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Cornell International Affairs Review

Can America Find a Grand Strategy? Professor Stephen Krasner, Stanford University US Foreign Policy after the Bush Presidency Professor Francis Fukuyama, Johns Hopkins University The Hippie and the Snake-Eater

The Role of Interagency Cooperation in Twenty-First Century Security Affairs

David Lin, George Washington University, MA Israel and Palestine The Twilight of the Two State Solution Maurice Chammah, Cornell University, 2010

The Myth of 9/11 in Latin America Ana Isabel Lopez Garcia, University of Oxford, MPhil The Re-Emergence of Russian Super-Power? Jennifer Fishkin, Cornell University, 2010 The Lebanese Blogosphere Speaking For and Against Sectarianism Elisheva Yun, Cornell University, 2008 A Violent Peace The Ongoing Conflict in The Democratic Republic of Congo Alexandra Taylor, Cornell University, 2008 Crisis in Burma A Lack of International Voluntarism Edward Bong Geul Joo, Cornell University, 2010

Volume II | Issue 1 | Fall 2008

Cornell International A airs Review

Faculty Advisor · Professor Ross Brann, Department of Near-Eastern Studies Board of Advisors · Professor Peter Katzenstein, Department of Government · Professor Isaac Kramnick, Department of Government · Professor David Lee, Department of Applied Economics and Management · Professor Nina Tannenwald, Brown University · Professor Nicolas van de Walle, Department of Government · Professor Hubert Zimmerman, Department of Government Executive Board · Luis-François de Lencquesaing, President · Mitchell Alva, Vice-President · Ryan S. Spagnolo, Literary Director · Cecilia de Lencquesaing, Director of Publication · Dening Kong, Director of Finance · Francis Pedraza, Director of Global Networking · Brian Druyan, Director of Public Relations · Sarah Eversman, Secretary General

Cornell International A airs Review, an independent student organization located at Cornell University, produced and is responsible for the content of this publication. This publication was not reviewed or approved by, nor does it necessarily express or re ect the policies or opinions of, Cornell University or its designated representatives.

President's Letter

The Cornell International Affairs Review is committed to providing an international, interdisciplinary and intergenerational approach to world affairs. We believe that bringing together perspectives of students from different countries and majors with the wisdom of professors and the vision of policy makers contributes in an original way to the debate on foreign policy and offers tools to analyze the world in its complexities and nuances. The variety of authors published in this issue and the guests of the forums we host reflects this approach. As the country prepares itself for a new administration, it is important to reflect on the foreign policy challenges we face in a changing and uncertain world. What strategy should the US President implement? Can we have a clear doctrine, a "Grand Strategy," that will organize and prioritize the foreign policy objectives of the 21st Century the way "containment" did for the second part of the 20th? What should we define as the major threat to our national security? Failing states and terrorism, or the emergence of great powers? Krasner and Fukuyama, with their background as academics and policy makers ­and as Cornellians--offer their thoughts on these fundamental questions and reflect on the Bush Presidency. But these questions also have profound implications for the organization of our governmental institutions and the way we prioritize ressources ­an issue explored by David Lin. American foreign policy impacts every region of the world, and we feel it is important to center our Fall 2008 issue around this problem. In addition to our publication, the Cornell International Affairs Review organizes forums and discussion on campus. Responding to the events in the Caucasus, we hosted a panel with Professor Bunce (Government) and Georgian writer and political activist Irakli Kakabadze on "A New Cold War? The Crisis in Georgia and its Implication for East-West Relations." The speakers agreed on the danger of the US expansion in what Russia considers its "near abroad." We hosted a panel with Professors Andolina (Finance, Johnson School and former Lehman Brothers executive), Easley (Economics) and Sanders (Government) on "The Financial Crisis and Its Implications for Washington, Wall Street and Main Street" as the "bailout" plan was being proposed. They reached a consensus on the need for regulatory reform to stabilize financial markets and structure innovation. Finally, we hosted a lecture by Professor Brann on "The 2008 Presidential Elections and the Middle-East," exploring the impact of the policies proposed by the two Presidential candidates for this region. These talks illustrate our objective of mobilizing resources across colleges and disciplines to help us understand the multiple dimensions of an issue. In addition, we animate weekly discussion groups among undergraduates to further explore world affairs and share the visions of students that come from various background and from around the world. The world we live in is fluid and challenging. The variety of topics we explore illustrates the complexity of its dangers and opportunity. It is our responsibility as students and as citizens to engage in the foreign affairs debate and attempt to provide solutions to make the 21st century a century of peace. Political apathy among students is an often emphasized issue. I have not seen this at Cornell. I am impressed by the commitment of my peers, and in particular those involved in Cornell International Affairs Review. Luis de Lencquesaing

Cornell University, Arts and Sciences, 2010 President, Cornell International Affairs Review

Editorial Letter

The Cornell International Affairs Review is a student-led organization that endeavors to provide the Cornell community with a medium to engage others in discourse on the most current transnational and international issues. We combine the energy and idealism of students with the knowledge and experience of professors and the pragmatism of policy-makers. Now in our second full year, this issue represents the culmination of over a semester of dedication and hard work put forth by the entire organization. The topics discussed in the following pages resonate throughout the globe and each has important implications for the lives of students and faculty members alike. Indeed, the diversity of interests, opinions, and subjects is a testament to the commitment the Cornell International Affairs Review has in engaging the world around us. From U.S. foreign policy in a post-President Bush world to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, from U.S.-Latin America relations post-9/11 to continuing unrest in the Democratic Republic of the Congo despite declared peace, the content presented aims to engage the increasingly complex nature of the international community. We are pleased to publish two articles from Professors Stephen Krasner and Francis Fukuyama, both Cornellians and both former advisors to the Bush administration, reflecting on the future of American foreign policy in the coming years. In a watershed year filled with unprecedented and historic change in presidential elections, the implications for American foreign policy will undoubtedly be characterized by a new and divergent direction from that of the past eight years. If the United States wants to continue its pre-dominant role within the international community, a change of image as well as new policy formulations on the economy, democracy promotion and use of coercive power must adapt to the shifting dynamics of a postBush administration world. President-elect Obama's foreign policy path will be tricky to navigate between two wars, the growing threats of Russia and China, and a tarnished image, to name a few. In order to effectuate our belief in an intergenerational approach to foreign policy, five of our fellow undergraduates also offer their insight into global issues. Jennifer Fishkin dissects Russian foreign policy through the constructivist lens by examining Russian domestic politics while Elisheva Yun explores the role of Lebanese bloggers in shaping discourse on the role of sectarianism in their government. Maurice Chammah uniquely argues that a one-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict may come to pass and Alexandra Taylor investigates the oftforgotten unrest which continues in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Finally, Edward Bong Geul Joo breaks down two widely held views about the role of international aid during the conflict in Burma. We offer our humble thanks and gratitude to all of our writers, editors, advisory board members and contributors for enabling us to provide the first issue of a second volume, our third publication overall. The journal, as well as other upcoming initiatives in the literary department of the Cornell International Affairs Review, owes its success to your time, energy, patience, and hard work.

Cornell University Industrial and Labor Relations, 2010 Vice-President Cornell International Affairs Review

Mitchell Alva

Cornell University Arts and Sciences, 2009 Literary Director Cornell International Affairs Review

Ryan Spagnolo


Can America Find a Grand Strategy?

Professor Stephen Krasner, Stanford University

6 15 22

US Foreign Policy after the Bush Presidency

Professor Francis Fukuyama, Johns Hopkins University

The Hippie and the Snake-Eater

David Lin, George Washington University, MA

The Role of Interagency Cooperation in TwentyFirst Century Security Affairs

Israel and Palestine

The Twilight of the Two State Solution

Maurice Chammah, Cornell University, 2010


The Myth of 9/11 in Latin America

Ana Isabel Lopez Garcia, University of Oxford, MPhil

35 41 45

The Re-Emergence of Russian Super-Power?

Jennifer Fishkin, Cornell University, 2010

The Lebanese Blogosphere

Elisheva Yun, Cornell University, 2008

Speaking For and Against Sectarianism

A Violent Peace

The Ongoing Conflict in The Democratic Republic of Congo

Alexandra Taylor, Cornell University, 2008


Crisis in Burma

A Lack of "International Voluntarism"

Edward Bong Geul Joo, Cornell University, 2010


Can America Find a Grand Strategy?

