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Center-Periphery Relations: A Key to Turkish Politics? Author(s): erif Mardin Source: Daedalus, Vol. 102, No. 1, Post-Traditional Societies (Winter, 1973), pp. 169-190 Published by: The MIT Press on behalf of American Academy of Arts & Sciences Stable URL: Accessed: 29/10/2009 08:25

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MARDIN Relations: A Key to Turkish Politics?


just as certain societies have stronger centers centers are forged vary than others, the materials of which greatly between to con of attempts societies.1 The Middle East has had a long history even efforts struct the institutional of such centers, framework though resources were, more to marshall often than not, these "free floating"2 ex as an outstanding the Ottoman Here, emerges ephemeral. Empire a in the Ottoman There was, center ception. lasting supported Empire, a network of institutions. by sophisticated The methods the Ottomans and varied. By co used were ingenious in the elite individuals recruited at an early age from opting largely ruling them into the official class, by tightly religious minorities, by socializing not necessarily the system of taxation and controlling, though centralizing, "Society Yet land administration, and by dominating the religious the establishment, center and strong leverage in the spheres of justice and education, acquired in the dissemination of the symbols of legitimacy.8 These imperial achieve ments emerge even more in relation to the situation in clearly neighboring Iran. Iranian rulers were often jug merely "grand manipulators," gingerly over which were unable to establish con gling the many social forces they success in these matters a cannot fully be evaluated trol. But Ottoman by contrast with the institutions of its a fuller To establish simple neighbors.4 another comparison is in order, one that places the Ottoman perspective side by side with the emerging, Western centralized state, and its Empire

successor, the modern nation-state.


a center."

the form of government in the West which "Leviathan," emerged in the middle of the seventeenth and the later nation-state had century, a role to in the development of Ottoman At first institutions. play they were seen as rivals who were to excel in those areas beginning precisely where the Ottomans had traditionally for achievement. themselves prided the process of modernization, the Ottomans however, Eventually, during looked to these new forms of the state as models for reform in their own Both




the nation-state

are also


for Turkish




because that


contrasts to Ottoman institutions. The forces they present structural seem to vary from those the state in the West significantly shaped set in. Because state before modernization of its that shaped the Ottoman feudal antecedents, ern state included what of centralization the process a series of confrontations that created to the mod


compromises leading the feudal nobility, may be called the forces of the periphery: and later, industrial the cities, the burghers, labor. The consequence of was that Leviathan were nation-state these compromises and the relatively even a one-sided structures. Each time a compromise?or well articulated some of the peripheral force into the obtained, victory?was integration or the center was achieved. Thus the feudal estates, or the "privil?gi?s," into the workers became while, at the same time, obtaining integrated polity some status. These successive confrontations of their autonomous recognition had important consequences. The confrontations and co-optations had been state and church, between varied: nation builders conflicts between and owners between of the means and non-owners of localists, production. a introduced These identifica variety of political cross-cutting cleavages tions which for much of the flexibility of modern Western European provided center existed within a system of politics.5 Also, the linkages with peripheral in estates found a elements: medieval the lower classes parliaments; place were accorded the franchise.

In the Ottoman the nineteenth before these char century Empire seem to be acteristics and integration of multiple confrontation missing. was unidimensional, a clash be the major confrontation Rather, always tween the center and the In addition, the autonomy of periphery. peripheral de facto, an important social forces was more than anything difference from the institutional to estates for example, in accorded, recognition Western which were from the Lord or Prince"6 even "separate Europe, were when Until the confronta they "dependent recently, corporations."7 was the most center and tion between social cleavage important periphery to have Turkish and one that seemed survived more underlying politics in which than a century of modernization. This paper takes up the ways this cleavage was perpetuated modernization. during

The Traditional System

and periphery and economic life. One the outstanding became the always of urban dwellers with of these was the incompatibility large in Anatolia, the core of the Empire. The state's of nomads contingent on the was But in with nomads endemic. periphery difficulty dealing more nomads and urban dwellers than this, the clash between generated was a contest that civilization man's cultivated the Ottoman stereotype and nomadism, urbanization and that all nomadic were between things There many were reasons the opposition why issue of Ottoman political of center




A residue between of this basic of contempt. cleavage only deserving can still be seen in Eastern nomad and sedentary today population social structure, and basic issues of the statistical data, Turkey where so contrast those with settled agriculture thirteen provinces with sharply a in the four provinces and residues of with found economy pastoral


was the Another of the center-periphery component cleavage suspicion traces of a of the center towards the remaining and pre-Ottoman nobility a number in the star had risen of powerful whose families provinces The provinces were also hotbeds of intractable with that of the Ottomans. mes Turbulent sects, syncretic cults, self-appointed religious heterodoxy. a siahs presented and well-remembered the threat. When long-lasting to the throne, Ottoman became havens for pretenders provinces occasionally the the added onus of having served as a launching gained periphery pad for rebellions. a of localism tolerated by the All of this occurred against background before social engineering insurmountable for Ottoman center, stopped the Ottomans tasks. As the Empire dealt with expanded, organizational encountered the seal of legitimacy the new social institutions by giving they a system of decentralized to local usages and by enforcing accommodation No attempt was made toward ethnic, religious, and regional particularisms. loose ties proved workable. One for a more complete integration when

may count among these semi-autonomous groups the non-Moslem com

in the more Thus, religious by were the center and the periphery two very sense, ecological general, This aspect of Ottoman social society, together with loosely related worlds. set one of the primary of the Ottoman establish fragmentation, problems ment: the confrontation the Sultan and his officials on the one between on the other. structure of Ottoman Anatolia hand, and the highly segmented munities controlled their leaders. is studies since it is the territorial important for modern particularly of modern Turkey. component set apart from the Those who opposed the officials, were segmentation, so to on the other side of the fence, not only periphery by being, speak, as well status characteristics, as but by virtue of certain distinctive by certain For a long time, one of the differences. symbolic distinguishing was re marks for a number of high?and low?officials that many were cruited from non-Moslem to establish This practice was designed groups.9 an ideal that of the bureaucrat the Sultan's slave (kul pattern, becoming in Turkish). In this ideal scheme, the official figured as a person with no ties and as to the goals of the ascriptive totally devoted implementing The establishment to accusations of was, therefore, open dynasty. having excluded free-born Moslems from these posts; obviously, this impediment to access rankled. Friction also existed between the kul and the members of the religious establishment who, barring certain exceptions, were closer Anatolia



