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Volume 39, Number 1

2002

In this issue: Electoral Systems and Women's Representation Broadcasting and Publishing Opinion Polls and Exit Polls Extremists and Moderates at the 2001 UK General Election in Northern Ireland The Extreme Right in the UK General Election of 2001 Reports on the French Presidential and Parliamentary Elections, 2002 and the Nice Treaty Referendum in Ireland, 2001

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Editorial policy

The electoral process lies at the very heart of representative democracy. Representation is a journal of record and comment about elections, voting systems and their place inside the democratic body politic. Representation, is published by the McDougall Trust and provides information necessary for informed debate and understanding of all aspects of elections. The new series dates from 1995.

Editors

David M. Farrell, University of Manchester, UK Sarah Birch, University of Essex, UK Tom Ellis, McDougall Trust, UK Nina Fishman, University of Westminster, UK David Mason, McDougall Trust, UK Paul Webb, Sussex University, UK Paul Wilder, McDougall Trust, UK Michael Gallagher, Trinity College, University of Dublin, Ireland Richard S. Katz, The Johns Hopkins University, USA Calum Macdonald MP, UK Richard G. Niemi, University of Rochester, USA Pippa Norris, Harvard University, USA Ben Reilly, Australian National University, Canberra, Australia Andrew Reynolds, University of North Carolina, USA Robert Richie, Center for Voting and Democracy, Washington, USA Joe Rogaly, UK Michael Steed, University of Kent at Canterbury, UK Joseph F. Zimmerman, State University of New York at Albany, USA

Editorial advisory board

Rt. Hon. Alan Beith MP, UK Rt. Hon. Lord John Biffen DL, UK André Blais, University of Montréal, Canada David J. Broughton, University of Wales, Cardiff, UK David Butler, Nuffield College, University of Oxford, UK Michael Dyer, University of Aberdeen, UK

Building national and international electoral networks The editors of Representation are interested in furthering links with national and international groups involved in the study of elections, representation and voting systems. This is reflected in the range of individuals on our advisory board. We want to establish more formal links with specialist groups of political scientists. Such arrangements have already been forged with the Elections, Public Opinion and Parties (EPOP) group of the British Political Studies Association and with the Comparative Representation and Electoral Systems Research Committee (ESRC) of the International Political Science Association. Individual members of those groups may receive Representation at a reduced rate on an agreed basis. We also invite papers for possible publication from members of those groups. We invite similar organisations to contact us.

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The Journal of Representative Democracy

2002, Volume 39, Number 1

Contents

Articles Ian McAllister and Donley T. Studlar Tim Bale Electoral Systems and Women's Representation: A Long-term Perspective Restricting the Broadcast and Publication of Pre-election and Exit Polls: Some Selected Examples The 2001 Elections in Northern Ireland: Moderating 'Extremists' and the Squeezing of the Moderates 'England Belongs to Me': The Extreme Right in the UK Parliamentary Election of 2001 3 15

Paul Mitchell, Brendan O'Leary and Geoffrey Evans Cas Mudde Election Reports Raymond Kuhn Mads Qvortrup and Delores Taffe News in Brief Elections Round-Up Contents and Author Index

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37

The French Presidential and Parliamentary Elections, 2002 Murphy's Law Revisited: The Irish Rejection of the Nice Treaty, 2001

44 57 64 67

Volume 38, 2001

73

ISSN 0034-4893 Published by the McDougall Trust Registered charity no. 212151

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Notes to readers, subscribers and correspondents

Readers Readers are reminded that views expressed in Representation by contributors do not necessarily reflect those of the McDougall Trust or of its trustees. Representation is published four times a year by the McDougall Trust. Subscribers Subscriptions, new orders and sample copy requests should be addressed to the Managing Editor at the editorial office's address given below. Cheques should be made payable to the `McDougall Trust' in pounds sterling, euros or US dollars. All subscriptions are supplied on a four issues basis. Subscription rates for 2003 are as follows: UK ­ £60 for Institutions and £25 for Individuals; for the Irish Republic, Europe and elsewhere ­ £70 (160 / US $140) for Institutions and £35 (80 / US $70) for Individuals. Rates are inclusive of printed paper air mail postage. Enquiries about back issues, advertising and copyright, should be addressed to the Managing Editor. Information for contributors can be found on the inside back cover. Publishers should send books for review to the Managing Editor. © 2002, The McDougall Trust. Representation, UK ISSN 0034-4893. The McDougall Trust is a registered charity no. 212151. Designed and printed by Voluntary Sector Services, Centurion Press Ltd. Rickmansworth, Hertfordshire WD3 1ER. 01923 891022. Correspondence All correspondence regarding Representation, including manuscripts and disks should be sent to: The Managing Editor Representation The McDougall Trust 6 Chancel Street London SE1 0UX Telephone: +44 (0)20 7620 1080 Facsimile: +44 (0)20 7928 1528 E-mail: [email protected] The McDougall Trust The McDougall Trust is an independent educational charity (registered charity no. 212151) established in 1948. The principal objects of the McDougall Trust (The Arthur McDougall Fund) are to advance knowledge of and research into representative democracy, its forms, functions and development and associated institutions. The Trust is governed by a High Court Scheme issued in 1959 which states its charitable purposes as being `to advance knowledge of and encourage the study of and research in: political or economic science and functions of government and the services provided to the community by public and voluntary organisations; and methods of election of and the selection of and government of representative organisations whether national, civic, commercial, industrial or social.' The Trust welcomes charitable donations, gifts and legacies in support of its work which includes the maintenance of a unique research library on electoral matters. Information on charitable giving, including gift aid donations and covenant forms, are available on request from the Trust's Executive Secretary.

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Representation, Vol. 39, No. 1, 2002, pp. 3-14

Electoral Systems and Women's Representation: A Long-Term Perspective1

Ian McAllister and Donley T. Studlar

Abstract: This paper provides a long-term perspective on women's legislative representation in 20 Western democracies by describing and analysing the patterns over a 50-year period, 1950-2000. Descriptive patterns show that the same countries who were leaders in women's representation, albeit at very low levels, in the 1950s, remain the leaders, but with an increased gap, in 2000. A multivariate analysis of factors influencing women's representation over the entire period finds that the most important variables are a proportional electoral system, early women's enfranchisement, and the introduction of gender quotas for political parties. The conclusion emphasises the implications of these findings for women's legislative representation in Anglo-American democracies.

In attempting to explain differences across countries in women's legislative representation, several factors have been tested. Among those that have been found to have demonstrable effects are economic development, political culture, women's socio-economic status, women's social movements, and electoral rules, especially electoral systems and the introduction of party quotas for women candidates (Darcy et al., 1994; Matland, 1998; Matland and Studlar, 1996; Banaszak et al., 2002; Caul, 2001). Norris and Lovenduski (1995) differentiate among system, supply, and demand variables for candidates. Electoral rules constitute part of the system variables, although they can also be considered as part of the demand structure for women candidates. The relationship between electoral systems and women's representation is longstanding. For almost a half century, studies have consistently found that singlemember district (SMD) systems, whether majority, plurality, or preferential voting, have fewer women than do proportional representation (PR) systems (Duverger, 1955; Lakeman and Lambert, 1955; Farrell, 2001).2 Within PR systems, party list systems have larger numbers of women representatives than single transferable vote (STV) systems. When mixed electoral systems are introduced, as in post-war Germany and New Zealand, Japan, Italy, and the recently established devolved legislatures in Scotland and Wales, women's representation falls between the SMD and party list PR levels, and is often greater than under STV. Yet, in most mixed systems women legislators come largely from the proportional part of the ballot rather than the single-member side (Studlar, 1999). Despite the generality of these findings, unresolved issues remain. The first is that not all proportional representation and mixed systems have higher proportions of women than do SMD systems, which indicates that other organisational and cultural factors are at work. Second, there is still considerable variation from country to

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country, even among those using the same type of electoral system. Third, those countries, all party list PR, which have the highest proportions of women in legislatures have tended to reach a ceiling at the 30-40% level over the past decade. Finally, most of the studies which have contributed to this generalisation have been snapshots of legislatures over a short period of time (Rule, 1981, 1987; Norris, 1987; Darcy et al., 1994; Siaroff, 2000; cf. Matland and Studlar, 1996; Matland, 1998). Furthermore, as women's representation levels have stabilised in recent years, there have been fewer such studies, and rarely up-to-date ones. To answer these questions, we need to examine the relationship between electoral systems and women's representation in stable democratic systems over the long term, taking into account the earlier years of generally low representation as well as more recent gains. Thus we analyse women's representation across 20 OECD democracies over half a century from 1950-2000. The focus, as in most such studies, is on the most popularly elected branch of the legislature, the lower house in a bicameral institution. Based on these findings and the results of recent electoral system changes in New Zealand and the devolved legislatures in Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland, we consider the implications for how Anglo-American countries, often considered laggards in women's representation, could generate greater shares of seats for women. Patterns of women's representation Some historical facets of women's representation which may affect current patterns in the 20 countries are shown in Table 1. The countries vary considerably in terms of relevant characteristics, including type of electoral system, the timing of women's right to vote and stand for the legislature, the date of the first woman elected, and the date of the first woman to become presiding officer over the legislature. Although Northern European and other heavily Protestant democracies usually enfranchised women in the first two decades of the twentieth century, Southern European and largely nonProtestant countries were either non-democratic (Japan) or, if they were, often did not allow women to vote and stand until after World War II (France, Belgium). Having women even in the symbolic position of head of a legislative body (the equivalent of Speaker of the House) is, in almost all instances, a recent phenomenon stemming from the 1970s. Figure 1 (on p. 6) shows the overall patterns of women's representation for the 20 countries, and Table 2 (on p. 7) shows the results for each country by decade since 1950. Figure 1 indicates that there was a period of relative stability (or even slight declines in the 1950s and 1960s) when women's representation in legislatures was around 5% overall, extending from the beginning of the period in 1950 until 1969. Thereafter, the increase is linear. These findings confirm that the `second wave feminist movement' (the first wave being the suffrage movement), stemming from developments in the 1960s, manifested itself in increased numbers of women

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parliamentarians from the early 1970s. Since 1970, the rate of increase of women's representation has been relatively constant across the countries under examination.

Table 1: Countries included in the analysis

Country Electoral system Right to vote 1902 1918 1948 1917 1915 1906 1944 Right to stand 1902 1918 1948 1920 1915 1906 1944 First woman elected 1943 1919 1921 1921 1918 1907 1945 First woman head of legislature 1986 1927 1972 1950 1991 -

Australia Austria Belgium Canada Denmark Finland France

Germany Iceland Ireland Israel Italy Japan Luxembourg Netherlands NZ Norway Sweden UK USA

Plurality-AV PR-List PR-List Plurality-FPTP PR-List PR-List PR-List (to 1957); Pluralitysecond ballot (from 1958); PR-List (1986); Pluralitysecond ballot (from 1987) PR-MMP PR-List PR-STV PR-List PR-List (to 1993); PR-MMP (from 1994) Semi-PR SNTV (to 1994); Semi-PR Parallel (from 1995) PR-List PR-List Plurality-FPTP (to 1993); PR-MMP (from 1996) PR-List PR-List Plurality-FPTP Plurality-FPTP

1918 1915 1918 1948 1945 1945 1919 1919 1893 1913 1919 1918 1920

1918 1915 1918 1948 1945 1945 1919 1917 1919 1907 1919 1918 1919

1919 1922 1918 1949 1946 1946 1919 1918 1933 1911 1921 1918 1917

1972 1974 1982 1979 1993 1989 1998 1993 1991 1992 -

Sources: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (1997a, 1997b); www.idea.int; Inter-Parliamentary Union (1997); www.ipu.org.

While women legislators were rare in the 1950s and 1960s, Table 2 shows that even then a few countries, all with PR electoral systems, had above-average shares (especially Finland and Sweden). For example, for the last half century, the level of women's representation in the Swedish and Finnish parliaments averaged just over 23%, compared to less than 10% among half of the 20 countries under consideration. Moreover, over the past three decades, the five leading countries, in

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terms of average women's representation for each decade and overall, remained the same: Sweden, Finland, Norway, Denmark, and the Netherlands. Only one country ­ Israel ­ has not improved its position with regards to women, with 0.3% fewer women representatives in the 1990s than in the 1950s.

Figure 1: Women's representation in 20 national parliaments, 1950-2000

28

24 Percentage women elected representatives 20

16

12

8

4

0 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000

Sources: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (1997a, 1997b); www.idea.int; Inter-Parliamentary Union (1997); www.ipu.org.

The modern literature on the relationship between electoral systems and women's representation is largely based upon findings first evident in the 1970s (Rule, 1981, 1987; Norris, 1987). The increase in women legislators was greater in PR systems, while their numbers in SMD systems such as the United Kingdom, the United States, Australia, France, Canada and New Zealand remained relatively low and stable. Observers drew a clear link between the proportionality of the electoral system and the chances of women gaining greater representation.

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Table 2: Average parliamentary representation for women in 20 countries

Rank 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. Country 1950s 1960s 13.9 15.2 8.3 9.9 9.2 7.7 2.2 5.5 5.7 7.8 4.1 0.7 4.2 1.5 4.1 2.6 3.2 1.9 0.2 1.5 (5.5) 1970s 20.2 21.6 16.2 16.4 10.3 6.6 4.7 6.7 4.6 6.7 5.5 5.3 5.4 2.5 4.0 3.0 3.6 2.8 0.3 1.5 (7.4) 1980s 30.9 29.5 30.0 26.3 18.0 11.1 14.0 9.7 11.3 7.6 9.0 12.6 7.1 8.5 4.2 7.4 5.0 6.7 4.6 1.5 (12.8) 1990s 38.6 35.8 37.4 34.1 29.9 27.1 26.3 22.1 21.1 8.9 11.6 17.0 11.8 16.3 11.3 11.2 10.5 7.9 12.4 2.6 (19.7) Change Overall 1950-2000 1950-2000 (+26.8) 23.5 (+23.2) 23.2 (+32.1) 19.8 (+25.6) 19.4 (+22.1) 15.4 (+18.7) 12.5 (+24.2) 10.3 (+17.0) 10.1 (+16.6) 9.9 (-0.3) 8.1 (+5.5) 7.3 (+17.0) 7.3 (+7.9) 6.8 (+15.1) 6.4 (+8.0) 5.6 (+7.8) 5.6 (+7.6) 5.2 (+4.4) 4.7 (+12.2) 3.9 (+0.5) 1.9 (+14.6) (10.4)

Sweden 11.8 Finland 12.6 Norway 5.3 Denmark 8.5 Netherlands 7.8 Germany 8.4 Iceland 2.1 Austria 5.1 New Zealand 4.5 Israel 9.2 Italy 6.1 Luxembourg 0.0 Belgium 3.9 Canada 1.2 United Kingdom 3.3 Ireland 3.4 United States 2.9 France 3.5 Australia 0.2 Japan 2.1 (Total) (5.1)

Note: Figures are percentages of parliamentarians who are women. Sources: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (1997a, 1997b); www.idea.int; Inter-Parliamentary Union (1997); www.ipu.org.

The 1980s saw more increases in women's representation, even in some SMD systems such as New Zealand and Canada, but proportionately greater rises occurred in PR systems, especially those with party lists and containing parties which adopted some form of quota for women candidates in their ranks (Darcy et al., 1994; Matland and Studlar, 1996; Caul, 2001). Even as quotas were introduced, the increase in West Germany, then the only mixed system, came almost exclusively from the party list (Kolinksy, 1993). Even more women MPs were elected in the 1990s, including substantial increases in SMD countries such as Canada, Australia and the United Kingdom, but PR systems continued to lead overall, even as their ranks reached a ceiling, perhaps a temporary one, at the highest levels (Siaroff, 2000). The development of more mixed systems generally coincided with increases in women's representation, especially in formerly exclusively SMD countries. The move from party list PR to a mixed system in Italy was

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initially associated with increases in previously low levels of women in parliament, although these higher levels were not subsequently sustained.3 Factors influencing women's representation In our analysis, electoral systems are measured through a dichotomy, those having at least some component of PR, including mixed systems, versus all forms of SMD only. In addition, we consider other factors which might be important in increasing the proportion of women elected representatives, either through previous studies or other potential political influences which might be confounded with electoral system effects. Our list of variables is further limited to those for which we have adequate and consistent data for the 20 countries over a 50-year period. Thus of the six major established explanatory variables for women's legislative representation, we include electoral system, economic development, political culture, and quotas, but not women's socio-economic standing or lobbying through social movements. We would predict that legislatures having fewer average constituents per district should lead to more women being elected, since there is a closer link between the representative and the local constituency, thus reducing competition for nominations. This is measured by the representation ratio, that is, how many thousands of electors there are for each elected representative. The more competitive the party system, the more incentives there should be for parties to search for new voters, which might lead to a `contagion' of women candidates among parties (Matland and Studlar, 1996). Competitiveness is measured by the percentage vote for the largest party in each national election. Turnout and voter registration are differentially located among social groups, as a consequence of political interest and involvement. This could have a negative influence on women's representation, especially in earlier years when women tended to vote less than men. Turnout is measured as the percentage of the registered electorate who voted. A variable is also included for the countries that had compulsory voting during the period (namely Australia, Belgium, Luxembourg, Netherlands until 1971, and Italy until 1989)4 in order to measure the net effect of turnout. The effect of political culture upon women's advancement is measured by the elapsed time in years since enfranchisement, and similarly for the first woman presiding officer of the legislature in either house. To measure quotas and targets, we estimate the proportion of the major parties within each party system using quotas or targets for the year in question.5 Data on quotas and targets for women are treated equally, though they reflect different levels of commitment and enforcement in the main political parties (Lovenduski, 1993). These are taken from the IPU, updated and supplemented from country sources.

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Table 3: Explaining changes in women's representation

Partial Institutional rules PR electoral system Representation ratio Turnout Compulsory voting system Party system competitiveness Political party quotas Women's advancement Enfranchisement Woman legislative presiding officer Economic development Constant R-squared (N) 6.0 -.01ns -.06ns -1.9 -.22 .16 .22 .02ns .02 6.0 .67 (1,020) Stand. .28 -.04ns -.06ns -.08 -.19 .36 .47 .03ns .07

ns = not significant at p <.01, two tailed. Note: Results are for ordinary least squares regression predicting the proportion of women elected representatives in 20 countries between 1950 and 2000. Estimates are partial and standardised coefficients. The dependent variable is the percentage of women elected representatives. PR electoral systems and compulsory voting countries are scored zero or one; representation ratio is thousands of voters per elected representative; turnout is percentage of registered electorate voting; party system competitiveness is the percentage vote for the largest party; quotas are the percent of parties operating a quota for women; enfranchisement and woman legislative head are the years since these occurred; and economic development is GDP per capita, in thousands of US dollars. Sources: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (1997a, 1997b); www.idea.int; Inter-Parliamentary Union (1997); www.ipu.org.