Graham H. Stuart Professor of International Relations, Stanford University Former Director of Policy Planning at the State Depatment

Stephen Krasner Cornell University, 1963

Professor Krasner, B.A. History, Cornell University 1963, spoke at Cornell on September 17, 2008, at the invitation of the Einaudi Center for International Studies. The Board of the Cornell International Affairs Review had the privilege of meeting with him during his visit. The following article, produced here with his permission, is an edited transcript of this talk. The board of the Cornell International Affairs Review thanks Professor Krasner for his support to our mission. The issue of Grand Strategy for the United States in the post 9/11 world, is an extremely difficult problem. The Bush Administration did have a grand strategy, but it has not worked. Neither of the Presidential candidates, Obama nor McCain, have articulated something that you can call an effective grand strategy for the United States. A Grand Strategy, in order to work, has to do a number of different things. It has to stipulate an overall strategic objective for what American foreign policy ought to be. It has to be effective. It has to be able to provide guidance across a wide range of specific policy areas, and this is something I understand much better after having worked in government than I did before. If you are thinking about policy guidance, the American Government is doing hundreds, even thousands of things at any particular point in time. It is not the secretary of state, but the political officer in Montevideo who has to work with his or her counterpart, and in those situations, you need some kind of strategic objective that can give people an understanding within the bureaucracy about what the overall broad foreign policy objectives are. And an effective Grand Strategy has to be able to mobilize domestic political support. If it cannot do that, it will not work in the United States, because whatever it is, it will cost something. Finally, any Grand Strategy has to be consistent with underlying structural conditions of the international system. If you look at effective Grand 6 Strategies in the United States, Containment is the obvious, classic example. There was a fundamental objective of containment. George Kennan, who was actually the first director of policy planning, developed the policy. I am asked sometimes, `well, what's your grand strategy now?' and I have to say, first of all, Kennan developed his containment strategy when he was still at the US embassy in Moscow, and secondly that these strategies come along maybe once every decade and we actually never came up with one when I was working in Washington. Containment did have a clear basic objective, which was to contain Communist expansion. Following from that were a number of specific policies: nuclear deterrence, regional alliances, Western based international financial institutions, such as the World Bank and the IMF, the GATT and then the World Trade Organization. Other policies included a series of overt wars in Vietnam and Korea where we did not fight the Soviets, but we fought against Soviet/Communist expansion, and a set of covert interventions against real, and sometimes perceived Communist threats, in Iran, Guatemala, The Dominican Republic, and Chile. You can argue about the wisdom of these policies, or each of these specific actions, but in Containment doctrine, specific policies could be derived from the overall strategy. Containment also conformed to the structural environment in the Cold War. You had bipolarity; we were trying to contain the Soviet Union and Communism. There was

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anxiety in Europe and Japan, the other major parts of the world with Communism. There was strong domestic support in the United States for anti-Communist policies, because Communism was seen as being antithetical to basic American values, such as individualism, democracy, and free markets. The House UnAmerican Activities Committee was actually well named, as it was something that people saw as being fundamentally un-American, and in the end, Containment worked. The current environment is one, which I would describe in the following way. You do have, in terms of a structural situation, a degree of US dominance or hegemony that is historically unprecedented in the four hundred year history of the modern state system. The US spends as much as all other countries combined on defense. One American Aircraft Carrier can strike 700 targets in one day, which is perhaps more than any other air force in the world in total, and the United States has 12 carriers and many other warplanes besides. The United States economy was 27% of world GDP in 2006. 51% of patents issued by the US patent office were issued to Americans, and the percentage for the period of 1977 to 2007 was 55%. It has gone down a little bit, but there is still a very impressive level of American preeminence in global technology. If you look at culture, look down the list of the hundred highest grossing films world wide, and you will see that they are Hollywood films. Therefore, I think American hegemony is one attribute of the current international system. The second attribute is the presence of a western security community, also historically unprecedented. The fact is that if you look at the western major powers, war among these powers is unthinkable. This may not be true forever, but it has been true for quite a long period, and there is no indication that this security community is disintegrating. Regardless of what the underlying causes are, and there may be more than one, it is now the case that war among the major industrial powers is unthinkable, and it's pretty hard to

see how it would happen. That is something else that is totally new at a global level. The third attribute of the contemporary environment is the existence in Europe of what you can call a post-modern world, a world that has actually transcended conventional notions of sovereignty. If you look at the European Union, this is also something unique historically in the global system. It is not just an international organization, and it is not a federal state. It is not going to become a federal state or a conventional international organization, either. You have pooled sovereignty in the form of the European Court and the European Monetary Union, so you have organizations in Europe that actually dictate national policy. You have qualified majority voting in the council of Europe on some specific issues, so, a member of the European Union might object to a specific trade policy that's being pursued by the European Union, and they still have to follow that policy. It is completely at variance with our conventional notions of what sovereignty means. It is unclear where the European Union is going to end up, and is still clearly a work in progress, and it is unclear what the geographic scope will be. But it is really an incredible accomplishment, and in this area of the world, which committed suicide or near suicide in the first part of the 20th century, Europeans have been able to create an integrated structure that affects now virtually all of Europe. If you look at central Europe, it's inconceivable that it would have been integrated in the way that it has, in a kind of democratic, market oriented world, absent the European Union. I do not think the European Union will be replicated. I think it is a result of two critical factors. One was that the United States was able to provide a security umbrella for Europe that took security issues off the table for the European powers themselves. The second and more important, is the fact that Germany wanted to essentially bury itself in Europe after its experience in World War one and especially World War two. The Germans 7

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wanted to constrain their own freedom of action. I do not see either of these kinds of variables replicated anywhere else, and if you look at MERCOSUR, I do not think Brazil is really interested in constraining its freedom of action in South America. I think MERCOSUR is a good organization, but I think the Brazilians are happy to be there and they are happy to dominate the organization. If you look at security issues, there is no equivalent to the role that the United States played in providing a security umbrella for Europe. Therefore, the existence of the European Union is a third aspect of the post-modern world of the contemporary international environment. If you look at Europe, one fact that is true as well is that Europe compared to the United States spends not that much on defense. 1-2% compared to 2-3-4% for the US. You can argue that this is a result of free riding on American security expenditures or the result of different values between the US and Europe, such as Mars vs. Venus, or reflects Europe's own post war experience and what they think works in the international environment, which is basically that values and institutions matter more than power. You can argue about what the causes are, but the structural fact is there. Europe in terms of population and economic size is comparable to the United States, but in terms of its military expenditures, it spends much less. Concerning domestic European politics now, especially European demographics, it is very hard to imagine that you would get significant increases in European military expenditures. I think in terms of the domestic political situation in the major European countries, it would be extremely challenging. Next, you have the rise of new powers, such as Brazil and Russia, but I think mainly China and India. Chinese GDP is now 23% of US GDP in 2007. At some point in the future, China will probably catch and surpass the United States. It is not clear exactly when that will happen. I have a very, reserved, possibly cynical view about Russia in terms of the role

that it will play in the world. It seems to me that if you are looking at what has made Russia palpable as a player on the international scene now, it is energy and oil money. If that goes

away, Russia will be in a much-diminished situation. Japan is a country that finds itself now in an uncertain position. It is extremely anxious about China, and worried about its demographic future. Therefore, if you look at the structural situation, you have the hegemony of the United States, the presence of Europe, rising powers, and if you look at some of these attributes, like American Hegemony and the European Union, they are really new things. Changing distribution of power in the international system is an old thing; it is what has always happened in the international environment. You do have though, also, as an interesting attribute of the international system, the presence of a significant number of failed and weak states. Estimates vary in different studies, with the numbers going from 37 to 73. It generates global bads, not just global goods, such as transnational crime, disease, and the thing that has been pointed to most consistently, transnational terrorism. Transnational terrorism is not a new thing. The Irish Republican Army organizing against Britain in the 19th Century, organized in New Jersey, and then these guys went back to Ireland. The anarchist movement around the turn of the 20th century assassinated seven heads of state including the President of the United States. We also have to say that transnational terrorism clearly has multiple causes, so I am not making a claim that, if

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you looked at failed and weak states, that the failed or weak state is the full explanation for transnational terrorism. There are other factors that are associated with it, and it is also the case that we have no consensus now on how and what the actual causal mechanisms are. You can point to radical Islamic ideology, and from that, if we somehow managed to get Saudi Arabia to stop sending people money and building mosques, then transnational terrorism would go away. There are arguments that radical Islam is the result of the failure of the Islamic world to meet the challenge of modernization and the West. The argument that was made by the Bush Administration was that political repression in the Arab world gave no political outlet for people, and one of the things that happened because of that were terrorist activities. Alienation of Muslim immigrants in Europe is another potential cause; it is a very different argument about what the causes of transnational terrorism are. In addition, failed states and the fact that they can offer sanctuary or safety could be considered another cause of transnational terrorism. Afghanistan and the border areas of Pakistan would be part of this. I do not want to make an argument about which of these is actually the right answer, and maybe they are all right in some ways. I only want to say that, at least to some extent, these security issues are tied up with the issues of sanctuary in failed states, and it clearly has been advantageous for Al Qaeda to have safe havens where they can train people and hatch major plots. Obviously 9/11, but also the plot that was just prosecuted in England, were done by people who were actually trained in Pakistan or Afghanistan. Transnational terrorism poses an unknown and unknowable threat. I had a conversation that stayed with me very vividly in 2003 with Cristoff Bertram, who was head of a big German foreign policy think tank. He said, `the trouble with you Americans is that you are using a worst case analysis here.' I thought about that for a year, and I could not see exactly what else we should be doing.