?ERIF MARDIN The and institution was thus religious the periphery. During moder it was of the center, policies

to the life of the lower classes. daily on the border line between the center nization, and because of the identified with

secularizing the increasingly periphery.10 The bases of the distinction between the official elite and the periphery were to be found in economic as well. Officials were not variables subject was to taxation; when their income the Empire compared flourishing to This was partly attributable favorably with that of the richest merchants. costs for the administrator's certain and other office employing personnel the wielders of expenses, but it was also an aspect of Ottoman legitimacy: were the first citizens of the realm. power, not the merchants, political over the economy was a further The tight control established by the state in the Ottoman of the primacy of Officials example Empire.11 politics in their administrative extensive wielded be power capacity. Conversely, cause of their kul status, were to administrative subject they special, law and lacked the "civil rights" of the Moslem In a wider population.12 the entire life-style of the patrimonial official and free-born perspective, Moslem The contrasted. was the center and the periphery between confrontation not, a transmission of official status. On the contrary, due to hereditary however, was this was a feature of the way by merit; by and large, advancement Some the Empire was most official careers were made when vigorous. but families with a history of service to the state held privileged positions, its members of officials provided this second pool for the recruiting only to officialdom. It was with indirect privileges of access only after the or the of official patronage its nadir that the practice reached Empire influence exerted by court circles seem to have become more important. One aspect highlighting the difference between all types of officials the operation of the bureau both rural and urban, was and the masses, cratic core of the state. Its arrogation of the major control of the economy it its control of the commerce of foodstuffs, the limitations and society, on land it tried to and the strictness with which ownership, placed were enforce social stratification all de sumptuary regulations through over the nodal to maintain of society the state's authority points signed relations and to build a corresponding image of paramountcy.13 Property on arable were included in this system. The Sultan had full property rights land outside the cities. He could alienate land when he chose, but, in fact, little land was given out in freehold. Latifundia existed, but most relatively and could, when of them were usurped be confiscated necessary, by the state. Conversely, land could only be fraud, by peasant by expropriated the original under which the land had been circumventing understanding state was always alert to the that such fraud had granted. The suggestion but action was restricted by three major considerations. been perpetrated, as freehold, while In some regions land had been granted in others, per




was based on the feudal system in operation of property petuation rights state in many at the time of the Ottoman conquest. regions the Finally, the seizure of land by not have the power?or the will?to did oppose notables. A number of changes away from the original system of military run to favor notables in this respect. When in the "fiefs" worked long it the state could re-assert itself, as it did during the nineteenth century, tried to protect the consolidation individual of land.14 peasant holdings by adopting statutes to hamper

its control was bolstered and economic The state's claim to political by to the heterogeneity Relative of the periphery, title to cultural preeminence. this was, above all, a cultural the ruling class was compact; singularly one one Two elements, negative, may be isolated positive, phenomenon. of the state was permeated here. On the one hand, the entire mechanism of the Sultan; on the other hand, there were by the myth of the majesty access on the common mortal's to the symbols of restrictions placed or settled, rural or For much of the nomad official culture. population, urban, this cultural separation was the most striking feature of its existence on the in the cities influenced Rulers and officials were heavily periphery. urban cultures the culture of earlier, successful, such as the Iranian. by in into Ottoman culture in particular was diffused Iranian bureaucratic and Arabic stitutions. For example, the rulers adopted languages?Persian were to the lower classes ?that and worked these into the foreign benefited from one of the educational official culture.15 The periphery only institutions that trained members of the establishment?the religious train its own institutions. Not surprisingly, the periphery developed ing extremely but it was well aware of its secondary cultural status, varied counter-culture, an awareness best illustrated by its clumsy imitation of the styles of elite was true of the lower classes, both rural and culture. This particularly as part the urban masses could also be counted urban, for in this matter at the height of the Ottoman power, when the image of the periphery. Even economic of the Sultan as a provident father had a tangible reality, the were the populace court, officials, and politics grim things from which kept in Turkish, and siyaseten kail means siyaset means apart. Today, politics to death for reasons of state, but in earlier official conderrmation parlance a synonym for a death sentence rea siyaset (politics ) was also imposed for sons of state. This connotation is the one which still retained grim siyaset in a study carried out in 1968 and 1969.16 for peasants These aspects of the style of state domination and of official status and culture together made up a cluster, an institutional code. In this code the set of which kept officials alert to the erosion by the of principles periphery an the achievements of the center occupied On the other important place. saw such as locally powerful hand, the forces of the periphery, families, as persons with whom the central officials had many of they points and also as rivals who tried to get the greatest possible share of the contact,



meant for the center?which less agricultural surplus and other values for themselves. Because of the periphery, of the fragmentation of the dis its own code parate elements that entered into it, it was to begin to develop much later. In earlier times this code simply consisted of an awareness of the burdens the center. imposed by of those opposing the state's incursions into the economic if not a code that and social life of the periphery made up an attitude and heterodoxy. have been called What localism, particularism spelled an and identi role in the periphery, important "primordial groups"17 played fication with such a group was one of a variety of forms that this peripheral stance could take. In fact, however, forms of the pe the many different a negative stance were similar only in view of officialdom. ripheral sharing When local notables were used in an official capacity, and the state was to use them, this attitude often obliged but the lack of any real softened, of anyone for outside officialdom legitimization kept alive the potential The world-view


