Headquarters Security Department; Head Fikret Muslimovic. 78 2D 00288 No. 03/35-68, SUBJECT: Assignments, Armed Forces Supreme Command Headquarters Security Department; Head Fikret Muslimovic. 79 4D 00036 Report about conditions and events in 42nd Mountain Brigade, Mostar, 02 May 1993, no: 01-3573/93, signed by Arif Pasalic.

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- Men (Muslims, note by M.G.) from the Capljina HVO have the task of taking Tasovcii village and the bridge in Capljna in order to prevent troops being brought from the direction of Metkovi - villages (Muslim, note by M.G.) have maximum security and are linked by courier - seize the town of Stolac with our people in the HVO - seize the checkpoints in the villages of Prenj, Nakovanj and Aladinii - watch the bridge over the Bregava river in the village of Prenj and prevent HVO forces being brought in from the Krusevo -- Prenj and Svitava -- Prenj directions - close the road/s/ towards Drinavac village and Krusevo village - MB /mortar/ 60 and 82 positioned for action against the HVO - also give launcher targets on the right bank of the Neretva"

136.

Within the context of this order is also a proposal of measures which the Chief of Security of the BH Army 42nd Brigade proposed to his commander:80 "introduce a guard in the villages with a Muslim population, and establish full control of the village. - establish contact with all members of the Muslim population through the organs of the civilian authorities, and request their full engagement in the defence of their homes; - call upon all Muslim members of the HVO to place themselves on the side of their people."

137.

In the general area of Capljina and Stolac, the Capljina detachment of the ABH was established in March 1993 consisting exclusively of Muslim members. Considering that HVO units in that area included a large number of Muslims who expressed their desire to transfer to this detachment, they were told that "we (the BH Army) need them more were they are".81 Since transfer

80

4D 00033 Security situation valuation, Army RBiH, 4th corps, 42nd Mountain Brigade, 16 April 1993, no 06-1019/93, signed by Huso Maric. 81 4D 01477 Establishment of the Capljina detachment in Capljina ­ report to the 4th Corps Command, Capljina detachment, 15 March 1993.

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was possible only with the approval of the HVO command, many HVO members of Muslim ethnicity abandoned wilfully HVO units and crossed to BH Army units, which is visible in a request by the commander of the Knez Domagoj 1st Brigade to the commander of the Bregava 42nd Brigade to submit to him approvals for the transfer of a large number of soldiers, where he expresses his doubts that they deserted82.

138.

It is my opinion that under the described assumptions it is reasonable and from a military point of view completely justified to believe that there was a danger of new betrayals by HVO soldiers of Muslim ethnicity and that the HVO could lose control of other areas as well because of that. In these conditions, every military commander must issue an order on measures to monitor the conduct in battle of his own soldiers of the same ethnicity as the opposing side, restrict access to confidential information, and not send them on important combat missions, including the drastic measure of disarming and isolation in the event of individual inadequate conduct, and in the event of inadequate conduct (desertion, collective disobedience) by a large number of personnel of the same ethnicity as the opposing side, those measures can be undertaken against the majority, or, rather, all personnel in own ranks who are of the same ethnicity as the opposing side. This is the only way to prevent losses in own ranks, defeat and loss of own territory.

82

4D 01478 Submission of approval for insight and control, Request, 1st HVO Brigade Knez Domagoj, number 1100-01-01-93-220, 16 March 1993.

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8.

MILITARY

SIGNIFICANCE

OF

CENTRAL

BOSNIA

AND

NORTHERN HERZEGOVINA

139.

I was asked whether the BH Army's gaining of control over the areas of Konjic, Novi Travnik, Fojnica, Bugojno, Kakanj and Vares, and over the area from Jablanica to Mostar and further south toward the Adriatic Sea in the course of the year 1993 could be interpreted as a planned conquest of roads and economically important territories, and whether that territory had any special significance in the defence concepts of the SFR Yugoslavia.

8.1.

Geographic definition of the area

140.

The territories of Central Bosnia and Northern Herzegovina cover the central part of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which we can delineate by the mountain ranges of Borja ­ Ravan ­ Zvijezda ­ Ozren ­ Romanija ­ Jahorina ­ Bjelasnica ­ Prenj ­ Velez ­ Mostarsko blato ­ Trtla ­ Cincar ­ Vitorog ­ Lisina ­ Cemernica, or, rather, the territory of the former municipalities of Jajce, Donji Vakuf, Bugojno, Gornji Vakuf, Travnik, Novi Travnik, Vitez, Zenica, Zepce, Busovaca, Fojnica, Kresevo, Kiseljak, Visoko, Kakanj, Vares, Breza, Ilijas, Hadzii, Konjic, Jablanica, Prozor, all of Sarajevo, and the northern parts of the municipalities of Livno, Tomislavgrad, Posusje, Siroki brijeg and Mostar, as well as the southern areas of the municipalities of Skender Vakuf, Kotor Varos, Tesli and Tesanj.

141.

The territory can also be defined geographically by the upper and middle courses of the Rivers Bosna and Vrbas, which flow north from the Dinaric drainage divide and belong to the Sava (Black Sea) basin, and the basin of the River Neretva, which flows into the Adriatic Sea. The landscape is predominantly mountainous with several high mountain ranges, including Mounts Vlasi (1933 m), Bjelasnica (2067 m), Jahorina (1916 m), Vranica (2110 m), Bitovnja (1700 m), Prenj (2155 m), Velez (1969 m), Cabulja (1776

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m), Cvrsnica (2228 m ), Vran (2074 m) and Radusa (1956 m). The mountain ranges are crisscrossed by deep valleys, even canyons in some places. Between the mountain ranges are wide fields and valleys, of which the largest are Uskoplje (the middle course of Vrbas), the Lasva valley (between Travnik and Vitez), the valley of the River Lepenica and the middle course of the River Fojnica near Kiseljak, the valley of the River Usora with the general areas of the municipalities Tesli and Tesanj, the Sarajevo valley with the lower courses of the Rivers Miljacka and Zeljeznica and the source of the River Bosna. In the general area are also the largest karst valleys on the Balkan peninsula ­ the Kupres, Suica and Duvno valleys and Mostarsko blato.

142.

The largest rivers flow from south to north (Bosna and Vrbas) and north to south (Neretva). Their tributaries mostly flow from west to east (Lasva and Usora into the Bosna) and (Trebizat into the Neretva). The main roads from the Pannonian Plain to the Adriatic Sea also follow the valleys of rivers. The Dinaric rdrianage divide is the greatest obstacle to fast movement and the most significant mountain passes are Ivan sedlo (959 m) on the Sarajevo ­ Mostar route, Makljen (1123 m) on the Jajce ­ Jablanica ­ Mostar route and Kupreska vrata (1348) on the Bugojno ­ Livno road. Between the basins of the River Vrbas and the River Bosna there is a road passing via the Komar pass (927 m).

143.

The total surface area of Central Bosnia and Northern Herzegovina is about 16,000 km2 or almost one third of the territory of BH. The average altitude is over 800 m. Mountain regions are mostly covered by tall forests, while the lowlands, valleys and plains are mostly arable land.

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8.2.

The significance of that area in defence plans of the former SFR Yugoslavia

144.

The foreign policy of the then Yugoslavia advocated active neutrality, or nonalignment, which was reflected internally in continuous tension and the threat of aggression by both leading international blocs. This was the basis for formulating the defensive doctrine of so-called all-people's defence and social self-protection, which had the following main characteristics: reliance on own forces, participation of all human resources in armed combat, partisan and guerrilla warfare and the creation of a permanent free territory in the hilly central part of Yugoslavia, the so-called defence bastion83 which covered parts of Croatia (the hilly areas of the former "Republic of Serbian Krajina" without the part in Slavonia), all of BH without the Posavina and Semberija, Montenegro and Western Serbia. In this bastion, Central Bosnia and Northern Herzegovina occupied the central part.

145.

This is why the former armed forces, especially the JNA, concentrated great military power, which was manifested in the following: In the area of Central Bosnia and Northern Herzegovina84 many military industrial plants85 were built and heavy weapons were manufactured there (Bratstvo in Novi Travnik), explosives and gunpowder (Slobodan Princip ­ Seljo in Vitez), ammunition, mines, fuses and light anti-armour weapons (Slavko Rodi in Bugojno), repair and maintenance of telecommunication equipment (Repair and Maintenance Depot in Travnik), clothing and footwear (Borac in Travnik). Although the area of Central Bosnia and Northern Herzegovina was not directly threatened by possible military operations in the initial phase of a war, significant JNA forces were concentrated there: one mechanised brigade, two motorised brigades, one mountain brigade, two partisan (light infantry) brigades, three artillery regiments, one anti-armour artillery

83 84

4D01486 Map, Defence Bastion of the SFRY. In the former Yugoslavia, there were three significant military industrial regions ­ the Lasva valley (Travnik, Novi Travnik, Vitez), the surroundings of Sarajevo (Vogosa, Stup, Pale, Konjic) and Western Serbia (Uzice, Lucani, Cacak, Valjevo). All three regions were self-reliant if necessary.

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regiment, one rocket regiment of PZO (anti-aircraft defence), as well as TO forces86: six district staffs, 30 municipal staffs, 13 TO brigades (light infantry). In that areas, there was also a large number of depots87 of war reserves of units, operational systems and the supreme command. Many war reserves were also located in companies of the military industry. There were 13 technical depots in total in which large quantities of ammunition, weapons and other technical equipment were stored. Major roads went through Central Bosnia and Northern Herzegovina, ensuring relatively safe supplies for operational and strategic groups and manoeuvre of forces on peripheral battlefields if the flat parts of Yugoslavia north of the Sava were captured88. The radio relay hub on Vlasi was one of the most important ones in the JNA system of radio relay communications.

146.

At the time of Tito's Yugoslavia, Central Bosnia and Northern Herzegovina had special significance for the entire then Yugoslav state. That area was the central part of the defence bastion and the last support for the existence of the state in the event of an invasion.

8.3.

The significance of the area at the time of the collapse of the SFR Yugoslavia

147.

Until 1989, the territory of BH was almost fully in the area of responsibility of the then 7th Army District with a command in Sarajevo. From 1987 until the end of 1988, the 7th Army District was dissolved and the territory of BH was divided so that a small part (the Cazin Krajina) was assigned to the 5th Theatre

85 86

4D01485 Map, Military Industry of Central Bosnia. 4D01484 Map, Locations of JNA and TO War Units in Central Bosnia. 87 4D01491 Map, Locations of Logistics Institutes. 88 In that context, the cable communication system "Central" was built along the whole length of the former Yugoslavia, linking Strumica in Macedonia (as the furthest south-eastern point) via Central Bosnia with Postojna in Slovenia (as the furthest north-western point).

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of Operations with headquarters in Zagreb, and most of the territory was in the 1st Theatre of Operations with headquarters in Belgrade. In addition to most of the territory of BH, the 1st Theatre also included the areas of Slavonia in Croatia, Vojvodina and the northern part of Serbia, and all of Montenegro. This is indicative of the desire of the Yugoslav General Staff to connect all territories to which the policy of Greater Serbia aspired. The western border of the Belgrade theatre almost fully matched the western border of the so-called Greater Serbia.

148.

Central Bosnia and Northern Herzegovina were the venue of the first attempts at armed intervention against aspirations for independence and cessation from the Yugoslav community. In March 1991, for instance, an armoured battalion from the 325th Armoured Brigade from Banja Luka, consisting of soldiers performing compulsory military service, was sent to Kupres. Each month, crews were rotated from other armoured brigades. This battalion had the task to intervene in Wetern Herzegovina or Dalmatia, or, rather, to retain the area of the Kupres plateau until the arrival of larger operational units. After large pro-Croatian demonstrations in Split, in which a JNA soldier was killed, the JNA prepared for possible military intervention in BH and Dalmatia. In May 1991, for instance, an attempt by a mechanised convoy to pass from Mostar toward Siroki Brijeg failed when it was stopped by unarmed residents of the village of Prolog. After several days, this convoy arrived in Kupres following political intervention from Sarajevo.

149.

All of these JNA activities in that area were parts of the initial rehearsals of a scenario dating from February 1991, when the General Staff of the OS of the SFRY adopted a new plan of defence in the event of aggression by the West, the so-called plan S-289. The plan envisaged defence from an aggression by NATO countries, but in reality it was a plan of engagement of JNA forces for intervention toward Croatia and Slovenia. The plan of intervention by core

89

The plan of defence against an attack from the east (the Warsaw Pact) "S-1" was abandoned already in 1990 as redundant. The General Staff assessed that Yugoslavia was not threatened by aggression from the east, which was entirely justified after the perestroika in the Soviet Union and the fall of the Berlin wall.

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JNA forces form Serbia and BH was drawn up between 1 and 3 July 1991, after the first unsuccessful ceasefire in Slovenia. After the Brijuni meeting on 8 July 1991, the plan was abandoned, and then they modified it at the end of July and partly implemented in mid September. Central Bosnia and almost all of Herzegovina were now in the area of responsibility of the 4th Corps with headquarters in Sarajevo.

150.

For the area of Central Bosnia and Northern Herzegovina, the role and task of the 37th JNA Corps was especially significant90. Its primary task in both variants of the war plan was to defend Serbia, from the River Kolubara in the north to Metohija in the south, the River Drina in the west to the River Ibar in the East. In February 1991, the plan of defence from an invasion by the NATO pact changed, the defence zone was completely altered and the 37th Corps was assigned a zone in the basin of the River Neretva and the area of Western Herzegovina91, which had belonged to the Sarajevo 4th Corps in earlier plans.

151.

Based on that plan, at the time of the first ceasefire in the armed conflict in Slovenia, a new plan for pacification and intervention toward Croatia and Slovenia and the Croats in BH was drawn up in complete secrecy, with the engagement of only the most reliable officers from corps commands, but that plan was not completed and implemented. A new plan92 was drawn up for the 37th Corps in later July 1991 and the basic characteristics of that plan were the following: After the mobilisation of these forces, the corps is to march along the route: Kraljevo ­ Uzice ­ Visegrad ­ Foca ­ Gacko ­ Nevesinje ­ Mostar. The main forces is to be deployed in the general area of Nevesinje in readiness for intervention toward Mostar and Metkovi, while the 10th Mechanised Brigade is to control the general area of the city of Mostar.

90

At that time, the author was corps chief of staff and concurrently deputy commander. He received that plan from the theatre of operations command in Belgrade. He modified it critically and adapted it to the conditions of any battlefield in Western Herzegovina. 91 4D01483 Map, JNA Plan of Intervention in Western Herzegovina and Dalmatia. 92 The author managed the elaboration of this plan as the chief of staff of the 37th Corps immediately before his departure from the JNA.

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-

The Corps's task was to prevent the capture of the city of Mostar and to retain roads leading to the coast and not allow the then still united Croatian and Bosniak forces to capture the left bank of the River Neretva from Jablanica to the sea, and to isolated Croatian forces in the general Dubrovnik area.

152.