Overall, the R-squared estimate of 0.67 suggests a good model fit for what explains women's representation among our independent variables. The results indicate that the major effects on women's representation over the post-war years flow from the electoral system, early women's enfranchisement as an indication of political culture, and the introduction of gender quotas within political parties. Party list systems (which constitute more than half of the elections) boost women's representation compared with the use of any other electoral systems, including mixed and STV as well as SMD ones. An egalitarian political culture, as measured by the early enfranchisement of women in each country, has a strong influence in increasing women's representation, as we might expect. Each additional year that women have possessed the vote increases their representation by 0.22%, net of other things. This contrasts with previous findings which have tended to discount early enfranchisement effects.6 This is a benefit, however, of taking a longer term perspective on this question. Early enfranchisement of women was related to women's share of legislators even in the 1950s and has continued despite other influences. The presence of a woman as head of the national legislature, however, has no statistically significant impact on increasing women's representation. This

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position is often more symbolic than powerful, serving largely as a referee for partisan conflict on the floor of the legislature. The stronger promotion of women through quotas further secures higher percentages of women legislators.7 Quotas have been largely introduced in countries where the position of women has already been extensively promoted, such as Scandinavia. For example, the use of quotas correlates strongly with the years since women were enfranchised (r = .41); once this and other factors are taken into account, the impact of quotas on women's representation is reduced. In addition to the electoral system, some other aspects of institutional rules also contribute to explaining women's representation. Although turnout has no overall effect, compulsory voting systems reduce women's representation by about 1.8% over the period. This may be an artefact of the few countries using this mechanism. Party system competitiveness further reduces women's representation, although its impact is somewhat less than the three major influences. This is probably due to the `manufactured majorities' produced by SMD systems. There is no significant effect for the representation ratio. Economic development serves as a control variable on the political influences and shows some effect. Of the variables which positively affect women's representation, instituting quotas and changing the electoral system are politically difficult. Nevertheless, they are still more likely to have substantial short and medium-term effects on increasing women's representation than changes in the political culture or party system competitiveness, which are even more resistant to change, or economic development. This is further illustrated by considering the short-term impact on women's representation of some recent institutional changes, especially in Anglo-American electoral arrangements. Women's representation in Anglo-American systems Electoral system change and the introduction of quotas have recently occurred in AngloAmerican systems. The introduction of mixed systems in New Zealand and for the devolved legislatures in Scotland and Wales have led to more opportunities for women. Most of these increases have occurred on the party list side of the ballot. The only central-level Westminster system which has modified its SMD system, New Zealand, has had two elections at the time of writing, 1996 and 1999, using a mixture of party list PR and SMD seats. New Zealand already had the highest SMD women's representation among OECD countries, 21.2%, before the change, but in 1996 this increased to 29.2% and in 1999 to 30.8%, the first Anglo-American democracy to reach that level. Despite the fact that some women were already established as incumbents in SMD seats, in 1996 women accounted for 45% of the list share of the MPs versus only 15% from the constituency side (Banducci and Karp, 1998). Only the party where women already had high representation, Labour, elected more women from SMD than party lists. In 1999, a stronger overall performance by Labour modified these figures slightly, 24% from individual constituencies and 40% from the party lists (Vowles, 2001). In both elections, all other parties in New Zealand, especially the smaller

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ones, had an overwhelming proportion of their women legislators from the party list. In both Scotland and Wales, women took advantage of the emergent devolved institutions to achieve new heights of political representation, winning 40% of the seats in the Welsh Assembly and almost 39% of those in the Scottish Parliament in the 1999 elections (Brown, 1998; Edwards and McAllister, 2001). This occurred both through a process of `twinning' for Labour Party nominations in the SMD seats in both countries and through favourable placements on the PR `additional member' lists of the other parties, especially the Scottish National Party and Plaid Cymru. `Twinning' of SMD seats is difficult to achieve, however, because when there is only one seat per district, safe or competitive seats are what aspiring candidates wish to secure. It may be easier for an established party which is likely to do well in a newly constituted body, such as the Labour Party in the Scottish Parliament and the Welsh Assembly, to manage this feat than parties in other circumstances in SMD systems. For instance, the New Democratic Party in Canada, a small party in an established SMD system, attempted this in the federal election of 1993, with mixed success. A major party which already has many incumbents would be even harder pressed to establish a new group of women in winnable seats. In recognition that twinning becomes more complicated with incumbents, it was initially adopted as a `one-off' policy for the devolved legislative elections of 1999 only (Edwards and Chapman, 2000). The limits of the introduction of new assemblies and the continuing influence of local political cultures are evident in Northern Ireland, the one part of the United Kingdom in which there has been a concerted effort to use more proportional forms of representation in order to induce cross-group harmony. In such a highly combative society, the use of STV in Assembly and local elections has coincided with modest increases in women's representation. As we have already said, STV has generally been found to be less favourable to women than party list forms of PR. In the 1998 Assembly elections, 12.9% of the 108 representatives were women (Fearon, 2000), virtually the same level of female representation as that found in the Irish Republic's Dáil since 1993 (12%), where STV is also used. In the SMD Westminster elections, the Labour Party attempt to increase the numbers of women MPs in 1997 through the use of all-women shortlists in selected competitive constituencies was initially successful, but was halted on legal grounds by an industrial tribunal (Studlar and McAllister, 1998). Without this policy, but with most incumbents choosing to run, there was a slight reduction in women MPs at the general election of 2001. Under continued pressure from the women's movement, Labour promised in its 2001 campaign manifesto to change the law to allow institutionalised `positive discrimination' policies within political parties. The Women's Representation Bill was duly introduced in late 2001, although it only provides a window of opportunity for such positive discrimination until 2015. Meanwhile, the French constitution and law have been changed to allow for a reduction of public subsidies to parties which do not offer equal numbers of women and men candidates; this is usually termed the policy of `parity' (Lovecy, 2000; Dauphin

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and Praud, 2001). The results of the National Assembly election of 2002 will be the first indication of how effective this policy will be in increasing the number of women in that body (see election report by Kuhn in this issue). Legal approaches for greater gender equality in legislatures have a mixed record in Latin America (Htun and Jones, 2001). Even with a well-developed feminist movement, the United States has been a laggard in terms of women legislators. Their share of the U.S. House of Representatives surged only once, in the 1992 election when a large-scale reapportionment of seats after the decennial census reduced the incumbency advantage. Subsequently, women's representation in the House has stabilised but could leap forward again at the Congressional elections of 2002 after another redistribution. Even in the state legislatures, where traditionally women have had higher shares than in Congress, overall levels began to stabilise in the mid-1990s, rising only from 20.5% in 1993 to 22.5% in 2000. There is considerable variation among the 50 states. Two other federal systems, Canada and Australia, experienced substantial increases in proportions of women legislators in the 1990s. In comparing the two countries, there are prima facie electoral system effects. In Canada, where SMD is the rule for both federal and provincial levels, women's representation is similar at both levels (Matland and Studlar, 1998). In Australia, STV is used for the upper federal house, the Senate, and in four state chambers. Elsewhere, the Alternative Vote (or `preference vote') is used. In 2001, there was a greater share of women in four out of these five cases where STV was used, than in the SMD House of Representatives, although the differences were relatively small. Conclusion Whether we focus on stable democracies over half a century or examine AngloAmerican countries more specifically ­ both those that have changed from relying exclusively on SMD and those that have not ­ the conclusion is the same. While other factors exercise some influence, especially having a more gender-egalitarian political culture and, more recently, women's group lobbying leading to the institutionalisation of quotas within parties for women's advancement, SMD electoral systems remain a high hurdle for women to clear in order to improve their share of legislators. Early women's suffrage, use of an electoral system involving PR, and the introduction of quotas have acted cumulatively to maintain some countries as leaders. The major means by which an SMD system may become part of this group are the adoption of a mixed electoral system and/or the institution of a form of positive discrimination. Attempts to aid women's representation through changing candidate selection rules have now moved from the party to the governmental level. What has happened in mixed electoral systems in formerly `Westminster-type' democracies confirms these findings. The introduction of a mixed system has improved women's representation markedly, even in New Zealand, previously the SMD system with the greatest proportion of women MPs. Even more dramatic results were achieved in Scotland and Wales when the new mixed system was combined with the use of positive discrimination policies within the dominant Labour Party.

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Electoral Systems and Women's Representation

This improvement in women's standing in newly mixed systems is not fully evident in the general comparative analysis. This is because mixed systems are included in a category with others which have a PR component. But when one looks at where women legislators originate in these systems, the relationship between PR and women's representation is even stronger than the aggregate figures reveal. If institutional designers wish to increase the number of women legislators, they still need to look carefully at the electoral system. Ian McAllister is Director, Research School of Social Sciences, The Australian National University. Donley T. Studlar is Eberly Family Distinguished Professor of Political Science at West Virginia University. He also serves as Executive Secretary of the British Politics Group.

Notes: 1 This research was conducted while the second-named author was a Visiting Fellow in the Political Science Program, Institute for Advanced Studies, Research School of Social Sciences, The Australian National University, Canberra, May-August 2001. We thank Jeffrey Karp of the University of Amsterdam, the two anonymous reviewers, and the editors of Representation for their comments on a previous version. Marian Sawer of ANU, Bernadette Hayes of Queen's University, Belfast, Karen Beckwith of the College of Wooster, Robert DiClerico of West Virginia University, and Jack Vowles of the University of Waikato helped identify data and references. 2 More finely-tuned analyses have examined such things as district magnitude and the possibility of candidate choice within PR systems. See Matland (1993). 3 For the first election under the new system in the 1994 the gender of list candidates alternated. This provision was thrown out by the courts in 1995. See Donovan (1996). 4 There is a long-standing puzzle about whether Italy should be considered a compulsory voting country because the penalties were light. The turnout levels declined below 80% in the 1990s, which indicates that it no longer should be considered one. See Gray and Caul (2000), p. 1108. 5 Inspection of the correlation matrix between all of the independent variables suggested that multicollinearity was not a problem for the multivariate analyses. 6 But see Rule (1981) and Siaroff (2000) on enfranchisement per se and Rule (1987) and Norris (1987) on the influence of attitudes in the political culture on representation. 7 The zero-order correlation is .62. References: Banaszak, Lee Ann, Karen Beckwith and Dieter Rucht (2002) Women's Movements Facing the Reconfigured State. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Banducci, Susan and Jeffrey Karp (1998) `Representation Under a Proportional System', in Jack Vowles, Peter Aimer, Susan Banducci and Jeffrey Karp (eds), Voter's Victory: New Zealand's First Election Under Proportional Representation. Auckland, NZ: Auckland University Press, pp. 135-52. Brown, Alice (1998) `Representing Women in Scotland', Parliamentary Affairs, 51 (3): 435-44. Caul, Miki L. (2001) `Political Parties and the Adoption of Candidate Gender Quotas: A Cross-National Analysis', Journal of Politics, 63: (4) 1214-29. Darcy, R., Susan Welch and Janet Clark (1994) Women, Elections and Representation, 2nd edn. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press. Dauphin, Sandrine and Jocelyne Praud (2002) `Debating and Implementing Gender Parity in France', Modern and Contemporary France, 10: (1) 5-11. Donovan, Mark (1996) `Electoral Reform in Italy', Representation, 33 (4):142. Duverger, Maurice (1955) The Political Role of Women. Paris: UNESCO. Edwards, Julia and Christine Chapman (2000) `Women's Political Representation in Wales: Waving or Drowning?',

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Contemporary Politics, 6: (4) 367-81. Edwards, Julia and Laura McAllister (2001) `One Step Forward, Two Steps Back? Women in the Two Main Political Parties in Wales', paper presented at Political Studies Association Conference, Manchester. Farrell, David M. (2001) Electoral Systems: A Comparative Introduction. London: Palgrave. Fearon, Kate (2000) `What Happened to the Women? Gender and Peace in Northern Ireland', in Michael Cox, Adrian Guelke and Fiona Stephen (eds), A Farewell to Arms? From `Long War' to Long Peace in Northern Ireland. Manchester: Manchester University Press, pp. 153-64. Gray, Mark and Miki Caul (2000) `Declining Voter Turnout in Advanced Industrial Democracies, 1950 to 1997: The Effects of Declining Group Mobilization', Comparative Political Studies, 33: (9) 1091-122. Htun, Mala N. and Mark P. Jones (2001) `Engendering the Right to Participate in Decisionmaking: Electoral Quotas and Women's Leadership in Latin America', in Nikki Craske and Maxine Molyneux (eds), Gender, Rights and Justice in Latin America. New York: Macmillan, pp. 32-56. International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (1997a) Voter Turnout from 1945 to 1997. Stockholm: International IDEA. International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (1997b) The International IDEA Handbook of Electoral System Design. Stockholm: International IDEA. Inter-Parliamentary Union (1997) Democracy Still in the Making, Series Reports and Documents, No. 28. Geneva: Inter-Parliamentary Union. Kolinsky, Eva (1993) `Party Change and Women's Representation in United Germany', in Joni Lovenduski and Pippa Norris (eds), Gender and Party Politics. London: Sage, pp. 113-46. Lakeman, Enid and James D. Lambert (1955) Voting in Democracies: A Study of Majority and Proportional Electoral Systems. London: Faber and Faber. Lovecy, Jill (2000) ` "Citoyennes à part entiére"? The Constitutionalization of Gendered Citizenship in France and the Parity Reforms of 1999-2000', Government and Opposition, 35: (4) 439-62. Lovenduski, Joni (1993) `Introduction: The Dynamics of Gender and Party', in Joni Lovenduski and Pippa Norris (eds), Gender and Party Politics. London: Sage, pp. 1-15. Matland, Richard E. (1993) `Institutional Variables Affecting Female Representation in National Legislatures: The Case of Norway', Journal of Politics, 55: (3) 737-55. Matland, Richard E. (1998) `Women's Representation in National Legislatures: Developed and Developing Democracies', Legislative Studies Quarterly, 23: (1) 109-25. Matland, Richard E. and Donley T. Studlar (1996) `The Contagion of Women Candidates in Single-Member District and Proportional Representation Electoral Systems: Canada and Norway', Journal of Politics, 58: (3) 707-33. Matland, Richard E. and Donley T. Studlar (1998) `Gender and the Electoral Opportunity Structure in the Canadian Provinces', Political Research Quarterly, 51: (1) 117-40. Norris, Pippa (1987) Politics and Sexual Equality. Boulder: Lynne Rienner. Norris, Pippa and Joni Lovenduski (1995) Political Recruitment: Gender, Race and Class in the British Parliament. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Rule, Wilma (1981) `Why Women Don't Run: The Critical Factors in Women's Legislative Recruitment', Western Political Quarterly, 34: (1) 60-77. Rule, Wilma (1987) `Electoral Systems, Contextual Factors, and Women's Opportunities for Election to Parliament in Twenty-Three Democracies', Western Political Quarterly, 40: (3) 477-98. Siaroff, Alan (2000) `Women's Representation in Legislatures and Cabinets in Industrial Democracies', International Political Science Review, 21: (2) 197-216. Studlar, Donley T. (1999) `Will Canada Seriously Consider Electoral Reform? Women and Minorities Should', in Henry Milner (ed.), Making Every Vote Count: Reassessing Canada's Electoral System. Peterborough: Broadview Press, pp. 123-32. Studlar, Donley T. and Ian McAllister (1998) `Candidate Gender and Voting in the 1997 British General Election: Did Labour Quotas Matter?' Journal of Legislative Studies, 4: (3) 72-91. Vowles, Jack (2001) Personal Communication.

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Representation, Vol. 39, No. 1, 2002, pp. 15-22

Restricting the Broadcast and Publication of Pre-election and Exit Polls: Some Selected Examples

Tim Bale

Even before it came down to butterfly ballots and pregnant chads, the battle between George W. Bush and Al Gore had already raised some familiar questions about elections, and in particular, the way they are dealt with by the media (see Norris, 2001a). Although scholars will always disagree on the extent to which the media actually influence the result of the contest, there are few who can resist bemoaning the so-called `horse-race' style of campaign coverage pumped out by networks and newspapers, seemingly more interested in opinion polls than issues.1 With the result `too close to call' going into the final days, things appeared to be little better this time around (Norris, 2001b). Some would even say worse ­ especially those conservatives convinced that the major networks' exit poll predictions of a Gore win in Florida prior to the close of voting may have robbed Bush of votes that might have rendered the multiple recounts unnecessary.2 But however bad things got, few if any American commentators ­ in or out of the academic community ­ seriously suggested that political opinion polls should be done away with altogether for part or all of the campaign. This essential liberalism is by no means universal, however, even in advanced democracies ­ including many whose enlightened progressivism apparently obliges them to scold the Americans for their reactionary attitudes on a whole host of issues, most notably on the environment and on the death penalty. An attempt to identify cultural reasons for the variation between countries which restrict the reporting of pre-election and exit polls and those which do not would indeed be fascinating. But the aim of this brief report is rather more modest. It arose out of the surprising difficulty encountered by the author in putting together a submission on prevailing international practice to a Select Committee of the New Zealand Parliament regarding a clause seeking to ban opinion polls for three weeks prior to a general election ­ a clause inserted at the last minute into an otherwise uncontroversial government bill.3 This report aims simply to bring together in one convenient place our best understanding of the current situation in a number of English-speaking and European democracies (countries with which New Zealand routinely compares itself) and a few other important cases. If anything, there is some bias towards discussion of countries in which legal restrictions are in operation. For instance, both France and Italy feature heavily here, even though, in trying to enforce a period of pre-election opinion poll silence, they have more in common with the former communist countries of Eastern Europe than with their Western counterparts.

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The last easily available, admittedly larger scale, attempt to do the same was The Freedom to Publish Opinion Polls: a Worldwide Study, by Nils Rohme on behalf of two industry bodies, the European Society for Opinion and Marketing Research (ESOMAR) and the World Association for Public Opinion Research (WAPOR).4 Although, it continues to be cited in academic texts and (if New Zealand is anything to go by) political interventions alike, it is now in need of revision. The Council of Europe made a nod to the issue in its helpful, if a little impressionistic, handbook, Media and Elections (Lange, 1999), but it was very brief. Although the author hopes to make use of the information gathered here in a case study of the ­ as yet unresolved ­ political debate on the issue in New Zealand, and also to encourage correspondence, corrections and collaborative research in a comparative setting, the chief object is to provide political scientists and practitioners with information that may prove useful in discussions of elections and media coverage of those elections.5 Opinion polls are now so integral a part of the contemporary political process that they can be said to form, for good or ill, part of the cultural and institutional framework of the democracy Representation seeks to explore and enhance. Interestingly, their place in that framework looks increasingly secure following a number of recent judicial decisions. Country profiles Australia There is no legal restriction on the broadcast of pre-election opinion polls. Nor, with the exception of the state of Victoria (see its Constitution Amendment Act 1999, section 35) are there any restrictions on the broadcasting of exit polls. In fact, the latter are very rarely used nowadays: media organisations are not convinced that they represent value for money given the speed with which the actual results are now delivered and negative experiences with such polls in times past. Nor, incidentally, are there any restrictions on broadcasting election results in states where voting is still going on. Australian networks regularly broadcast federal election results into Western Australia, for example, before the polls have closed there. Canada The issue is dealt with here by the Canada Elections Act, which received royal assent on 31 May 2000 and came into effect on 1 September 2000. It was a response to a Supreme Court decision in the Thomson Newspapers case (1998), which held that the extant legislation (which prohibited the broadcasting, publication or dissemination of opinion survey results during the final three days of a federal election campaign) violated freedom of expression and the right to vote guaranteed by the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.6 The majority judgement, arguing that voters should be credited with both maturity and intelligence, held that the ban was a serious invasion of freedom of expression and a denial of the right to receive and provide legitimate political information at a crucial time. Such rights exist in virtually all countries with written constitutions or bills of rights. Where they have not already

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prevented restrictions on the broadcast of polls via the `law of anticipated reactions', they have led there, too, to the striking down of such restrictions: in the new democracy of Bulgaria in 1997, for instance, the Constitutional Court threw out a fourteen day period of silence for very similar reasons; the same happened in India in 1999. The new Act (section 328) imposes a blackout on publishing or broadcasting new survey results on election day, with exit poll broadcasts (section 329) banned (on pain of summary conviction and fine) until the close of polling. Posting on the internet is similarly banned, although there is nothing this can do to prevent Canadians, as they have done before (sometimes assisted by broadcasters supposedly observing the ban), from consulting US sites for the said information. It also requires (sections 326 and 327) that the first media outlet to release the results of an election opinion survey, and any other outlet broadcasting or publishing them during the next 24 hours, provide information about the survey methodology, including the survey's sponsor, who conducted it, when it was held, the population from which the survey sample was drawn, the number of people contacted to participate, and the margin of error. France Article 11 of the Loi 77-808 du 19 Juillet 1977 banned the publication and broadcasting of opinion polls one week before each of the country's two rounds of voting. This was to be overseen by la Commission des Sondages ­ a public agency which is exclusively concerned with policing opinion polls, but which is part of a network involved in the supervision of elections in a country with a long tradition of centralised state competency in the field. Exit polls were also banned until the close of voting. Article 2 of the same law also obliges those who broadcast polls to say who commissioned and who carried out the poll, the sample size and the date of the fieldwork. The ban, however, has been increasingly compromised by the realities of transnational communication. With the exception of a commercial broadcaster which reported exit polls before the close of voting, French media outlets at the presidential election in 1995 largely respected the letter of the law. But the Commission could do nothing to stop a Swiss newspaper available in France printing (and making available on a telephone hotline) the results of polls carried out during the proscribed period. At the general election in 1997, the law was further undermined by a number of domestic newspapers. Several referred readers to a website in Switzerland which was accessible in France. More seriously, two published a poll the day after the first round of voting in France's double-ballot system. When prosecuted by the Commission, they mounted a legal defence, but the court of appeal upheld their conviction in June 2000. That decision, however, was recently overturned by France's highest court, the cour de cassation, on 4 September 2001 in a landmark ruling which effectively put an end to the ban on opinion poll publication and broadcasting in France and, potentially at least, elsewhere in Europe ­ east and west.