for violent confrontation the heyday of the Empire, this potential During between the center and the materialized both only sporadically, periphery of social forces and because of the because of the normal fragmentation this possibility. counterbalanced Among linkages with the periphery which of recruitment of free-born these one may count the regular system into some parts of officialdom, the judicial system penetrating Moslems to the of the tradition and charitable level, public works subprovincial real hinge and the wide net of the religious institution?the foundations, a center of military "fiefs" was The between and periphery.18 system the normal fief holder at the efficient integrative mechanism; particularly a cultivator with time of the rise of the Empire close ties to the being


the Empire that Ottoman officials and that the relation between society, plunderers with the peasant heavily burdened officials and the periphery?especially a of "Oriental despotism," the mark showed type of taxes?increasingly from the grimness of Sultanic rule in earlier different exploitation basically it to the earlier system only in the way times and comparable perpetrated elite and those excluded from it. Like the governing the cleavage between relied on local notables who emerged wise, the local population increasingly at this juncture to articulate the growth of their local interests. Despite status still had no autonomous influence and authority, these notables to that of the their legitimacy feudal nobility. While European comparable was in their role as agents for the center, increased autonomy acquired defiance of state power or by outright could only be obtained rebel by to stand rich in land and powerful lion.20 Thus, only those notables enough are some There up to the state could gain greater autonomy. signs that in squeez the local notables were no less interested where this occurred, only with the became of their decline own

It was





than was the state, but at least they saw it was in their ing the peasants services that interest to provide those minimum kept the system going. of estrangement One urban form of a new of the Ottoman type in Istanbul in 1730 in the form of the from the center appeared periphery their guilds, the artisans of Istanbul had so-called Patrona revolt. Through to a been asked to contribute that fizzled out military campaign heavily of the Palace. By then the lower because of the timidity and incompetence in Istanbul had for some time witnessed classes the Westernization of Ottoman to copy the statesmen and the Palace through various attempts France. When and the libertinism of eighteenth pomp of Versailles century to arms to prevent re called of traditional ways, the subversion they

sponded.21 There had been many in Istanbul before, but this was rebellions the an effort to first to show a syndrome that was thereafter often repeated: a Westernize and administrative military organization propounded by section of the official elite, some of Western manners, accompanied by aping and used by another interest group to mobilize the masses against Western ization. Turkish modernists have concentrated upon the back exclusively of political indeed, was an aspect intrigues by statesmen which, ground for a complete picture we should also of this and similar revolts. However, on the cultural alienation dwell of the masses from the rulers, of the pe from the center. During later of modernization, this aliena riphery phases to be tion was compounded.

Ottoman Modernization During the Nineteenth Century

stood out as demanding in the solution problems the nineteenth All were related to the century. Empire during a state modeled to build reformers' after the nation attempt into and all brought the relations of the center with the state, play The first was the integration of non-Moslem within the groups periphery. and the second consisted of accomplishing the same for the nation-state, some order into the mosaic Moslem of the elements bring periphery?to structure of the Empire. these "discrete elements" in the "national Finally, in the had to be brought "into meaningful territory" participation political was not initiated until the middle of the system."22 This last development the first tangible co-optation twentieth of nota century; however, through a bles into politics, of integration began to be seen after 1908. beginning The national of the non-Moslem of the Otto integration components man was more than achieved Empire by losses of anything by default, the nineteenth and early twentieth territory during century century. With its of of exchanges the Turkish Republic made the situ policy population, ation even In the years the exchange, the Republic simpler. following to take a minorities, might have continued suspicious view of non-Moslem Three outstanding Ottoman Ottoman

176 but


in rare cases did constitute the substance only minority problems of an outstanding issue. political it is usually of Moslem the national overlooked, integration Although was as much as that of the non-Moslem of a components just problem of the Turkish the Tanzimat reform policy, groups. The architects ( 1839 set a foundation stone here had already their fiscal and 1876), through reforms.23 By the third quarter of the nineteenth administrative century, state was an the Ottoman in the daily life of the increasing presence periph II (1876-1909) tried to continue the integration ery. Sultan Abdulhamid of the the remaining nomads to settle down. At the periphery by compelling same time, the Sultan to Ottoman bring to the Moslem attempted periphery a sense of its center. As is well underlined the Sir William unity with by a dream Pan Islamism was not so much Ramsay, Abdulhamid's policy of as an effort to establish some form of of uniting all Moslems proto an to unite his people around idea. As nationalism, Islamic-Imperial Ramsay notes: Until very recent times, the motley population of Asia Minor appears to have or been perfectly content with tribal and racial designations. The Turkmen Avshahr was satisfied to be Turkmen or Avshahr, and did not think so far as I know, of a national or imperial unity to which he belonged; and therefore there was no general name by which the Unity of the Empire could be ex


Whether Abd ul-Hamid attached any importance to the adoption of one name or general designation for the Moslem subjects of the Empire, I am not aware. it was outside the sphere of his interest . . . but at least it is in Perhaps

evitable name to that a process such to as he was give expression is a marked feature the it, and of his reign, attempting wide adoption as I can assert to out find should carry name of an imperial from positive knowledge. a in


The name was government

process any, the in the tendency

an old historic title, and the diffusion of it was a fact of Ottoman long before Abd ul-Hamid, by his policy gave strength to a natural

Empire. to real and ... So far as I can of tribes learn there in the the existed country, unification feeling previously and all little, therefore if



of name had

little vitality.