The plan was partly implemented in September 1991, but the units from Serbia soon withdrew to Serbia93. They implemented this plan later with units of the former (Rijeka) 13th Corps and the (Titograd) 2nd Corps. Reservists from Eastern Herzegovina and the western part of Montenegro were recruited into the units. From all of the plans of engagement of the 37th Corps in Central Bosnia and Northern Herzegovina, a conclusion can be drawn that the JNA military leadership planned an armed intervention against the Croats in Dalmatia and Western Herzegovina. This is confirmed by some indications and viewpoints: Marching the entire forces of a corps through Central Bosnia to the Kupres plateau had the aim of intimidating the Croats in Central Bosnia and encouraging the Serbs and Muslims in Eastern Bosnia and Northern Herzegovina. Deploying main corps forces on the Kupres plateau ensured unhindered stay and training of units surrounded by a population of mostly Serbian and Muslim ethnicity. There are good roads leading from the Kupres plateau toward Split, toward Imotski and on to Makarska, toward Ljubuski and on to Metkovi, toward Posusje and on to Mostar, and it is possible to intervene rapidly in Central Dalmatia. Deploying logistics units would secure facilities of the military industry in Bugojno, Travnik and Novi Travnik. The corps reserve the strength of a combat group from the area of Donji Vakuf could intervene quickly toward Travnik and the Lasva valley, or via

153.

93

At the end of September 1991, reservists from an artillery regiment from Valjevo (about 700) embarked on trailer vehicles, left the artillery pieces and small arms and went to their homes in Serbia.

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Makljen toward the middle course of the River Neretva, in the direction of Jablanica and on to Mostar. The inexistence of defence zones, failure to carry out fortification work and prepare positions before the beginning of an invasion, as well as the absence of support by theatre artillery and air forces at the time of an invasion and the lack of engagement of the forces of the Territorial Defence, which was then manned mostly by Croats, indicates that that plan was actually a plan for an intervention toward disobedient Croats in Central Dalmatia and Western Herzegovina and a plan to intimidate Croats in Central Bosnia and Northern Herzegovina.

154.

According to the author's personal knowledge, after the end of the armed conflict in Slovenia and Croatia, JNA units from these two republics mostly withdrew to the area of BH94.

155.

Therefore, on the eve of the collapse of Yugoslavia, the area of Central Bosnia and Northern Herzegovina was a kind of staging ground for intervention toward Central Dalmatia and Western Herzegovina. The intervention was supposed to be carried out by units mostly made up of Serbs from Serbia and Eastern Herzegovina, and partly also Montenegrins and some reliable Muslims from Eastern Herzegovina. In addition to intervention against the Croats, the engagement of the JNA 37th Corps from Serbia was also supposed to have an effect in intimidating Croats and Muslims in Central Bosnia and encouraging Serbs in large towns in Central Bosnia and Northern Herzegovina. One of the goals was also to ensure the unhindered work of the military industry in that area and unhindered traffic in the interior of Yugoslavia toward the central part of the Adriatic Sea. One goal was also ultimately to protect the defensive bastion from the south, which was later shown to be the defence of areas inhabited by Serbs or areas of special interest for Serbs in BH.

94

These units consisted exclusively of officers of Serbian, Montenegrin and Muslim ethnicity, because officers of Slovenian, Croatian and Albanian ethnicity mostly left the JNA during the armed conflict in Slovenia. Soldiers performing compulsory military service were mostly sent home or transferred to continue serving in their republics. They managed to withdraw a small part of their weapons and equipment. Only when they arrived in BH were these units partially filled by reserve soldiers of Serbian ethnicity from BH. These units were not a significant military force.

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8.4.

The significance of that area in the initial period of the war from mid1992 to late 1993

156.

After World War II, the former Yugoslavia located significant facilities for the production of weapons and military equipment in the territory of Central Bosnia and Northern Herzegovina. Before the start of the war in BH, those facilities were equipped with modern machines and a large number of firstclass experts were employed in them. The majority of those companies had their own development departments.

157.

The following table gives an overview of military industry facilities in Central Bosnia and Northern Herzegovina95

1.

Name

Location

Products

Employees

2.

Slavko Rodi

Bugojno

Artillery and mortar fuses Hand grenades Mines and obstacles Artillery detonator caps

3,450

3.

Borac

Travnik

Uniforms, boots and other personal equipment for soldiers

4.

Electrical repair Travnik depot

Repair

of

communications

equipment and other electronic equipment and circuits

5.

Bratstvo

Nov Travnik

60-120 mm mortars 90-155 mm artillery weapons 128-260 launchers Various hydraulics mm multiple rocket

1,450

6.

Slobodan Princip Seljo

Vitez

Nitro-glycerine gunpowder

and

rocket 780

95

Data on the military industry were obtained from the Dr. Aleksandar STAMATOVI's book "The Military Economy of the Second Yugoslavia (1945-1991), published by VIZ /Military Publishing House/, Belgrade, 2001. A. STAMATOVI was a JNA general and assistant federal secretary of defence for the military economic sector, and after retirement full professor at Belgrade Univesrity.

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Explosives

7.

Steel plant

Zenica

Special cast metals

8.

Pretis

Vogosa

Artillery ammunition Rockets Air bombs Light mobile anti-armour weapons

4,700

9.

Zrak

Sarajevo

Binoculars, sights, distance meters Optical and electronic circuits for artillery guidance systems and

2,150

Oganj /multiple rocket system 128 mm M-77/ control systems

10. Bosnalijek

Sarajevo

Medicines and other expendable medical supplies for military needs Medical equipment

11. Famos

Hrasnica

Tracked armoured vehicles Special transmissions for tanks and heavy vehicles

1,200

12. Igman

Konjic

Ammunition

for

light

infantry 1,350

weapons of all calibres from 4.5 to 14.5 mm

13. Maintenance and repair depot

Hadzii

Repair of KoV /ground forces/ 700 technical equipment (infantry and artillery weapons, armoured and tracked vehicles, motor vehicles, communications equipment) Production of spare parts for

machines and motor vehicles

14. Soko

Mostar

G-4, Kraguj and Orao combat 2,630 aircraft Gazela light helicopter

15. Repair depot for Koran engineering (Pale)

Repair of engineering equipment and devices

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equipment

16. Orao Depot

Aircraft Rajlovac

Repair of propeller and jet aircraft Production of jet engines

17. Energoinvest IRCA

Sarajevo

Medical kits

158.

In the second half of the seventies, many smaller industrial companies were built in BH to support the special purposes military industry. Small plants were built in almost every municipal seat or large town. These companies were built by three large industrial complexes in BH. The most important one was Energoinvest, which integrated companies for the production of machines and other equipment for energy facilities. Its production plants were mostly located around Sarajevo and in the Posavina. In the Herzegovina area, Soko from Mostar was such an industrial giant with many factories from Posusje to Trebinje. The military industry was mostly integrated into the UNIS (United Special Purposes Industry Sarajevo) system, based in Sarajevo. The production sites of UNIS were located in Central Bosnia as small plants or branches of larger factories of the special purposes military industry.

159.

During the collapse of Yugoslavia, the JNA managed to transfer a significant number of personnel (of Serbian ethnicity and JNA officers with a technical education) and production equipment to safe places in Serbia or BH territory under Serbian control (Republika Srpska). For instance, the Orao Aircraft Repair Depot in Rajlovac near Sarajevo was first transferred to Bijeljina (Republika Srpska) and then to Pancevo (Serbia). However, employees of Bosniak and Croatian ethnicity mostly stayed in places near factory locations and joined the political movements of their peoples. At the same time, many machines and equipment for production, raw material and semi-finished products, even unfinished products, especially heavy weapons, remained in special purposes industry plants.

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160.

During their creation (1992-1993), the armed formations of the Bosniaks and Croats in BH procured weapons, ammunition and other military equipment in three primary ways: a) From the Republic of Croatia, which supplied equipment, weapons and ammunition to the HVO and the ABH, and assisted in other ways in the creation and combat activities of those armed formations. b) By procurement through illegal channels, because a UN arms embargo was in force for all states of the former Yugoslavia, and transportation through Slovenia and Croatia. c) By collecting equipment and weapons from depots, factories and JNA installations, which the JNA did not manage to transfer to territory controlled by the Serbs when it withdrew. d) Through own production of ammunition, weapons and explosives in the special purposes industry plants that were taken over. e) By improvised production in small-business workshops.

161.

The Bosniak and Croatian sides also tried to start their own production of weapons and ammunition. The significance attributed to military production by the Bosniak side can already be observed in key documents from a military workshop of the commanders and senior officers of the Patriotic League96 on 7 and 8 February 1992 in the village of Mehurii on the periphery of the Lasva valley near Travnik. The basis for the discussion was a document entitled "Tasks of the RVS /regional military staffs/", which was drawn up in late 1991 by one of the initiators of the Patriotic League, and later Chief of the Main Staff of the BH Army, Sefer HALILOVI, which he sent then to all staffs in the field. That document stated the following97:

The Patriotic League is the embryo of the subsequent BH Army. It was in fact the military organisation of the Bosniac people and was formed and organsised mostly by former JNA active-duty officers of Muslim ethnicity. At the time of forming and the above-mentioned workshop, it was outside of the Territorial Defence, which at that time was the only military organisation of the Republic of BH (the JNA was a Yugoslav military organisation, and territorial defences were organised in the republics of the former Yugoslavia). 97 3D 02648 S. HALILOVI, Cunning Strategy, Sarajevo 1997, pages 164 and 165 (e-court pages BCS 68-69 and ET 49-50).

96

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"6. Pay special attention in the briefing to the special purposes military industry and type of production, and explain our positions and plan. 7. State the possibilities of small enterprises for the production of establishment and make-shift equipment (hand grenades, mines, etc.), along with the appropriate documentation. 8. Possibilities for storing and safekeeping large quantities of weapons and MES /mines and explosives/98."

162.

The "Directive for the defence of sovereignty" was also adopted at that workshop, and item 4 of it stated the following99: "...With select forces, fast and vigorous raids, capture JA /Yugoslav Army/ ammunition, MES and weapon warehouses and depots, seal off barracks... Keep main forces in Central Bosnia and auxiliary forces in the Cazin-Prijedor and Tuzla regions (underlined by M.G.)."

163.

Implementing this Directive the Bosniak side started production for military purposes in three phases. The first phase included production of auxiliary equipment, repair of captured weapons and the construction and production of makeshift ammunition and explosives and weapons, or as HALILOVI writes100: "Throughout the Bosnian state, homemade weapons production started in a hundred places. Nobody asks from what and how: every idea became reality overnight. At time of war, everything is more than welcome, especially when we are isolated on two sides ­ by two aggressors."

164.

The second phase already was organised production in factories where general consumption products used to be made earlier101.

98 99

MES ­ mines and explosives. 3D 02648 S. HALILOVI, Cunning Strategy, Sarajevo 1997, page 168 (e-court pages BCS 70 and ET 53). 100 4D01488 S. HALILOVI, Cunning Strategy, Sarajevo 1997, pages 92-94 101 4D01488 S. HALILOVI, Cunning Strategy, Sarajevo 1997, pages 92-94

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"So military factories appeared where there have never been any ­ in Biha, Travnik, Zenica, Tuzla, Tesanj and other towns, even in Srebrenica... A brigade of the Centre for Special Purposes Production was formed in Sarajevo ... in which they gathered an impressive number of military experts."

165.

The third phase of production began at the end of October 1992 when a sector for special purposes production was formed at the Ministry of the Economy and Energy. This production was organised completely on the basis of the earlier production, especially in Central Bosnia102. "Until then we produced hand grenades, rifle grenades, incendiary materials and the things that military factories in Konjic, Gorazde, Bugojno, Travnik, Novi Travnik and Zrak in Sarajevo could already make."

166.

S. HALILOVI again indicates the scale of this somewhat makeshift production103: "In the first year and a half of the war alone (from April 1992 to October 1993 ­ note by M.G.), about 25,000 mortar shells and other artillery rounds, and more than 200,000 hand grenades and rifle grenades, were produced in occupied Sarajevo."

167.

After the withdrawal of the JNA from BH territory under the control of Muslims and Croats in April and May 1992104, BH Army forces captured the

102 103

4D01488 S. HALILOVI, Cunning Strategy, Sarajevo 1997, pages 92-94 4D01488 S. HALILOVI, Cunning Strategy, Sarajevo 1997, pages 92-94 104 The Supreme Command adopted a decision to withdraw JNA units from BH on 4 May with a deadline until 19 May 1992. In practice, the 2nd Amy had already started to withdraw from BH territory in April by disassembling the military industry and redeploying depots and war reserves, but the real withdrawal of units started in May when paramilitary forces of the Muslims committed grave crimes in Sarajevo and Tuzla. The JNA handed over the majority of weapons, equipment and other materiel to the newly-created army of Republika Srpska /RS/. Almost all JNA members (soldiers, noncommissioned officers, officers and civilians serving in the JNA) who originated from BH also joined the RS Army. In practice, the JNA did not even withdraw from BH, but only retreated from areas under the control of the Muslims and Croats. Many JNA units which had withdrawn earlier from the territories of Slovenia and Croatia to BH and were manned by reserve personnel of Serbian ethnicity were just renamed as units of the RS Army. Some units of the POdgorica Corps remained in the area of Eastern Herzegovina until December 1992.

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most significant plants of the military industry in BH. The Bosniaks captured the Zrak and Bosnalijek special purposes production factories in Sarajevo, Famos in Hrasnica, Slavko Rodi in Bugojno, Borac and the Repair and Maintenance Depot in Travnik and Bratstvo in Novi Travnik. The infantry ammunition factory in Konjic was fully in the hands of the BH Army and it worked continuously in practice. The factory in Gorazde produced nitroglycerine explosive, different kinds of detonating caps and small-calibre ammunition. The heavy weapons factory in Novi Travnik was especially important. It was captured by the ABH and the HVO together in the first days of the war and they found significant numbers of unfinished artillery weapons there.

168.

The Slobodan Princip ­ Seljo explosives factory in Vitez and the completely empty factory halls of the Soko aircraft factory in Mostar remained in HVO hands. Only the factory in Vitez continued production, but it was not possible to organised the production of airfcraft, because the Yugoslav authorities took apart and transferred to Serbia most of the machined and semi-finished goods.

169.

According to pre-war assessments of the military industry, the Muslims kept facilities and equipment worth 1,844,300,000 USD105.One should add to this the value of the facilities of the Orao aircraft repair and maintenance depot in Rajlovac near Sarajevo, from which the JNA transferred the equipment and semi-finished goods to RS territory and on to Serbia. The Croats managed to keep military industry plants worth 713,900,000 USD, because the value of the Soko aircraft factory was completely negligible considering that the JNA left behind empty factory halls.

170.

Production was possible to the extent that supplies of semi-finished goods and energy were available. In November 1992, the Muslim side started to produce artillery shells, but the main problem was a shortage of explosives (underlined by M.G). Over 200,000 pieces of various types of artillery ammunition were

105

"Military Industrial Complex of the SFRY", S. KOVACEV, Z. MATIJASCI, J. PETROVI, Polemos 9, Zagreb, UDK /Universal Decimal Classification/: 355.1(497.1):338:341.2.