I actually bumped into him a year later and I asked him about this and of course, he had no memory of having said this, but it had filled my head for a year. I think the problem is you are dealing with a situation in which you have this small probability of something really bad happening. We have no way of assigning an expected utility to this. You know that if you set off dirty nuclear bombs in a number of major cities around the world it would be incredibly bad. Nevertheless, what is the chance of that happening? We have no way of getting something that looks like a real probability estimate. We have to say here, `look, very surprising, incredibly unpredicted things have happened in the world.' The Communists coming to power in Russia after the First World War would be one example. If you asked people in 1915, I do not know how many people you would have found who could have predicted that. Hitler coming to power in Nazi Germany would be another. If you'd asked people in Germany in the mid 1920s, at least, whether you would have had this quite crazed guy coming to power in one of the most advanced countries in Europe, the people would have said, `no.' It would not have been quite in the realm of possibilities. Therefore, very bizarre things have happened before, and 9/11 may not be the most bizarre thing that we have seen. I've had some conversations with people about why terrorism is so bad, because one thing people will say is `look, say you get even another 9/11, you kill quite a large number of people, but it's still a lot fewer people than are killed in automobile accidents in a year for instance in the United States.' So here, maybe you just want to ask, `why worry about this so much?' I mean let us say there's some terrorist event and you have several hundred people killed. We live with risk all the time in our lives, so why are we so worried about this? At least one explanation is that for many of the other risks that we live with, you know what they are, and you can take actions to deal with it. If you lived in New York City in the 1980s or 9

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1970s and you were worried about crime, so you could decide that you were not going to go out at night, or that you were not going to go into certain neighborhoods. The problem with terrorism is that there is a pervasive fear that you cannot protect yourself from it. Therefore, you have this unknown, unknowable threat, but I think what has happened if you look at transnational terrorism, in some weak or badly governed states, and with weapons of mass destruction, is that you have another development. You have broken the relationship between the ability to do harm and the underlying structural capacity of actors. For example, if you look at North Korea, a country that does have missiles, and does have nuclear weapons. Its GDP, however, is about .002 of the United States, so way less than one percent, and way less than one percent of the GDP of Japan. Despite that, North Korea could be in a position to kill millions of people in Japan, Russia, and China. That is historically unprecedented. It is like Lichtenstein posing a mortal threat to Germany in 1914. That is not something that has happened before. Therefore, you are in a situation in which you have the possibility of relatively weak actors being in a position to wreak substantial damage on much more powerful actors. I do think that if you did have a major transnational incident, something on the order of 9/11 or bigger or a number of these, there exists a real possibility for changing the international rules of the game in ways that would be very uncomfortable. Let us say we had another attack on the United States that kills ten thousand people, and there is evidence that it originated in the border areas of Pakistan. I do not think you'd be having the kind of discussions the United States is having now about whether or not we should actually engage in military activity in this border area. I think it would happen. If you looked at the situation and said, `gee, Saudi Arabia has been funding a lot of the kind of ideology which has supported Al Qaeda,' and you reach that conclusion, it is not so 10

evident that you'd continue to have a system in which you'd continue to transfer billions and billions of dollars to countries that have radical perspectives. You might have a way of thinking about oil, for instance, in which you would say, `maybe we should think about oil exports as part of the global heritage of mankind,' with the revenue going to the world bank to distribute to developing countries. I think developments like this, which are almost unimaginable now, but are potentially imaginable after a major attack, would be bad outcomes. This would be a much more violent, much less comfortable world than the one we are living in now. I have to say, as I used to say in my lectures in 2003, shortly after 9/11, that if you were an undergraduate now you would have a much better chance of dying from a nuclear bomb than I had growing up through the cold war. That looks more remote now, but I think if you did have a major nuclear attack you would have a much more uncomfortable world, so clearly, there are ways and reasons to think that we need to find a way of dealing with the nexus of problems that exist in the contemporary international environment.

Grand Strategy Options

Let me now offer a few contending grand strategies. Retrenchment It says that the United States should limit its alliance commitments, scale back NATO, limit NATO to Europe and the US Japanese alliance, and be very, very resistant to using force. The US should also limit expectations about anything you could accomplish if you are thinking about intervening in third world countries, and assume that transnational terrorism and WMD is a manageable threat. This is the wrong strategy and it would not work. I think the US still plays an extremely valuable security role in Asia. If the United States were to withdraw from Asia, you would have a nuclear-armed South Korea and Japan. The Japanese are clearly extremely anxious

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about the rise of China, and are somewhat mollified by the fact that the United States is still present. If you withdraw the American presence, I think it would be a much messier environment. If you think about American withdrawal from the Middle East, and I am not just talking about Iraq now, I am talking about the Arabian Peninsula and the surrounding area, it would be a problem. The Saudis, the Gulf States, all major sources of oil, clearly worry about Iran. They feel anxious, but they also feel bolstered by the fact that they think they have American engagement to protect them against the worst possible outcomes. If the US retrenched in a major way, I think you would either see the Saudis and the Gulf states throwing in their lot with Iran, or trying to develop a much more robust military capacity than they have now. That would also not be a very comfortable outcome. I do not see this policy of retrenchment as something that would actually further in a significant way American interests. Bush doctrine I thought Charles Gibson's question to Palin about what is the Bush Doctrine was interesting. I have to say that if someone had asked me that, I would never have said preventive and pre-emptive war, and I have worked for the Bush administration for 3 and a half years, so I want to think I have some claim to expertise here. If we look at the Bush doctrine, it has the following elements. It has this notion of pre-emptive/preventive war, which is that we have to strike first before really bad things happen to us. It has root causes and democratization, which is that the fundamental cause of transnational terrorism is political repression in the Islamic world. This is an argument that Rice repeated in her very recent Foreign Affairs article, in which she argued that the problem is that the bet that we made in the Islamic world was that we would get security from stability, and in fact, we have not gotten either stability or security. The necessity of American primacy

and unilateralism is also needed. The idea of democracy is the animating focus of the Bush Administration. So the question is, how well do the different elements of this work. We can see with clarity now that democratic regime change is hard. Much harder than the administration thought it would be. I think there is a more generic problem, which is that changing domestic authority structures in other states is very hard. Democratic regimes in the Middle East will not necessarily be more pro-American. There have been polls that say if you ran a free and fair election now in Saudi Arabia, Bin Laden would probably do very well. The United States has clearly relied

in the past and is going to continue to rely on autocratic regimes in the Middle East and central Asia to further its strategic and material interests, examples being Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Azerbaijan, and Kazakhstan. In the doctrine, there is an element of intellectual incoherence, and it puts the United States in a position where we are pushing democratization very strongly while at the same time we are closely allied with Saudi Arabia. Multilateral engagement This is something we have certainly seen from many; Ikenberry, Princeton Project, Ann Marie Slaughter, and others. It is an argument that you have to work through multilateral organizations, that you have to use persuasion and attraction rather than coercion and power as a way of getting what you want, and that you need to have self-constraint on America's freedom of action. I would say 11

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that this is the most prevalent alternative to the Bush doctrine as I have described it. The problems are this: Inescapably in the contemporary environment, American power will breed suspicion, so people are not going to be comfortable with the United States. Other powers will inevitably free ride on American power. I also think other major powers have different values than the United States. The Europeans have vision of how to operate, interact, and engage the world that is very different from the American one. Furthermore, it will be hard for the United States to limit its own freedom of action, which is something it will have to do if you want others to buy into this multilateral strategy. Otherwise, other countries are not going to trust us. Finally, you have a difference in the way transnational terrorism, and how we should respond to it, has been formulated. The Europeans have essentially bought in to the idea that this is something that needs to be treated as a criminal problem, and the United States went very quickly to the idea that this was a war on terrorism. These are very different views on what the nature of the problem is, and it is not going to be easy to resolve these. Given the uncertainty of the environment that we are looking at, multilateral engagement, although it sounds OK, is not something that is really going to work as a coherent and consistent strategy for the United States.