tie to the Sultan


sat very

lightly on





had no desire and were not accorded the Jews and certain heretic Moslems a name appropriate to imperial Turks. There did, right to call themselves by

however, unity in exist a name which a Turkish-Moslem Empire. gradually This established name was itself the as name an expression Osmanli.24 of

success at national should not be exag But Abdulhamid's unification At the turn of the century, "Arab," "Laz," "Abaza," "Tcherkess," gerated. still words that referred to the social "Arnaut," "Kurd," and "Lezgi" were reality of the Empire. took over at a time when The Young Turks (1908-1918) only this of the of Asia Minor unification had been achieved. partial population a and educational unification tried to enforce of cultural They policy other areas of the Empire where much clearer ethnic cleavages throughout




and Their better ineptitude organized. to undermine what support they might incipient for decen for their regime. Lack of integration, demands have gathered as well as con to what were tralized administration, opposition provincial theme of their sidered the secular ideas of the Young Turks are a main as well as outside, Anatolia.25 years in power and appear within, existed and local to redeem limited his objectives Kemal Thus, Mustafa (Ataturk), who for Turkey, did not begin with a clean slate. In the earliest ing Anatolia the movement for national stages of organizing independence, following forces in Ankara the Ottoman withdrawal from World War I, his nationalist were surrounded for the govern by insurgent groups supposedly working ment of the Sultan Mustafa these groups pro Kemal. While opposed by of a rebel against the Sultan and claimed their aims to be the elimination to work for the greater of Islam, they also seem to have represented glory to be a the forces of the periphery reacting against what they considered of Young Turk rule and a policy of centralization. Between continuation 1920 and 1923, the fear that Anatolia would be split on primordial group lines ran as a strong undercurrent the architects of Kemalism among as a fundamental? their own center, and it remained trying to establish to the end of one party often latent?issue of Kemalist although Policy rule in 1950. The problem of politically structure this segmented integrating only with the of national and may thus be integration problem a separate heading.

groups were nationalism combined

partly overlaps taken up under

Social Cleavages

The tion

in the Nineteenth


saw the end of the nineteenth of the penetra century beginning into certain more of market values regions of Anatolia. developed was the of local notables' earlier basis influence Thus, gradually as notables interest of all types and origin took an increasing transformed, in economic In this respect, tier of the the upper pursuits. provincial to acquire a not a it never began periphery uniformity?if unity?which one facet of this was the new focus of had had before. While uniformity the notables' another facet involved the new ubiquity of the activities, force: the greater penetration of the state into the opposing periphery. These to the the developments placed parties center-periphery cleavage in a new confrontation that embodied of the earlier clash, but elements also partly transformed the nature of that conflict. to the notables, With in the new this transformation centered regard area within which to operate. and client rela patronage began Patronage a structural transformation tions had Ottoman politics, but long permeated after the middle of the nineteenth instance, the determination the total picture. For century changed of the nineteenth of reform century architects

178 to make citizens


out of the and to bring subjects of the Ottoman Empire, into the new periphery by imposing obligations?taxes, military well as by offering new benefits service, various registration procedures?as the of justice, land the individuals ?roads, regulation registration?placed in the in closer contact with the administrative and judicial periphery Before the gradual penetration into the of a system of process. periphery centralist in 1864, notables still served as a administration, inaugurated transmission belt of administration through locally elected councils work with time, con ing with provincial governors. This role, though modified tinued throughout the nineteenth notables thus became more century;26 the between the lower classes?the the clearly hinge peasantry?and officials. Largely because of the hold that the state still maintained over the economy, the new economic of the notables, where these pursuits a second had become link between established and notables important, In addition, while officials. the number in the Ottoman of positions ad ministrative increased after 1876,27 middle system had been considerably and lower-rank officials were in a The fashion. only paid desultory a notables thus established symbiotic relation with the officials, and bribing a new dimension. This was as much a for the advance acquired necessity ment own interests of the notables' as it was one for the of rendering services to their clients. one may this new stratum of notables, Among also the provincial men of a number of whom were place religion, property owners and also to the class of local "influentials." However, their belonged influence and leverage over the lower classes was also established through in involvement Faced with seculariza religion and education. increasing tion, these men became more clearly involved with the periphery. With the success of the Young Turk Revolution of 1908, notables began to appear in the ranks of Ottoman and in political parties parliament. their influence can be traced, we see Where they stood for administrative and for a continuation decentralization of local control over culture, which, in fact, meant an attempt to the hold that men of keep religion had estab lished over the system of values and symbols. This was true for especially the poorer clerics, the men of who had no other basis of status religion than their standing as men of as the cru religion.28 But the view of Islam cial touchstone of the Ottoman was shared by patrimony non-religious notables. To this extent, an Islamic, dimension had again been unifying added to the peripheral a characteristic ideol code; what had thus become was not an of the of Lum ogy periphery idiosyncratic merely proposal One reason for this is clear: modern institutions had educational penulema. the pre-modern, cultural between the center and perpetuated cleavage the periphery. Modernization of Turkish educational institutions had be on the those of the officials. The provinces of the gun with lay margin world of elite education; the great majority of the provincials?even of in or fluential provincials?were unable to send their children to unwilling the state




data we have today suggest that only the brightest modern schools. What ones were to the be able to packed off capital with hopes that they would a channel of communication with official circles. In 1903 in the establish were area that had had some of Konya?an province development?there as to sector of secondary education, 1,963 students in the modern opposed in 451 Medrese the tradi 12,000 students schools) providing (religious tional equivalent.29 sector of education was much easier for chil Entrance into the modern dren with fathers who were already part of the class of reformist officials, or even any In one of the key new educational part of the bureaucracy. the military for more than school socialization counted schools, complexes, its extension to middle school and by of education family socialization, by its recruitment of a large portion of students from less privileged families. as a backwater In this military milieu, the critical view of the provinces of civilization and of cultural of media sharply. The modernization emerged life in Turkey generally the gap between increased, rather than decreased, to Islam, to its cultural pa the "little" and the "great" culture. A clinging was the to the center's inability to it trimony, response province's integrate into the new cultural The provinces centers of framework. thus became was the fact that the "reaction." Most significant, however, provincial world as a whole, both upper and lower classes, was now including increasingly to secularism. No doubt the decentralist united by an Islamic opposition notables found this development The lower classes in the Otto heartening. man were also in this new sense of persons of the periphery capital part in joining the stream of modernization. who had difficulties In this new was a new and found unity, the periphery by challenged intellectually more type of bureaucrat. uncompromising Modernization as the Westernization of the Bureaucrat

to compromise with Ottoman statesmen, although obliged powerful to see them acquire real autonomy: this notables, were never resigned was the core of the code of the traditional bureaucrat. However, bureauc in racy was also changing century. By the Turkey during the nineteenth that could be end of that century, the aspects of Ottoman bureaucracy or "sultanic"30 were to a "rational" bureauc called "patrimonial" giving way in the formula is limited, however, of this Weberian racy. The applicability sense that "bureaucratic" such as hierarchical structure, were elements, than "rational" claims, such as rewards based on per much more evident