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waiting for explosives106, which is even many more shells than requested in a request dated 7 April 1993107. The following claim presented by the Chief of the Main Staff of the BH Army, S. HALILOVI, at a military workshop on 21 and 22 August 1993108 is indicative of the goals of the Muslims in the early spring of that year: "If we are to get the military industry working properly we have to resolve two issues: capture the explosives factory in Vitez as a matter of urgency, and plan and carry out an operation to capture Zunovica, a significant depot for raw materials and, of course, ammunition.109"

171.

The Supreme Command Staff (earlier the Main Staff of the BH Army) requested support almost every day from the BH Presidency and Government in procuring semi-finished goods, especially explosives, to continue manufacturing ammunition. On 5 February 1993, for instance, it proposed the following110: "Provide the BH Army with the necessary quantities of ammunition,

medicines, medical supplies and food as soon as possible. This presupposes the opening up of corridors through Herzegovina and Central Bosnia under the control of the HVO (underlined by M.G.)."

172.

On 2 March 1993, the Supreme Command Staff sent the RBH Government and the Ministry of Defence a report on the critical situation with regard to armed combat111: "the units do not possess the necessary number of assets for POB /antiarmour combat/, infantry ammunition of 7.9 mm, 7.62 mm and 5.54 mm

106 107

4D01488 S. HALILOVI, Cunning Strategy, Sarajevo 1997, pages 92-94 1D 01062 S. HALILOVI, Cunning Strategy, Sarajevo 1997, pages 212 and 213 (e-court pages BCS 46-47 and ET 46-47). 108 1D 01062 S. HALILOVI, Cunning Strategy, Sarajevo 1997, page 239 (e-court pages BCS 73 and ET 70). 109 Zunovica is a place near Hadzii where a complex of JNA depots was located and where ammunition and explosives were mostly stored. The Serbs held the general area of Hadzii and these depots. 110 1D 01062 S. HALILOVI, Cunning Strategy, Sarajevo 1997, page 196 (e-court pages BCS 30 and ET 31). 111 1D 01062 S. HALILOVI, Cunning Strategy, Sarajevo 1997, page 197 (e-court pages BCS 31 and ET 32).

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calibres, and 120-155 mm calibre artillery ammunition. The current reserves have been reduced to 0.5 of a b/k /combat set/... Conclusion: the situation with regard to ammunition supplies for the BH Army is critical."

173.

One month later, on 7 April 1993, the Supreme Command Staff again submitted a request to the RBH Presidency and Government for the procurement of materiel and technical equipment, in which it requested112: "The amounts of ammunition for infantry weapons have been calculated for 3 b/k /combat sets/, as follows: 4. 7.62 x 39 mm round 28. Shell for 122 mm howitzer 31. 100 mm tank shell 78,000,000 pieces 1,500 pieces 13,000 pieces"

174.

At a RBH Presidency session held on 25 march 1993, the Chief of the Supreme Command Staff, S. HALILOVI, entered into a fierce verbal duel with Presidency member KONJICIJA, when he reprimanded the Presidency using sharp language113: "And, provide ammunition, we'll return everything in three days... ...the last minimal quantity of ammunition came to us on 15 November 1992... ...you, as the state, haven't provided anything..."

175.

Several days later, S. HALILOVI proposed the following at a RBH Presidency session on 10 March 1993114: "6. Make sure that the port of Ploce and the Ploce ­ Mostar ­ Sarajevo ­ Zenica road are in continuous operation for the needs of the state of BH. If necessary, engage international forces for this, and also use our own forces as necessary to secure that area."

112

1D 01062 S. HALILOVI, Cunning Strategy, Sarajevo 1997, pages 212 and 213(ecourt pages BCS 46-47 and ET 46-47) 113 4D01490 S. HALILOVI, Cunning Strategy, Sarajevo 1997, page 197, page 156. 114 3D02648 S. HALILOVI, Cunning Strategy, Sarajevo 1997, page 151 (e-court pages BCS 65 and ET 45).

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176.

At almost the same time, President of the RBH Presidency Alija IZETBEGOVI stated on Sarajevo TV 115: "We managed to get hold of 30,000 rifles and machine guns, 20 million bullets, 37,000 mines, 46,000 anti-armour rockets, 20,000 hand grenades, 90,000 military uniforms and 120,000 pairs of boots."

177.

Such a claim is certainly in collision with the request of the Supreme Command Staff to ensure b/k /combat sets/ of ammunition. The Bosniaks certainly did not manage to consume that much ammunition in twenty days or so. A. IZETBEGOVI's statement probably had political and propaganda significance in the sense of intimidating the opposing side and forcing negotiations, or, rather, opening supply routes, especially the Croatian /side/. The Bosniaks probably did smuggle significant amounts of ammunition, weapons and military equipment in spite of heightened controls of transports and cargo. Sefer HALILOVI writes about that:116 "The group in the Main Staff (later VK /Supreme Command/ Staff) led by Mirza PINJO and Raif DZIGALO worked out a way to bring raw materials to BH: we already had enormous experience ­ for months we had been sending ammunition from Visoko in oxygen bottles, and later, when that was discovered, we transferred weapons, ammunition and raw materials through Chetnik territory in humanitarian aid containers."

178.

It is also interesting that the Bosniaks purchased ammunition from their opponents. S. HALILOVI says117: "At the same time, we bought a small amount of weapons and about a million and a half bullets from the Chetniks and Ustasha... ...That happened at the end of April 1993."

P08632 162 and ET 83) 116 4D01488 117 4D01488

115

Lord David OWEN book: Balkan Odyssey, page 127(e-court pages BCS S. HALILOVI, Cunning Strategy, Sarajevo 1997, pages 92-94 S. HALILOVI, Cunning Strategy, Sarajevo 1997, pages 92-94

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179.

The former Chief of Staff of the 5th Corps, Ramiz DURAKOVI, told the author in April 1994, during a private visit to Ljubljana, how he had personally packed ammunition in flour sacks and food containers in Zagreb and that they were later sent to the surrounded Cazin Krajina as humanitarian aid.

180.

Another senior BH Army commander, M. ALAGI, who commanded the Bosnian Krajina Operations Group, which was deployed in the Lasva valley, wrote118: "The black market was flourishing ­ there was both ammunition and food there... ...I made the decision to trade with the Chetniks in the area of Meokrnje 119..."

181.

The Muslims succeeded in spite of great difficulties to obtain in the spring of 1993 certain amounts of ammunition for light weapons, but most probably did not manage to obtain large amounts of artillery shells. At the same time, over 25,000 artillery shells were finished, but had not explosive and gunpowder charges. That material could only be obtained at the Slobodan Princip ­ Seljo factory in Vitez, which was under HVO control.

182.

The Bosniak leadership did not have a united position on the creation of conditions for the work of its own military industry. This is confirmed by the response of Deputy Minister of Defence Hasan CENGI to the Chief of the Main Staff of the ABH, Sefer HALILOVI, when he insisted on own production of ammunition:120 "What you are doing is not worth it. It is much cheaper to buy ammunition and weapons abroad than to produce it in Bosnia. "

118

3D02638 N. LATI and Z. ISAKOVI, "The War in Central Bosnia, War Memoirs of General Alagi", BEMUST, Zenica, 1997, page 32(e-court pages BCS 15, ET 8) 119 Meokrnje is a mountain about 20 kilometres north-east of Travnik, then on the front line separating Muslim and Serbian forces. It is located on a forest road which connected Travnik and Kotor Varos at the time. 120 4D01488 S. HALILOVI, Cunning Strategy, Sarajevo 1997, pages 92-94

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183.

The fact that the Bosniak side had a significant number of military industry experts is also confirmed by the fact that already in 1993 they sent a large group to Iran, where they organised and led the refurbishment and modernisation of 1,200 Iranian T-55 tanks of Soviet make to Western standards. In addition to BH (personnel from the Hadzii repair and maintenance depot), Slovenia (Bregana repair and maintenance depot and Iskra ­ Fotona from Ljubljana) and Serbia (Cacak repair and maintenance depot) also took part in this large and profitable job121. Then Deputy Minister of Defence in the RBH Government Hasan CENGI is mentioned in this job.

184.

The following conclusions can be drawn from the above: The BH Army did not have enough ammunition for all types of weapons, especially infantry and mortar /weapons/. The central logistics support system of the BH Army was not effective. Due to a shortage of raw materials and semi-finished goods, especially explosives for artillery shells and nitro-glycerine gunpowder, production of ammunition for the needs of the BH Army was not possible in the captured installations and plants of the military industry. Supply routes from Croatia, leading through Northern Herzegovina and Central Bosnia, were controlled by the HVO, which favoured the central Bosniak political authorities, which could portray themselves as victims who cannot arm themselves to the international public. The absence of regular supplies of ammunition diminished the combat capabilities of the BH Army.

8.5.

Routes and traffic during 1992 and 1993122

185.

The most significant routes leading from the Pannonian Plain to the Adriatic Sea, or, rather, from Central Europe to the eastern and western parts of the Balkan Peninsula and further on to Asia cross in the area of Central Bosnia

121

4D01493 "NACIONAL", Headline: Americans want to prevent modernization of 1200 Russian tanks T-55 which Bosniak's engineers are repairing in Iran, 13 November 1996

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and Northern Herzegovina. All of these routes cross in the area of Central Bosnia.

186.

The administrative route Banja Luka ­ Jajce ­ Bugojno ­ Gornji Vakuf ­ Prozor ­ Jablanica ­ Mostar (number 1) follows the valley of the River Vrbas via the Makljen mountain pass and continued along the valley of the River Rama and the River Neretva. Due to shelling by the Army of Republika Srpska, traffic on part of the Jablanica ­ Mostar main road was not unsafe, so it was redirected near Prozor to the route Rumboci village ­ Orasac village ­ Lipa ­ Tomislavgrad ­ Livno ­ Croatia. Small vehicles could also use the alternative route Jablanica ­ Sovii ­ Blidinje ­ Posusje. The section of the Prozor ­ Orasac ­ Lipa road across Mount Vran was built by HVO construction units in the autumn of 1992. A section of the Banja Luka ­ Jajce ­ Donji Vakuf road was under continuous control of the Serbian army, and the remaining parts of the road were controlled by the Croats and Muslims.

187.

The administrative route Zepce ­ Zenica ­ Vitez ­ Novi Travnik ­ Bugojno ­ Gornji Vakuf ­ Prozor ­ Rumboci ­ Orasac ­ Lipa ­ Tomislavgrad ­ Croatia was dubbed the "road of salvation". This route includes the earlier mentioned route which was controlled by the Croats and Muslims (from Bugjno via Livno to Croatia). There was also a shorter alterative route for the section from Novi Travnik to Gornji Vakuf, which was a narrow dirt road for the most part, but was often used. There was also a side road on the Novi Travnik ­ Gornji Vakuf section, which led via the Rostovo plateau and mountain pass (1,025 m), which was paved from the direction of Novi Travnik, but was a narrow dirt road between Rostovo and Gornji Vakuf. In the second half of 1992, the BH Army had a training centre for sabotage units in tourist facilities on Rostovo.

188.

The administrative route Doboj ­ Zenica ­ Kakanj ­ Visoko ­ Sarajevo ­ Tarcin ­ Ivan Sedlo ­ Konjic ­ Jablanica ­ Mostar ­ Metkovi (in Croatia) follows the valley of the River Bosna via the Sarajevo valley, the valley of the

122

4D01482

Map, Roads of the traffic Muslim and Croats during the war 1992-1993

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River Zujevina across Ivan Sedlo and from Konjic further on along the valley of the River Neretva, and neat Jablanica it merges with route 1. Along this route, as well as route 1, there is a good-quality road with a paved surface about 7-8 m wide. Due to the blockade of Sarajevo, this route was redirected on the Visoko - Kiseljak ­ Kresevo ­ Tarcin section. The Kresevo ­ Tarcin section is an upgraded forest road. Since the Serbs controlled the area of Doboj and the area around Sarajevo, the Muslims and Croats used the route ZenicaKakanj-Visoko-Kiseljak-Kresevo-Tarcin-Konjic-Jablanica-Mostar-Metkovi.

189.

A new road corridor Kakanj ­ Vares ­ Rijeka ­ Ribnica ­ Busovaca ­ Tuzla was established as an extension on the above-mentioned administrative route. Most of the route follows forest road, traffic was difficult, especially in wintertime, but that was the only supply route for the population in the Tuzla region and the southern parts of the Posavina.

190.

Between Kiseljak and Jablanica there was a road; Kiseljak ­ Fojnica ­ Dusina ­ Neretvica ­ Ostrozac, on which traffic was limited because of a narrow, metalled surface and narrow canyons of the small rivers Gvozdanka and Neretvica. That road was mostly under the control of the BH Army, especially when the Bosniaks captured Fojnica in June 1993 and expelled the Croats from the Dusina area.

191. The lateral road Travnik ­ Lasva ­ Kakanj ­ Vares, and the bypass road Busovaca ­ Kiseljak ­ Visoko ­ Podlugovo ­ Breza ­ Vares, were the main roads in central Bosnia from west to east. The route was controlled alternately by the ABH and the HVO. After incidents on that route in the autumn of 1992, the ABH and HVO openly clashed in the second half of 1993.

192. Since the Komar mountain pass was continuously in the hands of the RS Army, communication between the Uskoplje valley and the Lasva valley was possible using the Bugojno ­ Novi Travnik road, which was under the control of Bosniak forces all the time.

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193.

Traffic on all roads in Central Bosnia and Norther Herzegovina was very difficult for all sides in the conflict, especially the Bosniak and Croatian sides. For the Bosniaks, opening the roads toward Herzegovina was of crucial importance and they had to open them using all means available, even at the cost of armed conflict with the Croats. The Croats of Central Bosnia and the Tuzla region would probably have been some kind of hostages with regard to the Repubic of Croatia and the HZ-HB /Croatian Community of HercegBosna/. This can be understood from the words of the Commander of the Bosnian Krajina OG /Operations Group/, M. ALAGI, whose area of responsibility included the Lasva valley when he prepared the operation to capture Vitez and expel the Croats from Central Bosnia123: "I for one was bothered by the question: what to do with civilians if we enter Vitez? Create conditions for surrender, or make it possible for them to move south-west, that was the second dilemma. And the third option was to keep them encircled and put pressure on them so that supplies for us from Croatia would not stop entirely (underlined by M.G.). In view of the overall situation, we opted for this latter assessment, and instead of liberating Vitez, we left it to serve as a strategic valve in order to supply other parts of Bosnia (underlined by M.G.)."

194.

It was also very important for the Croats to open internal routes. In that context, it was necessary to break the blockades and remove checkpoints near Kacuni and Bilalovac, and on Rostovo. The blockade of traffic cut regular supplies and communication between the individual parts of the Croatian enclave in Central Bosnia, and also regular supplies from the rear in Herzegovina in order to link up the Croats in the areas of Kresevo, Dusina and Kiseljak with the area of Busovaca and then with the area of Vitez ­ Novi Travnik, and after that with Bugojno and Gornji Vakuf. This road was also significant for supplying HVO units defending Bugojno and for the manoeuvre of reserves, or, rather, mobile forces toward endangered Croatian villages in

123

3D02638 N. LATI and Z. ISAKOVI, "The War in Central Bosnia, War Memoirs of General Alagi", BEMUST, Zenica, 1997, page 26 (e-court pages BCS 12, ET 7).