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The basis of the court's decision was the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) subscribed to by member countries of the Council of Europe (which, note, is entirely separate from and has far more members than the EU, which in turn has nothing to do with the ECHR). Many countries ­ including France and more recently the UK ­ allow their citizens to seek redress under the ECHR in domestic courts rather than requiring them to take cases to the Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg. The ECHR provides in article 10.1 for the right to freedom of expression which `shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers' except (article 10.2) where such interference is warranted by, among other things, `national security, territorial integrity or public safety [and] the protection of the reputation or rights of others'. The French court found that none of these conditions applied to the nation's opinion poll restrictions. Furthermore, it found that the restrictions, because they could be circumvented so easily by those with access to the internet, were incompatible with article 14, which provides for the enjoyment of the ECHR's human rights without discrimination.7 It is difficult to see, then, how the ban can survive. Germany There are no legal restrictions for the broadcast of pre-election polls (with the same going for its neighbour Austria). There is, however, a restriction on the broadcast of exit polls relating to state, federal and European elections (Bundeswahlgestz, 32). The publication of data before voting closes is prohibited on pain of fine. With regard to pre-election polls, any `gentlemen's agreement' between the publicly financed networks not to broadcast predictions during the final days of the campaign has now been undermined by private stations and by their own pollsters,who make the information available to their other media clients. India The banning of opinion polls was very much a live issue in the run-up to the last general election in the world's biggest democracy. Concerns centred on the influence of polls on less educated electors, and in particular on the release of exit polls before the end of the nation's five-phase, staggered electoral process. The Election Commission declared on 20 August 1999 that results of polls could not be made public between 3 September (48 hours before the first phase of voting) and the last round of the electoral process on 3 October, with no exit polls allowed until the evening of that day. This ban was very quickly broken by a number of media institutions, with the support in particular of the eventual election winner, the BJP. After a number of High Court cases, the matter finally came before the Supreme Court, which ruled that the Commission's guidelines on polls exceeded the powers of `superintendence, direction and control' granted to it by Article 324 of the Constitution. The Court did not explicitly address whether the ban infringed Article

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19, which guarantees freedom of expression, though arguably this was implicit in its ruling. Interestingly, the bench also questioned the practicality of such a ban, given the presence of CNN, the BBC and the internet. The Commission withdrew its guidelines, but hoped for legislation on the matter before the next election. So far none has been forthcoming, nor looks likely. Ireland Although there have been periodic calls for legislative restrictions on the broadcasting of pre-election opinion polls, there are none at present. However, the state broadcaster, RTÉ, does operate a self-imposed moratorium on political coverage the day before an election. The use of exit polls is not permitted until the polls have closed. Italy Under law 28/2000 (article 8) and subsequent secondary legislation, polls cannot be broadcast from 15 days before election day until the close of polling. This makes Italy one of Europe's most restrictive regimes, although under previous legislation the prohibition period was even longer. Interestingly, under the same law, those polls that are broadcast prior to the proscribed period also have to be accompanied by minimum information on polling date and method, sample size, response rate ­ usually given in subtitled form. The same information must be submitted to and will be posted on a dedicated website of the Department for Information and Press.8 Spain The ley orgánica 5/1985, de 19 de junio, del régimen electorál generál, as well as obliging (under the supervision of the Electoral Commission) those who publish and broadcast polls to provide key information on sample size, etc., bans publication and broadcast by whatever means for the five days up to and including election day. Sweden Like the other Scandinavian countries, there are no formal legal restrictions. In practice, no media organisation publishes or broadcasts any pre-election polling results later than the day before elections. Exit poll results, so far only collected by the state broadcaster, are never broadcast until after all polling stations are closed. However, exit polls done by a commercial TV channel have been broadcast before the end of polling, though public and political criticism of the move was intense and, while remaining legal, it did not occur at the last election. UK There are no legal restrictions on the broadcast of pre-election polls. Concern about the issue, however, was evident following the general election of 1992, when the opinion polls were widely, though not necessarily rightly, criticised for `getting it

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wrong'. Notwithstanding such concern, there was no attempt to legislate on the issue, despite the opportunity presented by recent major legislation on the conduct of elections, other than formally to prohibit the broadcasting of exit polls before the end of voting. This legislation (Representation of the People Act 2000, amending clause 66 of the 1983 Act) makes it unlawful to publish any statement relating to the way in which voters have voted at the election or any forecast as to the result of the election which is, or might reasonably be taken to be, based on information so given ­ but only before voting closes. The absence of legislative prohibition can in part be explained by the seriousness with which the broadcasters, state and private, treat their `mission to explain' and their commitment to impartiality. The BBC has its own internal `code of conduct' for the use of opinion polls. Non-state broadcasters are obliged by the terms of their licenses to adhere to the Programme Code laid down by the ITC (the Independent Television Commission which licenses and regulates commercial TV stations). This Code, required of the Commission by the 1990 Broadcasting Act, commits broadcasters to the pursuit of due accuracy and impartiality, and is periodically updated to bring it into line with relevant new legislation, such as that mentioned above. USA One sentence suffices: there are currently no legal restrictions on the broadcasting of any pre-election or exit polls; anything less is likely to be deemed unconstitutional. The only change in practice is likely to come from the networks, which, although they have agreed to continue pooling their exit poll resources in the Voter News Service, may be more wary about `calling' elections before the polls have closed. Conclusion While the report reveals some variation in practice, it is evident that the majority of advanced democracies do not operate significant formal restrictions on the broadcasting of pre-election opinion polls, though the broadcasting of exit polls is sometimes prohibited ­ but only until after voting has closed. The fact that in many countries such issues are covered by informal, `gentlemen's agreements' suggests that broadcasters are generally trusted to behave responsibly. In concrete terms, this means that polls are only one, admittedly important, part of their overall election coverage, and that broadcasters ­ even where (as in most cases) they are under no legal obligation ­ try to educate and inform their audiences as to the limitations and the methods involved in polling. This is very much in line with best practice as recommended by academics and practitioners alike (see Lavrakas and Traugott, 2000). This agreement on best practice, of course, does not extend to the question of whether opinion polls can materially affect the outcome of the elections whose results they try to predict. It is fair to say, though, that most academics specialising in elections and media effects thereon work on a rule-of-thumb assumption that so-called `bandwagon' and `mobilisation' effects are likely as not cancelled out by counteracting

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`underdog' and `abstention' effects, respectively (see Ceci and Kain, 1982; McAllister and Studlar, 1991; Nadeau et al., 1993; and Ansolabehere and Iyangar, 1994). This is because hard evidence for the deleterious or distorting effects of polls on electoral choices is hard to come by. And although the British general election would seem to support the suspicion that forecasts of a foregone conclusion may help depress turnout (see Norris, 2002, and Franklin, 2002), the same problems may well dog attempts to investigate the role of polls in determining not only who people vote for but whether they bother to vote at all. But whether or not polls do `make a difference', it is hard to see a ban on them being workable, let alone desirable. Taking only the cases dealt with here, it would appear that prohibitions on the broadcasting of pre-election polling (and possibly exit polling, too) are also practically problematic and open to effective legal challenge. Closer examination of those cases, however, shows that ­ just as in New Zealand ­ there is no shortage of politicians (especially those who see themselves as hard doneby by opinion polls) willing to raise the issue of restriction now and again! Hopefully, this brief contribution will add at least a little light to the heat thus generated. Tim Bale teaches European politics at the Victoria University of Wellington, New Zealand, and has published widely on political parties ­ especially the British Labour Party ­ and on politics and the media.

Notes: 1 See the fascinating Brookings Institution coverage of the coverage by Stephen Hess on http://www.brook.edu/gs/projects/HessReport/HD_HorseRace.htm. For Canadian evidence of a similar style, see Anderson (2000). 2 Whether or not the charge that the exit poll forecasts did depress the Bush vote (see Sammon, 2001) ever gains much mainstream currency, there is no doubt that their prematurity was a major theme in the inquests into media coverage of Campaign 2000 ­ including not only the February 2001 House Energy and Commerce Committee hearings on the coverage, but also those conducted by and for the networks themselves. The most comprehensive ­ and lacerating ­ of these was CNN's (see Konner et al., 2001). 3 Part 4 of the Electoral Amendment (No.2) Bill proposed to insert a new part 7A into the Electoral Act 1993. Clause 228A recommended the prohibition of publication of opinion polls and comments on them during the 28 days up to and including election day. 4 http://www.unc.edu/depts/wapor/freedom/contents.html 5 The author would like to thank assorted pollsters, political scientists, lawyers, and journalists ­ too numerous to mention individually ­ for confirming or disputing his initial assertions regarding practice in their respective countries, or at least directing him to persons and places ­ actual and virtual ­ that could tell him more. Individual thanks must go, though, to David Farrell, Pippa Norris and Bob Worcester for valuable feedback on earlier drafts. Responsibility for any errors, which nevertheless persist, remains, of course, with the author. 6 http://www.lexum.umontreal.ca/cscscc/en/pub/1998/vol1/html/1998scr1_0877.html 7 The constraints placed on states by the ECHR are becoming ever more apparent in cases involving everything from aircraft noise to asylum-seekers. Full details of this one can be found at http://www.courdecassation.fr/agenda/arrets/arrets/00-85329.htm 8 http://www.sondaggipoliticoelettorali.it/

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References: Anderson, Robert (2000) `Reporting public opinion polls: the media and the 1997 Canadian Election', International Journal of Public Opinion Research, 12: (3) 286-98. Ansolabehere, Stephen and Shanto Iyengar (1994), `Of horse shoes and horse races: experimental studies of the impact of poll results on electoral behaviour', Political Communication, 11: (4) 413-40. Ceci, Stephen J. and Edward L. Kain (1982) `Jumping on the bandwagon with the underdog: the impact of attitude polls on polling behaviour', Public Opinion Quarterly, 46: (2) 228-42. Franklin, Mark N. (2002) `The dynamics of electoral participation' in Laurence LeDuc, Richard G. Niemi and Pippa Norris (eds), Comparing Democracies 2: Elections and Voting in Global Perspective. London: Sage. Konner, Joan, James Risser and Ben Wattenburg (2001) Television's Performance on Election Night 2000, http://i.cnn.net/cnn/2001/ALLPOLITICS/stories/02/02/cnn.report/cnn.pdf Lange, Yasha (1999) Media and Elections: A Handbook. Strasbourg: Council of Europe. Lavrakas, Paul J. and Michael J. Traugott (2000) Election Polls, the News Media and Democracy. New York: Chatham House Publishers. McAllister, Ian and Donley Studlar (1991) `Bandwagon, Underdog or Projection? Opinion polls and voter choice in Britain, 1979-1987', Journal of Politics, 53: (3) 720-41. Nadeau, Richard et al. (1993) `New evidence about the bandwagon effect in the opinion formation process', International Political Science Review, 14: (5) 203-13. Norris, Pippa (2002) Democratic Phoenix: Reinventing Political Activism. New York: Cambridge University Press. Norris, Pippa (2001a) `US Campaign 2000: Of pregnant chads, butterfly ballots and partisan vitriol', Government and Opposition, 36: (1) 3-26. Norris, Pippa (2001b) `Too close to call: opinion polls in Campaign 2000', Harvard International Journal of Press/Politics, 6: (1) 3-10. Sammon, Bill, (2001) At Any Cost: How Al Gore Tried to Steal the Election. Washington, DC: Regnery.

The Journal of Representative Democracy

Articles forthcoming in future issues include: Analysis of the use and the impact of electoral technology Electoral systems and the far right in Europe Election reports world-wide

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Representation, Vol. 39, No. 1, 2002, pp. 23-36

The 2001 Elections in Northern Ireland: Moderating `Extremists' and The Squeezing of the Moderates

Paul Mitchell, Brendan O'Leary and Geoffrey Evans

After signing the 1985 Anglo-Irish Agreement it was the considered policy of the sovereign governments to isolate what they called the `political extremes' in Northern Ireland and build up what they called the `moderate centre-ground', from which a power-sharing government could be constructed. The policy did not work, at least not quickly and not as intended, but the Agreement did generate the environment from which came a peace process and eventually a political settlement. The peace process turned the original logic on its head. The extremes were to be integrated, if they wanted to be. John Hume, the leader of the SDLP, kick-started the public side of the process by talking with Gerry Adams of Sinn Féin in 1988 and again in the early 1990s; and that eventually led to everyone (except some in Ian Paisley's DUP) talking with Adams and his colleagues. In short, the paramilitary cessations of violence, and later the historic compromise, the Belfast Agreement of Good Friday 10 April 1998, were achieved by enticing political hard-liners into a political and institutional settlement in which they have a stake. Politics is transformative of identities, as well as a mechanism for their expression and defence, and what was most fascinating about the 2001 Westminster general election in Northern Ireland was the metamorphosis of both Sinn Féin and Ian Paisley's Democratic Unionist Party (DUP). Despite misleading rhetoric to the contrary, both `extreme' parties moderated their platforms, and may continue to do so, and this softening of their positions partly explains their electoral successes. An era of full antisystem politics which had seen the abstention and exclusion of Sinn Féin, and the frequent self-exclusion (`Ulster just says "no''') of the DUP, is being succeeded by an era of active negotiations, legislative and committee room politics. These parties, for the time being, have become stake-holders in the panoply of institutions established by the Belfast Agreement ­ the Northern Ireland Assembly and its novel Executive, the North-South Ministerial Council, the British-Irish Council, the British-Irish intergovernmental conference, the British-Irish inter-parliamentary body. The creation of these institutions, to put it mildly, were neither Sinn Féin's nor the DUP's first preference, but their consociational and confederal logics (O'Leary, 1999; Mitchell, 2001) have given both sufficient incentives to participate in styles that are less overtly anti-system than their historic credentials would have suggested.

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Extremists into moderates? The absolute ­ if ultimately futile ­ opposition of the DUP to the Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985, and its more nuanced opposition to the Belfast Agreement, ­ working within (most of) its institutions, including its executive, but criticising Sinn Féin ­ led to subtle shifts in the DUP's position as the elections approached. Far from calling for the Belfast Agreement to be scrapped, the DUP called for its renegotiation. The DUP's best-known rallying cry (`No Surrender') and absolute opposition to any `Dublin interference' in Northern Ireland had morphed by 2001 into a demand that any North-South institutional relationships be rendered more palatable by requiring that they be made more fully accountable to the devolved Assembly in Belfast. Such changes in its positioning, ably directed by DUP deputy leader and campaign manager, Peter Robinson MP, repositioned the party more competitively, especially in relation to the disaffected supporters of an openly fractious Ulster Unionist Party (UUP). The DUP had a long history as a party that favoured devolution, and neither the party nor many of its potential supporters wanted to bring down the new Assembly: they just wanted it run in a different manner, without Sinn Féin in government. More obviously Sinn Féin has also progressively moderated its position. Since 1996 the party has been the principal electoral beneficiary of an end to active war. The IRA's cessation of its armed campaign, Sinn Féin's de facto acceptance of the consent principle (that is, that Irish unification requires the consent of majorities in both parts of Ireland) and its enthusiastic participation in all of the Agreement's institutions have rendered the party more acceptable to others and more relevant to nationalist voters. While the peace process was the handmaiden of Sinn Féin's electoral `second coming' (O'Leary and Evans, 1997), the incorporation of Sinn Féin into `ordinary politics' has undermined the distinctiveness of the SDLP's own strategic position faster than anticipated. Especially for younger nationalist voters, the question increasingly arises: why not vote for the fresher and more assertive brand? For them, the SDLP looks aged, and some of its Europeanist and `post-national' talk cut little ice with voters focused on local issues and quarrels. While it is hard to imagine that the peace process could have been sustained without some electoral rewards for Sinn Féin, few expected the pace of its gains since 1994, and especially its breakout performance in 2001. Overview of the results Nationalists went from holding five to seven of Northern Ireland's eighteen seats. The constituencies which border the Republic of Ireland are now entirely nationalist: southern and western Northern Ireland have nationalist MPs running in a swathe from Foyle, through West Tyrone, Fermanagh & South Tyrone, and Newry & Armagh, to South Down. The west has been `deep greened', with three adjacent Sinn Féin constituencies (West Tyrone, Mid Ulster and Fermanagh & South Tyrone); and in the future, Newry & Armagh and possibly Foyle may fall to Sinn Féin with the eventual retirement of the prominent SDLP incumbents, party leader John Hume and the Deputy First Minister Seamus Mallon.1 Sinn Féin's two best-known leaders,

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Gerry Adams and Martin McGuinness, hold the two nationalist seats away from the border, in Mid Ulster and Belfast West.

Table 1: The 2001 elections in Northern Ireland: Aggregate results by party and bloc, seat bonuses and (dis)proportionality

Party Votes (V) % (+/-) Westminster 2001

(compared to 1997 Westminster elections)

Local government 2001

(compared to 1997 local government elections)

UUP DUP UKUP PUP Conservatives NI Unionist Total U bloc Sinn Fein SDLP Total N bloc APNI NIWC WP

26.8 (-5.9) 22.5 (8.9) 1.7 (0.1) 0.6 (-0.8) 0.3 (-0.9) 0.2 (-) 52.1 (1.6) 21.7 (5.6) 21 (-3.1) 42.7 (2.5) 3.6 (-4.4) 0.4 (-) 0.3 (-)

Seats Seats Seats(S) (S) Votes N (+/-) (%) (S-V) (%) 6 (-4) 33.3 6.5 5 (3) 27.8 5.3 0 (-1) 0 (-) 0 (-) 0 (-) -1.7 -0.6 -0.3 -0.2 9 0.5 -4.3 -3.8 -3.6 -0.4 -0.3 -

Votes (V) % (+/-)

23 (-4.9) 21.5 (5.9) 0.6 (-0.1) 1.5 (-0.7) 0.3 (-0.1) 0.2 (-) 47.1 (-0.4) 20.6 (3.7) 19.4 (-1.2) 40 (2.4)

Seats Seats Seats(S) (S) Votes N (+/-) (%) (S-V) (%) 154 (-31) 26.5 3.5 131 (40) 22.5 1 2 (-2) 4 (-2) 0 (-3) 0 (-) 0.3 0.7 -0.3 -0.8 -0.3 -0.2 2.7 -2 0.7 -1.3 -0.3 -0.2 -0.2 -0.9

11 (-2) 61.1 4 (2) 3 (-) 7 (2) 0 (-) 0 (-) 0 (-) 0 (-) 7.3 18.7 22.2 16.7 38.9 -

290 (1) 49.8 108 (34) 18.6 117 (-3) 20.1 225 (31) 38.7 28 (-13) 1 (-) 0 (-) 37 (-20) 3.1 3.6 4.8 0.2 6.4

5.1 (-1.5) 0.4 (-0.1) 0.2 ( -) 7.3 (-1.1)

Others 0.9 (-0.1) Disproportionality in 2001 Disproportionality (average 1981-97)

Notes: 1. The measure of disproportionality used is the least squares index (LSq) devised by Michael Gallagher (1991). `Others' and independents have been excluded from the calculations. The `others' (0.9%) are excluded since they are not a unified bargaining actor. However, their inclusion would make only a marginal difference. 2. The UKUP vote can no longer be considered a `party vote' ­ it is effectively a one-person party. All of the UKUP's 13,509 Westminster votes were for Bob McCartney. In the District Council elections the UKUP's eleven candidates managed only 0.6% of the total vote (4,763 votes). 3. Northern Ireland's Westminster elections are conducted under plurality first-past-the post rules; local elections under PR-STV. Source: Calculated by the authors from election returns. Table format based on Table 4.4 in Mitchell, 1999.

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At the same time, the unionists' demographic grip on Northern Ireland is slipping ­ they are retreating into their heartlands of north Armagh, North Down, Antrim and East Londonderry. A ring of DUP seats now flanks this heartland. Belfast, the distinctive epicentre of conflict, is becoming increasingly green: the local government results held on the same day as the Westminster elections confirmed that Sinn Féin is the largest party in the city. But in 2001 unionists took three of its four Westminster seats (DUP: 2, UUP: 1). In the long run, with changing demography and with this electoral system, it seems feasible that Belfast South may go to the SDLP and possibly Belfast North to Sinn Féin. The DUP had its best ever Westminster election, in seats and vote-share, and Sinn Féin for the fifth consecutive election had by far its strongest result. The much-touted moderate ground and the centre of `others' of Northern Ireland politics appears to be sinking, as Table 1 reveals. While UUP shed nearly 42,000 votes compared to 1997, the DUP gained 75,000. Similarly, Sinn Féin gained 49,000 extra votes while the SDLP lost 21,000. The fact that the DUP and Sinn Féin have partly achieved such gains by stealing the moderates' positions is likely to be of limited comfort to the UUP and SDLP, the formerly pre-eminent parties in the unionist and nationalist blocs respectively, who are now left, if not naked, at least partially disrobed. Context and campaign It was the first Westminster election since the Belfast Agreement. The referendum to ratify the Agreement in May 1998 led to almost unanimous endorsement by nationalists, North and South. By contrast, it split unionists evenly into `Yes' and `No' camps, and their parties likewise: the UUP was for the Agreement, as were the small loyalist parties, the PUP and the UDP; the DUP was against, as was the small UKUP. The pro-Agreement UUP was itself deeply divided. A majority of its Westminster MPs opposed the Agreement, isolating its party leader David Trimble, though as the First Minister of the Assembly he had much stronger support amongst his Assembly members (MLAs). The general election was called during a local crisis. Though the Agreement's institutions were functioning, deep fissures had erupted within the UUP and rendered Trimble very vulnerable (Tonge and Evans, 2001). To compel Sinn Féin to coerce the IRA to start decommissioning its weapons he had embarked on a series of political sanctions. First, he blocked the two Sinn Féin ministers in the power-sharing executive from participating in the North-South Ministerial Council. The Sinn Féin ministers and the SDLP Deputy First Minister,2 Seamus Mallon, promptly took Trimble to court, and won; Justice Kerr ruled his action `unlawful' in January 2001. Trimble immediately appealed the decision, but lost. Then just before the UK general election began, Trimble repeated the tactic he had deployed in 2000; he wrote a post-dated resignation letter, effective on 1 July 2001, which he declared he would make effective if the IRA failed to move on decommissioning. His long-run calculation was that if his resignation became effective then the UK government would have to choose between suspending

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the Agreement's institutions (Trimble's preferred default), or leaving the Assembly to trigger fresh elections, because of its failure to replace the First and Deputy First Ministers within six weeks (12 August 2001). His short-run calculation appears to have been that the resignation threat would immunise him, and his party's candidates, from criticism from other unionists over their willingness to share government with Sinn Féin in the absence of IRA decommissioning. Nationalists had spent much of the year before the election trying to redress the UK government's failures to live up to its public promises faithfully to implement the Patten Report on policing, in letter and in spirit, as mandated by the Agreement. These failures were in turn used within the nationalist community to justify the IRA's failure to put its weapons verifiably beyond use, though it had twice supervised international inspections of its arms-dumps as a confidence-building measure, and organised one of these just before the general election. The SDLP had done considerable work at Westminster to amend what became the Police (Northern Ireland) Act 2000, but neither the Act nor the published implementation plans delivered the full Patten, only `Patten lite'. Sinn Féin and the SDLP therefore made police reform and the full Patten report one of the central planks in their election campaigns ­ taking stances at odds with both the UUP and the DUP. Feedback from constituencies in unionist safe seats suggested that the UUP lost support to the DUP because of the scale of police reform, while the SDLP lost support to Sinn Féin amongst young nationalists because of the insufficiency of police reform, and because the SDLP appeared more pliant. The campaign was conducted according to the logic of a dual party system, with competition within the unionist and nationalist blocs being much more important than competition across the blocs (Mitchell, 1991; 1995). Unlike all other elections in Northern Ireland ­ local government, Assembly and European ­ the Westminster election is held under single-constituency (first-past-the-post) plurality rule. One might therefore have expected to see some tacit agreement within the blocs to support a leading candidate in each constituency, to prevent the other bloc from winning a seat. That logic used to operate, especially within the unionist bloc, where the imperative to keep out nationalists had restrained the DUP from campaigning against vulnerable UUP incumbents in 1997. Yet within the nationalist bloc this logic had not operated at all, because the SDLP had not been prepared to organise pacts with a party associated with support for violence. One might also have expected the fact that local government elections were being held on the same day, under the single transferable vote (STV) system of proportional representation, to have restrained rhetorical criticism of rival parties within each bloc. There was no such spill-over effect amongst party strategies. The parties fought each system separately, seeking to win under plurality rule at Westminster, while trying to maximise first preference and lower-order STV transfers in the local government ballots. Competition within the unionist bloc, with the exception of the constituency of Fermanagh & South Tyrone,3 was unrestrained. The DUP did not stand in North Down in order to give anti-Agreement Robert McCartney (UK Unionist Party) a chance of

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holding his seat. The DUP personally targeted Trimble as a vacillating traitor. Its cartoons lampooned him as a bent-over old man with a long flowing white beard and a resignation letter stuck in his pocket with the caption `Trust me. I will not wait indefinitely for IRA decommissioning'; its web site mocked him as the IRA's delivery boy. For the local government elections the DUP advised its voters to give their lowerorder preferences to `like-minded', that is anti-Agreement, unionists. The DUP's combination of hard-hitting attacks on Trimble, and its offer not to cause chaos, merely to re-negotiate the Agreement, paid handsome dividends. Though it did not run candidates in four constituencies it came within a hair's breadth of becoming the largest unionist party in vote-share and seat-share in a Westminster general election. The party's one significant setback was to lose the seat it had gained in a by-election from the UUP, the Reverend William McCrea losing to David Burnside of the UUP. The UUP leader managed to get all his party's candidates to stand uncomfortably behind a common pro-Agreement platform, albeit one that heavily emphasised the need to achieve IRA decommissioning. This fooled no one, as some of his incumbent MPs (especially William Ross, William Thompson, and the Reverend Martin Smyth) were known to be anti-Agreement, and they tried to stave off criticism from the DUP by emphasising their anti-Agreement credentials. This, of course, merely added to the party's public disarray, aggravated when one of its elderly incumbent MPs, Cecil Walker, put in an embarrassing television performance that threw away the North Belfast seat to the DUP's Nigel Dodds. The UUP's solitary success in nomination strategy was to run a new pro-Agreement candidate, Lady Sylvia Hermon, in North Down, where she toppled McCartney. In the local government elections Trimble advised that voters should `primarily consider pro-Union candidates after the UUP', rather than other pro-Agreement candidates (BBC website, 26 May), the line taken by the SDLP. This advice made it less likely that small numbers of pro-Agreement Catholics would vote tactically for pro-Agreement UUP candidates. Within the nationalist bloc Sinn Féin fought an energetic, disciplined, and wellfunded campaign. It sought to increase its vote share (standing candidates in every one of the 18 constituencies), its seat-share, and to get the nationalist electorate's endorsement for the Agreement, and its stances on policing, demilitarisation and decommissioning. In the republican priority list, the latter was usually last amongst the matters needing to be implemented to fulfil everyone's obligations under the Agreement. Sinn Féin's success in achieving extraordinarily high turnouts, both in its safe and its target seats, is detailed below. Its vote-share rose in every constituency in Northern Ireland, except Belfast South, where it made no tactical sense to vote for the party's candidate. Sinn Féin appear to have won most of the new young nationalist voters, who endorsed the party even in locations where there was an SDLP incumbent, or where the SDLP candidate appeared to have the better chance of winning. Sinn Féin expected to win West Tyrone, where an even nationalist split in the vote had allowed William Thompson of the UUP victory in 1997; but it did not expect its candidate Michelle Gildernew to be so successful in Fermanagh & South Tyrone.