of the Ottoman




attuned taken

to the re

quirements early relatively in reform century. This reformist during the nineteenth as the earliest nodal of reform the modernization point

of modernization

and had

the leadership selected bureaucracy of the educational




over institutions preparing the military and the civilian bureaucracy. Taking the French model of the "Grandes Ecoles," which was directed to aims very similar to those of Ottoman the nineteenth statesmen, century Ottoman a well-trained, in reformers succeeded bureau producing knowledgeable a view of the "interests of the state." In a way, cratic elite the guided by was was now formed earlier elite in molds then It that perpetuated. out a to the earlier official. in many ways comparable brought product a new dimension the penetration With of the state into the provinces, was added to the traditional concern with the center. An at shoring up a direct relation between to establish the state and the tempt was made citizen, man in a new form, of an ideal of Otto be no intermediate be statesmanship allegiances tween the Sultan and his the later stages of reform, the subjects. During creation of credit institutions and other facilities made a reality of the idea of the state as a provident father. When these re notables preempted invited the antipathy of statesmen.31 sources, they reforming But to this opposition officials to notables we must of reformist add still another source of opposition which began to appear toward the end of the nineteenth mod century. The new conflict resulted from administrative which was partly the revival, that there should

the reign of Sultan Abdulhamid II. More it ernization during precisely, was a of the Sultan's policy of half-way modernization, for while product he also relied the Sultan worked hard to rationalize Ottoman bureaucracy, on individuals who countered It is as directives. his achievement-oriented were in reaching access to the unclear how successful yet higher positions to the moderni institution Science?an of the School of Political graduates zation of which the the Sultan had given his full support.32 Nevertheless, to oppose who began bureaucrats and the military, the Sultan younger that the highest century, did believe actively at the end of the nineteenth were staffed by persons administrative and governmental character posts ized more by their loyalty to the Sultan than by their ability. As for the the Sultan's modernist reforms did not fit in well with his prohi military, in maneuvers that large military units engage with live ammuni bition tion near the to eliminate The attitude these contradic seeking Capital. tions and for a "closure" of the system might be called "national" looking as to the earlier, Ottoman of "reason of bureaucratism, ideology opposed


A further point at which the new, school-trained, national bureaucrats a modern to establish felt at odds with the Sultan was in their impatience state in allowed much less time for the elaboration of the Turkey. They as nation-state to the Sultan's more gradual?sometimes timid? compared the diffu impatience approach. The national bureaucrat's partly reflected into the Ottoman sion of nationalist These ideas had ideologies Empire. an affected part of the Ottoman intellectual establishment and created not to be found among earlier reformers. No doubt the new intransigence





of truth, which had become in influential after 1885, fitted in well with this attitude.33 capital The old Ottoman motto of preservation of "religion and the state" thus in the Young Turk refurbished emerged slogan of "Union and Progress." After these new men took the Sultan out of the picture, the following to them much Turk Revolution, the provincial notables seemed Young more evil than or even for they had been for the traditional bureaucrats, In the Young Turk reformers. the notables' bills aiming early parliament at decentralization and less military control singled them out for suspicion at a time when currents were to be seen as a real separatist beginning circles of the



of science

as the touchstone

War of this center (1920-1922), Independence once within the again organ of the na periphery duality appears directing tional resistance movement, the Grand National Here the Kemal Assembly. a diffuse ists were pitted was the party of against group which mainly notables led by alienated members of the official class. This group has been known as the "Second were aug Group." But in the Assembly they a mented more inchoate cluster of representatives with Islamist by larger, and decentralist cut across group lines.35 tendencies whose membership a series of These men formulated extremely interesting policies regard the military, and religious practice. instruction, ing representation, religious a five year residence to in an electoral They wanted requirement impose as a district as a prerequisite to for election candidacy they at deputy; to control the and began to attach the to the tempted military gendarmerie were on the of the Interior, stating that the Ministry gendarmes preying civilian population; education they strongly supported through religious the consumption of alcohol. Be schools; they passed a statute prohibiting cause we have no studies of the composition and uniformity of this precise we cannot say much about their cohesiveness, but the cluster cer group, as a tainly served rallying point against Kemalists.36 On the other hand, the more radical elements among the Kemalists pro tested that in the new law of "the people" were not repre municipalities sented on municipal councils. They the notables also accused of Bursa of having sold out to the Greek forces with whom the Kemalists were en a life or death for "the gaged in struggle. Both sides claimed to be working but for the Second this expression had clear connotations people," Group of decentralization and economic and for the liberalism, whereas political core it had undertones Kemalist of plebiscitar?an and the state's democracy "intermediate" duty to eliminate groups.37 The of the Kemalists' to the Second symbolic expression opposition and to provincials focused on For the moment, Group however, religion. Mustafa Kemal did not show his hand. With the end of the War of and the victory of the Kema Independence it became easier to assume a hold over lists, politics. Sophisticated political During