Krasner's Grand Strategy Option

I am going to offer my candidate here, which is that the United States ought to be trying to create a world of responsible sovereigns. I define this as a set of states that can essentially govern effectively within their own boundaries, and would play by the existing international rules of the game. This does not mean they would have to agree with these rules, but that if they wanted to change the rules they would do it according to the rules that are out there now. It would be normalization and not democratization. The model here is Libya and not Gaza. What 12

we have done with Libya is exactly what responsible sovereignty should look like as a foreign policy, although Libya is not a fully responsible sovereign state now. You want countries that can govern effectively within their own borders, that can provide services to their own populations, that can promote economic growth, that would respect basic, minimum human rights, and you would want them to be able to accept and work effectively with existing international regimes. I do think that this is a strategy that would secure international support. What has happened over the last five years has made democracy a very problematic word in the international environment. Responsible sovereignty, or maybe good governance, is something that could get general support. Everyone would say they are in favor of it, although that does not mean everybody would necessarily act according to it. I do think it is a policy that could secure domestic political support in the United States as well. You would have to say that this is something that is associated with basic human rights and that democracy could certainly be part of responsible sovereignty, although it is not necessarily all of it. The language is important in winning over domestic support, so let me use a couple of quotes here."Our hopes, our hearts, our hands are with those on every continent building democracy and freedom. Their cause is America's cause." The second quote is: "The survival of liberty in our land increasingly depends on the success of liberty in other lands. The best hope for peace in

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our world is the expansion of freedom in all the world." The first was Clinton's inaugural address and the second was Bush's second inaugural address, so there is not too much space there between the way Americans think about this. Therefore, I do think it is something that could generate some support. There are exceptions; I do not think it is going to be easy to get China to buy in to this in terms of Chinese material interests. If you look at political rulers in developing states in terms of what they actually did and not in terms of the rhetorical articulation that they may give you, the answer is not necessarily positive. In many cases, having bad governance is better for them than having good governance because it gives these political elites more opportunities for rent extraction. So it is certainly not the case that this would have universal support, or necessarily be easy, but I think it does have at least a possibility for getting generic support both internationally and domestically. Here is what this would mean in terms of policy guidance, in other words, what specifically we should be doing. First you should promote freedom in all of its dimensions. This could be economic freedom, political freedom, basic human rights, cultural freedom, religious freedom, etc. I think this is something that would give us a much wider range of policy steps that we could take that would actually be consistent with what we articulated as our Grand Strategy. It would not put us in the position of saying that we are in favor of democracy, while at the same time being closely allied with Saudi Arabia. That is one policy it would imply. Secondly, it implies that we need programs that offer incentives. Incentives work. The big incentive program for Central European States is clearly membership in the European Union. There are a couple of things that we could do such as broaden the Millennium Challenge account. This foreign aid program is entirely incentive based. The US increases its foreign aid if countries have demonstrated that they are ready to produce better governance. We ought to

have trade agreements, and more open trade arrangements as well. The single most important thing that Europe and the United States could do for development would be to get rid of their agricultural trade barriers. Increasing incentives is something I am pretty confident about when it comes to modifying State behavior. We need to increase options for multilateral cooperation. This is not something the US can do by itself, but it is also not something that you can do through the United Nations alone. There is too much disagreement. What you need are a number of different modalities. They may be the UN, they may be the Security Council, they may be regional organizations, and it may be NATO, which I think is very valuable as an out of area military force. It may be doing things like more coalitions of the willing. The United States, over the last several years, has promoted something called the Proliferation Security Initiative, which has about eighty countries, and is an arrangement where countries agree to try to prevent the sale and transportation of weapons of mass destruction. It requires some coordination among countries, and they have done a number of interceptions of ships. It has worked well, and although it is not highly institutionalized, it is not entirely ad hoc either. Those are, in terms of international policies, what the US would have to do. Within the United States also, there are many things the United States would have to do to make the strategy work, and these will be very hard. It is obvious, and everyone in Washington knows this, that we need a better mix of civilian and military capacity. The budget of USAID in the State Department is $40 billion, while the security budget of the United States is, if you combine Department of Defense plus Department of Energy expenditures on nuclear weapons, about $800 billion. This is a ratio of 20 to 1, whereas now that you are thinking about state building and post conflict reconstruction, the ratio ought to be the other way around. It ought to be more 13

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like 20 to 1 for Civilian as opposed to military. You would need to reorganize US government to enhance its state building capacity, and its ability to promote responsible sovereignty. There have been a number of different proposals, one being that you make USAID a cabinet level agency. You might want to integrate it even more closely with the State Department. You might want to increase the size of the State Department. You clearly would want to increase civilian-military coordination. Either that or you may end up needing to say that civilian agencies in the US government don't know how to do this, so we should just give it to the military and expand the scope of activity that it is engaged in. You would at least have to begin to tackle some of these problems if you wanted to make responsible sovereignty an effective Grand Strategy.


I will close by giving my answer to the title of this lecture, "Can The United States Have a Grand Strategy?" My answer is `maybe.' The `maybe' is because I think we are confronted with a huge challenge, and we do not know how to deal with it. That problem is how to get better governance, economic growth, and ultimately, full-fledged liberal democracy in parts of the world that do not have it now. If we actually had a world of responsible sovereigns, it would be a much nicer place to live in, not just for Americans, but for everybody else in the world. We do not know how to do that and we do not know how it has happened in places that are already well developed. We have a number of different theories out there in social science about how this works. If I had to bet on a position right now, I would say that much of what has happened is path dependent and haphazard. Rather than being

the result of structural conditions, political development and economic development are hostage to and contingent on indigenous factors which we are not able to predict and which sometimes we do not have a good grasp of. That is a big problem. The second problem that I alluded to earlier is that political leaders in weak and failed states often prefer rent seeking to responsible sovereignty. They do not want rule of law, they want rule of unlaw, because it gives them the opportunity to extract resources more effectively than they could otherwise. Thirdly, if you look at the situation, there is a deep structural problem. If you are looking at the industrial west including Japan, there are a set of developments which were more or less autochthonous. If you look at the developing world, you have a situation in which these countries are expected to perform a wide range of responsibilities: education, social security, healthcare, and others. These have been generated not by debates within these societies, but by mimicking the set of institutional structures that exist in the West. That is a problem Europe and the United States never confronted, and so there are some structural problems in terms of how you can get responsible sovereignty. If we are looking at some kind of guidance, some kind of path in the environment which we are in now, we are not going to find a Grand Strategy that is as neat as containment. We are not going to find that Grand Strategy because the problem that we are dealing with is harder than anything we have ever had to deal with in the Cold War. However, Responsible Sovereignty is the best shot that we can take at making something work. Moreover, it is better than what the alternative candidates are now, being either retrenchment, or what the Bush administration put forth, or engaged multilateralism.

Photos Courtesy of Joao Filipe C.S. U.S. Military and Cornell University Photography


Cornell International Affairs Review

US Foreign Policy After the Bush Administration

Francis Fukuyama Cornell University 1974

Bernard L. Schwartz Professor of Political Economy, Johns Hopkins University

Professor Fukuyama, B.A. Classics, Cornell University 1974, spoke at Cornell on April 21, 2008, at the invitation of the Einaudi Center for International Studies. The Board of the Cornell International Affairs Review had the privilege of meeting with him during his visit. The following article, produced here with his permission, is an edited transcript of this talk. The board of the Cornell International Affairs Review thanks Professor Fukuyama for his support to our mission. On January 20, 2009, Americans will inaugurate the 44th President of the United States. Immediately, our next president will face important decisions with regard to American foreign policy. With that in mind, I will look at the ideas that have animated foreign policy in recent years, and then at how reality has or has not coincided with those ideas. That sets the stage for looking ahead to the kinds of shifts that I think will be necessary, and the kinds of adjustments the new president will have to make as we proceed into the next administration. Despite contrarian notions, the Bush Doctrine was actually a fairly coherent set of ideas. A lot of my neo-conservative friends played an important role in shaping that strategy. I would summarize it as containing four elements. First, a very dire threat assessment on what would happen as a result of international terrorism following the September 11th attacks. Second, it is a doctrine of preemption to deal with the problem of terrorism. Third, a willingness to exercise American leadership ­or unilateralism--in working with allies. And finally, a strategic use of democracy promotion as a means of getting at the purported underlying causes of the terrorist problem. This doctrine formed the coherent strategy for the first four years. The problem is that the world is different, and the assumptions that animated that strategy are not suitable to the world that has emerged in the early twenty-first century. A lot of it has to do with the inapplicability of traditional hard power to achieve the kinds of political objectives that the United States seeks in certain important parts of the world. Today the United States spends as much on its defense budget as the whole rest of the world combined. It is a huge disproportion, and in terms of lift, technology, communications and firepower, the United States military has no rivals whatsoever. Yet Iraq, a small country of about 24 million people, is still not stabilized after five years of America occupation. Why is this concentration of modern technology and