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The SDLP's strategy was to portray itself as the key pro-Agreement party, one that had made the peace process and the Agreement possible, and one with a wider social democratic and good governance agenda. It trumpeted its successes in bringing together a programme of government out of the four parties in the Executive. It resisted appeals by the Alliance Party to form a pro-Agreement pact on seats, as did the UUP. The SDLP hoped to hold and slightly expand its vote-share, and to take one additional seat. In fact its total vote fell, but not by that much, in comparison with 1997 ­ only approximately 21,000 across Northern Ireland. It targeted West Tyrone, withdrawing precious resources from Belfast, to support its high profile Executive Minister for Agriculture Bríd Rodgers against the Sinn Féin Vice President Pat Doherty, to no avail. The inter-ethnic or non-ethnic `Others', principally the Alliance Party, were crushed in 2001. By comparison with previous elections, not only did the flanking parties take chunks from the moderates within their own blocs, but the moderates appear to have eroded the support of the Others, who also made tactical decisions to sacrifice their own prospects. The Alliance's proposals to make pro-Agreement candidate arrangements were firmly rebuffed by the UUP and SDLP, who were determined to maximise their share of the vote (Irish News, 2001, 10 March; 3 April). The campaign once again highlighted the unreliability of polls in Northern Ireland, at least insofar as voters' intentions are concerned: they consistently understate the intensity of their political preferences. If the public had been anywhere near as moderate as they have generally represented themselves to pollsters during the last three decades there would not have been a Northern Ireland question. A Belfast Telegraph/Irish Independent poll conducted by Irish Marketing Surveys published on 22 May suggested that the UUP, with 25% of respondents likely to vote for it, was 11 percentage points ahead of the DUP (14%), and that the SDLP (25%), was 9 percentage points ahead of Sinn Fein (16%). The poll did pick up two significant pointers: young unionists are the most anti-Agreement, and in the 18-24 cohort, Sinn Fein is the most popular party with 24% (compared with 15% for the UUP, 14% for the DUP and 13% for the SDLP, a portent of things to come).4 Analysis of the results The 2001 Westminster election was the most exciting and dramatic that have ever occurred in Northern Ireland. While political scientists and journalists are fond of saying that a particular election was `dull', Westminster elections in Northern Ireland have often seemed like a contest of the moribund. With only a small number of seats available, incumbents generally well `dug in', little partisan change and few floating voters in an ethnic party system, change has appeared glacial (Mitchell, 1999). This is not to say that alignments have been frozen and that nothing interesting has ever happened, but dramatic gains and losses have been rare by any standards. For example, if we compare the change in vote shares of the five main parties in Northern Ireland (UUP, DUP, SDLP, SF and APNI) in Westminster elections, the volatility index at

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successive elections was 7% in 1987, 5.2% in 1992, 7.2% in 1997, but then doubled in 2001 to 14.5%.5 To put this in perspective, the average net volatility for nineteen European countries in the 1980s and 1990s was 9.2% and 11.5% respectively (for the UK alone, 3.3% and 9.3% in the same periods) (Gallagher et al., 2001: 263). Similarly, seats very rarely changed hands between parties,6 whereas in 2001 seven seats changed partisan control and three incumbents survived by narrow margins. In short, in 2001 Northern Ireland had a genuinely competitive and perhaps a watershed election.

Figure 1: The growing Nationalist vote in Northern Ireland, 1979-2001

50

40 Share of NI vote (%)

30 Westminster 20 Assembly/Forum Local Government European 10 1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 Year

Bloc performance Before considering the performance of parties in detail, let us take stock of the overall bloc changes. In previous work, two of the present authors began with what they called a bold and falsifiable prediction. This was that the 1997 Westminster election would likely be the last in which the Unionist (with a capital `U') bloc would win an overall majority of the votes cast in Northern Ireland (O'Leary and Evans, 1997). At the 1997 general election the total U bloc (the UUP, DUP, UKUP, PUP, UDP and Conservatives) had managed just 50.5% of the total vote, compared with 40.2% for the Nationalist bloc, comprising the SDLP and Sinn Féin. Although the small Alliance Party of Northern Ireland (APNI) supports the Union, it is usually not defined as part of the U bloc because of its moderate, bi-confessional and inter-ethnic position. As Figure 1 shows, electoral support for the Nationalist bloc had been growing steadily since

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1979. However, in 2001 the prediction was falsified, although the logic behind the prediction is likely to prove accurate in respect of future trends. In 2001 the U bloc actually improved its position to 52.1%, though the nationalist bloc grew by even more to 42.7% (see Table 1 and Figure 1). The interesting question is: why did the U bloc not only hold its own but even manage a modest improvement? Especially since 1996, unionist politicians and commentators have often explained unionists' less than optimal performances as due to differential abstentionism. In the absence of a full-scale election study (estimating which individual voters actually went to the polls) we have no direct information on the differential turnout of the unionist and nationalist blocs. Indirect analysis confirms that turnout does appear to be lower in unionist strongholds (Mitchell, 2001). As explained in the note to Table 2, the 18 Westminster constituencies (which in the 1998 Assembly elections served as multimember constituencies, returning six members each) can be categorised as predominantly `unionist', `nationalist' or `balanced' on the basis of the 1998 results. For example, a predominantly `unionist constituency' for the purposes of Table 2 is one in which at least four of the members returned to the 1998 Assembly self-identified as unionist.7 The results in 1998 were clear and quite dramatic: the average turnout in `unionist constituencies' was 64.6%, just over 10% lower than in `nationalist constituencies'. Differential turnout is of course an important competitive dynamic in ethnic party systems, and these results may suggest that the unionist vote had been depressed by a lower willingness of unionists to turn out and vote, partly because there has often been a safe incumbent and no intra-unionist competition. Thus, a plausible explanation of the U bloc's improved position in 2001 is that the unionist parties were more successful in mobilising some of their more apathetic partisans in the context of a Westminster election that everyone believed would be the most competitive ever. After all, fear of losing seats to ethnic rivals is one of the classic motivators in such segmented party systems. But plausible as this proposition may seem, Table 2 indicates that it is incorrect. In 2001, as in previous elections, nationalists won the turnout wars: indeed the N bloc was even further ahead of the U bloc on this occasion (a lead of 10.7%). So how did the U bloc vote stay above 50%? The simplest explanation is much more prosaic than complex considerations of differential constituency turnout. Quite simply the U bloc in 2001 had one significant competitor missing: the Alliance Party deployed candidates in only ten constituencies, seven fewer than in 1997, in effect sacrificing itself. The Alliance Party, in attempting to maximise the chances of the leading pro-Agreement candidate in several constituencies, paid the price of seeing its own percentage vote cut in half (see Table 1). In several constituencies the UUP was a major beneficiary. Indeed, if most of Alliance's 7,553 votes in 1997 in North Down, historically the Alliance's strongest constituency, transferred to the UUP candidate in 2001 to defeat the anti-Agreement incumbent, as was the APNI's intention, then this `gift' alone constitutes two-thirds of the U bloc's entire gains in 2001.8

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Table 2: The turnout wars

Number Average Turnout in 1998 Assembly election (%) Average Turnout in 2001Wesminster election (%) `Unionist' 10 64.6 63.6 `Nationalist' `Balanced' 6 2 74.9 72.5 74.3 70.9 N Lead 10.3 10.7

Notes: The table shows average turnout by constituency type. `Unionist' constituencies are those in which at least four of the elected assembly members in 1998 self-identified as unionists in the Assembly (UUP, DUP, PUP, UKUP or independent unionist). Similarly `nationalist' constituencies are those in which at least four of the elected members belonged to either the SDLP or Sinn Féin. This leaves two `balanced' constituencies: Fermanagh & South Tyrone elected 3 nationalists (2 SF, 1 SDLP) and 3 unionists (2 UUP, 1 DUP); Belfast South elected 3 unionists (2 UUP, 1 DUP), 2 nationalists (2 SDLP) and one `other' (NIWC). The comparison is possible because the constituencies have not changed geographically (the Assembly election involved selecting 6 members from each Westminster constituency), though of course we are comparing across electoral systems. Source: Adapted and updated from Mitchell, 2001.

The results in 2001 were a triumph for the DUP and Sinn Féin; but big winners also beget big losers. The biggest of the losers was the UUP, now merely a front-runner compared with its former hegemonic domination of Northern Ireland politics. While 2001 certainly constituted the UUP's worst-ever Westminster election, in which for the first time in the modern party system it plummeted significantly below the 30% barrier to only 26.8%, it can be seen from Figure 2 that this is just the latest dip in a long term decline.9 By contrast, the trend line for the other big loser in 2001 ­ the SDLP ­ had been a gentle but steady incline, benefiting from a growing Catholic population and a progressively more nationalist electorate. While the SDLP vote continued to rise, its rate of growth slowed appreciably as the `peace process' continued, with most nationalist gains going to Sinn Féin. For example, as Figure 2 shows, the SDLP vote in 1997 was barely up (by just 0.6%) on its 1992 Westminster performance. Over the same time period Sinn Féin's vote jumped by 6.1% to a total of 16.1% in 1997. Sinn Féin's accelerated growth continued in 2001 with a further gain of 5.6% to a new total of 21.7% (a 35% increase on its 1997 vote), thus capturing the long sought symbolic prize of becoming the largest nationalist party. Sinn Féin has gone from being an abstentionist party, as it was before 1982, to being the largest nationalist party today and probably the party with the greatest share of young voters, in less than 20 years. The answer to the question `Who has benefited electorally from the peace process and Belfast Agreement?' could not be clearer. Attempts to resolve protracted ethno-national conflicts tend not to be universally popular ­ if they were that would constitute proof that the conflict was not `deep' or `protracted'. Thus, while Sinn Féin has captured most of the electoral gains from nationalist enthusiasm for a long overdue process of institutional and policy change, the DUP appears to have ridden the tiger of opposition to these same changes. `Just saying no' to compromises with one's inter-ethnic rivals has always been a successful strategy in such polarised party systems, but the DUP on this occasion cleverly combined its

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oppositional stance with partial co-operation with the new devolved governing arrangements, which are locally popular. With the UUP sharply divided over the Agreement many UUP voters decamped to the DUP. Nevertheless, the DUP's leap of 8.9% (a 65% increase on its 1997 vote) was much further than optimistic DUP members could have hoped for.

Figure 2: Vote share in Northern Ireland Westminster elections, 1979-2001

40 35 Share of NI Westminster vote (%) 30 25 20 15 10 5 0 1979 1983 UUP DUP 1987 SDLP SF 1992 1997 APNI 2001 Year

While winning the percentage battle for votes is undoubtedly very important, the seats of course are the actual jobs at stake. Northern Ireland voters, long accustomed to seeing about 17 of their 18 incumbent MPs returned in an election, struck a blow for a change in 2001, though their desired changes were often diametrically different. The net result however was that seven seats changed partisan control, and several other MPs survived narrowly. The UUP was the only major party to lose seats (the UKUP lost its single seat; this became the UUP's sole gain).10 The UUP lost five seats (net four); of these three were lost to the DUP (Strangford, East Londonderry and Belfast North) and two to Sinn Féin (West Tyrone and Fermanagh & South Tyrone). Thus, the DUP gained three seats, Sinn Féin gained two, and the SDLP held its existing three seats. The final seat total was UUP (6), DUP (5), Sinn Féin (4) and SDLP (3).

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In 2001 three of the new MPs are women (17%). While hardly reaching Scandinavian levels of gender representation this is novel for Northern Ireland. No woman had been elected at any Northern Ireland Westminster election since Bernadette Devlin was returned in 1970. If the 1998 Assembly results, held under STV (PR), are taken as a reasonably faithful reflection of overall ethno-national bloc divisions, then the 2001 Westminster seat allocations were a much more faithful reflection of overall bloc divisions than was the previous Westminster contest in 1997. In other words, the `appropriate' bloc won all of the seats in 2001, whereas in 1997 two `nationalist constituencies' returned UUP MPs (Fermanagh & South Tyrone and West Tyrone). The other four seats that changed hands in 2001 were simply changes in the balance of power within the unionist bloc (three UUP losses to the DUP, marginally compensated by one UUP gain from the UKUP). In other words the 2001 Westminster results were more proportional with respect to parties and ethnic blocs than 1997. Indeed, it is worth highlighting (see Table 1) that the disproportionality figure of 7.3 (on the least squares index) is by a massive margin the most proportional outcome of a Westminster election in Northern Ireland (the average for 1983-97 is 18.7). The decline of the UUP (and hence fall in its average seat bonus from a massive 23% in 1997 to only 6.5% in 2001) is the largest contributory factor.11 This is not a commercial for the Westminster electoral system, which is highly inappropriate for the genuine multi-party system in Northern Ireland. Electoral prospects The next big electoral test for the parties in Northern Ireland will be the second elections to the Northern Ireland Assembly, which must be held by the early summer of 2003, marking the expiration of a five-year term. Simply surviving to reach a second regularly scheduled election would be a major triumph for the Assembly and the peace process, and not something that any earlier Assemblies, Conventions, or Forums have managed since the end of the UUP's ancien régime in 1972. Given the results of the 2001 elections, the once dominant parties in their respective blocs, the UUP and SDLP, must view the crucial 2003 elections with some trepidation. The DUP will be in a good position to challenge for the leading position among unionists and most of its campaign appeals of 2001 are likely to still have resonance. Yet another threat of resignation by David Trimble is likely to cut little electoral ice with disaffected unionist voters. Among nationalists the SDLP have a new leader and will once again claim to be the authors of the peace process and its institutions and the custodians of good governance. This in itself is a far from exciting electoral pitch. Sinn Féin is clearly the party with the electoral wind in its sails, in Northern Ireland as we have seen, and now also in the Republic of Ireland, where in May 2002 it more than doubled its vote from 2.5% to 6.5% and increased its number of TDs from one to five (see Gallagher et al., 2003 forthcoming). However, the analysis in this article suggests that the DUP and Sinn Féin can do best in the forthcoming Assembly elections on moderated platforms.

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The two parties have to choose between stealing their opponents' clothes and usurping their positions, or showing that they remain wolves in sheep's clothing. Postscript At the time of going to press, Northern Ireland's devolved institutions had just been suspended by the UK government for the fourth time. It is unclear whether elections for the Northern Ireland Assembly will take place in May 2003, as scheduled. Paul Mitchell is Lecturer in European Politics and Political Methodology at the London School of Economics and Political Science. Brendan O'Leary is Professor of Political Science and Director of the Solomon Asch Center for the Study of Ethnopolitical Conflict at the University of Pennsylvania; Geoffrey Evans is Official Fellow in Politics, Nuffield College, Oxford. The authors would like to thank Leigh Somerville, Gitta Frank and Simone Lewis for research assistance, and Jane Pugh of LSE's drawing office. Brendan O'Leary's visits to Northern Ireland were supported by the United States Institute of Peace and by Ulster Television News. Paul Mitchell thanks the Fulbright Commission for a scholarship during which this paper was written, and Ken Shepsle for hosting his stay in CBRSS at Harvard. The authors would also like to thank the anonymous referees for their comments on this article.

Notes: 1 The poor election result for the SDLP hastened the long expected retirements of Hume and Mallon as party leader and Deputy First Minister, respectively (though they retained their seats at Westminster). Mark Durkan was elected to the posts they vacated. 2 The First and Deputy First Ministers are equal in powers and functions, and differ solely in their titles. They are elected jointly by a concurrent majority of registered nationalists and unionists in the Assembly ­ and the death or resignation of one immediately triggers the other's loss of office, and fresh elections within six weeks. 3 Here the DUP decided not to stand for fear of fragmenting the unionist vote ­ instead it backed and campaigned for a local anti-Agreement candidate, Mr Jim Dixon. 4 One of Representation's referees points out that the British Election Study did an even worse job than the local polling companies of estimating voting intentions in Northern Ireland. 5 The figures are a slight adjustment to the well-known Pedersen volatility index. (This is the sum of cumulative gains made by all winning parties, or cumulative losses made by all losing parties, in net percentage terms. See Pedersen, M. (1979) `The dynamics of European party systems: changing patterns of electoral volatility', European Journal of Political Research 7: 1-26.) Although often all parties are included in the count, this can lead to a distorted impression of partisan change if there is a high frequency of small party emergence, splits and fusions. Since small `parties' are frequent vehicles in Northern Ireland they have been excluded from these calculations. We thus have a comparison from 1987-2001 of aggregate partisan vote change among the five main parties. These are the only parties with even a remote chance of winning a Westminster seat (leaving aside the unusual case of North Down which has effectively elected independent members). Between them these five parties accounted for 95.6% of the votes cast in 2001. 6 In 1987 only two seats changed partisan control, in 1992 one seat, and in 1997 two.

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7 The only purpose of Table 2 is to provide an approximate guide to differential turnout in the absence of more direct information. No other assertions are being made here. In total, sixteen of the eighteen constituencies can easily be distinguished on this basis. 8 The combined APNI vote in 1997 in the seven constituencies not contested in 2001 was 16,073. If this had been repeated in 2001 it would have constituted 1.98% of the total votes cast. It cannot be assumed that all of these potential Alliance votes were cast for the U bloc instead, but most of these `missing Alliance' party votes were accumulated in three predominantly unionist constituencies in 1997 (North Down, 7,553; North Belfast, 2,221; and Upper Bann, 3,017, which incidentally is much more than David Trimble's margin of victory in 2001). Exactly 80% of these `missing Alliance' votes were cast in 1997 in these three constituencies. Consider the following simulation: if Alliance had fielded candidates in these three constituencies in 2001 and achieved its 1997 level of support and if, as seems likely, these votes would have been `reclaimed' from the U bloc, they would have constituted exactly 1.58% of the total vote in 2001. And recall that the U bloc's improved position in 2001 was a gain of 1.6%. Thus, the suggestion is that with Alliance party competition in 2001 the total vote of the U bloc would have been approximately 50.5%, i.e. unchanged from 1997. 9 It should be noted that the recent growth of the much smaller unionist parties (the UKUP, PUP, UDP, and Northern Ireland Conservatives) is over. At their high point they had collectively taken 8.3% of the vote in the 1998 Assembly elections; in 2001 they managed only 2.8% in the Westminster election and 2.6% in the district council elections. Indeed, in an extraordinary example of organisational disarray the UDP failed to register in time for the 2001 elections ­ its leaders could stand only as independents. 10 David Burnside's victory over William McCrea of the DUP in South Antrim was a second UUP victory, though it did not count as a gain in relation to 1997. This former UUP seat had been won by McCrea in a by-election. 11 Sinn Féin's modest 0.5% seat bonus is the first ever positive figure for the party across all elections types and systems. For example their average Westminster `bonus' for 1983-97 is -7%. References: Gallagher, Michael, Michael Laver and Peter Mair (2001) Representative Government in Modern Europe. New York: McGraw Hill. Gallagher, Michael, Michael Marsh and Paul Mitchell (2003 forthcoming) How Ireland Voted 2002. London: Palgrave. Mitchell, Paul (1991) `Conflict Regulation and Party Competition in Northern Ireland', European Journal of Political Research, 20: (1) 67-92. Mitchell, Paul (1995) `Party Competition in an Ethnic Dual Party System', Ethnic and Racial Studies, 18: (4) 773-96. Mitchell, Paul (1999) `The Party System and Party Competition', in Paul Mitchell and Rick Wilford (eds.), Politics in Northern Ireland. Boulder, Co: Westview Press, pp. 91-116. Mitchell, Paul (2001) `Transcending an Ethnic Party System? The Impact of Consociational Governance on Electoral Dynamics and the Party System', in Rick Wilford (ed.), Aspects of the Belfast Agreement. Oxford: Oxford University Press. O'Leary, Brendan (1999) `The Nature of the British-Irish Agreement', New Left Review, 233: 66-96. O'Leary, Brendan and Geoffrey Evans (1997) `Northern Ireland: La Fin de Siècle, The Twilight of the Second Protestant Ascendancy and Sinn Féin's Second Coming', Parliamentary Affairs, 50 (4): 672-80. Tonge, Jonathan and Jocelyn Evans (2001) `Faultlines in Unionism: Division and Dissent within the Ulster Unionist Council', Irish Political Studies, 16.