the Turkish




were as intimidation, The Repub used with persuasion. tactics, as well the Party of the Kemalists, established lican People's Party, successfully was an formed When its members. among party opposition discipline a Kurdish revolt in 1925, a Law for the activities with whose coincided for wide powers Maintenance of Order was passed giving the government two years. the Party and the revolt, there was no link between Although It was suppressed the new opposition did represent decentralist aspirations. the same year because said to be its links with "religious re of what were had been the central than "Kurdishness," action," and indeed this, more theme of the revolt.38 the primary aim in the suppression of this Party seems to have Although in which it was made been the elimination of the context political rivals, should be underlined. The nightmarish fissions seen before and during the War of Independence rebellion brought had traumatic effects; the Kurdish them to the surface. A second trauma, this time connecting political parties, in 1930. At that time an ex the provinces, and religious reaction, occurred from with multi-party received strong support periment politics which in a minor "Patrona" type the many groups opposing resulted Kemalism, the primary locus of the revolt in the town of Menemen.39 The province, was once more identified with treason the secularist aims periphery, against in the in this of the Republic. It is understandable, light, that beginning to Mustafa Kemal should have devoted his energies early 1930's, linguistic It is no coincidence that and historical myths. cultural matters, problems, he personally into the picture at this time to forge a new national stepped identity for the Turks. an In 1946 after Ataturk's death, when important political opposition was formed for the third time, the out from the that went party warning was "Do not go into the pro characteristic: Party Republican People's un our national to vincial towns or villages unity will be gather support: will be resurrected dermined,"40 meaning groups primordial "provincial as this argument was disingenuous, of whether political parties." Regardless 1923 and 1946 the the sense of the the fact is that between periphery?in an area of was considered it potential provinces?was suspect, and because it under close observation. the political center disaffection, kept is that a sizeable portion of Given is remarkable all this tension, what into the ranks of the the provincial, notable class was successfully co-opted This did not differ Party. compromise radically People's Republican at the time of the Young Turks, or even earlier. De from what prevailed as it was on the notables, the center had few means of realizing pendent the perennial Ottoman dream of working local through supine ideally In fact, the Kemalist revolu intermediaries for the benefit of the peasantry. in a number of ways: by an organizational tion could have been achieved the notable was actively opposed, in which revolution and/or by providing on the real services to the lower classes, and/or by an ideology focussing




In fact, the builders of the Turkish Republic placed even of the state first in their priorities, though it meant a very on notables. This the perpetuation of dependence might have been wise decision, one that allowed and to survive despite the economic Turkey Yet this option seems to have been weakness of the new Republic. military seem rational considerations, in retrospect, derived not so much from what, but from the bureaucratic code: the center had to be strengthened?partly else. It is this aspect of the bureau against the periphery?before everything cratic code that was profoundly unrevolutionary, despite the populist themes which the Republic developed. The Re the single party through which People's Party, Republican were channeled, was unable to establish contact with the publican policies so much rural masses. The movement the people," for which "toward was thin, clamor had gone up in the first years of the Ankara government, new links and the for establishing opened up by the Republic possibilities between and peasants were not fulfilled. In fact, the meager government sector financed much of of the reconstruction surplus of the agricultural on the notables The peasant for credit, social as still depended Turkey. The sistance, and, in some regions of Turkey, protection. symbol of the as the "fundamental Turk" came up very early in the Kemalist peasant were devoted to the but Kemalist of symbols movement, energies building of national rather than to radically altering the of the peas identity, place ant in the system. This is fairly understandable in view of the limited re sources of the in fact, went Republic. But the problem, deeper. of the bureaucratic The members class under the Republic had little an notion of identifying is with the peasantry. This themselves perhaps unfair judgment, given the large literature on the that ap village question in at the time and given the experiment of village institutes. peared Turkey I do not, however, of the recall any members ruling elite having constructed an or Chinese of peasant mobilization, Russian operative theory style. As for attempts by officials to themselves with the peasant, these are identify limited to a few radical teachers. Again, one has a feeling that the tradi tional Ottoman is relation with In the periphery being perpetuated. vestments in education, which be used as a shorthand notation to might of this attitude, the multiple show that what little capital recapture layers a genera there was came to be invested in institutions that would shape tion of true Kemalists at the center.41 One would highly


masses. peripheral the strengthening


of apprehending in these terms was the the consequence problem cast of the were "backward" and program: peasants Republican be changed by the laws of the land, such as the only transforming unrealistic law?what Marxists would call the superstruc village from the top down Ottoman had been the by imposing regulations social engineering. The characteristic

Integration general



184 features In



of Kemalism show that this view of society was still preeminent. re a theoretical the Kemalist to the peasant commitment program, an old Ottoman was to be advancement theme, while peasant peated achieved from the top down, an idea which also had an by integration vu. of element of d?j? had a fine understanding the Kemalists Altogether, but they missed the revolutionary-mobilizational that, in regulation, aspect certain contemporary masses schemes of modernization, for a re mobilized of society. To the extent that regulation had always been a structuring maxim of Ottoman had an unmis rule, their ideas about modernization organizational-mobilizational the publication Kadro activists which had a number of Marxist (1931-1934) in its ranks. Just as the Kemalists missed of mod the mobilizational aspects see too well the nature of the net ernization, they also did not integrative or were unable to work of modern it into existence. society, legislate to be seen in this The thinness of Kemalist ideology has light. Ataturk was to do with what he had not achieved trying ideology through political or a commitment to radical mobilization in social struc changes through ture. This was a hard burden to shift onto The Turkish country ideology. closer to the center by side, already suspect as separatist, was not brought a remarkable these policies. While showing ability for small but sustained the could see that it was paying for the prosperity of the growth, periphery as consolation, that it was being given speeches but being denied cities, the haven of its religious it is not culture. Thus, that local no surprising to and that the state was unable tables kept their hold over the peasantry, drive a wedge into the unity of the periphery. The Democrat founded Party, some erstwhile and prominent of the Republican members by People's was not so much a party of notables as it was a Party in 1946, party that a it speculated with political ideology which thought would be strongly sup the rural masses and by their patrons. This was the old Ottoman ported by idea of the state being solicitous of the interests of its subjects: the protec on the one hand, and abundance on the other. tive state justice distributing But this time it was the stance. To show this periphery who had preempted that the issues that were so central to the opposition had their roots in the from the center, we have only to look at the themes that won the alienation in the first multi Democrat Party 81 per cent of the seats in Parliament it would to the The new party promised services bring party elections. concern of as a take his daily problems de peasants, legitimate politics, bureaucratize and liberalize religious Finally, Turkey, practices. private controls and angered by its enterprise, by bureaucratic equally hampered on influence, was also promised greater freedom. dependence political at most a "means Until the Republican 1946, People's Party had been this date, when action." After it became "a for political parties emerged, was in medium for public participation but this transformation politics," takably traditional took note of the component. The only current within Kemalism side of modernization which was