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the Lasva-Lepenica valley.

195.

There was no political will at the highest levels on both sides to establish communication by means of negotiations and cooperation. The Supreme Command Staff of the BH Army sent a request to the RBH Presidency on 5 February 1993 for vigorous engagement in order to resolve the complex military situation, with an almost imperative and blackmailing request to124: "...Provide the BH Army with the necessary quantities of ammunition, medicines, medial supplies and food as soon as possible. This presupposes the opening up of corridors through Herzegovina and Central Bosnia under the control of the HVO (underlined by M.G.).

If these steps are taken, the BH Army will be provided with more favourable means to defend and extend the free territory (underlined by M.G.). Otherwise, the BH Army will not be responsible for possible negative consequences."

196.

On 2 March 1993, the Supreme Command Staff of the BH Army sent a report to the BH Government and Ministry of Defence on the critical situation in the conduct of armed combat in which it accused all organs of the authorities for possible failure and the defeat of BH Army units125: "It is the work and the responsibility of the R BH Ministry of Defence and Government organs to obtain and supply weapons and military equipment to R BH Army Logistics Centre. The fact is that there are not sufficient assets in the R BH Army Logistics Centre to conduct the armed struggle, and we have no information about what the Ministry of Defence and the R BH Government have done with regard to this matter, and that the success of the armed struggle depends on the weapons and ammunition available. It is obvious that R BH Ministry of Defence and

124

1D 01062 S. HALILOVI, Cunning Strategy, Sarajevo 1997, page 196 (e-court pages BCS 30 and ET 31). 125 1D 01062 S. HALILOVI, Cunning Strategy, Sarajevo 1997, page 197 (e-court pages BCS 31 and ET 32).

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Government organs will bear full responsibility for any lack of success in the struggle with the aggressor (underlined by M.G.)."

197.

On 10 March 1993, the Chief of the Supreme Command Staff, S. HALILOVI, presented the following proposal at a joint session of the Presidency, Government and parliamentary parties126: "4. With the Republic of Croatia, at the political stage, finally settle the most important issue ­ logistics for the needs of the RBH, or, rather, the armed forces. 5. At the international stage, encourage all friendly countries to put pressure on the Republic of Croatia to abandon its support for `Herceg-Bosna' and work actively to abolish it. 6. Make sure that the port of Ploce and the Ploce ­ Mostar ­ Sarajevo ­ Zenica road are in continuous operation for the needs of the state of BH. If necessary, engage international forces for this, and also use our own forces as necessary to secure that area." Further in his presentation, S. HALILOVI, warned those present127: "...since requests for your more active engagement that we have submitted to the Government and the Presidency have not yet appeared on the agenda, let me remind you briefly of them, and ask you yet again to take them into consideration as soon as possible... However, it is our opinion that the Presidency and the Government, and municipal authorities, are not reacting in an organised and sufficiently vigorous manner to the current, very complex situation on the battlefield and the problems appearing in organised resistance to the aggressor against the RBH, which may lead to negative consequences of unforeseen proportions (underlined by M.G.)."

198.

199.

The following conclusions can be drawn:

126

3D02648 BCS 65 and ET 45). 127 4D01489

S. HALILOVI, Cunning Strategy, Sarajevo 1997, page 151 (e-court pages S. HALILOVI, Cunning Strategy, Sarajevo 1997, page 152.

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-

The main roads were completely cut because they were physically occupied and controlled by the RS Army.

-

Some roads were exposed to occasional artillery fire of the RS Army, especially the Novi Travnik ­ Bugojno and Capljina ­ Mostar ­ Jablanica roads.

-

Partial control of individual sections of main roads by the BH Army and the HVO caused frequent traffic interruptions lasting several days and frequent negotiations with UNPROFOR mediation were required to enable traffic.

-

Setting up of checkpoints at important intersections by members of the BH Army and the HVO caused much tension and serious incidents which often grew into armed clashes128.

-

Traffic in the winter of 1992/1993 was especially problematic because of deep snow.

-

Both sides were preparing to use arms and armed force against each other in order to open up roads and establish traffic and supplies for their armies and population.

8.6.

Conclusion

200.

In view of the economic and traffic significance of Central Bosnia and Northern Herzegovina, it would be justified for the BH Army from a military point of view to: (i) Secure full control of the Konjic area, which is exceptionally important because of the following circumstances: 1) It is in Sarajevo's rear and thus exceptionally important for preparing and carrying out any military operation to liberate Sarajevo. 2) Due to the vicinity of Sarajevo, the military infrastructure from the time of Yugoslavia and roads, the Konjic area was the most

128

4D01479 UNHCR humanitarian convoys had to negotiate their way through 90 roadblocks to get from Zagreb to Sarajevo. www.unhcr.ba/publications/state_refugees_bih.pdf

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favourable location for the military command leading combat operations. 3) Konjic was the most important communication point on the Sarajevo ­ Jablanica ­ Mostar ­ Adriatic Sea route. 4) Konjic was the location of the IGMAN factory, which produced ammunition for light infantry weapons. (ii) Capture Vitez and use the exceptionally important explosives factory in that town to arm itself. (iii) Establish full control over town in which important facilities of the military industry were located ­ Bugojno, Travnik and Novi Travnik. (iv) Establish full control over the route leading from Central Bosnia via Jablanica and Mostar to the Adriatic Sea and thus ensure conditions for receiving continuous and unhindered supplies.

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9. WAS MOSTAR BESIEGED?

201. I was asked whether East Mostar could be considered to have been besieged after 30 June 1993 from a military point of view if (a) an area of 50 km on the left bank of the Neretva (a part north of East Mostar and a part south East Mostar) was under the control of the BH /Bosnia and Herzegovina/ Army129 and (b) if there was a route between Jablanica and East Mostar (though it was a mountain trail for several kilometres), over which BH Army units in East Mostar and surrounding areas received aid and over which weapons and ammunition arrived for the BH Army, and the civilian population could leave toward Jablanica.

202.

The above-mentioned assumptions (a) and (b) are confirmed by the following documents: (i) Report of the Supreme Command Staff of the OS /Armed Forces/ of BH on combat operations in the territory of the RBH /Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina/ for a period of 24 hours on 30 June 1993, stating that the BH Army "captured the following important strongholds: North Camp, Rastane, Vrapcie, Bijelo Polje, Salakovac i Rosci. Among other things we have under our control all HE /hydroelectric powerplants/ on the Neretva river except HE Capljina. /.../ According to the report of the Command of the 4th Corps, the units of this Corps linked up with the units of the 6th Corps and that will have the positive influence on the further combat activities."130 (Remark by M.G. ­ the Mostar area is in the area of responsibility of the 4th Corps of the ABH /Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina/, and the area of Jablanica and Konjic is in the area of responsibility of the 6th Corps).

Shown in documents 4D00625, IC01005, IC01006. 2D 01389 Report of the Supreme Command Staff of the OS of BH on combat operations in the territory of the RBH for a period of 24 hours on 30 June 1993, no. 02/1-182 of 1 July 1993.

130

129

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(ii)

Order of the ABH Commander Rasim DELI of 27 July 1993 to send Namik DZANKOVI to the territory in the areas of responsibility of the 4th and 6th Corps131.

(iii)

UNPROFOR press release of 21 August 1993 stating that the ABH Commander in Mostar, Sulejman BUDAKOVI, stated that he would agree to a ceasefire, but that the corridor to Jablanica must be retained132. [Redacted]133. Order of the Deputy Commander of the Supreme Command Staffa of the OS of the RBH, Stjepan SIBER, of 4 September 1993, with an introductory assessment that "the extreme wing of the HVO /Croatian Defence Council/ and HV /Croatian Army/" are ready for an offensive on the Prozor ­ Jablanica axis, and that the Mostar ­ Jablanica ­ Sarajevo road would be blocked as a result134.

(iv) (v)

(vi)

Order of the Chief of the Main Staff of the Supreme Command of the ABH, Sefer HALILOVI, of 6 September 1993, which mentions the engagement of the Zulfikar reconnaissance and sabotage brigade "on the Vrdi village ­ Goranci village axis toward Mostar", and the commander of that unit is ordered to regulate how and when to release water from the lake of the Salakovac HE /hydro-electric power plant/ together with the director of the hydro-electric power plant135. Document of the Commander of the ABH 4th Corps, Arif PASALI, of 7 September 1993, which states that one or two companies of the 7th Muslim Brigade of the 3rd Corps of the RBH Army should be sent as

(vii)

131

4D 00768 Order issued by Rasim Delic to the 4th and 6th Corps Command, ref:1/29772, Sarajevo, 27 July 1993. 132 P 03858 UNPROFOR Operational updates and press releases for the period 16 Aug 93 to 22 Aug 93. 133 [Redacted] 134 4D 00780 Signed and stamped order issued by Stjepan Siber to the 6th Corps Command, re: measures for stabilization of defence, ref: 02/1075-1, Sarajevo, 04 September 1993. 135 3D 00939 Command issued by Sefer Halilovi, 6 September 1993.

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agreed to the area of responsibility of the 4th Corps, therefore the Mostar area136. (viii) A report of the Chief of Staff of the ABH 4th Corps of 14 October 1993 on the situation in the area of responsibility of Operations Group North-1 contains information on military units and their positions north of East Mostar. Among other things, it states "a big problem for the OG /Operations Group/ Command is the transport of civilians and others marching north and south", and that "there are big problems with the transport of the wounded and other things for the town". "There is a big problem with bread supplies for this unit since firewood for the bakery has to be transported to Mostar, and bread from Mostar to Bijelo Polje, while at the same time there is a bakery in Vrapcii that could start operating after minor reparations," states the report. A large part of the report is dedicated to the issue of competence over the transport platoon used for transporting goods on the mountain section of the Mostar ­ Jablanica road, and it mentions that "when petroleum is transported, it drips on horses, causing large wounds and knocking them out of action".137 (ix) Order to attack of the commander of the Zulfikar brigade, Alispaga Zulfikar, of 11 September 1993, with the assessment that "the aggressor forces, including parts of the HVO and HV" have received the task to "capture HE on the Neretva River."138. (x) Order of the Commander of the ABH Supreme Command Staff, Rasim DELI, of 12 September 1993 mentioning combat operations in the direction of Prozor and Mostar139. (xi) Proposal for combat operations on the front from Gornji Vakuf to Mostar, drawn up on 20 September 1993, by a team consisting of Sefer

136

3D 00932 EXHIBIT FROM HALILOVIC, REPLY/REPORT SIGNED BY ARIF PASALIC, No. 838-06 of 7 September 1993. 137 4D 00179 Signed and stamped report issued by Esad Ramic, re: situation found during inspection of responsibility zone of Operational Group 'NORTH-1', ref: 03-81/93, 14 October 1993. 138 3D 02155 HAL-1-208, ORDER TO ATTACK ISSUED BY ALISPAGO ZULFIKAR, OPERATION DEFENCE OF THE PEOPLE'S RIGHTS VRDI 93. 139 4D 01113 Order issued by Rasim Delic to the Chief of Supreme Command Staff and to the Commander of the 6th Corps Command, re: reexamine the decision regarding planned combat actions towards Prozor and Mostar, ref: 01/47-245, 12 September 1993.

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HALILOVI, SULJEVI (xii)

140

Vehbija

KARI,

Rifat

BILAJAC

and

Ziro

.

Reply by the Chief of the GS ABH /Main Staff of the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina/, Sefer HALILOVI, to Commander Rasim DELI to his question of 25 September 1993 (with regard to a telegram by Arif PASALI), stating among other things that "I sent 4 orders ­ even appeals for a helicopter to come to transport the seriously wounded and one company to the region of Bijelo Polje." and that after HALILOVI and DELI intervened "a company of 150 men was transported to Bijelo Polje to help Mostar."141.

(xiii) Order of the Commander of the ABH 4th Corps, Arif PASALI, of 25 September 1993, which shows that the areas north and south of East Mostar are under the control of ABH units, that the eastern part of that whole area is under the control of the Army of Republika Srpska ("the Chetniks") and that the HVO ("the Ustasha") control the western part of that area142. (xiv) (xv) [Redacted]143. Order of the Commander of the ABH 4th Corps, Sulejman BUDAKOVI, of 19 December 1993, which presents in the

140

3D 00737 HAL-1-203, EXHIBIT FROM HALILOVIC CASE, REPORT OF THE INSPECTION TEAM, HALILOVIC, KARICBILAJAC, SULJEVIC, 20 September 1993. 141 4D 00798 Telegram with explanation to Arif Pasalic and Rasim Delic issued by Sefer Halilovic, re: document no. 337 of 25 September 1993. 142 4D 00711 Order issued by Arif Pasalic, re: reorganization for the purpose of forming the Operative Groups for conducting combat activities, ref:03-09/93, 25 September 1993. 143 [Redacted]

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introduction intelligence on HVO preparations for an attack on Dreznica with the goal of cutting the Mostar ­ Jablanica route144. (xvi) Extract from a book by Esad SEJTANI "Herzegovinians on the Fiery Gateway of Bosnia" in which this ABH commander in Mostar states: "The situation in the town and its surroundings was getting worse. Hunger was raging all around. What little food came to Mostar from Jablanica via Glogovo was parcelled out, and a large number of people wanted to leave again for Jablanica and further on for Bosnia. Using repressive measures, regrettably, we prevented the exodus of the population and reduced all movement to the minimum."145 (xvii) SPABAT report of 19 July 1993, stating that the Metkovi UNHCR cancelled all humanitarian aid convoys because the HVO insisted on being informed of the percentage of aid allocated to the population of each party in the conflict146.

203.

To explain a possible siege of Mostar by the HVO it is necessary to determine the basic characteristics of a modern military siege. In doing that, we will apply the rules of engagement in urban areas according to the principles of the US military, which are essentially no different than the general principles of other modern armies. Definition of a siege147: A siege is a term which indicates a military operation to capture a city or any other place by surrounding it and blocking communication and supplies, which may, or may not be accompanied by artillery attacks and bombardment. The aim is to force the enemy to surrender or his authorities to make political concessions. The purpose of a siege may also be to tie up enemy forces and thus prevent their engagement on other axes, and to protect own forces on other axes.

204.

144

4D 00720 Signed and stamped order issued by Sulejman Budakovic, re: taking measures for combat readiness, ref: 03-641, 19 December 1993. 145 4D 00545 Excerpt from the book Herzegovinians on the Fiery Gateway of Bosnia, Esad Sejtanic, June 2005. 146 P 03547 UNPROFOR HQ BH Kiseljak daily infsum for 19 July 1993. 147 To surround a city or enemy army, cutting off supplies, in order to force surrender.

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205.