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`England Belongs to Me': The Extreme Right in the UK Parliamentary Election of 2001

Cas Mudde

Years of being told you ain't as good as us join the line, sign your name and they all said that our country's going bust but no-one's fooling us again England belongs to me a nation's pride the dirty water on the river no one can take away our memory England belongs to me We'll show the world that the boys are back to stay and you all know what we can do heads held high, fighting all the way, for the red, white, and blue. Cock Sparrer, 'England Belongs to Me', Shock Troops, 1982. Introduction In the shadow of Labour's historic second landslide victory, the 2001 British elections had a second 'success' story to tell. In Oldham West & Royton Nick Griffin received 6,552 votes, or 16.4%, the third biggest share. In itself this might not seem remarkable, were it nor for the fact that Mr Griffin was a candidate for the extreme right British National Party (BNP), in a city which was the scene of violent 'race' riots a few weeks before the elections. In the other city district, Oldham East & Saddleworth, his colleague, Mick Treacy, did almost as well, gaining 5,091 votes (11.2%) and fourth place. The media and political élite initially reacted with shock (see www.oldhamunity.co.uk). In Oldham itself the élite had clearly anticipated an upset,

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and had taken the controversial step of banning all candidates from giving speeches after the results were announced. In a protest aimed more at the national media than the local population, BNP supporters taped their mouths. All in all, these were scenes reminiscent of continental European cities faced with strong extreme right support, such as Antwerp, Toulon, or Vienna. But just how successful was the extreme right in the 2001 British parliamentary election? Has Britain now become as susceptible to the appeal of extreme right as Belgium, France, or even Austria? And if not, why not? The 2001 parliamentary election Though the election campaign was, as always, dominated by the two major parties, the context was relatively favourable for the extreme right. First of all, the Conservatives were in clear disarray, because of internal division over strategy and leadership. Moreover, it was evident well before election day that they stood no chance of winning the election, opening up the potential for protest voting on their right. Second, prominent in the campaign were policies that typically lie at the heart of extreme right agendas: immigration, national sovereignty, and law and order. For months sections of the tabloid press had carried frenzied coverage of the alleged `flood' of immigrants, the European super-state, and the rise of crime and disorder (often in combination). In addition, attacks on asylum-seekers and race riots had received somewhat halfhearted condemnation from politicians and media. As always, the extreme right in Britain went into the 2001 parliamentary election highly divided and very localised in organisation. Three extreme right parties put forward candidates: the BNP, the National Front (NF), and the New Britain Party (NBP). Except for one constituency in Wales (Newport West), only districts in England were contested. The BNP was by far the dominant representative of the extreme right, with candidates in 33 constituencies, while the NF contested just four constituencies, and the NBP only one. This means that extreme right parties stood in less than 40 of the 659 UK districts, just 6%. In fact, this constitutes a significant decrease on 1997, when the BNP stood in 57 constituencies (including three in Scotland) and the NF in six - a coverage of 9%. As was already the case in the heyday of the National Front, in the 1970s, the extreme right in the 2001 election `had little support in rural or suburban areas, but was mainly a feature of parts of London, the Midlands, and northern England' (Eatwell, 2000: 178). The heartland of BNP activity remained London ­ 14 out of the 32 contested districts in England were in Greater London ­ despite the fact that it averaged only 2.8% of the vote there and hardly made any substantial gains. Moreover, in the two districts where the BNP had gained most votes in 1997, it encountered significant losses in 2001: in Bethnal Green & Bow it went from 7.5% to just 3.3%, to a large extent because the New Britain Party took 2.3%, while in Poplar & Canning Town it dropped from 7.3% to 5.1%.

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The BNP did particularly well in the North West (Ashton under Lyne, Burnley, Oldham, Pendle). As already mentioned, Oldham was the scene of some of the most violent 'race riots' in post-war Britain before the elections, an experience repeated by Burnley shortly afterwards. These particular districts had been targeted by the BNP, although the NF had also been active, both organisations hoping to capitalise on growing racial tensions between the predominantly Asian (particularly Pakistani and Bangladeshi) 'minorities' and the 'white majority' (Lyall, 2001). Finally, it should be noted that the BNP performed only averagely in the West Midlands, traditionally another 'heartland' of extreme right activity.

Table 1: The BNP's top ten constituencies, 2001

Constituency 1. Oldham West & Royton 2. Burnley 3. Oldham East & Saddleworth 4. Barking 5. Poplar & Canning Town 6. Dagenham 7. Pendle 8. Dudley North 9. Bradford North 10. Ashton under Lyne Percentage 16.40 11.25 11.21 6.39 5.08 5.00 4.97 4.72 4.61 4.52 Votes 6,552 4,151 5,091 1,606 1,733 1,378 1,976 1,822 1,613 1,617

Source: Electoral Commission (2001) Election: The Official Results. London, Politico's Publishing.

Within the contested districts, the extreme right, most notably the BNP, did significantly better than four years previously. They increased their total vote by more than one quarter, from 38,705 in 1997 to 50,013 in 2001, despite running fewer candidates and notwithstanding the general fall in turnout. Moreover, while the extreme right won a mere 1.4% per constituency on average in 1997, this increased to 3.6% in 2001, with the BNP averaging 3.9% in England. In addition, while the BNP achieved only fourth place in three constituencies at the 1997 election, and only twice topped 5% of the constituency vote, this time they came fourth in five seats and third in one, gaining 5% or more in seven contests, including three scores of over 10% (see Table 1). Of almost equal importance for a cash-strapped party like the BNP was the fact that it saved its deposit in five constituencies. Britain in comparative perspective How does this record compare with other European countries? Has Britain become part of the `third wave of right-wing extremism' (Von Beyme, 1988), which has been lapping at the shores of Europe in recent decades? The short answer is no. To put

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things in perspective, the BNP's best result, 16.4% in Oldham East & Saddleworth, is well under the national average of the Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ), which gained 26.9% in the 2000 parliamentary elections. Indeed, it only just surpasses the 16.2% which the combined Italian extreme right achieved nationally in the 2001 parliamentary elections (with the National Alliance (AN) winning 12%, the Northern League (LN) 3.9%, and the Italian Social Movement ­ Tricolour Flame (MSI-FT) 0.3%). The BNP's average score of 3.9% in the contested districts is also well behind the national averages of the Flemish Block (VB), the French National Front (FN) and the Danish People's Party (DFP), which range from 7-15%. The British results look still less impressive when one considers that they account for just 0.2% of the total number of votes cast across the UK. This places the extreme right in Britain in the same category as its brethren in countries like Spain or Portugal, and even behind Sweden and the Netherlands. With the average support for extreme right parties across Western Europe as a whole running at 5.3% in the 1990s (Gallagher et al., 2001:225), it is clear that the BNP and its allies have been particularly unsuccessful. This begs the question why. Why is the extreme right in Britain unsuccessful? The success of extreme right parties in Europe has led to a flood of publications, providing more or less substantiated theoretical claims of the why and how. In short, most authors take a demand-centred approach, arguing that extreme right parties have profited from the increased intensity and distribution of sentiments of xenophobia and political resentment among the national populations (Betz, 1994). However, this does not seem to explain the lack of success of the British extreme right, as levels of xenophobia and political resentment have grown to quite high levels in the United Kingdom as well (see Eatwell, 1997, 2000). Moreover, the 2001 election campaign environment was particularly conducive in this respect, with parts of the press characterised by xenophobic statements against both immigrants and 'Europe' as well as by populist anti-party sentiments over the arrogance and sleaze of the major parties. Some authors look for the explanation of the lack of success in particularly 'British' factors. For example, the popular argument that British culture, unlike in Continental Europe, is not susceptible to political extremism, has been used in the past (with regard to both fascism and communism) and the present. It is questionable whether this argument holds up empirically: as just noted, various surveys have shown the existence of nationalist, xenophobic, and authoritarian attitudes within the British public. The fact that this has not been translated into support for extremist parties might actually have a less flattering explanation. It may be, for instance, that British extremists did not vote for fascist and communist parties because, as Roger Eatwell (1997:54) has argued, `grand ideological visions, especially linked to violent means, were seen as un-British'. If this is indeed true, the contemporary extreme right needs to come up with a more 'indigenous' ideological image to break through this xenophobic public scepticism about extremism.

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A second key 'British' factor that is used to explain the lack of electoral success of the extreme right in Britain, both by insiders and outsiders, is the first-past-the-post electoral system (Copsey, 1996; Eatwell, 2000; Heffernan, 2001). Though it certainly imposes a high representational barrier for small parties in general, and will therefore have a negative effect on extreme right electoral support, I believe that its importance is often overstated. By itself, an electoral system does not necessarily guide voters; it only translates votes into seats. Hence, it could explain why extreme right parties do not gain parliamentary representation, but not necessarily why they are unable to attract a large(r) electorate. After all, the BNP has been able to attract over 10% of the electorate in some districts while using exactly the same first-past-the-post system as in all the other districts. Even the assumed 'psychological effect' of the electoral system cannot convincingly explain this pattern of variation (Duverger, 1954). A third factor points to the role of the Conservative Party, which is widely believed to have actively and successfully sought to integrate the extreme right electorate. For example, various authors have argued that the electoral fortunes of the National Front in the 1970s were mainly halted by the strict anti-immigration profile of Margaret Thatcher (for instance, Elbers and Fennema, 1993; Kitschelt, 1995). There are both empirical and theoretical problems with this argument though. At the empirical level, the NF was already losing support before Margaret Thatcher started her 'antiimmigrant campaign' for the 1979 parliamentary election (Eatwell, 2000). At the theoretical level, in other countries ­ notably France ­ people have pointed out that the decision of a mainstream right-wing party to take up the immigration issue in fact strengthened the extreme right by legitimising its programme (Hainsworth, 2000). There is a way out though, through the intervening variable of 'issue ownership'. If an extreme right party is able to 'own' an issue, it will profit from the fact that that issue becomes more important in the political debate. This has been the case, for example, with the issue of immigration in Belgium and France in the 1990s, where it was owned by the VB and FN respectively (Mudde, 1999). When other parties started to focus increasingly on immigration, this played into the hands of the extreme right, whom most people who cared deeply about the issue considered to be the best party to handle it. However, in countries where the extreme right does not own the issue of immigration, this does not work. In Britain the Conservative Party traditionally owns 'extreme right' issues like law and order, immigration and (opposition to) the European Union. Moreover, in the 2001 parliamentary election only the first of these issues could be considered particularly salient among the public: hence, also, part of the explanation for the weak result of the Conservative Party (Webb, 2002: 364). In short, the fact that Thatcher, and more recently Hague, played the 'race card' did not strengthen the extreme right, because voters do not primarily associate that issue with the extreme right. The reason for this difference in ownership has a lot to do with the nature of the extreme right party itself. While extreme right parties like the VB and FN are wellorganised, professionally run political organisations, the BNP and the NF are

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amateurish groups, consistently linked with violence and internal strife. Some have argued that this is due to the lack of a 'charismatic' leader (Eatwell, 2000; Heffernan, 2001). However, though charismatic leaders might lead to better election results ­ so far proof has been ambiguous, not least because of the difficulty of operationalising the concept of 'charisma' ­ they do not necessarily help foster well-organised parties: consider Franz Schönhuber and the German Republicans or Mogens Glistrup and the Danish Progress Party (see Mudde, 2000: ch. 2; Widfeldt, 2000). Even so, whether charismatic or not, the British extreme right does need a capable political leader to transform one of its various groups into an attractive electoral competitor. With Cambridge-educated Nick Griffin, who took over from John Tyndall in 1999, the BNP may finally have found such a leader. Griffin is educated and carries himself well in the media. His plans to present a less radical image of the party, and to invest more time and effort in local campaigns (such as the `Rights for Whites' campaigns; see Copsey, 1996), seem to have had some initial effect. Perhaps as important, so far they have not led to a backlash amongst more extreme party members. This notwithstanding, it remains to be seen whether the BNP can be transformed into a credible political alternative. Perhaps the old British extreme right is too much a 'stained entity' and the only chance lies in a completely new party emanating from outside the traditional extreme right milieu (see also Heffernan, 2001). In this respect, the continuing internal problems within the Conservative Party should be watched with interest, particularly after the suspension of the Monday Club by the new Tory leader, Iain Duncan-Smith (see Watt, 2001). Conclusion: A new extreme right dawn? In conclusion, the BNP is clearly still far from becoming a similar national political force to the FN, VB or FPÖ. Moreover, there is little reason to suppose that it will become such a force in the not too distant future. This is not so much due to British political culture, but rather, in spite of it. In fact, the breeding ground for the extreme right in Britain is very fertile, with both major parties campaigning on strict asylum laws and tough law and order measures, a widespread Europhobia at the mass level, and a 'leftwing' government, whose honeymoon with the electorate is well and truly over, being confronted by a weak right-wing opposition party. The main reason for the failure of the British extreme right is, and remains, the British extreme right itself. Unlike their 'brethren' in Europe, parties like the BNP have not really modernised and transformed into more moderate 'xenophobic nationalist' parties. Instead, they maintain forms of crude racist street politics, keeping the neo-fascists and thugs in, and deterring the many more competent right-wing radicals. Consequently, the extreme right in general, and the BNP in particular, remain without much grass-roots support or strong party organisation. This is best seen in the small number of districts which were contested in both 1997 and 2001 (that is, only 14, of which 9 were in the Greater London area). Moreover, the BNP gained in just six of these districts, stagnated (gained or lost less than 1%) in six others, and lost in two

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­ and tellingly, the two districts where they lost had been the most successful in the 1997 elections. The most probable outcome is therefore that the little that was gained in the 2001 election will be lost again at the next one. Cas Mudde is lecturer at the University of Antwerp-UFSIA. He has published widely on the subject of the far right in Europe, including The Ideology of the Extreme Right (Manchester University Press, 2000).

References: Betz, Hans-Georg (1994) Radical Right-Wing Populism in Western Europe. Basingstoke: Macmillan. Beyme, Klaus von (April 1998) 'Right-wing extremism in post-war Europe', West European Politics, 11 (2): 1-18. Copsey, Nigel (1996) 'Contemporary fascism in the local arena: the British National Party and "Rights for Whites"', in Mike Cronin (ed.), The Failure of British Fascism. The Far Right and The Fight for Political Recognition. Houndmills: Macmillan, pp. 118-40. Duverger, Maurice (1954) Political Parties. Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State. London: Methuen & Co. Eatwell, Roger (2000) 'The extreme right and British exceptionalism: the primacy of politics', in Paul Hainsworth (ed.), The Politics of the Extreme Right. From the Margins to the Mainstream. London: Pinter, pp.172-92. Eatwell, Roger (1997) 'Britain', in Roger Eatwell (ed.), European Political Cultures. Conflict or Convergence? London: Routledge, pp. 50-68. Elbers, Frank, and Meindert Fennema (1993) Racistische partijen in West-Europa. Tussen nationale traditie en Europese samenwerking. Leiden: Stichting Burgerschapskunde. Gallagher, Michael, Michael Laver, and Peter Mair (2001) Representative Government in Modern Europe. Institutions, Parties and Governments, 3rd edn. Boston, Mass.: McGraw-Hill. Hainsworth, Paul (2000) 'The Front national: from ascendancy to fragmentation on the French extreme right', in Paul Hainsworth (ed.), The Politics of the Extreme Right. From the Margins to the Mainstream. London: Pinter, pp.18-32. Heffernan, Ian (2001) 'No representation: The sorry history of the radical right in Britain since 1948', available at www.geocities.com/newdemocracy/013-no-representation.htm Kitschelt, Herbert (1995) The Radical Right in Western Europe. A Comparative Analysis. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press. Lyall, Sarah (2001) 'Shadowy party heats up British racial tensions', New York Times, 4 July. Mudde, Cas (July 1999) 'The single-issue party thesis: extreme right parties and the immigration issue', West European Politics, 22 (3): 182-97. Mudde, Cas (2000) The Ideology of the Extreme Right. Manchester: Manchester University Press. Watt, Nicholas (2001) 'Tories cut Monday Club link over race policies', Guardian, 19 October. Webb, Paul (2002) 'Political parties and party systems: more continuity than change', Parliamentary Affairs, 55 (2): 363-76. Widfeldt, Anders (July 2000) 'Scandinavia: Mixed success for the populist right', Parliamentary Affairs, 53 (3): 486-500.

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The French Presidential and Parliamentary Elections, 2002

Raymond Kuhn

The re-election of Jacques Chirac on 5 May 2002 brought to an end the most dramatic presidential election since the foundation of the Fifth Republic in 1958. The result in itself was not a huge surprise; although by no means a foregone conclusion at the start of the campaign, a victory for the incumbent had always been a distinct possibility. Rather, the shock lay in the circumstances in which Chirac secured his re-election, following a first round which saw the unexpected elimination of the prime minister and Socialist Party candidate, Lionel Jospin, at the hands of the National Front leader, Jean-Marie Le Pen. Greeted with expressions of incredulity and dismay both within France and across the international community, the presence of Le Pen in the second round totally changed the nature of the election as a contest. Chirac's victory was followed by a significant triumph for the mainstream right in the parliamentary election. A new catch-all (or more accurately `catch-most') conservative formation ­ the Union pour la Majorité Présidentielle (UMP) ­ singlehandedly won an overall majority in the National Assembly with 369 seats out of a total of 577. The parties supporting the outgoing government of the 'plural left' were soundly defeated, while the National Front failed to win a single seat. Thus, after five years of executive cohabitation between president and prime minister of different political tendencies, in 2002 the Fifth Republic returned to the historically dominant model of mutually supportive presidential and parliamentary majorities. The presidential election: first round (21 April) The 2002 presidential election was the seventh since de Gaulle's 1962 constitutional amendment introduced election of the head of state by direct universal suffrage. Up until 1986 the presidential and parliamentary majorities had always coincided. However, during the next 16 years France experienced three periods of cohabitation: Mitterrand/Chirac (1986-88), Mitterrand/Balladur (1993-95) and Chirac/Jospin (1997-2002). In an attempt to give greater stability and clarity to the functioning of the regime, a constitutional amendment was successfully passed in 2000 to reduce the presidential term from seven to five years, thus bringing it into line with its parliamentary counterpart. It was subsequently agreed that in 2002 the presidential election should precede the parliamentary contest. The French presidential election is contested over two rounds in a single national constituency. While in the first round a variety of candidates may stand, only the two leading candidates go forward to the second round. In 2002 no fewer than 16 candidates (12 men and four women) obtained the minimum 500 sponsoring

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signatures from local mayors. This was the highest ever number of first round candidates (see Table 1)

Table 1: French presidential election statistics, 1965-2002

Number of candidates 6 7 12 10 9 9 16 First round turnout (%) 88.21 77.59 84.23 81.09 81.37 77.88 71.60 Second round turnout (%) 84.29 68.85 88.33 85.86 84.06 79.66 79.71

1965 1969 1974 1981 1988 1995 2002

Sources: Duhamel and Jeanneney, 2002, pp. 281-4; Le Monde (2002) 27 April, 8 May, 11 June; http://www.interieur.gouv.fr

The ideological spectrum ranged from the extreme right ­ Le Pen and Mégret ­ to the extreme left ­ Besancenot, Gluckstein and Laguiller. It included five candidates from the right ­ Bayrou, Boutin, Chirac, Lepage and Madelin; five from the left ­ Jospin (Socialist), Hue (Communist), Mamère (Green), Taubira (Radical de gauche) and the pro-sovereignty Republican, Chevenèment; and, finally, the hunting/fishing/nature/ tradition candidate, Saint-Josse. Despite the unprecedentedly high number of first round candidates, the expectation throughout the political class, the media and public opinion was that the contest was effectively a two-horse race between Chirac and Jospin, with the second round predicted to be a replay of their 1995 duel. In contrast to the first round of several previous presidential contests, there was no major clash within either the mainstream right or left to excite commentators. Public interest in the election in the run-up to the first round was low, no doubt exacerbated by a widespread perception that there was little substantive difference on policy between what all opinion polls consistently judged to be the two front runners. In short, the first ballot seemed a formality in terms of its main function of deciding the two candidates to proceed to the second and final round of voting. The campaign agenda prior to the first round was narrow in its issue coverage. The dominant issue was l'insécurité, which not only covered law and order questions, but was also related to a popular perception that globalisation and immigration had undermined job security and French distinctiveness. Chirac, in particular, based his campaign on this theme, which opinion polls showed to be the issue which most concerned French voters. The media, especially the evening news programme of the main television channel, TF1, gave considerable emphasis to crime stories in the weeks running up to the first round. Other issues, such as the economy, taxation, pensions

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and the 35 hour week, also featured in the campaign, but less prominently. In contrast, Europe, health and education never really became election issues. Nor, to the surprise of many foreign journalists, did Chirac's alleged involvement in various financial scandals during his period as mayor of Paris (1977-95) and president (19952002): sleaze was almost wholly absent from the election agenda.