to it.42 On the contrary, the electoral the periphery as seen in Democrat of the opposition, Party political platform especially in newspapers, and in the media, the lines of a established propaganda, debate between "real populists" and "bureaucrats." This symbolic and cul tural paraphernalia?the and religious of mosques conspicuous patronizing rituals by members of the Democrat and the reluctant follow-up by Party the Republican that secularism was with protests Party?laced People's the Democrat with the culture of the periphery. lost, identified being Party its four official founders were Ironically, just as much part of the bureau cratic "class" as other members. People's Party to Islam achieved by the Democrat The high resonance Party's appeal as the culture of the in the light of acquires greater significance periphery a Behice Bor an in the 1940's. Boran discovery by the Turkish sociologist came into found that as villages towns, the villager greater contact with as inferior. The electoral cam to see his village ways began increasingly at just the right time to of the Democrat intervened paigns Party provide rural areas with the belief that they were not inferior. The many transitional Democrat Islam and traditional rural values.43 Party relegitimized sufficient The tween blows dealt 1950-1957 endeared to the power and the of the bureaucracy prestige to both the notables the Democrat Party under new conditions; alliance was now continued be and the


to entice

the peasants. The laws of the Republic, the growth of the judicial apparatus, and the success in of the Republic the infrastructure of reforms had gradually building in the master-servant relation between patron and client, except changed the still such as Southeastern and Eastern Turkey. regions, undeveloped Economic set the relation be power, rather than domination, increasingly tween notables saw new and villagers. Smaller men notables surrounding success. Deals, for economic and bargains became trade-offs, opportunities much more pervasive than in the earlier situations, and client politics flour ished on a new level. This was not the form of mobilization that the Re a have approved, but it was undeniably would People's publican Party a form that a greater form of mobilization, of the masses portion brought into a relation with the center than had been possible under the meaningful People's Party, Republican not have realized rural following might The Democrat that the very stemmed from the success of the of these bargains possibility Republican an economic in The workers, who at infrastructure. building People's Party not have the time usually voted for the Democrat Party, might thought that the Republican earlier, progressive People's Party's legislation had kept a rootless as some them from becoming but then, gratefulness, proletariat, of the Republican to believe, members have continued is People's Party not an element in the of 1950's Turkey was still early politics. Moreover, was not a land rich, and thus land redistribution major issue. Al relatively the notable-peasant whose framework was a common alliance, together,




to either side would bring greater benefits that collaboration understanding state control, worked than would rather well. In these straits, instead of future tasks in terms of organiza seeing its tion and mobilization, the Republican Party stood fast for the People's selected it as the of Kemalist ideals. And, thus, the bureaucrats preservation now one There were with which could best cooperate. party they good reasons to claim the that the Republican Party represented People's the "demo Democrat "bureaucratic" the center, whereas Party represented cratic" periphery. the cleavage be The Revolution of May 27, 1960 once more underlined of a static order, tween the center, now identified with the preservation The old polarization of the real "party of movement." and the periphery, a new form: the preservers of the Pro center against acquired periphery order against those who wanted crustean, change. The early Republican commented Celal Bayar, has recently of the Republic, deposed president of 1924 and the new the Turkish Constitution between that the difference of 1960 amounted to the consti after the revolution adopted as one of the bureaucracy and the intellectuals tutional legitimization source of to the "Turkish in addition who had earlier sovereignty people," as the source of sovereignty in the Kemalist only ideology.44 figured was All of the protests mounted by the Republican People's Party that it of democratic the real Party of change and the real supporter procedures were the latest appeal of a faction of the Party to "popu thus lost. Even to get down to the grass roots?dissipated, because the lism"?an attempt an issue was not so much down to the grass roots as providing getting means no confi alternative of fundamental change. The grass roots had constitution in the in the outlined and populist policies dence democratic, progressive, it of the Republican various because electoral program Party, People's no confidence in its methods of change. placed to identify the recent ( 1971 ) intervention It was easy for the periphery in Turkish with a desire for a return to the rigidity of the military politics of the intentions behind the move or the popu of the old order. Regardless of the of law and order, the elements lar support for the reestablishment that their down-to-earth, still believe observable direct, personal, periphery is its short-run gratifications, and integration, with of mobilization method more fewer risks than the Turkish bureaucracy's and presents sys tangible Insofar as the center's attitude tem of mobilization economy. by planned advice than by toward the periphery has been marked more by patronizing seem to have a lower classes, they would identification with the plight of the over one's fate to the limbo of seems to relegate all control point. Planning once raises its ugly head. Whether decision: bureaucratic again, regulation is irrelevant; of the implications of planning this is a correct assessment creates is that of officials that the perception of regulation the polarity versus all others.



Once my thesis is stated this simply, I should add that the picture is, a of the in fact, more labor is not completely part complex. Organized of the of owners against non-owners The cross-cutting cleavages periphery. are an aspect of Turkish that could change means of production politics and has emerged, the Shi'ite minority the picture. A party representing have been Kurdish attempts at separate organization concerning rumblings is evidence and of dif heard for some time. There both of new cleavages of the bureaucracy Certain members the periphery. within ferentiation are now aware of the demands and integrated of a differentiated quite to and some of them are defecting modern representing system, parties and center But these are future aspects of Turkish politics, the periphery. is still one of its extremely structural compo important periphery polarity


code seem to have emerged two facets of the peripheral In retrospect, as made up of the periphery clearer outlines during modernization: as the center of a counter-official and the periphery groups, primordial culture. Both were b?tes noires of the Young Turks and of the Kemalists. as well as fortuitous But the policies of the modernizers, developments, Since this to the second facet of peripheral worked identity. highlight it was able to submerge in almost all of provincial Turkey, identity emerged code that ?if not to overcome aspect of the peripheral entirely?that as counter this identity harked back to primordial Later, allegiances. a nationwide for a party basis of allegiance also bureaucracy provided suc at the national Democrat level?the Party, and also for its operating one aspect of the cessors. Thus, stance?of which peripheral paradoxically, a national in the sense of pro the center was so suspicious?produced unity it was used by the Democrat around common vincial unification themes; is that this common code of the Party in its rise to power. The paradox was productive of a unifying national which unexpectedly skein, periphery not have emerged if the policies of the center toward the would probably had been more conciliatory. periphery with

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Yayinlarindan Siyasal



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Halil "Land Problems Inalc?k, Land ( 1955), pp. 221-228. ownership tween center Officials and periphery. the few who legal title to acquired they had gained control of these

History," important

element a

it?usually resources.

land acquired into shifted

45 World, in the be boundary as well surreptitiously?as peripheral stance once




15. F. p. B. Kramers, 959 ff. and "Ottoman M. C. first ed., Vol. IV, Turks, of Islam, History" Encyclopedia Mehmet Sahabeddin "Semsuddin Bey Devrinde Tekindag, 14 (March Tarih Dergisi, Fakiiltesi Universitesi Edebiyat

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Instanbul 81-98.