The basic principle of a siege or blockade is complete isolation of surrounded enemy forces from other own forces outside, which means that the attacker controls and prevents all contact with forces outside the blockade. In modern military theory, an isolation can be: - Physical ­ by capturing a firm ring around surrounded enemy forces, artillery and air fire in the event of a shortage of forces or inaccessibility of part of the ring, and continuous and persistent control of the blockaded area and surrounding areas. - Electronic ­ by offensive information operations in the form of intensive jamming of electronic means of communication, electronic media (TV, radio, telephone, the Internet), and intensive monitoring of enemy electronic equipment. - Psychological ­ with the activities of civilian affairs, combat operations, electronic operations, especially deceit and propaganda and psychological operations aimed at the morale of individuals and entire surrounded units, as well as the hostile population inside and outside the surrounded area, with simultaneous encouragement of inhabitants who support the attacker.

206.

It is also necessary to bear in mind many facts about a possible siege of East Mostar by the HVO. The degree of physical blockade of East Mostar can be determined through several facts: The city of East Mostar was not blockaded, because the entire area on the left bank of the River Neretva north and south of the city was under the control of the BH Army, with a total length of 50 km (from Jablanica to Buna). Podvelezje, or, rather, the area east of East Mostar was under the control of the Army of Republika Srpska. The HVO controlled the area west of BH Army positions.

These undisputable facts confirm that East Mostar was not surrounded by HVO units, or, rather, the HVO did not physically block East Mostar.

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207.

Supply of combat materiel (weapons, ammunition) was not cut, so the BH Army not only held positions at the line of disengagement established already in April 1993, but also carried out large-scale combat operations.

208.

Supplying food for the numerous population (residents and refugees) was difficult. Owing to the possibility to produce food in areas north and south of East Mostar, food deliveries from the direction of Jablanica and the activities of humanitarian organisations, East Mostar was not left without food. A long interruption in supplies by the UNHCR and international organisations lasted about a month and a half in the summer of 1993.

209.

According to claims by the city water works, water supply was accessible also to the population of East Mostar through several improvised pipes with a reduced capacity. The reduction in water supply was caused by combat operations by both sides, the old age of the water supply network and equipment and reduced amounts at sources due to high summer temperatures and the lack of precipitation148.

210.

East Mostar also had power supply because hydroelectric power plants on the Neretva produced power exclusively for the needs of the Muslims, and the power lines toward Mostar followed the left bank of the Neretva. It is visible in some documents mentioned in paragraph 203 that the hydroelectric power plants were controlled by the BH Army.

211.

With regard to radio and television programmes, the situation did not change compared to 1992, when the Army of Republika Srpska destroyed the repeater on Velez and thus prevented reception of the broadcast of Radio-Television

148

3D00723 P02611

1D01569 1D01567

Report on the situation with regard to water supply in the period 1992-1994, Vodovod /Water Works/ d.o.o. /Limited Liability Company/ Stamped request re: Solution of water supply system on the left bank of the city of Mostar, addressed to United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and THW, signed by Arif Pasalic. Ref: 01-11/93 Report on the problems re: damaged pipeline at Studenac water spring Report on the problems in the water supply in the city of Mostar

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Sarajevo, although radio programmes could be received on medium waves. Local media founded by the Muslim authorities operated without hindrance.149

212.

Stationary cable telephone lines were interrupted because bridges on the River Bijela and Neretva near Aleksin Han were destroyed. ABH commands had satellite mobile communications.150 The 4th Corps command also

communicated with the Supreme Command Staff without difficulties caused by the HVO.151

213.

Although both sides used propaganda to achieve their goals, one could not say that the HVO applied measures of psychological isolation, which would be directed both toward BH Army members and the population.

214.

A conclusion can be drawn from the above-mentioned facts that the eastern part of Mostar was not besieged in the sense of modern military theory: The city of East Mostar had free communication with a larger area north and south of the city. - The Muslims had an open route toward their side in the centre of BH. - There was no armed threat to the Muslims from Podvelezje in the east, because that part of the front was held by the Serbs who had stopped armed operations against the Muslims. - Supply of combat materiel was difficult, but not impossible. - Supply of the population of East Mostar became more difficult, but was not completely cut.

2D00448 Arif Pasalic speech on the War radio BiH on June 30th. 1993 at 11.00 3D01836 IL-2-387, REQUEST SENT BY SALIM SABIC TO MR. HADZIOSMANOVIC RE:STELLITE PHONE INSTALLED IN THE OFFICES OF THE MOSTAR MUNICIPAL BOARD OF THE SDA 151 3D02591 R68-3-191, SPECIAL REPORT FROM 21 SEPTEMBER 1993 BY APOLLO ON ZUKA AND ALIJA IZETBEGOVIC CONVERSATION

150

149

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10.

POSITION

WHERE

A

STATE

IS

ATTACKED

OR

THREATENED FROM

THE

TERRITORY OF ANOTHER

STATE?

215. I was asked whether from the military point of view the Republic of Croatia had the right to send its military units to the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina to defend its territory from the JNA and later the Army of Republika Srpska, which attacked Dubrovnik and other towns on the Croatian coast from the BH territory.152

216.

Article 51 of the UN Charter states that each state has the inherent right to selfdefence, until the Security Council has taken other effective measures to defuse the conflict or deter and end aggression. None of the resolutions of the Security Council with regard to wars in the former Yugoslavia referred to the concrete case of armed operations in Southern Croatia ­ the general area of Dubrovnik and South-Eastern Herzegovina. Pursuant to the UN Charter Croatia had the inherent right to self-defence in the event of an attack by forces of the then FRY /Federal Republic Yugoslavia/ on its territory and to resist the occupation of that area, the destruction of towns (Cepikue, Cavtat, Dubrovnik) and the expulsion of the non-Serbian population (Croats and Muslims).

Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of selfdefense shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such

152

Such action by the HV is mentioned, among other places, in document 4D01240: Directive of the Staff of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces of the RBH of 10 September 1992.

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action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.

217.

The Washington Treaty, which is the legal basis for NATO envisages the possibility of collective defence in the event of an attack against one of the members, as stated in Article 5: The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective selfdefence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area. Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.

218.

In modern practice after World War II, this provision was often invoked for the purposes of military intervention against many countries which did not attack any NATO pact member, but did threaten the political, economic or military interests of a member, usually the USA as the leading member, through their political activities or the use of their armed forces. Military interventions were carried out outside the territories of member states, that is, outside of the territory defined in Article 7. That was the case in the wars in Croatia (bombardment of the Udbina airfield in 1994), the war in BH (bombardment of VRS installations and personnel in BH in 1995), and the war in the FRY (air attacks on Serbia in 1999).

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219.

Article 7 of the Constitution of the Republic of Croatia prescribes that the armed forces protect the sovereignty and independence of the Republic of Croatia and defend its territorial integrity.153

220.

Every state has the right to defend itself from attacks against its territory and its populations. That right to self-defence includes the elimination of the sources of attack operations. If weapons and military units carrying out the attack are in the territory of another state, the attacked state has the right to launch an attack on the area in which the enemy army is located.

221.

The general area of Dubrovnik, from the Neretva delta to Prevlaka, was attacked by the Yugoslav Army, whose units were manned by reservists from Montenegro and Eastern Herzegovina, and partly also from Serbia (37th Uzice Corps). The starting line for those forces was the territory of the Republic of BH under the control of Republika Srpska (the general area in the rear of Popovo Polje and Nevesinjsko Polje). Although the persecution of the Muslim and Croatian population started already before the arrival of Yugoslav Army units, large-scale persecution of that population started with their arrival. Immediately upon arrival, these forces of the FRY carried out an armed attack against the hinterland of Dubrovnik.

222.

The constitutional obligation of the RH /Republic of Croatia/ and inherent right to self-defence pursuant to international laws of war were the legal basis for the offensive by Croatian forces from inside its state territory. When the invading forces were expelled from the territory of the RH, the threat to the state was not yet removed. The principles of warfare prescribe that as long as that threat remains the enemy must be pursued until he is destroyed or capitulates or until a political agreement in the form of a ceasefire is reached. That pursuit also continued in the territory of the RBH. Entering RBH territory was also necessary for HV units from the point of view of the tactical and operational position needed for effective defence of the liberated area in the rear of Dubrovnik. Stopping the HV at the borders of Croatia would have hurt

153

1D 02912

Constitution of the Republic of Croatia, 22 December 1990.

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the interests of Croatia (shallow defence) and the interests of the RBH ­ the Croatian and Muslim peoples in Herzegovina who were in direct danger in Mostar and the lower course of the Neretva River.

223.

The HV had the duty and inherent right to expel the invading forces of the FRY from its territory and prevent any new attack by entering the territory of the neighbouring BH. An attack on the forces of the VRS was entirely justified because those forces were allied to the forces of the Yugoslav Army and allowed them to set up bases in its territory.

224.

From a military point of view, combat operations by the HV in South-Eastern Herzegovina were entirely justified and necessary.

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11.

MILITARY

MEANING

OF

THE

BCS

TERMS

"ASANACIJA" AND "CISENJE" OF THE TERRAIN

225. I was asked to explain the meaning of the terms "asanacija" and "cisenje" the terrain, which are mentioned in numerous documents of the HVO and BH Army.154

226.

Clearing up ("asanacija") the battlefield are organised measures for the removal of the remains of dead members of the armies of both sides and civilians, dead domestic and wild animals, biological waste and other possible sources of contagious diseases on the battlefield and in inhabited areas155.

227.

The term clearing up the battlefield is unique to Yugoslav military terminology and other armies do not know it as such, but almost all modern armies carry out these measures and engage logistics organs for that purpose.

228.

In general, special units are assigned to clear up the battlefield and are merged into teams or detachments. These temporary units are formed by the commander whose unit is carrying out combat operations in an area. In the event of high-intensity combat operations, when military units have a high pace of movement, special units which establish a military territorial command can also take over clearing up of the battlefield, and specialised or ad hoc groups of members of the territorial component of the army and civilian protection units are engaged.

229.

Groups or detachments for clearing up the battlefield are made up of medical organs (military or civilian) in order to determine the cause of death, veterinary organs in order to determine the cause of death of domestic or wild animals and any contagious animal diseases, personnel organs in order to identify the dead, an engineering unit with earth digging equipment in order to

154

For instance, in document 4D01240: Directive of the Staff of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces of the RBH of 10 September 1992, clearing up of the battlefield is mentioned. 155 Military Encyclopaedia ­ 2nd edition , volume I, page 2666, Belgrade, 1970.

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dig mass graves, priests belonging to the religions of the majority of the dead and a physical work force.

230.

Clearing up of the terrain is always carried out after combat operations. If members of the military unit located in the area in which clearing up should be done have to be engaged on a combat task, civilian protection units can carry out the clearing up.

231.

Cleanup ("cisenje") of the terrain is a term which means a detailed check of the battlefield before combat, during combat and after combat, and it includes a detailed check of the area of responsibility and the removal of natural and man-made features and items which could significantly affect combat or the stay of units in the area of responsibility. Cleanup of the terrain is a broader term than the term clearing up the terrain, where the latter term is just one, but the most important part.

232.

Before combat cleanup of the terrain includes a detailed check, removal of low-growth vegetation and trees in front of the forward defence line of each unit and the removal of any obstacles on the axes of movement, retreat and counterattack. Sources of potable water are thoroughly checked and cleaned, or marked with signs forbidding use. Before combat, mopping up of the terrain is generally carried out by units organising defence.

233.

Cleanup up the terrain after combat is the task of the unit which occupies an area by capturing it in combat, arriving after combat or on special orders. Cleanup up the terrain after combat can be carried out be military units, units of military territorial commands and civilian protection units. In general, combined teams or detachments are formed consisting of engineering units with the appropriate construction machines and special kits, NBC /nuclearbiological-chemical/ protection units, specialised teams from civilian infrastructure institutions (power supply, water works, telephone, etc.) and labour.

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234.

Cleanup up after combat includes: clearing and removing rubble, essential repair of roads and other infrastructure features, finding, marking and removing unexploded explosive objects (artillery shells, air bombs, mines), finding, marking and demeaning own and enemy minefields, gathering leftover or discarded military equipment and weapons, NBC decontamination of items, features and the ground, examining sources of potable water and preventing overflowing from damaged pipes and reservoirs, examining and shutting down power supply sources, examining features and equipment which could cause subsequent damage and casualties (water reservoir dams, etc.). The focus is on finding, marking and removing unexploded explosive objects and minefields. This term also includes the cleaning up of the terrain of the remaining members of enemy forces (by capturing, wounding or killing, depending on their resistance). They can remain in the conquered territory, because due to the dynamics of combat they have not been able to withdraw with the main forces or have been deliberately left behind to slow down the attacking forces by their resistance or by safeguarding of important facilities. They might be armed and in military uniforms or individuals might get into the civilian cloth in order to avoid capture or perform illegal activities. This aspect of the military concept of cleanup ("cisenje") of the terrain is also known under the English term of "mop up" or "mopping up" operations.

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12. RESUBORDINATION: MEANING AND DIFFICULTIES

235. I was asked to explain the meaning of the term "resubordination" and the types of resubordination.

236.

Military units are generally organised and formed in such a way that they can perform most combat tasks independently without reinforcement by other units. However, modern combat abounds in specifics with respect to the diversity of enemies (weapons, equipment, capabilities), features of the terrain (mountains, forests, karst, towns) and weather conditions (winter, summer, precipitation). Combat disposition also depends on the concrete combat task, which may require special reinforcements and combat support forces.

237.

Combining different units into a special purpose unit for the performance of a specific combat task generally starts at battalion level, and exceptionally at company level. This combining can also take the form of attachment or reinforcement or the formation of a special combat group in the form of a combat (BG), tactical (TG) or operational group (OG). The basis for forming temporary units is an organic unit ­ for a BG it is a battalion or company, for a TG regiment or brigade and for an OG a brigade or division.

238.

Reinforcements or attached units are parts of the organic composition of another unit of the same level or the organic composition of units which are directly subordinated to a higher-level unit. These units are separate from the unit which is the basis for the combined unit. This kind of relationship is called resubordination in Yugoslav military terminology. In US military terminology, this merging for the execution of a concrete combat task is called a task force.

239.

Resubordination can be defined as subordination of a lower-level unit from the organic composition of another unit of the same or higher level to the command of the unit which is the main force in the execution of a concrete combat task.

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240.

Resubordination is generally limited with regard to combat task (the execution of an entire combat task or one part or phase), time (for the execution of a concrete combat task or during other non-combat activities or until revocation) and place (as a direct part or at a separate location).

241.

With regard to a combat task, resubordination of an armoured unit to an infantry unit as the main force in a task can take place for the purpose of carrying out an attack in entirety or only for exploiting success in an attack. With regard to time, a unit can be resubordination just for the duration of defence or during retreat and withdrawal and the assumption of new defensive positions. Resubordination can also end after revocation by the superior command. The resubordinated unit can carry out combat operations as a direct component of a higher-level unit to which it is resubordinated or operate on a separate axis or even behind enemy lines. With regard to the status of command, a unit can be resubordinated fully or just from a disciplinary or logistics point of view, etc.