Table 2: French presidential election results, 2002

Electorate Votes cast Abstentions Spoiled ballots Valid votes Candidate Jacques Chirac (RPR) Jean-Marie Le Pen (FN) Lionel Jospin (PS) François Bayrou (UDF) Arlette Laguiller (LO) Jean-Pierre Chevènement (PR) Noël Mamère (V) Olivier Besancenot (LCR) Jean Saint-Josse (CPNT) Alain Madelin (DL) Robert Hue (PCF) Bruno Mégret (MNR) Christiane Taubira (PRG) Corinne Lepage (CAPVS) Christine Boutin (FRS) Daniel Gluckstein (PT) First round 41 194 689 29 495 733 28.4% 3.4% 28 498 471 Total votes 5 665 855 4 804 713 4 610 113 1 949 170 1 630 045 1 518 528 1 495 724 1 210 562 1 204 689 1 113 484 960 480 667 026 660 447 535 837 339 112 132 686 Votes % 19.88 16.86 16.18 6.84 5.72 5.33 5.25 4.25 4.23 3.91 3.37 2.34 2.32 1.88 1.19 0.47 Second round 41 192 327 32 832 842 20.29% 5.38% 31 067 651 Total votes 25 541 709 5 525 942 Votes % 82.21 17.79

Notes: RPR ­ Rassemblement pour la République (Rally for the Republic ­ Gaullists); FN ­ Front National; PS ­ Parti Socialiste; UDF ­ Union pour la Démocratie Française; LO ­ Lutte Ouvrière (Workers' Struggle); PR ­ Pôle Républicain; V ­ Les Verts (Greens); LCR ­ Ligue Communiste Révolutionnaire; CPNT ­ Chasse, Pêche, Nature, Traditions (Hunting, Fishing, Nature, Traditions); DL ­ Démocratie Libérale; PCF ­ Parti Communiste Français; MNR ­ Mouvement National Républicain; PRG ­ Parti Radical de Gauche (Left Radicals); CAPVS ­ Citoyenneté Action Participation pour le 21ème siècle; FRS ­ Forum des républicains sociaux; PT ­ Parti des Travailleurs. Sources: Le Monde (2002)27 April, 8 May, 11 June; http://www.interieur.gouv.fr

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One of the interesting aspects of the campaign was that after five years of cohabitation it was the prime minister rather than the president who was widely regarded as the incumbent with a record to defend. In this respect the omens were not favourable for Jospin. Although two previous prime ministers had successfully made the transition from the premiership to the presidency in the Fifth Republic (Pompidou in 1969 and Chirac in 1995), neither had gone directly from Matignon to the Elysée. In contrast, prime ministers who had attempted to make a direct transition, such as Chirac in 1988 and Balladur in 1995, had come unstuck, with Balladur even failing to make it through to the second round. The result of the 2002 presidential election is reported in Table 2. The great shock of the first round was Le Pen pushing Jospin out of the second place slot. A close reading of the opinion polls in the final days of the campaign might have suggested the possibility of Le Pen making it through to the second round. However, for most of the campaign Le Pen had been credited with a much lower projected share of the vote, around 10-12%, and his late run was not really picked up by the mainstream media. Le Pen's score of 16.9% ­ compared with 15% in 1995 and 14.4% in 1988 ­ was all the more remarkable in the light of the split in the extreme right vote following the departure of Bruno Mégret from the National Front in 1999. Between them these two candidates of the extreme right polled over 19% of the vote, fewer than 200,000 votes behind Chirac. Yet while Le Pen emerged as the leading candidate in 35 of the 96 metropolitan departments, in terms of the number of votes obtained his score was up only a couple of hundred thousand on his first ballot result in 1995. In this respect, therefore, the 2002 first round result did not seem to represent a spectacular breakthrough for Le Pen, but rather an incremental advance on his previous presidential performance. Given the low turnout, however (see below), the relative advance of the far right was significant. Jospin's score of 16.2% was a catastrophe for the Socialist candidate. During the campaign opinion polls had tracked a steady decline in support for the prime minister. His campaign was marred by several gaffes, including an early reference to Chirac's age which was immediately reflected in a drop in the polls. Though the record of his government of the 'plural left' on unemployment and economic growth was objectively quite respectable, some initiatives, such as the introduction of the 35 hour week, had lost it support among its electoral base. Jospin was driven to fight the election on an issue agenda largely favourable to the right and extreme right. Rational, didactic and rather austere in his television interviews, he lacked the seductive qualities of a natural campaigner. Most curiously, Jospin and his campaign team made the crucial error of assuming that he would go through to the second round. Therefore, instead of obeying the iron law of the two-ballot system ­ secure the core vote in the first round before widening the base of support in the second ­ Jospin alienated sections of the traditional Socialist vote without attracting sufficient support from elsewhere. His was the lowest first round score obtained by a Socialist candidate since the formation of the new Socialist

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Party in 1971 and compared unfavourably with the 23.3% he had won in the 1995 contest. On receiving the news of his defeat, Jospin immediately announced his retirement from politics, to take effect after the second round, thus leaving the Socialists to fight the parliamentary election without the figure who had dominated the party in the post-Mitterrand era. Chirac also performed worse than in his previous two outings. Though he emerged as the leading candidate on the first ballot, his score of 19.9% ­ compared with 20.8% in 1995 and 20% in 1988 ­ was disappointing. Previous incumbents had done much better in first ballot results: de Gaulle won 44.6% in 1965, Giscard d'Estaing 28.3% in 1981 and Mitterrand 34.1% in 1988. Nonetheless, there was no serious challenger to Chirac among the mainstream right. François Bayrou, the head of the centrist pro-European UDF, was way behind with 6.8%, while Alain Madelin, who had fought a campaign based on pro-market economic values and a reduction in the role of the state, obtained just 3.9%. For the Communist Party candidate, Robert Hue, the result was an unmitigated disaster. The 1969 score of 21.3% obtained by Jacques Duclos was now a distant memory. Hue's score of 3.4% was lower than Marchais' in 1981 (15.4%), Lajoinie's in 1988 (6.8%) and his own result in 1995 (8.6%). Humiliatingly, the Communist Party leader found himself outdistanced by two candidates of the extreme left (Laguiller and Besancenot), as well as by Mamère and Chevenèment. Moreover, the failure to clear the 5% hurdle meant that the party would receive from the state only minimal financial reimbursement for its election expenses. Hue's result, therefore, was a huge financial as well as electoral blow to his party. Two other features of the first round vote are worth noting. First, the level of turnout was a record low (see Table 1 again). Second, if one combined the number of abstentions, invalid ballots and votes for extreme right and extreme left candidates, then over half the French electorate were not prepared to vote for candidates from the broad pro-system centre ground. Between them the incumbent president and prime minister obtained the votes of fewer than 25% of the registered electorate. The presidential election: second round (5 May) The first round result effectively ended the election as a competitive battle, since Chirac was now assured of victory. Not only did all the candidates of the right call for a pro-Chirac vote in the second round. More or less explicitly, so too did the majority of the other defeated candidates. Only Mégret called for his supporters to vote for Le Pen, while Laguiller refused to choose between the two representatives of 'big business capitalism'. The only issue on the election agenda was now Le Pen himself, with his personification of intolerance and xenophobia. In the two weeks between the two ballots a huge outpouring of anti-Le Pen sentiment was apparent across France. The most striking evidence came on the 1 May, when hundreds of thousands of people, mainly secondary school pupils and students, participated in anti-Le Pen

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demonstrations in towns and cities throughout the country, most spectacularly in Paris. Various representatives of civil society ­ religious leaders, community representatives, intellectuals, actors and sporting heroes such as the footballer Zinedine Zidane ­ all expressed their opposition to Le Pen and urged their fellow citizens to defend the values of the Republic. The mainstream news media also disseminated a strong anti-Le Pen message. The front page of the centre-left national newspaper, Libération, of 22 April consisted of a huge 'NON' which many demonstrators brandished during the street protests between the two rounds. The television news programmes on the main channels were considerably less than rigorous in maintaining a qualitative balance in their coverage of the two candidates. Moreover, to no discernible protest from journalists, Chirac unilaterally decided that he would not engage in a television debate with Le Pen, although such a duel had been an integral feature of French presidential elections at every contest since 1974. With the result not in doubt, attention focused on the possible second round score of the National Front leader. The focus of the anti-Le Pen campaign between the two ballots centred on the need for a high turnout on 5 May. From this perspective, the mobilisation of the electorate between the two rounds was a great success, with over three million additional voters participating in the second round, marking a slight improvement on turnout in 1995 (see Table 1). The result was an overwhelming victory for the incumbent (Table 2). With 82.2% of valid votes, Chirac recorded a unique historic triumph. No previous winning candidate had come anywhere near the scale of his victory, either in terms of absolute number of votes or percentage share (see Table 3).

Table 3: Number and percentage of second round votes gained by winning candidates, 1965-2002

1965 1969 1974 1981 1988 1995 2002 Charles de Gaulle Georges Pompidou Valéry Giscard d'Estaing François Mitterrand François Mitterrand Jacques Chirac Jacques Chirac Total votes 13 083 699 11 064 489 13 396 203 15 708 262 16 704 279 15 763 027 25 541 709 Valid votes % 55.19 58.21 50.81 51.76 54.02 52.64 82.21

Sources: Duhamel and Jeanneney (2002) pp. 281-4; Le Monde (2002) 8 May; http://www.interieur.gouv.fr

For Le Pen the result was a huge disappointment. His second round total of votes represented an increase of only just over 700,000 on his first round score, almost exactly the number of votes previously secured by Mégret. The extreme right appeared

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to have no additional reservoir of potential support outside of the combined total of its two candidates in the first round. Moreover, since Le Pen had argued that he would deem a second round score below 30% to be a personal failure, not even to reach 20% was a huge blow to his self-esteem. Conversely, for the extreme right to have held on to its first round support after two week's of almost unanimously critical campaign coverage indicated the extent to which a significant section of the French electorate was prepared to support views outside of the dominant republican value system. The parliamentary election: first round (9 June) French parliamentary elections are also contested over two rounds, but in 577 separate metropolitan and overseas constituencies. In the first round a variety of candidates may stand. Only those candidates securing at least 12.5% of the registered electorate (not of votes cast) in the first round may proceed to the second. In 2002 there were 8,456 candidates nation-wide, by far the highest ever number of first round candidates, giving an average of over 14 candidates per constituency. Despite constitutional provisions introduced in 1999 to ensure parity between male and female candidates (Dauphin and Praud, 2002), most parties had more men than women standing. The exceptions were the extreme left Lutte Ouvrière (50.2% women candidates) and Ligue Communiste Révolutionnaire (50.1%). The Greens (49.8%), the National Front (48.9%) and the Communists (44.0%) made creditable efforts towards achieving formal gender parity, while the Socialists (36.1%) were rather less impressive. Finally, the mainstream parties of the centre-right were particularly disappointing in this regard, with Chirac's UMP (19.9%) and the centrist UDF (19.7%) preferring to accept the financial sanctions imposed by legislation. The campaign for the first round of the parliamentary election was a strangely muted affair after the outburst of civic engagement which had marked the run-up to the second round of the presidential contest. With opinion polls showing that a majority of French citizens did not want a return to cohabitation but rather a parliamentary majority for the president, the new caretaker government of the right headed by Jean-Pierre Raffarin was largely content to maintain a low electoral profile. Its main concern was to display to the electorate that it would actively counter l'insécurité, something it demonstrated by various events deliberately staged for the television cameras, which prominently featured the new Minister of the Interior and Security, Nicolas Sarkozy. Raffarin refused a 'live' television debate proposed by the Socialist Party first secretary, François Hollande, on the grounds that as prime minister he was not the leader of a party but the head of government. Most of the candidates of the right stood under the label of a new single party ticket (the UMP), which effectively submerged the Gaullist current within a broader conservative entity that also embraced former Giscardians and centrists. Only the presence of some centrist UDF candidates under Bayrou's leadership maintained the long-standing pluralism which has characterised the forces of the French right.

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Table 4: French parliamentary election result: first round, 2002

Electorate Votes cast Abstentions Spoiled ballots Valid votes Right UMP UDF Others Left Socialists/ Radicaux de gauche Communists Greens Republican Others Extreme right National Front MNR Extreme left LCR LO

Source: Le Monde (2002) 11 June.

40 930 928 26 350 320 35.62% 2.13% 25 787 902 Total votes 11 259 909 8 826 543 1 081 368 1 121 296 9 662 901 6 519 691 1 210 913 1 142 723 313 589 475 985 3 218 282 2 865 173 278 524 737 931 328 620 303 288 Valid votes% 43.66 34.23 4.19 4.35 37.47 25.28 4.70 4.43 1.22 1.85 12.48 11.11 1.08 2.86 1.27 1.18

The parties of the outgoing government of the 'plural left' had hoped that the parliamentary elections would give them the opportunity to reverse the outcome of the presidential contest. In particular, they argued that Chirac's presidential triumph represented a victory for the Republic rather than a mandate for his programme. However, they were severely handicapped by the unwillingness of the parties of the right to engage in a substantive electoral debate. Furthermore, since the record of the Jospin administration had been so decisively rejected in the first round of the presidential election, the Socialist Party ­ the keystone of any future government of the left ­ lacked a coherent programme to present to the electorate. In addition, the call for a parliamentary majority of the left did not square with previous critiques of the practice of cohabitation, such as that eloquently made by the head of Jospin's

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political staff at Matignon, Olivier Schrameck, in a book published only a few months before the elections (Schrameck, 2001). Finally, in seeking to win two successive terms, the left were trying to perform a feat which no French government had succeeded in achieving in almost a quarter of a century. At every parliamentary election since 1981, the incumbent government has lost (the right in 1981, 1988 and 1997; the left in 1986 and 1993). This contrasts markedly with the period between 1958 and 1978 when parliamentary elections were consistently won by the right, thus preventing any transfer of power.

Table 5: Turnout at French parliamentary elections, 1973-2002

1973 1978 1981 1986 1988 1993 1997 2002 First round 81.24 83.01 70.86 78.02 66.15 69.31 67.96 64.38 Second round 81.8 84.9 75.1 70.0 67.8 71.1 60.29

Note: All figures are percentages of registered electorate. Source: Adapted from Le Monde (2002) 11 and 18 June.

Sadly lacking in policy issues, the parliamentary campaign was dominated by one institutional and one strategic question. The first centred on the advantages and disadvantages of another round of cohabitation. The second focused on the capacity of the National Front to maintain candidates in the second round and thus force three-way run-offs between left, right and extreme right to the likely electoral benefit of the left. The result of the first round of the 2002 parliamentary election is reported in Table 4. The turnout of 64.38% was the lowest ever for the first round of a parliamentary election in the Fifth Republic (see Table 5). It was estimated that well over half the electorate below the age of 35 abstained from voting. The first round result represented a substantial victory for the parties of the right, whose 43.7% share of the vote was up from 36.5% in 1997. Within the mainstream right the balance of power shifted enormously to the advantage of the UMP. While in 1997 the Gaullist RPR (15.7%) had only narrowly outdistanced the centrist UDF (14.2%), in 2002 the UMP on its own had 34.2% of the share of the vote, with the UDF winning only 4.2%. The mainstream right won a total of 56 constituencies in the first round, with the UMP taking 47. Overall, the parties of the left were clearly defeated, their 37.5% share of the vote contrasting with 41.8% five years previously. However, there were significant

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variations in electoral performance within the left. The Socialist Party (including the Radicaux de gauche) held on to its share: 25.28% in 2002, compared with 25.26% in 1997. The Greens even increased theirs, from 3.6% in 1997 to 4.4% in 2002. But the Communists suffered a major setback. Whereas in 1997 they had won 9.9% of the vote, five years later they managed to secure only 4.7%, dropping in absolute numbers from 2.45 million votes to 1.21 million. At 2.9% the parties of the extreme left improved slightly on their 1997 score of 2.6%, but were massively down on the performance of their candidates in the first round of the presidential election. The left won only 2 seats in the first round. The National Front's 11.1% share of the vote represented a marked decline on its first round presidential result in 2002 (16.9%) and its first round parliamentary score in 1997 (14.9%). The party managed to exceed the 12.5% hurdle in only 37 constituencies compared with 133 in 1997, and forced only 9 three-way second round contests. Consequently, its capacity to inflict damage on the right in the second round was virtually nullified. The extreme right won no seats in the first round. Le Pen had decided not to stand, while Mégret failed to win enough votes in his constituency to proceed to the second round. The parliamentary election: second round (16 June) The campaign for the second round was hugely overshadowed by the main news of the week: the elimination of the French team from the World Cup football finals. The right eschewed any premature electoral triumphalism, while the left sought to limit the damage. Most of the second round run-offs were straight fights between left and right. The results of the second round are reported in Tables 6 and 7. Once again the turnout of 60.29% was a record low (Table 5). In terms of the allocation of parliamentary seats, the functioning of the electoral system tends to reward the winning side. Thus, although gaining less than 44% of the vote in the first round, the parties of the right emerged with 70% of the seats after the second, while the left, with over 37% of the vote in the first round, claimed only 30% of the seats (see Table 7). The National Front, with over 11% of the vote in the first round, failed to win a single seat in the new National Assembly. These results indicated a large degree of bipolarisation in the composition of the Assembly, with both left and right dominated by a single large formation. In addition, the Communist Party on the left and the UDF on the right managed, if only just, to win the minimum of twenty seats necessary to be recognised as official parliamentary groups, with the attendant status and resource implications. In terms of gender balance, the composition of the new legislature marked only a slight advance on that of its predecessor. Of the original 3,284 female candidates, only 250 made it through to the second round and a mere 71 were finally elected (39 UMP, 23 Socialist, 4 Communist, 2 Radicaux de gauche, 1 UDF, 1 Green and 1 Other Left). This means that female deputies now constitute 12.3% of the total, compared with 10.9% in 1997 ­ a far cry from the objectives of parity legislation.

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Table 6: French parliamentary election result: second round, 2002 (votes)

Electorate Votes cast Abstentions Spoiled ballots Valid votes Right UMP UDF Other right Left Socialists/ Radicaux de gauche Communists Other left National Front

Source: Le Monde (2002) 18 June.

36 788 231 22 178 500 39.71% 4.36% 21 212 502 Total votes 11 206 086 10 368 555 594 761 212 422 9 613 643 7 505 582 648 758 1 489 651 392 773 Valid votes % 52.83 48.88 2.80 1.00 45.32 35.38 3.06 7.02 1.85

Table 7: French parliamentary election result, 2002: Final seat distributions after second round

Mainstream right UMP UDF Other right Mainstream left Socialists Radicaux de gauche Communists Greens Other left Total

Source: Le Monde (2002) 18 June.

399 369 22 8 178 141 7 21 3 6 577

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Conclusion With the exception of the second round of the presidential contest, the turnout for the 2002 presidential and parliamentary elections was the lowest for these national firstorder elections in the history of the Fifth Republic. Some commentators interpret this as symptomatic of a more general crisis of representative politics in France, with some voters, notably the young and the socially marginalised, feeling themselves excluded from the political process. Others see in abstentionism a rational political response to electoral competition marked by a reduction in ideological conflict between parties of left and right in contemporary France, accompanied by a convergence in policy options as a result of growing European integration and globalisation. For the left, the 2002 results mark a substantial defeat. The Socialist Party now has five years in which to rebuild itself under a new leader. This will involve a re-evaluation of the party's policies, organisation and electoral strategy, as the legacy of the five years of 'plural left' government is placed in context. For the Communists, the loss of his seat in the parliamentary election confirmed a horrific few weeks for Hue as party leader. The Communist Party seems unable to define for itself a role in a post-industrial society in which the ideological values associated with the Cold War divide and class struggle seem increasingly anachronistic. The party even appears to have lost its protest role to other political groups on the extreme left and extreme right. What, in 1945, had been the most important electoral force in France now appears to be a barely relevant rump, struggling to maintain its existence. For the extreme right the 2002 presidential contest may come to represent its electoral high-water mark. Mégret has failed to establish either himself as a genuine rival to Le Pen or his party as a credible replacement for the National Front. Meanwhile, at 74 years of age, Le Pen may well have fought his last presidential election. There is nobody else in the party with his personality and media skills to take up the succession. Finally, there is no possibility in the immediate future of the extreme right benefiting from tactical alliances with the parties of the right as has sometimes happened at the local and regional levels in the past. Nonetheless, the National Front is not going to disappear in the short term. Since it first made its electoral breakthrough in the early 1980s, its share of the vote has only marginally dropped below 10% at any presidential or parliamentary election, while it has often performed considerably better. Not only does it still retain loyal supporters, but it will continue to act as a haven of protest for disaffected voters. The results of the 2002 elections mean that the right can now look forward to five years of uninterrupted power at the national level. The right has a firm hold on the presidency, the premiership and the government, and dominates the National Assembly, the Senate, the Constitutional Council and the Higher Broadcasting Council. This combination of power is unparalleled in the history of the Fifth Republic; despite their general dominance of the political system, neither the Gaullists in the 1960s and early 1970s, nor the Socialists in the early 1980s, ever controlled the Senate.