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military power not able to achieve a relatively straightforward goal in a relatively small country? The reason has to do with the fact that we are living in a weak-state world that is very different from the kind of strong-state world that we are used to thinking about in terms of twentieth century politics. If you take a standard international relations course, it's all about the interaction of strong centralized states. The kind of states that we dealt with in the twentieth century- with Nazi Germany or Stalin's Russia, or imperial Japan- were all modern, centralized states that could enforce rules on their own territory. In that kind of a world, the classic instruments of foreign policy worked, primarily the instrument of hard military power. Therefore, if you were attacked by another state, and you got them to surrender on the deck of a battleship, that was it, the war was over, and you could proceed to rearrange the strategic pieces on the chessboard, understanding that most of those chess pieces were under the control of relatively coherent forms of political authority. The greater Middle East, which I would define as beginning in North Africa, extending through much of sub-Saharan Africa, through the Middle East proper, much of Central Asia and South Asia and up until the border of India, is characterized by weak and sometimes failing states. In that kind of world, traditional hard power simply will not work as well. Without coherent states in places, the use of hard military power does not have the same kind of political effect, because you cannot deter or coerce or compel states to act on the actors that operate out of their territory. Lebanon and Hezbollah is a good example to illustrate this shift in international relations. Henry Kissinger, after the 2006 war in Lebanon, wrote an article where he came out of that traditional twentieth century world, and said: "Hezbollah is, in fact, a metastasization of the Al-Qaeda pattern: it acts openly as a state within a state, a non-state entity on the soil of a state, with all the attributes of a state. Backed by a major regional power, it is a new 16

thing in international politics." It may have been news to Henry Kissinger, but if you had been following African politics over the past couple of decades, you would understand that this is exactly the kind of world that has been emerging in that part of the globe. And it is particularly difficult for American foreign policy because we have a tremendous hard power machine that we want to use to solve problems. They say when your main tool is a hammer, most of the problems end up looking like nails. I think that is one of the difficulties we had in approaching Iraq, that we thought we could solve certain basic political problems through the use of hard power without recognizing that the reconstruction of political authority was central to the aims that we wanted to achieve, and that we did not really have the tools to do that. That is why, in this part of the world, we are going to have to use different kinds of instruments. We have made the beginnings of an adjustment already in Iraq, where we have realized that this is a genuine counterinsurgency war. In this kind of a struggle, the overuse of hard power is almost always counterproductive because the central struggle is really that there are bad guys that have to be killed, captured, or neutralized, but who are swimming in large populations of people that are potentially enemies, potentially friends, or potentially undecided. And if you do not wage a political struggle for the hearts and minds of those broader populations you are going to lose the broader struggle. It really requires a very different set of policy instruments to deal in that kind of world. East Asia does not follow this model. Japan, China, Korea, the states of Southeast Asia are all classic, centralized, relatively strong states with a couple of exceptions, and the old rules apply much better in that part of the world. But with the broader Middle East, we should have learned several important lessons about the way that politics operate there. The lessons affect every one of the four elements of the Bush Doctrine ­the threat,

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preemption, unilateralism, and democracy. The administration, after September 11th, took an extremely dire view of the threat posed by radical Islamism. President Bush has compared the struggle that we are currently involved in to the struggles against Hitler's Germany or global communism. One of the problems is that the fundamental analysis about how deep and dangerous the threat is, was considerably overstated. It was not an existential threat for the future of Western civilization. There was a discussion about the nature of the threat that got truncated too early. Right after September 11th everybody asked the question: why do they hate us? "They" being the people who had perpetrated the attacks. There were two answers that were given: one was that they hate us for who we are, and they have this fundamental hatred of Western values, and the other was that they just do not like American foreign policy. The one that President Bush finally chose was the former. He said in speeches on a number of occasions that terrorists hate freedom and that this is a fundamental fight over freedom. But the problem is that the answer depends on who the antecedent to the "they" is: if the "they" is the actual Al-Qaeda jihadists who organized September 11th and all of the other attacks since then, that is probably a fair assessment. But if the "they" refers to the broader Arab and Muslim populations in the countries of the broader Middle East, then the answer is really not so clear. There is a fair amount of evidence that indicates that the abysmally low popularity ratings of the United States in that region do not arise from the fact that large numbers of people hate American values, but rather that they do not like American foreign policy. They do not like the fact that we invaded Iraq, they do not like what they regard as our one-sided support for Israel, they do not like basing American forces in the Persian Gulf. But it is not a fundamental clash of values. Therefore it reinforces the contention that in a certain sense the antiAmericanism that has been generated in

that part of the world can be dealt with most effectively not through force. Of course you have to kill, capture, and neutralize the people who genuinely hate freedom, but again you are dealing in this broader world where your behavior in the short run will very much affect the willingness of the broader populations to help or support the really hardcore and very dangerous people. So again, the hearts and minds component of dealing with this threat is very important. To treat it primarily as a war that is fought through military means is an error. The "war on terrorism" is going to look like a police and intelligence operation, not like a war. The second lesson I would draw from the past few years is that preventive war cannot be the basis of American nonproliferation policy. The Bush Doctrine emphasized preemption in a perfectly logical manner. With a stateless group, you cannot use deterrents and containment because they have no return address, and therefore the tools that we used during the Cold War are not adequate: you have to go out and get them before they get you. And that logic is pretty iron-tight. The United States invaded Afghanistan on that ground, to stop these people who had attacked us once and would attack us again, and everybody accepted the legitimacy of that type of preemption. The problem was that this tool of preemption was used for a different policy purpose, which was to deal with a different foreign policy problem: the rogue state proliferation problem. It is potentially more dangerous because you are talking about nuclear proliferation, but because the potential proliferators--the famous Axis of Evil, Iraq, Iran, and North Korea--are states, they are susceptible to a kind of deterrence calculation. Even if their foreign policies seem in some respects pretty crazy, states have a very different calculus when it comes to the use of nuclear weapons. The rogue state problem and the Al-Qaeda terrorist problem were all mixed together into a single threat. The use of preemption was directed against that second 17

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category of problems, and it actually made the problem worse. The administration hoped that by preemptively invading Iraq it would raise the potential costs of proliferation so high that North Korea and Iran would not think of doing it. That may have happened in the case of Libya but North Korea and Iran accelerated their nuclear programs once it was clear that we were bogged down in Iraq, because for them, perfectly rationally, if you want to avoid being invaded by the United States and having your regime changed, you need a nuclear weapon. Iran's motive for wanting a nuclear weapon is real and strategically easy to understand. So we did not solve the nonproliferation problem in this manner, and I do not believe that as a general policy, preventive war can be used. The third lesson that we should have learned from the experience of the last few years is that one needs to deal with this series of foreign policy challenges in a much more multilateral way. At this point, it is not even worth making the argument, since the Bush administration itself has now agreed with this. If you look at the way they handled North Korea and Iran in the last four years, it is much more multilateral. It is important to understand what the fundamental problem was. In the 1990s the UN and the Europeans collectively failed to solve the problem in the Balkans. That experience forms the backdrop for the Bush administration deciding not to bother with what they saw as defective institutions that could not provide either legitimacy or an effective basis for dealing with terrorism, human rights violations, refugees, any of the problems that the world faces in security terms. They went to the opposite extreme in terms of coalitions of the willing, and they got into trouble because the United States simply could not handle the problem all by itself. But there was also this deeper problem that nobody adequately appreciated in the earlier part of the decade, which was that we were flying into this big headwind of antiAmericanism that is simply a structural feature of the world today. It did not begin with the 1

Bush administration, it was already emerging in the Clinton years. The reason is straightforward: because of the disproportionate influence that the United States has exercised (militarily, culturally, economically, politically) it sets up this position of non-reciprocity. That is to say, that we can turn over a regime eight thousand miles away basically without breaking a sweat, but other countries cannot do the same to us. Or that we make economic policy decisions that are very consequential to other countries and may lead to a world financial crisis, but the rest of the world does not have a reciprocal degree

of influence. This started in economic issues in the Clinton administration, where many close European allies greatly resented what they regarded as an American-orchestrated globalization that they felt was designed to undermine their own welfare state and social protection mechanisms. So already you had anti-globalization protests outside American borders with globalization seen as the cutting edge of American global hegemony. The Bush people only shifted that argument into the military security realm, where they ran into the same kind of anti-Americanism. The structural basis of that anti-Americanism is something that any future administration is going to have to take into account. Because it is structural ­as long as you are powerful you are going to be resented--the way you exercise that power at the margin can make a big difference with regard to how willing people will be to legitimate what you do and to cooperate with you.