242.

Resubordination is ordered by the commander of the superior unit both with regard to the receiving unit and the unit providing the resubordinated unit. He informs both of subordinated commanders by means of an order, in which he regulates precisely relations between them and the manner and time of resubordination. The commander of the subordinate unit conveys the decision on resubordination of the superior commander to his unit which is to be resubordinated. He must also undertake all the measures to ensure personnel, weapons and combat and other material in accordance with the norms, and hand over the units in full combat readiness. On orders of the superior commander or at the request of the commander receiving the unit, he can send skilled officers from his command to provide help, but not to exercise command.

243.

The resubordination command defines precisely mutual relations and the duration and manner of resubordination. The commander of the resubordinated

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unit is completely subordinated to the new commander and has the same status and duties as units from the organic composition. The commander of the unit receiving the resubordinated unit cannot make any differences or put too much burden on the resubordinated unit. Likewise, the commander of resubordinated unit cannot request special status or privileges. During resubordination, communication with the original unit goes exclusively through the command of the units which received the resubordinated unit. Any direct channels without the knowledge and approval of the new commander are considered to be serious violations of military discipline.

244.

Resubordination replaces the superior commander of the resubordinated military unit. The commander to whom the military unit is resubordinated assumes all rights and duties of the superior commander during the resubordination, or for a specific task in the case of partial resubordination.

245.

If a member of a resubordinated military unit violates a rule of military discipline during the resubordination, the commander of the unit or institution to which the perpetrator is assigned at the time when his disciplinary responsibility is determined decides on his responsibility.156

246.

In condition of warfare in shifts, as was the case with all three sides in the war in BH, units of company or battalion level were often resubordinated. Since the personnel of these units was recruited based on the territorial principle from one municipality or a smaller area, and were resubordinated to the command of a unit from a completely different area, serious violations of the relationship of resubordination occurred. The combat readiness of

156

Article 20 of the Rules of Military Discipline of the HZHB /Croatian Community of HercegBosna/ (P 00293), for instance, prescribes the following: "Establishing liability for a disciplinary error committed in a previous military unit or military institution, (hereafter called unit, i. e. institution) shall fall within the competence of the commander of the unit or institution in which the offender finds himself at the time disciplinary liability is decided. The officer who, in compliance with paragraph 1 of this Article, pronounced a disciplinary measure shall inform the commander of the offender's previous unit, i. e. institution."

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resubordinated units was not known to the new command and they were given larger and more demanding tasks than they were capable of.

247.

Resubordination is a complex military action and should be avoided for this reason. It is especially complex if new temporary units from several higherlevel units are created by resubordination and a new temporary command is formed. Resubordination or the formation of battalion-level combat groups should generally be carried out from units of the same brigade or regiment.

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13. "OPERATIONS AND TRAINING"

248. In an interview published in HRVATSKI VOJNIK /Croatian Soldier/, no. 10 of 24 April 1992, then RH President Dr. Franjo TUðMAN stated: "... the Main Staff was only part of the Ministry of Defence for operations and training just like, for example, the IPD /information and propaganda service/, the military police, the counter-intelligence service, etc. They all form part of the Ministry as a whole. In a democratic society, such as we have today in Croatia, the Minister of Defence is accountable for the forming of the armed forces on the whole to the Government, to the Assembly and to the President of the Republic".157 I was asked to explain the term "operations and training".

249.

Every unit from battalion level and higher has its staff. The composition and number of employed officers depends on the size of the unit. Within every staff there is an operations officer or operations department or operations section depending on the size of the units. Within the staff the operations organ is generally the largest one and is the pillar of command. In the US Army, this organ is called the coordinating staff group. In all armies this group is the commander's most significant organ of support in decision making and implementation and command and control of the unit. It is directly subordinated to the chief of staff. This organ generally performs two types of the most important staff activities ­ training and planning of combat actions (operations and plans). It is also responsible for force development and modernization, staff planning and supervision and coordination of staff responsibility for the special staff officers. In the JNA staff organisation these latter functions were covered by the term operations, while the function of training was called training affairs.

250.

Operations affairs in the narrow sense of the word include the preparation, planning, coordination, monitoring and analysis of combat operations. A

157

4D01330 TUðMAN

HRVATSKI VOJNIK no. 10 of 24 April 1992, interview with Dr Franjo

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broader description of these activities includes the following actions and procedures: - Preparation, coordination, verification, creation and submission of plans and commands and other orders for all staff sections. - Planning, coordination and supervision of exercises. - Participation in the selection of targets (targeting). - Examination of the plans of subordinate units. - Coordination of combat operations with other staffs. - Examination of the entire plan and order for the purpose full coordination and completion. - Observation of combat operations. - Ensuring conditions for combat support. - Coordination of the use of the unit for establishing civilian authorities. - Coordination with the intelligence organ in the preparation of attachments on reconnaissance, the selection of priorities for intelligence operations and recommendation on the use of technical equipment. - Integration of fire support in overall combat operations. - Planning of unit movement: selection of axes of movements, selection of priorities, allocation of rest and preparation of orders for movement. - Planning and allocation of disposable time. - Planning, assigning and selection of locations for delivery and temporary storage of ammunition. - Forecasting of possible losses in manpower and weapons and proposing measures for prevention and replenishment. - Cooperation with the intelligence organ and the organ for coordination of fire support in the execution of the plan of combat operations and proposing amendments to the initial plan. - Proposing command locations. - Proposing combat dispositions and grouping of forces and resubordination. 251. Training affairs include the planning, organisation and implementation of the training of soldiers, officers, commands and units in entirety:

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- Creation of plans and programmes of training in commands and units. - Preparation and supervision of the execution of training in subordinate units. - Preparation of training instructions and manuals. - Planning, preparation, organisation and execution of demonstration and other exercises for commanding officers and commands. - Participation in the formation and training of special units and units for the execution of concrete combat tasks. - Coordination in the planning and execution of training with other organs in the staff and with subordinate commands. - Creation of favourable conditions for training ­ planning of materiel and construction of training installations. - Organisation and management of internal forms of training ­ school, courses, etc. - Planning and execution of the supervision of training, examination and assessment. - Maintaining the combat readiness of each subordinate unit. - Maintaining records of training and reporting to superior commands.

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14. "STAFF SERVICES" FOR THE NEEDS OF THE SUPREME

COMMANDER

252. The Decree on the Armed Forces of the HZHB prescribed that for the purposes of performing staff and other specialised services for the needs of the HZHB Presidency, a Main Staff would be formed in the Defence Department.158 I was asked to explain the term "staff and other specialised services".

253.

In peacetime the general staff is a specialised organ of the ministry of defence, and through it also the supreme commander, for the preparation of the armed forces and other state organs and institutions which have a role in the armed defence of the country, while the relationship in wartime is rather different in some countries. In states with a parliamentary democracy with a prominent role for the executive branch and a minor role for the president, the general staff is directly subordinated to the ministry of defence and communicates with the supreme commander through the minister or with his approval. In states where the president of the state is the dominant power holder and also the head of the executive branch that relationship is more direct ­ the president can and is allowed to communicate with the general staff directly with the assistance of the ministry of defence. In autocratic states the general staff is directly subordinated to the president as the supreme commander.

254.

In the SFRY /Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia/, the general staff was a specialised operational organ of the ministry of defence, which was also the supreme defence staff and was directly subordinated to the supreme commander, that is, the SFRY Presidency as the holder of sovereignty. In wartime the government had no direct powers over the ministry of defence and the general staff.

255.

In peacetime the general staff carries out operational and planning activities for the needs of the supreme commander in the area of development,

158

4D 00521

Decree on the Armed Forces of the HZHB, 17 October 1992.

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preparation and use of the armed forces, in accordance with the military and political goals of the country.

256.

In wartime most general staffs become supreme command staffs and as such: - Monitor and analyse the situation on battlefields and in theatres of operations. - Prepare and implement decisions (plans, orders, directives and instructions) for the conduct of operations and combat operations. - Supervise the implementation of directives of the supreme commander. - Analyse and generalise war and combat experiences and observations in the domain of war doctrine, organisation, command, and the use and operations of combat arms and services of the armed forces. - Prepare proposals and coordinate replenishment in the event of losses, and the introduction of new weapons and equipment.

257.

In all armies the general staff does not have the authority to directly command operational and strategic or operational units. The supreme command may delegate its authority to the general staff for certain less significant tasks.

258.

The tasks of almost all main staffs (general staffs) in almost all states are equal and cover activities in peacetime and wartime.

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15.

MILITARY

OPERATIONS

AT

THE

STRATEGIC,

OPERATIONAL AND TACTICAL LEVEL

259. I was asked to explain the meaning of the term "military operation" and to explain the difference between military operations at the strategic, operational and tactical level.

260.

In the vocabulary of the US Department of Defence, an operation is a military action or the carrying out of a strategic, operational, tactical, service, training, or administrative military mission. There is also another definition ­ an operation is the process of carrying on combat, including movement, supply, attack, defense, and maneuvers needed to gain the objectives of any battle or campaign. A military action or the carrying out of a strategic, operational, tactical, service, training, or administrative military mission. The process of carrying on combat, including movement, supply, attack, defense, and maneuvers needed to gain the objectives of any battle or campaign

261.

According to the JNA military encyclopaedia, an operation as a combat activity covers the totality of parallel (simultaneous) and consecutive actions, which are carried out in a coordinated and organised way, according to a single idea and plan, in a single area and during a specific timeframe in order to achieve operational or strategic goals.

262.

According to US interpretations the term operation indicates any military activity regardless of the goal, type of forces carrying it out and level of command. According to the Yugoslav interpretation the term operation indicates military action by joint forces in a large area over a long time period and at the strategic or operational level of command. At the tactical level of command, military activities are called engagements or battles.

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263.

Bearing in mind that officers in the armies and wars in the territory of the former Yugoslavia completed military schools mostly in the JNA, the terms operations at the strategic and operational level will be explained in further text.

264.

An operation at the operational level is a set of engagements and battles of a number of joint tactical units (regiments, brigades, divisions), supported by tactical units (regiments, brigades) of the air force or navy (in coastal areas), artillery, anti-aircraft artillery and rocket units, engineers and other army branches. This operation is carried out over a period of 4-10 day or exceptionally over a longer period in 2-3 phases. With regard to area, it is organised and carried out in a limited part of state territory and depending on the size of the engaged forces and type of operation (attack or defensive) it can cover an area of 100 ­ 500 km2. Battles and combat can sometimes also be waged in separate areas, at different times by individual tactical units, but pursuant to a single idea and single goal. Such operations are carried out by reinforced establishment task forces (a corps or an army) or temporarily formed units in the form of operations groups (1-3 divisions or 3-5 brigades) when a special command is formed only for the purpose of command in a specific operation. The operations zone covers the areas where own and enemy forces are staying, while enemy forces can be at the joint tactical or operational level.

265.

In the war in BH an example of an operation at the operational level is Operation Neretva-93 carried out by the BH Army in the area of Northern Herzegovina.

266.

A strategic operation is a set of operations at the operational level and battles carried out by operational-strategic formations pursuant to a single idea of the supreme command and with the goal of achieving a decisive outcome in a particular phase of a war. These operations are carried out by armies or groups of armies of the ground forces and can be supported by operational air force formations (1-2 divisions of combat aircraft, 1-2 regiments of fighter aircraft,

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up to a PZO /anti-aircraft defence/ division), corps /as printed/ and navies in coastal areas (1-2 TG /tactical groups/ of combat ships. 1-2 marine infantry brigades).

267.

A strategic operation lasts longer, from one to several months, and covers a significant part of the battlefield or state territory, and even the territory of the enemy state or a state allowing the attacker to use its territory as the starting line for waging war.

268.

A strategic operation proceeds in several phases, where 1-2 phases are made up of 1-3 operational level operations.

269.

The great powers and large armies can carry out strategic operations in which only the air force carries out combat operations (NATO attack on the FRY in 1999) or the navy, or a joint force with minimal participation by ground forces.

270.

At the tactical level, combat operations are called battles, which are carried out by joint tactical units (brigade, division, reinforced tactical group) pursuant to a single idea over a short period of time lasting 2-3 days. A battle can be independent or part of a phase of an operation at the operational level.

271.

In the war in BH, an example of a strategic operation is the liberation of the south-eastern part of BH in 1995 with the participation of the joint forces of the 5th and 7th Corps of the BH Army, the three HVO guards brigade and three guards brigades and part of the forces of the Split Operations Zone of the Croatian Army. The operation was carried out in two operations at the operational level ­ Operation Maestral and Operation Juzni potez.

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16. ACTIVE, PERSISTENT AND DECISIVE DEFENCE

272. In documents of the HVO and BH Army, the following terms are often used: active, persistent and decisive defence, so I was asked to explain these terms. Defence159 is a form of battle operation in which a combination of fire, active operations and skilful use of the terrain and effective manoeuvre is employed to crush, repel, halt or slow down an enemy attack. Defence may have the following goals: - Inflicting losses on a superior enemy. - Halting, slowing down or completely stopping an attacking enemy. - Defending certain features and sectors. - Gaining time. - Protecting own forces from excessive losses. 274. Defence can have different degrees of persistence, tenacity and mobility, and can be more or less decisive, or more or less delaying. The US Army manual defines defensive operations as follows160:

(Army forces defend until they gain sufficient strength to attack. Defensive operations defeat an enemy attack, buy time, economize forces, or develop conditions favorable for offensive operations. Alone, defensive operations normally cannot achieve a decision. Their purpose is to create conditions for a counteroffensive that allows Army forces to regain the initiative. Although offensive operations are usually required to achieve decisive results, it is often necessary, even advisable at times, to defend. Commanders defend to buy time, hold terrain, facilitate other operations, preoccupy the enemy, or erode enemy resources).

273.

275.

276.

According to US viewpoints, defence may be mobile (mobile defence), where the defender must achieve higher mobility than the enemy and defeats him by fire and manoeuvre of strong forces. For this type of defence it is typical that small parts are in positional defence (dug in and fortified), but that the bulk of the forces are made up of mobile forces ready for a counterattack with strong

159 160

Military encyclopedia, volume 6, page 251c, Belgrade 1973. 4D01481 Article from GlobalSecurity.org, re: Defensive Operations, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/army/fm/3-0/ch8.htm#par3

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fire support. Defence can also be organised as area defence, where the defender defends a certain feature or zones with varying degrees of decisiveness. In this case the bulk of the forces are made up of generally well fortified infantry units, while small armoured or mechanised units are intended for launching small counterattacks. Holding on to features or zones is possible for small periods of time or until attack forces arrive or for an orderly and timely retreat of the main forces. Area defence may also be organised in enemy encirclement. A special type of defence is retrograde defence, which is carried out as a withdrawal or delay or retirement. In Yugoslav military terminology, this type of defence is also called retreat and included two phases ­ withdrawal and retirement.

277.

When we compared the Yugoslav and US understating of defence we can concluded that there are no essential differences.

278.