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The next five years will be a test for Chirac in his attempt to rebuild his presidential image after the failed premature dissolution of parliament in 1997 and the resultant period of cohabitation which, along with the allegations of corruption, so marred his first term. It will also mark the end of an era. In all likelihood Chirac will not stand again in 2007. Just as the left was dominated by the figure of Mitterrand for much of the Fifth Republic until his death in 1996, so since 1981 the right has been largely associated with the figure of Chirac. He first became prime minister in 1974, which means that if he sees out his new five-year presidential term he will have been around the top of the French political system for no less than 33 years. The left has never really satisfactorily replaced Mitterrand and still seeks a suitable successor. Chirac is determined that the right will not make the same mistake. Already Alain Juppé, Chirac's prime minister between 1995 and 1997, is positioning himself in readiness for the 2007 presidential contest. And unlike Jospin, Juppé has notably stood back from becoming involved in the day-to-day running of the country as he begins the long precampaign to become only the third prime minister to capture the Elysée. Raymond Kuhn is a Senior Lecturer in the Department of Politics at Queen Mary, University of London. He has published widely on French politics and political communication, including the book The Media in France (London: Routledge, 1995).

References: Dauphin, Sandrine and Jocelyne Praud (2002) 'Debating and implementing gender parity in French politics', Modern and Contemporary France, 10 (1): 5-11. Duhamel, Olivier and Jean-Noël Jeanneney (2002) Présidentielles, les surprises de l'histoire. Paris: Seuil. Le Monde (2002) 27 April; 8 May; 11 June; 18 June. Schrameck, Olivier (2001) Matignon rive gauche. Paris: Seuil.

Correction: In the last issue of Representation (38:4) the article on the use of the Limited Vote for Senate Elections in Spain referred in endnote 1 (p. 315) to the current use of the single non-transferable vote system (SNTV) in South Korea. Please note that SNTV has not been used for National Assembly elections in South Korea since 1988.

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Murphy's Law Revisited: The Irish Rejection of the Nice Treaty, 2001

Mads Qvortrup and Delores Taffe1

Irish statesman W.T. Cosgrave's view, in the 1920s, that the Irish people `did not care' about the referendum device was prophetic. Following the referendum to ratify the Treaty of Nice, held on 7 June 2001, it is probably shared by many of his present day compatriots (Kissane 2002:208). The Irish rejected the Treaty, some 53.9% percent voting nil (no) on a low turnout of only 34.8% (despite the inclusion of two other ballots on the same day).2 The outcome spurred a widespread perception that the Irish have become increasingly Eurosceptic (The Economist, 2001). In this article, we report on the conduct and context of the referendum campaign which produced such an unexpected outcome. Background Ireland was the only country to hold a referendum on the Nice Treaty. Following a Court Ruling in 1986, the constitutional position in Ireland is that all amendments to the European treaties must be submitted to referendum (O'Mahony, 1998). While unique in a comparative perspective, this is consistent with the Irish constitutional position established in the 1930s. Eamon de Valera, `the maker of the modern Irish polity in its modern form', once argued that the Bunreacht na hÉireann, the 1937 Constitution, should not be `changed by the Dáil except by...approval of the people in a referendum' (Kissane, 2002: 213, 215). By requiring that all changes to the Treaty of Rome be submitted to referendum, the Supreme Court has interpreted de Valera's declaration broadly. The prospect of yet another referendum in Ireland did not, however, send shivers down spines in Brussels. Previous plebiscites on European issues had all delivered `pro-hegemonic' results (Qvortrup, 2000), though there has been a slippage in the `yes' vote in each campaign following the accession referendum in 1972 (see Table 1). The referendum campaign on the Nice Treaty was not followed closely across the continent. Few ­ if any ­ expected rejection by the Irish people. Having capitalised on substantial funds from the EU, the Irish have traditionally been among the most enthusiastic supporters of European integration. Following the defeat, the taoiseach (prime minister), Bertie Ahern, and foreign minister Brian Cowen were forced to seek a resolution from their colleagues in the European Council, the majority of whom found it unacceptable that the process of EU enlargement should be stalled by a narrow majority on a tiny turnout in the Union's second smallest country. The response was, perhaps, predictable for observers who remember the European governments' reaction to the Danish voters' rejection of the

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Maastrict Treaty in 1992 (Svenson, 1996: 43). While the Treaty of Nice was (formally speaking) rejected, the summit effectively sought to downplay the verdict of the Irish voters and declared that ratification and enlargement could not be halted, and that the Irish government would have to solve `their' problem. While the other European governments softened their approach later, they showed little regard for the verdict of the voters, let alone the principle of democracy, as set out in the Irish Constitution of 1937, which upholds the right of the people `...in final appeal, to decide all questions of national policy, according to the requirements of the common good' (Article 6).

Table 1: Irish referendum results on Europe

Referendums EEC Accession Single European Act Maastricht Treaty Amsterdam Treaty Nice Treaty Year (%) 1972 1987 1992 1998 2001 Turnout 70.9 44.1 57.2 56.2 34.8 Yes vote (%) 83.1 69.9 69.1 61.7 46.1

Sources. Irish Times (2001); Qvortrup (2002).

Why a 'no' vote? Could the government have expected the outcome? Perhaps not. The government was riding high in the opinion polls. Moreover, the most recent available Eurobarometer poll (Eurobarometer 53) showed that support for European Union membership in the Republic of Ireland stood at 75%. While down from 83% in the previous Eurobarometer, this was still a substantial figure, as the overall EU average satisfaction rating stood at 49%. Further, 86% admitted that Ireland had benefited from EU membership. It would seem that the Government (a coalition of Fianna Fáil and Progressive Democrats) and the other `yes' parties had little to fear, and that the referendum would be an almost trivial formality ­ like the previous ones. The `yes' side was bolstered by the support of the main political parties, business, the bulk of the trade union movement (with just one section dissenting), the farming organisations, and the mainstream media. On paper the combined electoral support for Fianna Fáil (FF), Fine Gael (FG), Labour and the Progressive Democrats (PD) accounted for 85% of the votes cast in the previous general election (held in 1997). This augured well, if only voters could be trusted to follow the cues and signals given by the parties. Even the Catholic bishops issued a statement, which seemed to favour a `yes' vote. They were challenged by sundry `no' groups, whose campaign out-performed the combined might of the proponents of the Treaty. The `no' campaign comprised such diverse groups as `No to Nice' (drawn largely from Youth Defence, a pro-life group), the Green Party, Sinn Féin, the Irish Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, the justice

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and anti-poverty body Action from Ireland (AFRI), the Peace and Neutrality Alliance, the National Platform, and Christian Solidarity. These groups had little in common except opposition to the EU. However, they proved more united than their opponents, the `yes' parties struggling to work together with a general election looming in 2002. The latter did not trust one another, whereas the heterogeneous `no' side was not generally hindered by such rivalries. It was not altogether surprising that the `yes' parties failed to make an effort to cooperate. They had little incentive to concentrate their endeavours. Earlier opinion polls predicted a relatively easy win. However, the opinion polls showed considerable slippage. On 2 June an Irish Times/MRBI poll revealed that 45% intended to vote `yes', whereas the figure two weeks previously had been 52%. According to the same poll, some 28% indicated that they would be voting `no' (up from 21% in the earlier poll). The number with no opinion remained the same at 27%. Perhaps surprisingly the political parties took little notice of the poll. The politicians reasoned that the margin was too wide for discomfort ­ they made this assumption at their peril. Past experience and present conditions dictated that the result should have been favourable to the `yes' campaign. What were the reasons for the outcome? Election and referendum outcomes are inevitably the result of many factors (see LeDuc, 2002 for an overview). Any attempt at an explanation in such limited space must necessarily eschew details, and focus on a few major determinants. The evidence from the polls and the campaign suggests the outcome was due to a combination of factors, such as the booming economy (why vote for change when things can't get better?), partypolitical in-fighting, and mixed and confusing messages. Paradoxically, surveys carried out by Richard Sinnott, a prominent Irish political scientist,3 indicated that the voters were rather supportive of some of the key Treaty changes agreed at Nice. Thus, two-fifths said that they were in favour of EU enlargement, while only 15% claimed to be opposed; and half supported involvement in foreign peacekeeping/peacemaking operations (with 15% against). However, 50% felt that the large member-states had too much power in running the EU, while only 19% felt that the smaller states could look after their own interests. Attitudes to decision-making in the EU indicated that 46% reserved their position while the remainder were evenly divided between being satisfied or dissatisfied. It is interesting to draw comparisons with similar referendums in other European countries. Above all, it seems that such referendums are generally won during recessions, when the voters are willing to experiment (Qvortrup, 2001). The Swedes and the Finns voted for membership of the EU after the two countries' currencies had taken a hammering following the ERM débâcle in 1993. However, the Norwegians ­ who had been practically unaffected by the meltdown of the ERM ­ could afford to vote `no', and did so. Likewise the Irish. With a growth rate of 11% there was little incentive to experiment with change, not least if this would threaten to reduce Ireland's net gains from EU membership.

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Yet such an explanation smacks of crude determinism. While economic factors weakened the case for a `yes' vote, the negative result (from the point of view of the pro-integrationists), is also likely to have derived from other factors. The `yes' campaign was lacklustre and ineffective, and the political parties did not present a unified front, other than by agreeing on the need for ratification. The campaign The timing and length of the campaign were severely criticised. Ruairí Quinn, leader of the Labour Party, claimed that the referendum was held quickly because of partisan electoral considerations. The taoiseach, he argued, wanted to keep the autumn free for a general election, and gave this consideration priority over the Treaty (Irish Times, 15 June 2001). A valid critique, perhaps, but also one that reveals the deep distrust and poor relationships within the `yes' camp. The `no' side proved unusually effective. Posters urging `No to Nice' began to appear overnight throughout the country, with succinct and stark messages, such as: `You will lose Power! Money! Freedom!' By contrast, the few posters put up by the mainstream political parties barely merited a glance. `No to Nice' spokesperson, Justin Barrett, described Fianna Fáil posters as `basically background noise' (Irish Independent, 9 June 2001). Fine Gael's poster campaign was an exercise in cost effectiveness, with an eye to matters of domestic concern. Pictures of the candidates for the next general election appeared on the posters, alongside personalised messages. Interestingly, the `yes' side in the ill-fated Danish referendum on the Euro in 2000 had resorted to the same format ­ with the same lack of success. As a result of the McKenna judgement the government4 was restrained from using public funds to advocate partisan positions in referendums. At the same time, the flow of corporate donations to parties had been hit by tales of scandal and corruption emanating from the Moriarty Tribunal, and was due to suffer further depletion with the new electoral reform bill which limited the amount of money a party or politician could receive from companies or individuals. This meant that the main political parties had to dig into their own pockets to fund the referendum campaign, but none of them proved willing to dig deep on this occasion. Fianna Fáil admitted it spent precisely IR£40, 612 on its campaign and affected surprise that the `no' camp could be so well resourced and organised. Bertie Ahern accused them of accepting foreign cash from Eurosceptic Conservatives and American fundamentalist groups, but offered no proof. The response from the `no' camp was to produce receipts and seek a High Court injunction preventing the taoiseach from spreading false information. This was an own-goal that perhaps reinforced the perception that the `yes' campaign was a re-run of Murphy's law: All that can go wrong will go wrong. The reluctance of the major parties to spend heavily on the `yes' campaign may have been significant. After all, the literature on referendums presents an abundance of evidence that plebiscites have been won despite apparent public hostility at the

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outset of the campaign (Worcester, 2000). But the political parties judged it wise to exercise restraint in spending, particularly mindful, perhaps, of a by-election on 30 June in South Tipperary. In short, party political considerations took centre stage. In political science terms, the parties were engaged in playing a variety of nested games (Tsebelis, 1990). The governing parties, the Labour Party and Fine Gael, were all squarely in favour of ratification. Yet the prospect of the by-election in Tipperary, and beyond it, a general election, loomed. The three largest parties were desperate for a victory in the by-election. Fianna Fáil had lost five by-elections since taking power; Fine Gael's new leader, Michael Noonan, needed to win in order to consolidate his position as an effective party leader; and Labour had been humiliated in the same constituency a year previously when it lost a seat to an independent socialist. In addition, there was speculation that Ahern would call a general election in the autumn.5 All parties within the `yes' camp feared that the other parties would capitalise on a positive result in the referendum (Irish Times, 10 June 2001). Co-operation would have been an ideal option; however, both Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael feared that the other side would profit politically, despite `free-riding' to some extent in their referendum campaign efforts. Fine Gael, the main opposition party, did not contribute to a common campaign, as the leadership feared that Fianna Fáil would hold their fire ­ and save their money ­ for a post-referendum election campaign. Fianna Fáil, for their part, were reluctant to commit themselves ­ and open their coffers ­ for fear that Fine Gael would campaign only half-heartedly, blame the government for defeat, and reap the benefits in a general election. In addition to fighting the referendum, the parties were thus embroiled in an acrimonious nested game with their rivals. Rational parties ­ irrational outcome. There were, however, other (and equally fundamental) problems which affected the `yes' campaign. The `no' side had the advantage of being able to focus on conflicting statements by members of the government ­ and by senior politicians in other EU countries. A call for tax harmonisation by Lionel Jospin during the final stages of the referendum campaign severely wrong-footed the `yes' side. And while Bertie Ahern stressed his mantra that `when we are in (Europe) we must be fully in' (quoted in Arbuthnott, 2001: 50), Mary Harney, tánaiste (deputy prime minister) and leader of the Progressive Democrats, appeared not to share his view. Speaking to a meeting of the American Bar Association, Ms Harney warned against a centralised Europe `with key political economic decisions being taken at Brussels level', stressing that she `believe[d] in a Europe of independent states, not a United States of Europe' (Irish Times, 21 July 2000). This discord was not lost on the voters. As Michael Gallagher points out, referendum issues rarely run along party lines (Irish Independent, 11 June 2001), and to some extent the party élites may well have reflected their followers' own diversity of views on Nice. Thus, a pre-referendum poll run by MRBI for the Irish Times on 2 June 2001 showed that while support for the Nice Treaty among Progressive Democrat supporters stood at 65%, it was 51% for Fianna

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Fáil supporters, 50% for Labour voters, and 45% for Fine Gael followers (despite their party's strongly pro-European stance). Conclusion Never before in modern Irish history has the political élite taken a similar battering. That it happened in June 2001 was a surprise. The government was popular and the polls indicated that the `yes' campaign was within close range of victory. It is possible the outcome would ­ or at least could ­ have been very different had the `yes' parties been able and willing to co-operate. They did not. The focus on the Tipperary byelection and concern about general election prospects created tension within the `yes' camp. The proponents of the Nice Treaty were anxious not to bear the full costs of the campaign lest their political rivals should gain an electoral advantage. As a result, cooperation within the `yes' camp was limited and its campaign lacklustre. The `no' side, by contrast, succeeded in maintaining unity ­ perhaps because the parties were too ideologically heterogeneous to pose an electoral threat to each other. Yet, it is possible that the Treaty would have been rejected even if the pro-Treaty parties had managed to co-operate. Evidence from previous referendums on European integration suggests that voters tend to reject proposed Treaty changes if the domestic economy is performing well. Seen in this light, with a growth rate in excess of 11%, the Irish had little incentive to vote yes. It is also likely that other factors played their part in accounting for the Irish voters' rejection of the Nice Treaty. Fear of loss of independence, the country's neutrality status, loss of subsidies, a row with the European Commission over public spending, criticism of the EU by several ministers, and general disagreement about the aims of Irish membership of the EU, seem ­ with the benefit of hindsight ­ to explain the outcome. Whether these factors will combine in the `no' side's favour in the next referendum on the Treaty of Nice remains to be seen. The general election held on the 19 May 2002 resulted in an overwhelming victory for the Fianna Fáil (the party gained six seats, and now hold 81 of the 166 seats in the Dáil). Its main electoral rival Fine Gael lost 21 seats, ending up with a meagre 31 seats. The result maintained Fianna Fáil-Progressive Democrat coalition, and within a month the government announced its intention of staging a new referendum on the Treaty of Nice in the autumn of 2002. Whether a second poll is likely to alter the verdict of the voters remains an open question. The EU was not an issue in the election campaign. Further, the strong standing of the anti-Nice parties (the Green Party and Sinn Féin both gained four seats) indicates that the political legitimacy and presence of the `no' side parties is considerably stronger than was the case in 2001. The result is far from being a foregone conclusion. This underlines de Valera's confident statement that `there is one thing more than another that is clear and shining through the constitution...the fact that the people are masters' (quoted in Chubb, 1988: 98). Or at least, we may add, those of the people who turn out to vote!

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Postscript A re-run referendum was held on 19 October 2002. On a turnout of 48.5%, 62.9% of Irish electors voted `yes' in favour of the Treaty of Nice. (Source: Irish Times). Mads Qvortrup is the author of A Comparative Study of Referendums: Government by the People (Manchester University Press, 2002), Dr. Qvortrup currently teaches comparative government at the London School of Economics. Delores Taffe is a Ph.D. candidate at the University of Limerick. She is currently finishing a thesis on referendums and direct democracy.

Notes: 1 We are grateful to Bill Kissane and Brendan O'Leary, and Paul Wilder. The usual disclaimer applies. 2 There was an amendment designed to delete any remaining references to the death penalty in the Constitution (this was approved by 62.1%), and an amendment dealing with the ratification of the International Court (approved by 64.2%). 3 Can be found at: http://www.euireland.ie/news/Institutions/1001/opinionpoll 4 McKenna v. An Taoiseach (No.2) [1995] I.R. P. 37. McKenna, a Green MEP, successfully challenged the government's use of tax-payers' money to run partisan campaigns. 5 In fact, it was held in May 2002, and won by Fianna Fáil. References: Arbuthnott, Tom (2001) `Ireland, June 2001', in Mark Leonard and Tom Arbuthnott (eds), Winning the Euro Referendum. London: The Foreign Policy Centre. Bowler, Shaun and Todd Donovan (forthcoming) `Do Voters have a Cue? TV Ads as a Source of Information in Citizen-initiated Referendum Campaigns', European Journal of Political Research. Chubb, Basil (1988) `Government and the Dáil: Constitutional Myth and Practice', in M. Farrell (ed.), De Valera's Constitution and Ours. Dublin: Gill & Macmillan. Coakley, J., M. Holmes and N. Rees (1997) `The Irish Response to European Integration: Explaining the Existence of Opposition', in Alan W. Cafruny and Patrick Peters (eds), The Union and the World: The Political Economy of a Common European Foreign Policy. London: Library Binding. Eurobarometer 53 (2000) Spring. The Economist (2001) `Ireland', in The World in 2002. London: The Economist. Gallagher, Michael (1996), `Ireland: The Referendum as a Conservative Device', in M. Gallagher and P.V Uleri (eds), The Referendum Experience in Europe. Basingstoke: Macmillan. http://www.ireland.com/special/nice/ Kissane, Bill (2002), Explaining Irish Democracy. Dublin: UCD Press. LeDuc, Lawrence (forthcoming), `Opinion Change and Voting Behaviour in Referendums', European Journal of Political Research. O'Mahony, Jane (1998) `The Irish referendum Experience', in Representation, 35 (4):225-36 Qvortrup, Mads (2000) 'Are Referendums Controlled and Pro-Hegemonic?', Political Studies, 48 (4):821-26. Qvortrup, Mads (2001) `Denmark September 2000: The Campaign', in Mark Leonard and Tom Arbuthnott (eds), Winning the Euro Referendum. London: The Foreign Policy Centre. Qvortrup, Mads (2001b) `The Danish Euro-Referendum in Comparative Perspective', Representation, 38 (1): 77-85. Qvortrup, Mads (2002) A Comparative Study of the Referendum. Government by People. Manchester: Manchester University Press. Sinnott, Richard (2001) The Nice Treaty Referendum, unpub. European Commission. Svenson, Palle (1996) `Denmark: The Referendum as Minority Protection', in M. Gallagher and P.V Uleri (eds), The Referendum Experience in Europe. Basingstoke: Macmillan.

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News in Brief

A Summary of Recent Events

United Kingdom: Party finance During the summer of 2002, various ideas were floated for the reform of party funding in the UK. In May, Conservative MP, John Maples, proposed allowing taxpayers to sign up to a £2 levy to be distributed to the political parties. His colleague, Andrew Tyrie MP, proposed matching state funding for individual donations to political parties, (with donations limited to £1,000), and a ban on trade union and company donations. In July Labour minister, Peter Hain, suggested in a BBC radio interview that state funding should be made available to local organisations to encourage the grassroots process of politics. In another BBC radio interview in August, former Labour minister, Peter Mandelson, appeared to suggest some form of state funding was needed to rebuild confidence in the political system, which had been undermined by 'cash for access' rows. There has been some media speculation that the Labour government might move on the issue of state funding for political parties without waiting for a consensus to arise between the main parties. Electoral registers On 16 July 2002 Parliament approved new regulations on the sale of the electoral register. The regulations have been amended to comply with the Representation of the People Act 2000, which allows voters to opt out of the copy of the electoral register for sale to commercial organisations. Electoral Commission: During the period, the Electoral Commission reported on a number of issues: Voting age In July the Electoral Commission announced that it will be starting a review into the lowering of the voting age to 16. Electoral pilot schemes In August the Commission published an analysis of the 30 local election pilot voting schemes. The chancellor of the exchequer, Gordon Brown, announced that £30 million had been set aside for e-voting trials over the next three years, perhaps with the intention of holding an e-enabled general election after 2006. The Commission urged caution on the introduction of e-voting and recommended more e-voting trials.