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The final lesson has to do with the role of democracy promotion and the idealistic agenda of American foreign policy. President Bush was not the first president to talk about democracy promotion. Certainly since Woodrow Wilson this idealistic component has been part of the rhetoric of virtually every American administration. But President Bush raised democracy promotion to a very different position in American foreign policy. In his second inaugural address, he talked about democracy as the basis of America's "Grand Strategy." It was not about aircraft carriers or nuclear weapons or army divisions, it was all about the lack of democracy, particularly in the Arab world, being the deep rooted cause for terrorism, and therefore the need to promote democracy in that part of the world as a means of getting at the underlying causes of everything that had happened since September 11th. That was in itself a wrong analysis, but this strong connection between democracy promotion and American strategic interest had a disastrous effect both for American foreign policy and for the cause of democracy around the world. It made us look hypocritical. No sooner did that second inaugural get delivered than you get the election of Hamas, the election of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the Muslim brothers doing well in Egypt, a whole series of Islamists using democratic elections to come to power, and the administration immediately backed off this emphasis on democracy. If you go to the Middle East right now and try to talk about American ideals of human rights, this coming on top of Guantanamo Bay and prisoner abuse, people will simply laugh at you. Certainly that perception was very much fortified by this close union between strategic interest and democracy. The truth is that the United States is a great power with interests in oil and security and supporting allies; it is never the case that democracy promotion will ever be the single most important goal that Americans pursue at the expense of those other things. But by promoting democracy promotion to that

extent, you expose the inevitable hypocrisy. It is also not good for the cause of promoting democracy on the ground. The administration is so unpopular in the Middle East that a lot of democratic groups there are simply not willing to take American money for fear of being tainted. Congress, about two years ago, appropriated 75 million dollars to support pro-democratic groups in Iran and not a penny of that money has been spent because it is too dangerous for anyone to accept it. This component of American foreign policy has been quite problematic. Turning now to some of the changes that need to be made: firstly, we need to talk about the threat quite differently. We need to change the conduct of the war on terrorism in ways that make it look more like a global counterinsurgency or police operation rather than an act of war. In terms of the hearts and minds campaign there is another important component that is missing in our foreign policy and needs to be there. I think that you need more social work in foreign policy. If you look at the groups that are most hostile towards the United States ­Hezbollah, Hamas, the people who voted for Ahmadinejad in Iran, or people who voted for Hugo Chavez or Evo Morales--in many cases, the basis for their support of these leaders is not foreign policy or anti-Americanism, but the social agendas of these groups. Their political parties are directly delivering social services like schools and clinics and other social needs. One of the big problems in American foreign policy is that this social component that appeals to poorer populations in developing countries has been missing from our rhetoric and from the panoply of things that we have to offer the rest of the world. Our foreign policy has been largely built on democracy promotion and free trade as an engine to economic growth. There is nothing wrong with that agenda. Those are good things in themselves and they fit with American values, but they really do not appeal, in many countries, to poor and excluded people. They tend to appeal more to better19

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educated middle classes. One of the reasons the United States has been losing influence in all of Latin America and particularly in the Andean countries is that we have not been seen as offering anything in the social realm, or anything to deal directly with problems of poverty or social exclusion. One of the issues that we are going to have to address is how the American government can actually change that. The final big issue is implementation. One of the really distressing things about the way that the American government has worked over the past seven years is the sheer level of incompetence at administering policies. You invade Iraq but you do not plan for the aftermath, you are in a counterinsurgency war but the military does not admit this for two or three years, you actually go through two big reorganizations of the federal government and of the intelligence community and homeland security, and both make things worse rather than better. There are a lot of cases where our bureaucracies and our agencies are unable to deliver the goods. We need to think about how to strengthen the soft power instruments that are available to us. The funding part of it is good: the one area where the administration does not get nearly enough credit is in foreign aid (general levels of spending on foreign assistance have gone way up). The problem is not resources; the problem is that our current institutional structure is not good at translating those dollars into real results on the ground. To take an example, the coordination of nation-building in Iraq was a disaster. There were some efforts to create an office of a special coordinator to deal with this in the State Department, it did not get funded, and now the Pentagon is basically taking over these civilian kinds of functions, which is not an ideal function. You get a lot of micromanagement of money from Washington, which must be unwound and redone in the next administration. We are going to switch our attention to another part of the world, because while 20

we have been preoccupied with terrorism and the Middle East, we have got this really big set of issues in East Asia that have to do with the rise of China and how to think about it and how to deal with it. I am not convinced that Osama bin Laden and his friends are going to be around in twenty five years, but China is going to be there and they are going to have a lot more power, as will India and others in that part of the world. If you look at the history of rising powers, it does not give you a lot of confidence, because there are plenty of cases where the international system has not dealt well with new powers. The classic case of this was Germany after German unification in 1871, where the mishandling of the emergence of this new, very large power in the center of Europe by England and France set the stage for World War I. The only case where there has been a graceful accommodation of a rising power was Britain accommodating the rise of the United States, as the U.S. emerged as a global naval power in the twentieth century. We peacefully displaced Britain in that role. We have been hoping that the problem will be solved by China becoming a democracy, because there is an argument, supported by a certain amount of data, that democracies do not fight one another, and that the real problem with China is the fact that it is run by an authoritarian Communist party. I think that there is actually very little chance, in the short run, meaning in the next ten or fifteen years, that China will democratize. People say that economic development brings pressure for democratization, because you have a new rising middle class that owns property and therefore wants a share of political power in order to get the government to protect that new wealth. That is a decent argument if the majority of citizens consider themselves middle class and own property. But China's development is very uneven: its Gini Coefficient has gone up by about ten points over the last twenty years. The top 10% in China earn nineteen times that of the bottom 10%. So there are two or three hundred million people who have benefited

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tremendously from China's modernization, but an awful lot of people in the countryside who have been left behind. Everything that I have seen suggests that none of those new elites in China really want democracy in the short run, because they know that it will release demands for redistribution, and they will not be able to protect their gains in that situation. When China becomes a much richer country, and when that number left in the countryside is down to 20%, which is more like where South Korea and Taiwan were in the 1980s, then there will be pressure for democracy. China may be the first country that democratizes because of environmental concerns. China is poisoning itself; it is like an early-stage capitalist country where developers and companies and local governments are all colluding to deprive people of property and violating the country's own labor and environmental laws. The only way that you solve these issues politically is by having more democratic participation from the grassroots. But this is a development that will not solve the problem of a rising China for another generation. In Asia, the basic choices have to do with an institutional security architecture that is put in place. In the period right after 1945, the "wise men" of American post-war policy thought in institutional terms. Their most enduring legacy were things like BrettonWoods, NATO, the United Nations, and the U.S.-Japan security alliance. All of these institutions are still in place and they still structure the ways in which countries interact. Apart from the WTO, there has been very little top-level institutional creativity exercised in this administration. Their Asia policy has been extremely pragmatic and not architectural, it has not been thinking about long-term institutions. In the case of managing China, that is important; the real issue that everybody would like to know is, as China gets more powerful and commands a greater and greater share of global GDP, are its ambitions going to expand, or will it become a stakeholder in international institutions and modify is objectives? This is the great hope of

liberal internationalism. People come at this problem with preconceived notions. They are either realists or liberal internationalists, and assume an answer. It is going to be hard to tell; it would be hard to imagine China not having greater ambitions once they become very powerful. But it is also the case that one of the reasons people accept international rules is that it is in their self-interest to do so. Right now, China is all over sub-Saharan Africa, all over Latin America, in search of energy, commodities and raw materials and shipping it to ports in China, under a fairly cynical principle of respect for sovereignty. You do not complain about the way anyone governs their own people, you just do business with them. What they are finding is that they are getting a lot of pushback. When you put in an energy project that generates local backlash and guerillas shooting at your workers, as has happened with the Chinese energy investment in Sudan, then perhaps a more politically sensitive approach to these problems might be in order. There needs to be in Asia careful attention to whether there are institutional arrangements for making sure that nationalism between Japan, China, and Korea does not get out of hand. Channels of communication, institutionalized ways of doing business in terms of investment and trade, should be established now. This is the time to do it; the time when it is not going to work is when China is as powerful as the United States. This is the time when it is necessary to develop certain habits of interacting and certain channels of communication. Unfortunately, there are other parts of the world we have not touched on: Africa, Latin America. Everybody wants to come up with a grand, overarching strategy like containment to deal with the next generation of problems in foreign policy. That is a fundamental mistake, and a mistake that the next administration should be aware of and an agenda that whoever occupies the White House next will have to think through.

Photos courtesy of Francis Fukuyama and U.S. Military

Volume 2| Issue 1


The Hippie and the Snake-Eater

Masters Candidate, Security Policy Studies Analyst, defense consulting firm in Northern Virginia

The Role of Interagency Cooperation in Twenty-First Century Security Affairs

David Lin George Washington University, 2010

An early-2008 Foreign Policy index found that 88% of active and retired American servicemen and women agree that the war in Iraq has stretched the United States military dangerously thin.1 Another 60% think that the US military today is weaker than it was five years ago. 74% of those surveyed hold low regards for the civilian leadership expressing that civilian policymakers set unreasonable goals for the US military to accomplish. With current military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan serving as backdrops, these inflections serve as the basis of a much-needed conversation on the evolving roles and responsibilities of civilian and military agencies in the post-conflict environment. The immediate solutions to the military's frustrations have been logical if not only reactionary or temporary stopgaps. If the military is stretched too thin, then expand it. Over the next five years there will be substantial increases in the Army and Marine Corps by as much as over 90,000 troops.2 If the military is weakening, then strengthen it. The President's 2008 defense budget pushes defense spending to levels not seen since the Reagan Administration, bringing with it a slew of new military hardware meant to keep the US military on the cutting edge of technology and flexible in the face of emerging threats. If the military is lacking comprehensive training and doctrine to combat insurgencies, then revise doctrine. In December 2007, the US Army and Marine Corps revamped their Counterinsurgency Field Manual, the first time in over two decades either service had published a field manual devoted to counterinsurgency.3 The next President of the United States will face a dynamic range of transnational threats that will likely make us rethink the way modern wars are fought. From terrorism and counterinsurgency to combating the spread of weapons of mass destruction, from illicit trafficking of drugs, people, and guns back to traditional conventional warfare with rising superpowers such as China and Russia, the United States must maintain a variety of diplomatic and military responses at its disposal. As emerging threats in the twenty-first century appear to be rooted at the nexus of security and development, a single-sided military solution cannot fully resolve a multi-dimensional problem. There is a need to develop a more comprehensive civil-military approach to combating terrorism, insurgency, and asymmetric warfare, something that has not fully materialized on the strategic or on the operational level. In order to do this, there is a need to tear down the stereotypes and reintroduce the hippie (statesmen) to the snake-eater (soldier).