Decisive defence implies a decision by the commander to retain certain features or positions until the completion of the general combat task or task of the higher-level unit at any cost with the greatest losses and in conditions of complete encirclement. Defensive positions may not be abandoned without the approval of the superior commander and the unit must not surrender. An example of this kind of defence in the history of warfare is the defence of the industrial zone of Stalingrad by the Red Army in the winter of 1942/43.

279.

The terms active and persistent defence do not mark a type of defence, they are actually the basic characteristics of defence. Any defence must be active in the sense of taking initiative from enemy hands, and forcing the enemy to change initial decisions and modify his attack. Activity is achieved by counterattacks, spoiling attacks, combat operations by small forces behind enemy lines (inserted, left behind according to plan or encircled forces), artillery and aircraft fire, additional barriers, surprise actions (sudden retreat) and so on. Persistence means perseverance in holding on to features, positions or zones, which is achieved through fortification, erection of barriers, active

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operations, courage of individuals and the whole unit and psychological warfare measures.

280.

Decisive defence implies utter persistence and activity by small forces for short periods of time and at small distances. Counterattacks are intended mostly to reduce the burden on own forces and stretch enemy forces away from the focal point of the attack. In decisive defence, active operations are carried out by adjacent units and units at higher command levels.

281.

In delaying defence, the focus is on activity while persistence in the sense of holding on to features and positions is less significant. The terms active and persistent defence, as already stated, only indicate conduct in defence, but not the type of defence.

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ANNEX C

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MILAN GORJANC pukovnik (u mirovini)

CURRICULUM VITAE

· ·

Roñen 15. ozujka 1943., Republika Slovenija Pohañao JNA Vojnu akademiju, Zapovjedno-stozernu skolu, kao i Ratnu skolu (skola narodne obrane), te kratke kurseve o drzavnoj sigurnosti (obavezni za visoke oficire JNA i jugoslavenske politicare); uvijek uspje. Pjesadijski oficir tijekom cijele karijere, prvo u JNA (1965- kolovoz1991), a zatim u Slovenskoj vojsci. Studirao na JNA vojnoj akademiji u Beogradu (1962-1964) i Sarajevu (1964­1965); diplomirao 1965. Dvije godine (1965­1967) sluzbovao kao zapovjednik cete u vojnoj oblasti JNA u Splitu (Knin i Benkovac - Hrvatska). Instruktor u JNA vojnoj akademiji u Sarajevu, BiH; poducavao taktiku na razini bataljona (1967­1972). Pohañao Zapovjedno-stozernu JNA u Beogradu, Srbija (1972­1974). Obavjestajni oficir u stabu motorizirane divizije u Postojni (1974-1975) Komandant JNA pjesadijskog bataljona u Postojni, Slovenija (1975­1977). Sluzio kao nacelnik staba pjesadijskog puka u Postojni, Slovenija (1977-1980) Komandant JNA pjesadijskog puka u Novom Mestu, Slovenija (1980-1981) Komandirao motoriziranom brigadom u Ajdovscini, Slovenija (1981-1986) Zamjenik komandanta divizije u Postojni, Slovenija (1986­1988). Sluzio kao nacelnik staba JNA korpusa u Uzicu, Srbija (1988­1991, ukljucujui 10-dnevni rat u Sloveniji). Clan Centralnog komiteta Saveza komunista na federalnoj razini, kao vojni oficir (1986­ 1990). Polozio ispite i trebao biti imenovan general-majorom JNA, ali nije unaprijeñen zbog rata; nakon toga oko sedam godina obavljao poslove ranga generala u Slovenskoj vojsci, ali je imao samo cin pukovnika. Napustio JNA i vratio se u Sloveniju u kolovozu 1991.; pridruzio se Slovenskoj vojsci (najvisi oficir bivse JNA u Sloveniji). U slovenskom Generalstabu bio nacelnik za obuku i obrazovanju i nesluzbeni savjetnik slovenskog ministra obrane o pitanjima vojne doctrine (kolovoz 1991-ozujka 1993).

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· ·

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· · · · ·

Savjetnik nacelnika Centra Slovenske vojske za strateske studije o vojnoj doktrini, a kasnije nacelnik Centra (March 1993­September 1995). Nacelnik Centra Slovenske vojske za vojnu naobrazbu; poducavao strategiju i doktrinu vise razine (1995). Sluzbeno posjetio SAD 1994. i 1998. Studirao politicke nauke u Sarajevu i Beogradu; magistrirao politicke nauke na Fakultetu za drustvene nauke Sveucilista u Ljubljani. Proucavao Sredisnju Bosnu i Sjevernu Hercegovinu: provodio obuku studenata vojne akademije JNA na tom podrucju; proucavao partizanske operacije u Drugom svjetskom ratu na tom podrucju. Poslije 1994. sluzbeni komentator na TV Sloveniji i POP TV o ratu u BiH i Hrvatskoj, te napadu NATO na Jugoslaviju, kao i o drugim ratovima u svijetu Umirovljen iz aktivne sluzbe u Slovenskoj vojsci u svibnju 1999. Sada vojni analiticar. Objavio brojne clanke u bivsoj Jugoslaviji (bibliografija u annexu).

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BIBLIOGRAFIJA

del o obrambi, Slovenski vojski, Natu in stanju na Balkanu

Objavljeni clanki, analize in razprave: Alternativna informativna mreza (AIM) ­ pokrovitelj OVSE 1. Jugoslovenski predsednik Milosevi u sluzbi Zapada?, 2. Rat je bio besmislen, 3. War gains and loosses, 4. Mnogo generala, malo vojske, 5. Slovenija i Nato, Zasto u paktove? 6. Slovenija i Nato, profesionalizacija ­ da ili ne?, 7. Slovenija i Nato, pare na videlo 8. Panika ili politika?, 9. Balkan syndrom, Panic or politics, 10.Marionete sa epoletama, 11.Obavestajne sluzbe ­ igracka politike, 12.Slovenija i Hrvatska, Kombi se vratio kui, 13.Intelligence agencies, A Toy of Politics, 14.Slovenija i Nato, Obostrana ljubav, 15.Teror novoga terora, 16.Osveta pobednika, 17. Slovenacka vojska,Tenk do tenka, modernizacija, 18.Slovenija za Nato, Drang nach Osten, 19.Slovenija i Nato, Pare na sunce, 20.Etnicko ciscenje na slovenacki nacin 21. Ne daj se, Vuce! 22.Izbori u Sloveniji i jugoslovenstvo SLOVENSKA PANORAMA: 1. Avenija k miru ali slepa ulica mascevanja, 2. Ceri na poti v Nato, 3. Vsi so le grabili pristojnosti zase, 4. Nevarne pasti profesionalne vojske, 5. Nato na razpotju ali na novi poti?, 6. Nato in slovensko gospodarstvo, 7. Sofisticirano etnicno ciscenje, ZDA, Evropa in Balkan, 8. Slovenija v luci obrambne politike ZDA, 9. Braniti domovino! 10.Brundanje na Vzhodu 11.Hrvaska - regionalna sila 12.Konec spopada, zacetek vojne 13.Opozorila z Vzhoda 14.Razkazovanje misic z namenom 15.Vojna na Starem kontinentu 16.Zobje in kremplji ruskega medveda 17.Drzava brez oblasti 18.Generali, na smetisce politike, v dir ­ mars!

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19.Komedija tece 20.Meje in mejasi 21.Prva eksekucija na haaskem sodiscu 22.Sodna farsa se nadaljuje 23.Sonce nad temnim vilajetom 24.Zlocin in kazen 25. Bog Mars prihaja na zemljo 26. Pesek v oci 27. Po vojni ­ mir ali prepir? 28. Podarjena svoboda 29. Poraz sveta v Iraku 30. Prevara in laz, ali politicna diverzija? 31. Sramota brez sramu 32. Strele z jasnega neba 33. Alternativa Natu? 34. Besede, besede v prazno, ideja v brezno! 35. Busheva Pirova zmaga 36. Nato in slovensko gospodarstvo 37. Nato in NOB 38. Nato, politika in ljudstvo 39. Ne Natu bo drago kot zafran? 40. Rusija in Nato - » 19+1 = 19:1« ?! 41. S porazom v zmago 42. Siri, siri, kolo vilovito 43. Ves trud zaman 44. Zarecenega kruha se najvec poje 45. Demokracija ­ da, toda za koga? 46. Generala ne bodo vec preganjali! 47. Izbrisani ­ nadloga ali sramota za Slovenijo? 48. Jansi podtaknili neresnicno zgodbo 49. Neresnice iz poslancevih ust 50. Demokraticno sofisticirano etnicno ciscenje 51. Na kriz z njim! 52. Vijuganje slovenske politike 53. Al Quaida v nasih zepih 54. Bav, bav ­ v lavorju! 55. Denar sveta vladar 56. Depala vas ­ kraj brez spomina 57. Druzinski mentor 58. Janseva privatna vojska 59. Kam, gospodje tovarisi? 60. Kje so tiste stezice...? 61. Podalpski »kazin« 62. Policijski ples v maskah 63. Politicni igrokaz ­ tragedija ali komedija 64. Sojenje in obsodbe 65. Velike besede na velikih plakatih 66. Dolarji in pokoncna drza - koncno 67. Kavboj v globalnem svetu 68. Nafta - sveta vladar

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69. Prijatelji in sovrazniki 70. Slovenija v luci obrambne politike ZDA 71. Vecna vojna proti terorizmu 72. ZDA in Balkan 73. Dohajanje in prehitevanje z mencanjem 74. Drzava brez obrambe 75. Modro razmisljanje uniformiranih glav 76. Neozdravljivo bolno vojasko zdravstvo 77. Obramba domovine s peticijo 78. Porocilo, stanje - mavricna pisanica 79. Profesionalna vojska 80. Prostovoljna rezerva nic ne stane 81. Prostovoljno sluzenje vojaskega roka 82. Regiment po cesti ... vec ne gre. 83. S kom in cim braniti domovino 84. Slavje nekega konca 85. Slovenci kremeniti 86. Vlada bo padla!? 87. Rezervisti v tujino, naprej 88. Zlorabljena stroka za politicno zavajanje ljudstva 89. Zvest bogu in domovini DELO: 1. In kdo brani Slovenijo? SP, 2. Vegasta hisa brez nacrta, SP, 3. Znanje v mikru ­ hrabrost v vojni, SP, 4. Zajnci na balkanskem strniscu, SP, 5. Usmili se jih, mati Slovenija 6. Z dezja pod kap DNEVNIK: 1. Profesionalna vojska ­ pomanjkljivosti, 2. Generali in politika, 3. Oce vseh bomb je pocil 4. Na rob ob dnevu clovekovih pravic 5. Nova strategija ­ strma pot k zmagi, ozka steza za casten umik, drca v poraz? 6. Indijanci na Kosovu 7. Napad na Kosovo 8. Orozje za globoko prodiranje 9. Porazenci v vojni, zmagovalci v miru! 10.Plocevinasti bojevniki 11.Sunek vetra v Zalivu 12.Zaveznistvo, neznanje, hlapcevstvo?! 13.Solta pred Piranskim zalivom 14.Vojaska prisotnost ZDA na Bliznjem Vzhodu 15.Bo »Zmaga-3« poletela proti Evropi? 16.Zmagovita improvizacija

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OBRAMBA: 1. Novosti v obrambnem bojevanju slovenske vojske, 2. Protioklepni boj na ozemlju Slovenije - za napad z oklepnimi silami neugodna dezela, 3. Protioklepni boj na ozemlju Slovenije - S cim se bo "talilo" jeklo, 4. Protioklepni boj na ozemlju Slovenije - Ker tanki ne znajo leteti, 5. Obrambno povezovanje Slovenije - da ali ne? 6. Slovenija - stratesko utesnjena drzava, 7. Vojaska ogrozenost Slovenije, Druge publikacije in casopisi: 1. Udarna moc i manevarska sposobnost partizanske brigade u borbenim dejstvima na brdskoplaninskom zemljistu u zahvatu fronta, BILTEN GENERALSTABA, maj 1991 2. Transportni helikopter v obrambi Slovenije, Slovenska vojska 1994 3. Cena za vstop Slovenije v NATO, analiza, Teorija in praksa, april 1994 4. Hrvaska je zavrnila UNPROFOR?, Vecer 1995 5. Moznosti oborozenega ogrozanja Slovenije, razprava v DZ RS 1999 6. Kosovo ­ vzigalna vrvica soda s smodnikom, Razgledi, april 1999 Analize za potrebe ministrstva za obrambo: 1. Razmestitev in bojna pripravljenost enot JLA v Zahodni Srbiji, avgust 1991 2. Mozni vojaski cilji ob posredovanju mednarodnih sil v BiH, 1993 3. Organizacijska struktura generalstabov nekaterih evropskih vojska, 1993 4. Primerjalna analiza vojaskih zmogljivosti vojska na tleh nekdanje Jugoslavije, 1993 5. Hrvaska in UNPROFOR, januar 1995 6. Mirovna posredovanja v vojnah na tleh Jugoslavije, casovno zaporedje, junij 1993 7. Vzroki za razpad Jugoslavije, april 1994 8. Zrtve in skoda v vojnah na tleh nekdanje Jugoslavije, junij 1993 9. Prognoza razvoja vojasko-politicne situacije v BiH, maj 1993 10.Vojaski cilji vojska v BiH, maj 1993 11.Prognoza razvoja vojasko-politicne situacije v BiH, marec 1994 12.Prognoza razvoja vojasko-politicne situacije v BiH, maj 1994 13.Razmere na bojiscih v BiH in vpliv na politicne odlocitve, opisna analiza, december 1994 14.Vojaski vidiki razresitve krize v nekdanji Jugoslaviji, januar 1994 15.Vodenje in poveljevanje v obrambnih subjektih, opisna analiza odnosa subordinacije v 7 evropskih drzavah, junij 1993 16.Vojaska ogrozenost Slovenije, april 1994 17.Sukcesija JLA, kompleksna analiza imetja, december 1992 18.Ocena ogrozenosti Slovenije z vojaskimi operacijami, analiza za potrebe RUZR, maj 1995 19.Vsebinska izhodisca za oblikovanje Slovenske vojske 20.Oborozeno ogrozanje Slovenije, januar 2002 Neobjavljene analize in razprave, ki so javno predstavljene in strokovno verificirane: 1. Protivhelikopterska borba kao novi sadrzaj oruzane borbe (Izpitna tema za cin generalmajorja, Uzice 1991) 2. Specificnosti napadnih dejstava agresora na strategijskoj dubini privremeno zaposednute teritorije 3. Uporedna analiza borbenih mogunosti alpske brigade Italije, lovacke brigade Austrije in brdske brigade SRN na severoistocnom delu SFRJ 4. Zakljucci o operativno-strategijskim problemima odbrane SFRJ