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The Commission also noted that while all-postal voting had a clear impact on the turnout in some areas, experiments with voting via the internet, text messaging and telephones had no significant impact. After the May local elections, the security of postal voting was also called into question by, among others, Liberal Democrat peer, Lord Greaves. Notwithstanding these doubts, and depending on the Electoral Commission's views, in answer to a parliamentary question, the Secretary of State, Stephen Byers, hinted that all-postal ballots were an option for the European Parliament elections in 2004. House of Lords: Following the publication of responses to the government's white paper on reform of the House of Lords in May, a joint committee of both Houses of Parliament was established to set out the next steps for reform of the second chamber. The committee held its first meeting on 9 July. The committee consists of 8 Labour MPs, 3 Conservative MPs and 1 Liberal Democrat MP plus 4 Labour peers, 4 Conservative peers, 2 Liberal Democrat peers and 2 Crossbench peers (including former Commons Speaker, Lord Weatherill). The Bishop of Guildford complained that the Church of England bishops had been 'excluded' from the committee. The committee has been asked to outline a range of options from a fully nominated to a fully elected upper house. Following free votes in both Houses on the options, the committee will develop more detailed plans, on the basis of which the government will draft legislation. Local government: In June Nick Raynsford, the Minister for Local Government and the Regions, told MPs that the government would not force councils, (including Birmingham, Bradford, Thurrock), to hold referendums on the introduction of mayors as was previously expected. Scotland: Scottish Parliament In Scotland the debate continues on the size of the Scottish Parliament and the closely related matter of the number of Scottish MPs. Scottish local government Meanwhile, the consultation period over the Scottish Executive's white paper on local government reform, Renewing Local Democracy: The Next Steps, closed on 31 July. It was announced in September 2002 that a draft bill to introduce the single transferable vote (STV-PR) system for local elections in Scotland would be published in March 2003, shortly before fresh elections to the Scottish Parliament.

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Wales: Welsh local government The Commission on Local Government Electoral Arrangements in Wales, chaired by Professor Eric Sunderland, reported on 3 July. The commission recommended the introduction of the single transferable vote (STV-PR) system for Welsh local elections in 3-5 member wards. (In 2000 the Kerley working group had recommended the same arrangement for local government in Scotland.) The Sunderland Commission also recommended that the voting age be lowered to 16. Edwina Hart AM, the Minister for Finance, Local Government and the Communities, announced a consultation on the report. The consultation period will end on 31 October. It is likely that the findings of the consultation will be debated in the National Assembly for Wales' local government committee. Other matters: The Constitution Unit has set up an independent commission, chaired by Peter Riddell and David Butler to review the operation of the proportional representation systems in the UK. The commission held its first meeting in July 2002 and will report in 2003. It is intended to inform the promised Labour Party review on the same subject. Representation is grateful to Pete Moorey of the Electoral Reform Society for the information supplied.

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Elections Round-Up

Republic of Ireland 17 May 2002: Dáil Éireann (lower house)

Table 1: 2002 Irish election result

Party Fianna Fáil (centre-right, populist) Fine Gael (christian democratic) Labour Sinn Féin Progessive Democrats (right-liberal) Green Party Independents / Others Totals votes 2002 770,846 417,653 200,138 121,039 73,628 71,480 203,329 1,858,113 votes % change % on 1997 41.5 +2.2 22.5 10.8 6.5 4.0 3.8 10.9 100.0 -5.4 -2.1* +3.9 -0.7 +1.0 +1.1 seats 2002 81 31 21 5 8 6 14** 166 seats change seats (1997) on 1997 2002 % (77) +4 48.8 (54) (21) (1) (4) (2) (7)** (166) -23 +4 +4 +4 +7 18.7 12.7 3.0 4.8 3.6 8.4 100.0

* Compared with Combined Labour and Democratic Left Vote in 1997. Includes the Ceann Comhairle (Speaker) elected automatically. In 1997 17 Labour and 4 Democratic Left. ** Includes one Socialist Party deputy in 1997 and 2002. Electorate: 2,994,642 Total vote: 1,878,393 ­ 62.7% (1997: 65.9%) Valid vote: 1,858,113 (provisional figures) Turnout (valid vote): 62.0% (1997: 65.3%) Data source: Irish Times (2002) 20 May.

Dáil Éireann, the lower chamber of the Republic of Ireland's two-chamber parliament, currently has 166 members. Members of the Dáil, known as deputies or TDs (Teachtaí Dála), are elected for a five-year term. The electoral system used is the single transferable vote (STV) form of proportional representation in multi-member constituencies. This system has been used for all public elections in Ireland since 1920. Universal adult suffrage at 21 was established in 1923. The voting age was lowered to 18 in 1972.

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There is a constitutional requirement that membership of the Dáil is based on population, with not more than one deputy per 20,000 of the population or less than one for every 30,000. Constituency boundaries have to be revised at least every 12 years. Prior to the 1981 election, the first independent boundary review recommended increasing the membership of the Dáil from 148 to 166 members, with deputies elected to represent 41 multi-member constituencies. Broadly speaking this remained the general arrangement up to 1997. However, before the 2002 election, a boundary review increased the number of constituencies from 41to 42, although the number of deputies remained unchanged at 166. (An additional constituency, Dublin Mid-West, was formed from the adjacent constituencies of Dublin South West and Dublin West.) There is a constitutional minimum of three deputies per constituency and since 1948 all constituencies have elected either 3, 4 or 5 members according to population. In the 2002 election there were some 463 candidates contesting 165 seats. The Ceann Comhairle (Speaker) was elected automatically (Irish Times, 17 May 2002, p.8).

Table 1: Distribution of Dáil constituency seats

Elections concerned 1977 1981-89 1992-97 2002 No. of constituencies 42 41 41 42 5 6 15 14 14 No. of members per constituency 4 3 10 26 13 13 15 12 12 16 Total no. of members 148 166 166 166

Sources: Chubb, Basil (1982) The Government and Politics of Ireland, 2nd edn. Harlow: Longman Group; Nealon, Ted (1993) Nealon's Guide to the 27th Dáil & Seanad: Election '92. Goldenbridge, Dublin: Gill & Macmillan; Irish Times (2002), 20 May.

The election of June 1997 resulted in a change of government and the formation of a centre-right coalition government of Fianna Fáil and the Progressive Democrats. The Fianna Fáil leader, Bertie Ahern, became taoiseach (prime minister) and the Progressive Democrat leader, Mary Harney, became tánaiste (deputy prime minister). A number of significant changes took place in the period after 1997. The main opposition party, Fine Gael, replaced its leader, former taoiseach John Bruton, in an internal party upheaval in January 2001. Former health minister Michael Noonan became leader of the opposition as a result. In retrospect, some commentators (e.g. Mark Brennock, Irish Times (2002) 20 May, Election 2002 supplement, p. 2) have suggested that this episode damaged rather than enhanced the party's appeal.

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There were also important changes involving the Irish Labour Party. In December 1998, Labour and the Democratic Left agreed to merge. Having become leader of the Labour Party after the 1997 election, Ruairí Quinn, the former finance minister, went on to become leader of the newly merged party. This election of 2002 took place a full five years after the previous general election. Set against a background of the strong 'Celtic tiger' economy, the result was generally interpreted as a personal triumph for taioseach, Bertie Ahern, and Fianna Fáil's professional campaign. Though winning an 'astonishing' seat bonus based on 41.5% of first preferences, Mark Brennock of the Irish Times pointed out that Fianna Fáil's achievement was the 'result of a breakdown of traditional voting patterns', (ibid). There were some disappointments for Fianna Fáil as well. As Michael Gallagher pointed out in the Irish Independent (2002, May 21 p.10), with better electoral management Fianna Fáil might well have won an overall majority. Instead, with 81 seats (the same number as in February 1982 and 1987), the party fell tantalisingly short of a majority. The party's deputy leader, Mrs Mary O'Rourke, was a notable electoral casualty, losing her seat in Westmeath. Two other Fianna Fáil ministers also lost their seats. Mrs O'Rourke was said to be one of three Fianna Fáil deputies who lost their seats to running mates due to over-ambitious or poor electoral tactics. For Fine Gael, commentators agreed that the result was an unmitigated disaster. The party lost 5% of the vote, polling only 22.5% of first preferences ­ its lowest share of the vote since 1948. However, this translated into the disproportionate loss of 23 seats, leaving it with just 31 deputies ­ the same number as in 1948. Thirteen constituencies failed to elect a Fine Gael TD, including nine of the 12 constituencies in Co. Dublin, where the party did especially badly. A number of senior Fine Gael deputies were among the defeated candidates, including deputy leader Jim Mitchell, chief whip Paul Bradford, former leader Alan Dukes and former deputy leader, Nora Owen. The party's performance was blamed, in the main, on the lack of professionalism in its campaign (e.g. Geraldine Kennedy (2002) 20 May, Irish Times Election 2002 supplement, p.3). For the merged Labour Party the result was a disappointment. Starting with a total of 21 seats (17 Labour, 4 Democratic Left), the merged party finished up with the same number ­ 21, including the Ceann Comhairle (Speaker), who was elected unopposed. The combined Labour/Democratic Left vote of 12.9% in 1997 actually fell to 10.8% in 2002. The party's gains, such as the election of Joan Burton, a former minister who lost her Dublin West seat in 1997, were off-set by losses. These included former leader Dick Spring, who narrowly lost his seat in Kerry North. 'Politics is a cruel trade,' he said, quoting Lord Birkenhead. Shortly after the election, Ruairí Quinn announced that he was not seeking re-election as leader of the Labour Party leader in October 2002. In his column in the Irish Times (2002, 18 May, p.14) ­ published before any results were known ­ Garret FitzGerald was one of several commentators who pointed out

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that the Labour Party in particular, and the opposition parties generally, had done themselves a disservice by not co-operating (e.g. through an explicit preference vote transfer pact) in order to reduce Fianna Fáil's electoral advantage. Paradoxically, the failure to co-operate deprived the electorate of an alternative government and may have contributed to the scattering of votes among the smaller parties and independents. The surprise of the election was the performance of the Progressive Democrats. Defending the four seats won in 1997, and fighting only 18 constituencies, the party gained four seats ­ just as it had gained seats after a spell in government in 1992. Several commentators (e.g., Chris Glennon, Irish Independent 2002, 20 May, p.1; Gene McKenna, p.15) credited this to the PDs' election campaign tactics which employed slogans like: 'Coalition Works Better' and 'Single Party ­ No Thanks'. Whatever the truth, the strengthened PDs re-joined Fianna Fáil in government: making it the first Irish administration to be re-elected since 1969. Two other parties, both fighting on broad fronts, emerged with increased representation. One was the Green Party, which gained four seats, giving it 6 seats in total; the other party was Sinn Féin, which won the fourth largest share of the vote (6.5%) and also gained four extra seats, giving it 5 seats in the Dáil. The Sunday Independent's front page headline (2002, May 19) described Sinn Féin's performance as an 'ominous' breakthrough. The other interesting feature was the election of 13 independents, seven more than in 1997. Four of the independent deputies were said to be close to Fianna Fáil, while three (plus the re-elected Socialist Party deputy) were regarded as left-wing. Interestingly, four of the newly-elected independent deputies had campaigned on health and hospital issues, according to Irish Times' reports (Election 2002 supplement, 20 May, p.6). After the election there was speculation that Bertie Ahern might look to the sympathetic independents to support a minority Fianna Fáil government. These reports turned out to be wide of the mark: the Fianna Fáil/Progressive Democrat coalition was re-formed with the PDs this time holding two cabinet posts instead of one. According, among others, to Bruce Arnold in the Irish Independent (2002, 25 May, p.6) the election result demonstrated the Irish electorate's desire for political continuity rather than change. Fine Gael, on the other hand, was forced by the result to contemplate change. The party caucus elected as its new leader Mayo deputy, Enda Kenny, a former minister for tourism and trade. Kenny has inherited the difficult task of rebuilding the party. Some hopeful Labour observers saw in the election of a dozen or so left-leaning independent and minor party deputies the basis for the possible re-alignment of Ireland's party system. This will be a challenge for the new Labour Party leader.

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Election innovations This election saw the extended polling hours of 7.30 a.m. to 10.30 p.m. in order to improve turnout. In fact the turnout fell to 62.0% (as measured by the valid vote) ­ down 3.3% on 1997. Torrential rain in parts of Ireland during polling day may have discouraged some electors from voting. Although Ireland uses a preferential voting system, the invalid votes represented less than 1.1% of all votes cast. If one excludes the three constituencies where there were no invalid votes (see below), the figure was still under 1.2%. The three constituencies where no invalid votes were cast were those which saw the use of electronic, push-button voting for the first time in Ireland. The three constituencies concerned were Dublin North, Dublin West and Meath (the largest constituency in Ireland with nearly 109,000 voters and the constituency of former Fine Gael leader, John Bruton). Contrary to expectations, the results from these constituencies were not declared until the early hours of Saturday morning. This resulted from delays in getting the data modules from the polling stations to the counting centres because of heavy rain causing blocked roads, and because of teething problems with the counting technology. When these difficulties were overcome the results were announced quickly ­ too quickly for some. There were complaints that the declaration of the results lacked atmosphere. Nora Owen, a former deputy leader of Fine Gael and defeated candidate in Dublin North, commented in the Irish Independent (2002, 20 May, p.16): 'There's a cruelty and suddenness in the new system. It has to be changed.' One possible advantage of electronic voting is that detailed data are available for analysis and can be accessed from the web.1 The other constituencies had the traditional tension and intrigue of counts lasting through Saturday into Sunday. Four constituencies had particularly close results for the final seat. One notable result in Cork South-Central initially saw the 3-vote defeat of a sitting Fianna Fáil deputy, John Dennehy, by Katherine Sinnott, a disability campaigner. A recount reversed the result, giving Dennehy a 2-vote lead, and then another recount confirmed this by giving the Fianna Fáil deputy the final seat by six votes. This was unusual, as re-counts in Ireland rarely make any difference. The number of female deputies remained almost unchanged: 21 women deputies (12.7%) were elected at this election: FF 7, FG 2, Labour 6, PD 4 and Inds. 2. There were 20 women elected in 1992 and 1997.

1 Data are available for the three constituencies using electronic voting at: http://www.meath.ie/election.html and http://www.dublincountyreturningofficer.com/Results_Download.html

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Representation, 39 (1)

Elections Round-Up Calendar

Elections were held recently in the following selected states and self-governing territories:1 Mali Vanuatu Burkina Faso Sierra Leone Netherlands Dominican Republic Republic of Ireland Lesotho Colombia France Czech Republic Papua New Guinea Bolivia Guinea Mali Tuvalu New Zealand Macedonia Sweden Slovakia Germany Morocco Serbia 28 April & 12 May 2002, presidential election (rounds one & two) 30 April 2002, parliamentary election 5 May 2002, parliamentary election 14 May 2002, presidential and parliamentary elections 15 May 2002, parliamentary election 16 May 2002, parliamentary election 17 May 2002, parliamentary election 25 May 2002, parliamentary election 26 May 2002, presidential election 9 & 16 June 2002, parliamentary election (rounds one and two) 14 & 15 June 2002, parliamentary election 15-29 June 2002, parliamentary election 30 June 2002, presidential & parliamentary elections 30 June 2002, parliamentary election 14 July 2002, parliamentary election 25 July 2002, parliamentary election 27 July 2002, parliamentary election 15 September 2002, parliamentary election 15 September 2002, parliamentary election 20 & 21 September 2002, parliamentary election 22 September 2002, parliamentary election 27 September 2002, parliamentary election 29 September 2002, presidential election

1 Several elections were included in a previous list, see Representation, 38 (4): 366 for details. Data sources: http://www.electionworld.org/election/calendar.htm http://www.freedomhouse.org/ratings/index.htm http://www.ifes.org/eguide/2002.htm http://www.klipsan.com/calendar.htm http://www.mherrera.org Notes: Countries described as 'not free' according to the Freedom House Country Ratings index are not included in the above table. For details see: http://www.freedomhouse.org/ratings/index.htm The term 'parliamentary election' is used widely here to include elections that may be called 'national assembly', 'congressional', 'legislative' or 'assembly' elections elsewhere.

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ISSN 0034­4893 print ©2002, McDougall Trust, London.

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The Journal of Representative Democracy

Volume 38, 2001

Contents and Author Index

List of Contents Volume 38, Number 1 Articles Electoral Administration Analysing the Impact of Election Administration on Democratic Politics Jørgen Elklit and Andrew Reynolds

The Political parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000 Justin Fisher The Representation of the People Act 2000 Steven Lake The Australian Electoral Commission: Balancing Independence and Accountability Michael Maley Debate and Comment Candidate Centred and Party Free Elections: Lessons from the Livingstone Mayoral Campaign Nicholas Startin A System of Disproportional Representation: The Proposed Electoral Law for the Czech Republic Keith Crawford Election Reports Canada's General Election, 27 November 2000 Terry McDonald Elections in Sri Lanka, October 2000 Amanda Sives The Danish Euro Referendum in Comparative Perspective Mads Qvortrup

ISSN 0034­4893 print ©2002, McDougall Trust, London. 73

3 11 21 25

31

46

59

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Contents and Author Index for Representation, Vol.38

87 88 92 94 95

Letter to the Editor Reviews News in Brief Elections Round-Up Contents and Author Index ­ Volume 37, 2000

Volume 38 Number 2 Retrospective on the US Presidential Election 2000 Introduction Paul Webb

Articles Back to Chicken Entrails? Problems of Opinion Polls in US Campaign 2000 Pippa Norris Anatomy of a Constitutional Coup Bruce Ackerman Bush v. Gore and the Courts: Sound and Fury, Signifying Nothing? Mark E. Rush 1876, 1916 and Now 2000: Decisive Small State Bias in the US Electoral College Alan Siaroff The 2000 Presidential Election: A Perverse Outcome? Richard S. Katz He Lost...But He Won! Electoral Bias and George W. Bush's Victory in the US Presidential Election, 2000 Ron Johnston, Charles Pattie and David Rossiter The State of the Electoral Reform Movement in the United States Douglas J. Amy Review Elections Round-Up: The 2001 General Election in the UK

103

106 115 123 131

141 150

159 171 174

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Contents and Author Index for Representation, Vol.38

Volume 38 Number 3 The United Kingdom General Election, 2001 Introduction Paul Wilder

Articles Looking Back at the 2001 General Election Robert Shrimsley The 2001 General Election and Local Voting: An Analysis Colin Rallings and Michael Thrasher The Conservative Performance in the 2001 General Election Peter Dorey Two Steps Forward, One Step Back? The Liberal Democrats' 2001 General Election Performance in Perspective Andrew Russell, Edward Fieldhouse and Iain MacAllister The Election in Oldham: Combating the Politics of Disillusionment Phil Woolas Labour and Liberal Democrat Relations after 7 June 2001 John Bartle The General Election 2001: The View from Scotland James Mitchell The 2001 General Election in Wales: Present Stasis, Future Change? David Broughton Explaining Turnout in the 2001 British General Election Ian McAllister Elections Round-Up

183

187 193 204 213

229 231 243 249 256 268

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Contents and Author Index for Representation, Vol.38

Volume 38 Number 4 Articles Putting a Human Face on Proportional Representation: Early Experiences in Scotland and Wales Thomas Lundberg

Élite Level Co-ordination of Party Supporters: An Analysis of the Irish Aggregate Data, 1987-1997 Fiachra Kennedy The Impact of the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act (2000) on Trade Union Election Campaigning in 2001 Steve Ludlam, Andrew Taylor and Paul Allender Position Effects and Party Nomination Strategies Under the Limited Vote: The 2000 Spanish Senate Election Juan Montabes Pereira and Carmen Ortega Villodres Election Reports The Municipal and Cantonal Elections in France, 11 and 18 March, 2001 Sue P. Collard The 2000 Legislative Council Elections in Hong Kong Lo Shiu-hing and Wu Wing-yat Party Strife and Political Impasse in Zanzibar's October 2000 Elections David Pottie Reviews News in Brief Elections Round-Up

271

284

294

304

317 327 340 351 363 366

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Contents and Author Index for Representation, Vol.38

Author Index Author Ackerman, B. Allender, P. Amy, D.J.

Bartle, J. Broughton, D. Collard, S.P. Crawford, K. Dorey, D. Elkit, J. Fieldhouse, E. Fisher, J. Johnston, R. Katz, R.S. Kennedy, F. Lake, S. Lo, Shiu-hing Ludlam, S. Lundberg, T. MacAllister, I. McAllister, I. McDonald, T. Maley, M. Mitchell, J. Montabes Pereira, J. Norris, P. Ortega Villodres, C. Pattie, C. Pottie, D. Qvortrup, M.

Page no. 115 294 159

231 249 317 46 204 3 213 11 150 141 284 21 327 294 271 213 256 59 25 243 304 106 304 150 340 77

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Contents and Author Index for Representation, Vol.38

Rallings, C. Reynolds, A. Rossiter, D. Rush, M.E. Russell, A. Shrimsley, R. Siaroff, A. Sives, A. Startin, N. Taylor, A. Thrasher, M. Webb, P. Wu, Wing-yat

193 3 150 123 213 187 131 69 31 294 193 103 327

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The Journal of Representative Democracy

2002, Volume 39, Number 1

Contents

Articles Ian McAllister and Donley T. Studlar Tim Bale Electoral Systems and Women's Representation: A Long-term Perspective Restricting the Broadcast and Publication of Pre-election and Exit Polls: Some Selected Examples The 2001 Elections in Northern Ireland: Moderating 'Extremists' and the Squeezing of the Moderates 'England Belongs to Me': The Extreme Right in the UK Parliamentary Election of 2001 3 15

Paul Mitchell, Brendan O'Leary and Geoffrey Evans Cas Mudde Election Reports Raymond Kuhn Mads Qvortrup and Delores Taffe News in Brief Elections Round-Up Contents and Author Index

23

37

The French Presidential and Parliamentary Elections, 2002 Murphy's Law Revisited: The Irish Rejection of the Nice Treaty, 2001

44 57 64 67

Volume 38, 2001

73

ISSN 0034-4893 Published by the McDougall Trust Registered charity no. 212151

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