Civilian, Soldier

In November 2007, a United States Cabinet-level official presented a compelling case for an increase in State Department funding during a speech in Kansas. The official pointed out how $700 billion circulates through the Pentagon whereas a meager $35 billion is spent on the State Department ­ the same amount the Pentagon spends on healthcare alone. The official went on to highlight how

only 6,600 Foreign Service officers serve in 265 posts around the world ­ less than the number of military personnel serving on just one US Navy aircraft carrier strike group. Furthermore, the official pointed out that the US Agency for International Development has seen a debilitating drop in number of staff, from 15,000 during Vietnam, to about 3,000 in the 1990s and now is faced with a workforce of which 30% are eligible to retire.


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Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, however was not the one to deliver these staggering numbers. Instead, the uncanny proponent of stronger State Department funding was none other than Robert Gates, the US Secretary of Defense.4 Secretary Gates'speech reveals not only the dire need for ramped up State Department involvement in stability operations, but symbolizes perhaps an long-needed reach across the cultural divide between the State Department and the Pentagon, bringing a connection between traditional adversaries in the political-military realm. Secretary Gates would go on to say, "I am here to make the case for strengthening our capacity to use soft power and for better integrating it with hard power" drawing a clear recognition that the military alone cannot stabilize a country on the verge of collapse, and that there needs to be a balance between soft power (diplomacy) and hard power (military force) in order to form an effective stabilization effort in a post-war environment. Indeed, this is one of the major lessons learned in Iraq and Afghanistan. As the United States continues its efforts to stabilize Iraq and Afghanistan and looks toward developing better approaches to trouble spots around the world, it is now faced with a dilemma within its military and civilian ranks ­ how to balance civilian expertise and military brawn in stability operations. In October 2007, the United States Department of State announced that it would direct Foreign Service Officers (FSO) to deploy to Iraq as a result of fifty vacant posts in the US Embassy in Baghdad.5 If volunteers failed to fill the gap, the Department would fill the posts through directed or mandatory assignments. The American Foreign Service Association, representing 26,000 retired and active State Department personnel serving worldwide responded in protest: "We believe...that directing unarmed civilians who are untrained for combat into a war zones should be done on a voluntary basis."6 The idea of directed assignments to Iraq was something that had

not been implemented by the Department since the Vietnam War and generated heated debate in a town hall-style forum organized by senior State Department officials provoking one officer to comment that being deployed to Iraq was "as good as a death sentence." Across the Potomac at the Pentagon, a different story was taking shape. Leaders of the military services were struggling to justify massive expenditures on combat systems that appeared to remain focused on conventional warfare. Large defense projects ranging from the F-22 Raptor to the Zumawalt-class destroyer were facing criticism and resistance due to their decreasing relevance in the face of land-based unconventional adversaries. The military balance was tilting heavily in favor of unconventional and more flexible land-based military technologies with a focus on asymmetric warfare. As violence in Iraq continued to increase and while political pressure grew stronger for a change of course, the Bush Administration decided to deploy an additional 20,000 troops to Iraq as apart of a troop"surge"to bolster security and combat the insurgency. As the intensity of the insurgency in Iraq continued to fluctuate, soldiers on the ground found themselves conducting an array of tasks beyond traditional war fighting. War fighting became less and less like the war they had trained for ­ soldiers were patrolling the streets, conducting house-to-house raids, mediating local disputes, and training Iraqi police and soldiers. Soldiers undertook development and infrastructure projects, paving roads, restoring basic utilities, and building schools. Troops quickly discovered that they were doing much more than fighting an insurgency; they were in fact, nation building. Where civilian capabilities dwindled, the Defense Department filled the gap by default, taking on many of the reconstruction and governance duties. By virtue of being a deployment and recruitment-based organization centered on training and force projection, the Pentagon mobilized to 23

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compensate for inadequate civilian capacity or capabilities. However, the deficiency in civilian agencies' ability to deploy the needed expertise and personnel into the field of operations has also adversely affected the military's mission. It has expanded the military's mission substantially as soldiers have been forced to take on tasks such as economic reconstruction, judicial reform, and political mediation ­ things that have been traditionally outside the scope of the military's realm of war-fighting.7 The civilian gap has resulted in an extension the duration of the military's mission, compounding problems of readiness, force allocation, force rotation, and ultimately, combat readiness for future conflicts.8 In Secretary Gates' words: "Our brave men and women in uniform have stepped up to the task, with field artillerymen and tankers building schools and mentoring city councils ­ usually in a language they don't speak. They have done an admirable job...but it is no replacement for the real thing ­ civilian involvement and expertise."9

crisis, recognizes the importance of microlevel strategic communication ­ ensuring that the true intentions and goals of the US government in the field is not misinterpreted in any way on the tactical level. The NLSC is also just one component of President Bush's National Security Language Initiative (NSLI), a nationwide effort to expand language education from primary education through professional development. Both NLSC and NSLI recognize the importance of language skills in US security interests and how "deficits in foreign language learning and teaching negatively affect our national security, diplomacy, law enforcement, intelligence communities and cultural understanding."12

Crisis Spurs Innovation

The call for federal agencies to act has not entirely fallen on deaf ears. In early 2005, a new standing Task Force for Financial Reconstruction and Stabilization was created at the Department of Treasury to lend expertise in economic development to the war effort.10 As apart the roll out of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Afghanistan in 2005, the Department of Agriculture deployed a mix of veterinarians, soil specialists, food safety experts, and an array of other specialists as apart of the PRTs to focus on agricultural development projects.11 From the Defense Department's Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) in 2006, two civilian-centric national security concepts were proposed: the Civilian Linguist Reserve Corps and a National Security Officer Corps. The Civilian Linguist Reserve Corps, a network of volunteer linguistic experts that would respond at a time of national or international 24

Another proposal set forth by the QDR that has yet to gain traction is the National Security Officer Corps (NSOC), a self prescribed "interagency cadre of senior military and civilian professionals able to effectively integrate and orchestrate the contribution of individual government agencies".13 Interestingly, Foreign Policy's survey among members of the US armed services (cited earlier in this paper) assesses that few military personnel see the need of such a contingent. In fact, when given the choice to pick two things "[The US military] must do to prepare for the threats and challenges of the 21st century," developing a "cadre of operational, deployable civilian experts" ranked as the least important with increasing the size of the ground forces as the most important.14 In addition, the NSOC sounds heavily reminiscent of the US National Security

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Council, which was established to, "[serve] as the President's principal arm for coordinating [national security and foreign policies] among various government agencies."15 In fact, one of the central recommendations to a report sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations is to have stability and reconstruction policy indoctrinated into the NSC in order to formally coordinate the interagency process.16 On the State Department side of things however, the idea of a "cadre of operational, deployable civilians" is gaining momentum. In August 2004, the State Department created the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (CRS), one of the first major institutional changes to come from post-conflict Iraq and Afghanistan. Since its creation, CRS has been tasked with being the lead civilian office in coordinating stabilization and reconstruction operations and has made proposals to answer the call for a more deployable civilian capability to warinflicted areas, one of the proposals being a three-tiered Civilian Response Corps.17 The Civilian Response Corps (CRC) would ultimately be composed of a small active response corps consisting of 250 civilian personnel being pulled from an array of federal agencies with the ability to deploy within 72 hours of a military deployment. The initial deployment could be as long as one-year. The standby and reserve corps, the second and third tier of the total force that would consist of upwards of 4,000 civilians combined, would be deployable within weeks and would tap into the resources of the private sector as well as other branches of the US government. The CRC concept seeks to fill the gap in civilian presence and expertise in crisis areas in post-conflict stability and development activities. Debatably, the lawlessness that immediately followed the fall of the Saddam regime in Iraq could have been avoided if a robust contingent of civilian governance and rule of law experts were present to help the society transition and stabilize from war to peace. On March 5 2008, the US House of

Representatives passed the Reconstruction and Stabilization Civilian Management Act, which was the first step in moving towards the real establishment of such a force.