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5. Partizanska divizija v ofenzivnem bojevanju na zacasno zasedenem ozemlju na podrocju Slovenije, 6. Nacela protipartizanskega bojevanja in okupacijski sistem morebitnega agresorja na podrocju Slovenije, 7. Korpusna operacija na zacasno zasedenem ozemlju na podrocju Slovenije, diplomska naloga v SNO, 1983 8. Borbena dejstva 15. slovenacke divizije u dubljoj pozadini eprijatelja u toku zavrsnih operacija JA (Referat na simpoziju Zavrsne operacije JA, Beograd, maja 1985) 9. Razlozi sukoba izmedju Muslimana i Hrvata u Sredisnjoj Bosni 1992-1993. ekspertiza za Haasko sodisce, april 2000, 10.Uzroci sukoba izmedju Muslimana i Srba u periodu 1992-1995, ekspertiza za Haasko sodisce, maj 2001 11.Majhno orozje ­ groznja demokraciji ­ uvodni referat na regionalnem simpoziju o majhnem orozju pod pokroviteljstvom OVSE 12.Vzroki razpada Jugoslavije, analiza 13. Akterji jugoslovanske krize ­ krae biografije kljucnih licnosti (za potrebe FDV Ljubljana= Izdelava ucnih gradiv za stabno in poveljnisko usposabljanje 1. Bojevanje protioklepnega odreda SV, 1992 2. Vodenje priprav za obrambo drzave, Vodenje in poveljevanje, Sola za castnike 1994 3. Bojno nacrtovanje, Vodenje in poveljevanje, Sola za castnike 1994 4. Napadno bojevanje takticnih enot OS Italije, Poveljnisko-stabna sola 1995 5. Bojevanje motoriziranega bataljona SV, Poveljnisko-stabna sola 1995 6. Obrambno bojevanje brigade SV, Poveljnisko-stabna sola 1996 7. Napadno bojevanje brigade SV, Poveljnisko-stabna sola 1996 8. Obrambno bojevanje oklepne takticne skupine SV - teze, Poveljnisko-stabna sola 1996 9. Napadno bojevanje brigade oklepne takticne skupine - teze, Poveljnisko-stabna sola 1996 10.Nacela organizacije in izvedbe mirovnih operacij OZN - teze, Poveljnisko-stabna sola 1996 11.Organizacija zdruzenih takticnih enot - teze, Poveljnisko-stabna sola 1996 12.Nacela napadnega bojevanja Hrvaske vojske, Poveljnisko-stabna sola 1998 13.Organizacija operativnih sestav in nacela vodenja operacije SV, Poveljnisko-stabna sola 1988 14.Napadna operacija korpusa Hrvaske vojske 15.Napadna operacija korpusa za hitre intervence Rusije 16.Takticni znaki NATO v SV - racunalniska grafika

54509

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MILAN GORJANC Colonel (Ret.)

CURRICULUM VITAE

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Born 15 March 1943, Republic of Slovenia Attended JNA Military Academy, Command and General Staff School, and War College, short course on national defence (mandatory for high JNA officers and Yugoslav politicians); always high in class. Infantry officer for entire career, first in JNA (1965 to August 1991) then in Slovenian Army. Student at JNA military academy in Belgrade (1962-1964) and Sarajevo (1964­1965); graduated and commissioned in 1965. Stationed two years in JNA Split Military District (Knin and Benkovac - Croatia) as Company Commander (1965­1967). Instructor at JNA military academy in Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina; taught tactics to battalion level (1967­1972). Attended JNA Command and Staff School in Belgrade, Serbia (1972­1974). Intelligence officer at headquarters of the motorized division in Postojna (1974-1975) Commanded JNA infantry battalion in Postojna, Slovenia (1975­1977). Served as chief of staff Infantry regiment in Postojna, Slovenia (1977-1980) Commanded JNA infantry regiment in Novo Mesto, Slovenia (1980-1981) Commanded motorized brigade in Ajdovscina, Slovenia (1981-1986) Deputy division commander in Postojna, Slovenia (1986­1988). Served as chief of staff of JNA army corps in Uzice, Serbia (1988­1991, including the 10­ day war in Slovenia). Member of the Central Committee of Communist Party at Federal level, as a military officer (1986­1990). Took examination and should have become a JNA Major General, but not promoted because of the war; subsequently served some seven years in positions in the Slovenian Army calling for rank of a General but held only the rank of Colonel. Left JNA and returned to Slovenia in August 1991; entered Slovenian Army (highest ranking former JNA officer in Slovenia). Served as Head of training and education on Slovenian General Staff and unofficial advisor to the Slovenian MOD on military doctrine (August 1991­March 1993). Advisor on doctrine to Chief of the Slovenian Army Center for Strategic Studies and then became Chief (March 1993­September 1995).

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Head of Slovenian Army Centre of Military Schools; taught higher level strategy and doctrine (1995). Official visits to the United States in 1994 and 1998 Studied political science in Sarajevo and Belgrade; awarded MA in Political Science from Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Ljubljana. Studied Central Bosnia and North Hercegovina: conducted training exercises in the area for JNA military academy students; has studied World War II partisan operations in the region After 1994, official commentator on BiH and Croatian War and NATO attack on Yugoslavia and other wars in the world on TVS (Slovenian Television) and POP TV. Retired from active service in the Slovenian Army in May 1999. Now a military analyst. Has published many articles in former Yugoslavia (see bibliography)

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BIBLIOGRAPHY Part on the defence, NATO, Slovenian Army and situation in the Balkans

Published articles, reviews and papers: Alternative Information Network (AIM) ­ sponsored by Council of Europe 1. Yugoslav President Milosevic in the service of the West? 2. The war was meaningless 3. War gains and losses 4. Many generals, hardly any army 5. Slovenia and NATO. Why into pacts? 6. Slovenia and NATO, professionalisation ­ yes or no? 7. Slovenia and NATO, show the money 8. Panic or politics? 9. Balkan syndrome, panic or politics? 10. Puppets with epaulets 11. Intelligence agencies ­ toys of politics (in Slovenian) 12. Slovenia and Croatia, the van returned home 13. Intelligence agencies ­ toys of politics (in English) 14. Slovenia and NATO, mutual love 15. Terror of the new terror 16. Victor's revenge 17. Slovenian Army, tank by tank, modernization 18. Slovenia for NATO, Drang nach Osten 19. Slovenia and NATO, show the money (in English) 20. Ethnic cleansing in Slovenian way 21. Don't give up, Vuk! 22. Elections in Slovenia and Yugoslavhood SLOVENSKA PANORAMA: 1. Avenue towards peace or blind alley of revenge 2. Ceri on the way to NATO 3. Everybody fought for powers 4. Danger traps of professional Army 5. NATO on the crossroad towards the new road 6. NATO and Slovenian economy 7. Sophisticated ethnic cleansing, USA, Europe and Balkan 8. Slovenia in the light of USA defence policy 9. To defend a homeland! 10. Humming from the West 11. Croatia ­ regional power 12. End of conflict, the begging of the war 13. Warnings from the West 14. Showing muscles with a reason 15. War in the old continent 16. Teeth and claws of the Russian bear 17. State without power 18. Generals, to the garbage of politics - forward march!

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19. Comedy is going on 20. Borders and border-guards 21. First judgement of the Tribunal in the Hague 22. Judicial farce continues 23. Sun in the kingdom of darkness 24. Crime and punishment 25. God Mars comes to Earth 26. Dust in the eyes 27. After the war ­ peace or conflict? 28. Freedom given in gift 29. Defeat of the World in Iraq 30. Deception and lie, or political sabotage? 31. Shame without a shame 32. Arrows from the blue sky 33. Alternative to NATO? 34. Words, empty words 35. Bush's Pyrrhic victory 36. NATO and Slovenian economy 37. NATO and NOB 38. NATO, politics and people 39. No to NATO would be expensive as saffron 40. Russia and NATO ­ 19 + 1 = 19 : 1 41. Victory out of defeat 42. /can not be translated, verse from the folk poem/ 43. All trouble for nothing 44. Promised bread is the most eaten bread 45. Democracy ­ yes, but for whom? 46. General would not be persecuted any more! 47. Erased - sorrow or shame for Slovenia 48. Untrue story passed off to Jansa 49. Lies from the mouth of parliamentarian 50. Democratic sophisticated ethnic cleansing 51. To the Cross with him! 52. Twisting of Slovenian politics 53. Al Quaida in our pockets 54. Bav, bav ­ in the wash basin 55. Money rele the world 56. Place without memory 57. Family mentor 58. Jansa's private army 59. Where are you going gentlemen comrades? 60. Where are those paths ...? 61. "Kazin" beneath Alps 62. Police masked ball 63. Political show ­ tragedy or farce? 64. Trial and judgements 65. Big words on the billboards 66. Upright posture ­ finally 67. Cowboys in global world 68. Oil ­ the ruler of the world

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69. Friends and enemies 70. Slovenia in the light of U.S. defense politics 71. Eternal war against terrorism 72. U.S. and Balkans 73. Catching up and overtaking the /mencanjem?/ 74. State without defense 75. Wise thinking of uniformed head 76. Ill health of military health care 77. Defence of homeland with petition 78. Report, the state ­ another /pisanica?/ 79. Profesional Army 80. Voluntary reserve costs nothing 81. Voluntary military service 82. Regiment on the road ... no longer the case 83. With whom and with what to defend the homeland 84. Celebration of an end 85. The Cruel Slovenians 86. The government will fall? 87. Reservists abroad, go on 88. Misused profession for political deception of people 89. Faithful to God and to the homeland DELO /ACT/: 1. And who defends Slovenia? 2. Uneven house without a plan 3. Knowledge in Peace - Honour in War 4. /Zajnci na balkanskem strniscu/ 5. Have mercy on them, the mother of Slovenia 6. With the rain under attack DNEVNIK /JOURNAL/: 1. Professional army - a shortcomings 2. Generals and politicians 3. Father of the bomb burst 4. On the edge on Human Rights Day 5. The new strategy - the way to victory steep, narrow path of honorable withdrawal, slide into defeat? 6. Indians in Kosovo 7. Attack on Kosovo 8. Weapons for deep penetration 9. Losers in war, victorious in peace! 10.Tin soldiers 11.Gust of wind in the Gulf 12.Alliance, ignorance, /hlapcevstvo?/ 13.Solta in front of the Piran Bay 14.U.S. military presence in the Middle East 15.Will "Victory-3" fly to Europe? 16.The winning improvisation

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OBRAMBA /DEFENCE/: 1. News in defensive warfare of Slovenian Army 2. Anti-tank battle in the territory of Slovenia - Unfavorable state for an attack of armored forces 3. Anti-tank battle in the territory of Slovenia ­ How to "melt" the steel 4. Anti-tank battle in the territory of Slovenia - As the tanks do not know how to fly 5. Defense integration of Slovenia - yes or no? 6. Slovenia - strategically confined state 7. The military threat of Slovenia Other publications and papers: 1. Alliance and manoeuvrability of the partisan brigade in combat operations in hilly and mountainous land in the front, THE MAIN STAFF NEWSLETTER, May 1991 2. Transport helicopter in Slovenian Defence, the Slovenian Army 1994 3. Enter Price for Slovenia in NATO, analysis, Theory in Practice, April 1994 4. Croatia has refused UNPROFOR?, 1995 Vecer /Evening/ 5. The possibilities of armed threats of Slovenia, the debate in the National Assembly RS 1999 6. Kosovo - fuses with soda powder, Razgledi /Outlook/, April 1999 Analysis for the Department of Defence: 1. Deployment and combat readiness of the Yugoslav Army units in western Serbia, in August 1991 2. Possible military targets mediated by the international forces in BiH, 1993 3. The organizational structure of some European military headquarters, 1993 4. Comparative analysis of the military capabilities of the army on the ground of the former Yugoslavia, 1993 5. Croatia and UNPROFOR, January 1995 6. Peace intervention in the wars on the ground of Yugoslavia, time series, June 1993 7. The reasons for the disintegration of Yugoslavia, April 1994 8. Victims and damage in the wars in former Yugoslavia, in June 1993 9. Prognosis of the development of military-political situation in BiH, May 1993 10.Military objectives in BiH Army, May 1993 11.Prognosis of the development of military-political situation in BiH, March 1994 12.Prognosis of the development of military-political situation in BiH, May 1994 13.The situation on the battlefield in BiH and the impact on policy decisions, descriptive analysis, December 1994 14.Military aspects of the solution to the crisis in former Yugoslavia, January 1994 15.Leadership and command of the defense entities, descriptive analysis of the relationship Subordination in 7 European countries, June 1993 16.The military threat of Slovenia, April 1994 17.JNA succession, complex analysis of assets, December 1992 18.Threat Assessment of Slovenia in military operations, analysis for the RUZR, May 1995 19.Content platform for the creation of the Slovenian Armed Forces 20.Armed threat to Slovenia, January 2002

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Unpublished Analysis and Discussions, which have been publicly presented and professionally verified: 1. Anti-helicopter combat as the new content of armed conflict (Exam thesis for rank of general major, Uzice 1991) 2. Specificity of attack actions of the aggressor on the strategic depth of temporarily occupied territory 3. A comparative analysis of combat capabilities of the Italian alpine brigade, the Austrian hunting brigade and the SRN mountain brigade on the northeaster region of SFRY 4. Conclusions on operational-strategic problems of SFRY defence 5. Partisan divisions in offensive warfare on the temporarily occupied territory in Slovenia 6. Issues of antipartisan warfare and systems of potential occupying aggressors in Slovenia 7. Corpus operation on temporarily occupied territory in Slovenia, graduation thesis for School of National Defence, 1983 8. Combat actions of the 15th Slovenian division in deeper enemy background during final operations of the Yugoslav Army (Report at the symposium for final operation of YA, Beograd, May 1985) 9. Explanations for the Muslim-Croat conflict in Central Bosnia 1992-1993, expert report for ICTY, April 2000 10. Reasons for the conflict between Muslims and Serbs in the period 1992-1995, expert report for ICTY, May 2001 11. Small arms ­ a threat to democracy ­ Opening report at the regional symposium on small arms, sponsored by Council of Europe 12. Reasons for the break-up of Yugoslavia, an analysis 13. The players in the Yugoslav crisis ­ short biographies of key persons (for use of /FDV?/ Ljubljana) An Assembly of Teaching Materials for Command and Cadre Training: 1. Warfare of the anti-tank unit of SA, 1992 2. Management of preparations for national defence, Management and command, Officer School 1994 3. Battle planning, Management and command, Officer School 1994 4. Assault warfare of Italian defence tactical units, Command-Headquarters School 1995 5. Warfare of motorized battalions of SA, Command-Headquarters School 1995 6. Defence combat brigade of SA, Command-Headquarters School 1995 7. Assault combat brigade of SA, Command-Headquarters School 1995 8. Defence of tactical armoured warfare of SA - thesis, Command-Headquarters School 1996 9. Assault armoured combat brigade tactical group - thesis, CommandHeadquarters School 1996 10. The principles of organization and execution of UN peace operations- thesis, Command-Headquarters School 1996 11. The United tactical units - thesis, Command-Headquarters School 1996 12. The principles of combat of the Croatian Army, Command-Headquarters School 1996

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13. Organization structure and operational principles of management of SA operation, Command-Headquarters School 1996 14. Assault operation of Croatian Army Corps 15. Assault operation corpus for rapid intervention in Russia 16. NATO tactical marks in SA - computer graphics

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