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(2), Yapi


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Bowen, and (1858)

p. 247 1274


"Turk Toprak Barkan, in Arazi Kanunamesi,"

Tan Yil

d?n?m? M?nasebetiyle

20. For

(Istanbul: Maarif Matbaasi,


p. 325.

see Halil "The Nature of Traditional the earlier of notables Inalc?k, importance in Robert Mod E. Ward and Dankwart Rustow, eds., Political Society, Turkey," in ernization Princeton Press, 1964), (Princeton: pp. University Japan and Turkey 46-48. For later developments Old and New: The Ottoman Stanford Shaw, Between under pp. Selim III 1789-1807 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971), 212-217. Aktepe, Patrona No. 808, Isyani: 1958), 1730 passim. (Istanbul: Istanbul Universitesi Edebiyat



See M. Munir Fakiiltesi

Yay?nlar? G.


See on

Joseph Political



Political 23. See Halil

Development Inalc?k,

and Myron Weiner, "Conclusions: The of Parties Impact in LaPalombara Parties and Weiner, and eds., Political Princeton (Princeton: Press, 1966), p. 413. University Uygulanmas? ve Sosyal Tepkileri," Belleten, 28


(1964), pp. 623-690.

24. W. M. Ramsay, "The Intermixture of Races in Asia Minor: Some of Its Causes and

Effects," Proceedings of the British Academy

25. For 96th provincial and 97th April opposition sessions to of secularism the Ottoman at

( 1915-1916), p. 409.

the time of May the Young 24-25, Turks, 1910, see also the 71st


session, 26. For man 27. Enver 1907 Tarihi 28. See

3, 1911. Law of 1864, see Roderic Princeton H. Davison, Press, ve Reform 1963), in the Otto pp. Devirleri 136-171. 1876

the Administrative Empire 1856-1876



Birinci Mesrutiyet Tarihi VIII: Ziya Karal, Osmanli tarih kurumu (Turk (Ankara, 1962), Yay?nlar?ndan, 5), p. 329. Bayar, Ben de Yazdim: Milli M?cadeleye Giris

Istibdat 13

ser., No.

16, Dunya





1966), pp. 451, 475.

29. Server Bas?mevi, 30. I take Claus this Wittich, Iskit, Nesriyat Turkiyede p. 113. Hareketleri Tarihine bir Bakls (Istanbul: Devlet


from Max Weber, terminology eds., 3 vols. (New York:

Economy Bedminister


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31. "Yeni 1971), 32. Andreas Allen Belgelerin pp. 60-117,


Siyasal durumu," Belleten, 35 (January

Pasan?n ?s?ginda K?mil here pp. 110-111.

in the Quest Education and (London: for Modernity Turkey to this information 12. I was alerted 1966), p. 90, note by Joseph in L. Szyliowicz, Recruitment World Role The "Elite of the Mulkiye," Turkey: concur that 10 cannot with his but 23 Politics, 1971), 386, interpretation (April is also at variance is "significant." This in higher data per cent of graduates posts P. Roos, Managers L. Roos, with that given of Moderniza by Leslie Jr., and Noralou in Harvard tion Organization Mass.: and Elites (1950-1969) (Cambridge, Turkey 20. Press, 1971), p. University Kazamias, and Unwin, See M. Orhan Okay, Ben Group, 1928), of p. Besir Fuad (Istanbul: Vol. Z. Hareket note Yay?nlar? 1. Siys? Partiler (Istanbul, 1969), passim.

33. 34. 35.

See Celal On the

Bayar, Second

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[Ad?var], The Turkish Ordeal

see Vol.

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Ceridesi municipal Meclisi

the gendarmerie by the civilians Latin I, 29/6-7-1336. script edition boards Zabit

Turkiye II, pp.

Biiyuk Millet 182-183.

military protecting 38.

service, their

see not being of the people T?rkiye representative Biiyuk Vol. Ill, p. 85; on notables Ceridesi, I, 43/3-8-1336, evading in as persons interested ibid., Vol. II, p. 433; on notables primarily Vol. Ibid., II, p. 260. property, Siyast Lewis, Partiler, p. 617 The Emergence 1968), p. 266. p. 417. Birlik," in Demokrasi Yolunda (The Hague: 1964), on article of Modern 14 of On the party program. 2nd ed. (London:

See Tunaya, Turkiyede see Bernard the revolt Oxford University The Press,


39. 40.

See Lewis, F. K?pr?f?, p. 304.



ve Mill?




T. ?zelli, "The Estimates in the First Turkish

of Private Republic



of Return International

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of Middle

East Studies, 1 (April 1970), pp. 156-176.

42. Osman Faruk Logoglu, Unpublished "Ismet Ph.D. In?n? and the Political Modernization University, Turk a tarih transitory 1970, Kurumu situation 1945-1965," 43. Behice Boran, Dissertation, Princeton (Ankara: this was of Turkey p. 135. basimevi, but

1945), pp. nevertheless 44. Celal Bayar,

Y api Arastirmalarl Toplumsal out that 218-219. Boran points served the Democrat Party well. "Ba?vekilim Adnan Menderes,"







Center-Periphery Relations: A Key to Turkish Politics?

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