Interagency on the Operational Level

The Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) provoked much controversy when it was first fielded in June 2005, but proves itself as a useful and weather-tested civil-military interagency model on the operational level. While the structure and organization of PRTs in Iraq and Afghanistan have varied, their core mission has remained the same, centered on governance, reconstruction, and security mission areas. The PRT's governance mission involves improving the ability for provincial and even municipal governments to restore the rule of law and return to providing basic services. One study drew a direct correlation between basic services and violence and its conclusion was quite simple: areas that lacked basic utilities such as water, electricity, or sewage treatment, gave rise to higher levels of violence.18 The other part of the governance mission concerns establishing the rule of law. Indeed soon after the fall of the Saddam regime, reports of theft and robbery consumed the country-side, depriving Iraqi civilians the sense of basic human security. The lack of both basic services and basic legal frameworks of governance were attributed for fueling the insurgency after the fall of Baghdad. PRTs' second mission sought to undertake reconstruction projects such as building local schools and clinics to fuel social and economic development. Flexibility in micro-level funding, quickly became an issue, further complicated by interagency administrative hurdles and staffing issues. The PRT's security mission evolved as the PRT's organizational structure evolved. In Afghanistan, PRTs are primarily military units, responsible for providing their own security and force protection. In Iraq, however, PRT security is the responsibility for either the 25

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Brigade Combat Team in which the PRT is embedded, or whatever military force's area of operation the PRT is operating in. What has remained consistent in the three PRT models, however, is that conducting military operations or military assistance is not apart of the PRT portfolio. Even while the PRT may be commanded by a military office, embedded with a military unit, or have armed military personnel as apart of it, the core PRT mission is development ­ political, economic, and physical development. Three distinct types of PRTs have formed since the formal launch of the operations in 2005: the Afghanistan PRT, first-generation Iraq PRT, and the secondgeneration Iraq embedded PRT model.19 The Afghanistan PRT model was first deployed in June 2005 in close collaboration with the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. A total of twenty-two PRTs were deployed, thirteen under US command, nine under ISAF control. These eighty-man teams were mostly composed of military personnel specializing in civil affairs and force protection and commanded by an Army Lieutenant Colonel. Only three civilians were apart of this model ­ one from the State Department, USAID, and US Department of Agriculture (USDA) respectively. In November 2005, the US deployed ten PRTs to Iraq, this time under civilian control, led by Senior Foreign Service officers. The PRTs were similar in size as the Afghanistan PRTs, though they were comprised mostly of civilian rather than military personnel. The civilian component had representation from USAID, USDA, Department of Justice, and other cultural and linguistic specialists. The military component was slightly more refined, with a deputy leader, civil affairs soldiers, and a representative from the Army Corps of Engineers. In January 2007, ten new PRTs were deployed in Iraq as apart of President Bush's "New Way Forward" strategy. Once again, a State Department official led the PRT, however, 26

the State Department official would closely coordinate actions with a four-member core group that includes a representative from USAID, Army Civil Affairs, and a cultural advisor. Personnel from the National Guard or Army Reserve man the other civilian positions. The major new concept introduced in these PRTs is that they are "embedded" with a Brigade Combat Team, which also provides security for the PRT. All in all, PRTs have proven to be perhaps one of the most innovative civilmilitary concepts to emerge in the wake of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. The PRT concept has called on typically domestic-focused federal agencies, once far removed from any war effort, to not only make foreign policy recommendations, but also deploy specialists on the ground into war zones. The PRT has also seen State Department Foreign Service officers deployed in virtual war zones, working alongside their military counterparts. PRTs have demonstrated at least the initial ability for the interagency process and civil-military integration to work relatively coherently on a tactical level. With the presence of civilian specialists, PRTs are able to undertake a fullspectrum approach to the conflict, helping to achieve stability through force and security fused with economic development and political reconciliation.

Interagency on the Strategic Level

The US Government must start developing a more unified and preventive strategy that will prepare it for emerging security challenges that utilize a multidimensional approach, finding a balance between conventional and unconventional military capability and also military and civilian capacity. While there still lacks a unified and integrated interagency doctrine, the concept of Security Cooperation, formally adopted within the Defense Department in 2001, can serve as a useful template in which to develop a more coherent and directed interagency framework. Joint Publication 3-0 defines

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security cooperation as20:

All the Department of Defense (DoD) interactions with foreign defense establishments to build defense relationships that promote specific US security interests, develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational opeations, and provide US forces with peacetime and contingency across to a Host Nation. Joint actions such as nation assistance to include foreign internal defense, security assistance, and humanitarian and civic assistance; antiterrorism; DoD support to counterdrug operations; and arms control are applied to meet military engagement and security cooperation objectives. Security Cooperation is a key element of global and theater shaping operations and a pillar of WMD nonproliferation.

While based around the idea of peacetime military engagement, Security Cooperation is a useful strategic tool that can enhance civil-military cooperation as well as interagency coordination, making the national security organization as a whole better prepared for stability operations, such as those currently underway in Iraq and Afghanistan. Joint Publication 3-0 brings about the range of activities that require not just interagency coordination, but international cooperation, which brings a whole other dimension to the concept unity of effort. From emergency preparedness to enforcing sanctions, from border security to counterinsurgency, Joint Publication 3-0 reviews just some of the military operations other than war that can benefit from strong international partnerships. The purpose of Security Cooperation is to not only build alliances, but also shape the broader politicalmilitary environment. At the core of Security Cooperation is the idea of utilizing the Defense Department's diverse interactions with foreign defense establishments, such as combined exercises, combined training, combined education, military-to-military contacts, and information

exchange.21 The importance of these diverse interactions with foreign establishments as prescribed by Security Cooperation can be easily related to those with domestic establishments as an effort to bolster the interagency process. Activities such as field exercises, combined training, education, and meetings between civilian and military agencies would help overcome hurdles currently hindering the domestic interagency process, making the concept of Security Cooperation useful not only in shaping foreign alliances, but also domestic partnerships. Regular field or tabletop exercises between Department of State Foreign Service Officers and Army officers would enable them to understand their respective professional cultures and decision-making processes. Encouraging Department of Agriculture and Department of Treasury personnel to take substantive classes in foreign affairs at State Department's Foreign Service Institute or the National Defense University would enable them to contextualize their work in the bigger global picture. Developing online regional or functional information sharing databases would facilitate a more open dialogue and exchange of ideas without even having to leave the office. The newly created US Africa Command, or AFRICOM, launched in February 2007, attempts to incorporate this spirit of interagency security cooperation into its organizational structure. According to the website, this new ambitious combatant command will seek State Department and USAID personnel to be among its ranks, while encouraging partner nations, international organizations, and non-governmental organizations to work alongside US staff on shared objectives.22 Only time will tell if the US Africa Command can mobilize its soft-power approach in an effective and productive way. Conclusion. The same way 9/11 opened the United States' eyes to global terrorism and religious extremism, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have opened the United 27

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States eyes to the importance of developing a balanced approach to war and viewing conflict as a multi-dimensional process ­ one that cannot be resolved by force alone and one that cannot be dealt with by one agency or even necessarily one country alone. The US Government is beginning to see a new kind of `revolution in military affairs.' The US military and civilian agencies have made significant steps towards bridging the cultural divide but more must be done. While both State and Defense Departments have made commendable first steps in striking a balance in hard versus soft power, military versus civilian roles, there remains a need for strong leadership in interagency efforts, operationally and strategically. Provincial Reconstruction Teams serve as a useful interagency and civil-military model on the operational level, demonstrating the ability to address multiples sides of a conflict. Security Cooperation marks an important strategic development in defense strategy, and serves as a good point of reference by which to shape

a more coherent interagency framework. As with all new initiatives, there will be challenges ahead. Bolstering interagency efforts will be a long and arduous process, one that will require persistent political will, clear vision, and likely span several Presidential Administrations. The effort will call for innovation, institutional soul-searching, and a frame of mind where hard power and soft power are not mutually exclusive. The military force should remain rooted in effectively conducting war-fighting operations in pursuit of military objectives. The diplomatic corps should likewise continue concentrating on representing and defending US interests abroad. However, both sides of the house ­ civilian and military ­ should be prepared, able, and willing to cooperate as a unified force in countering the emerging threats of the twenty-first century problems. For in the final analysis, multi-dimensional problems require equally multi-dimensional solutions. It will be imperative for the next Administration to recognize that.


"U.S. Military Index". Foreign Policy Magazine March/April 2008: 70-80. 2 Tyson, Ann Scott. "Bush's Defense Budget Biggest Since Reagan Era." The Washington Post 6 February 2007. A06. 10 March 2008 <http://www.>. 3 Gordon, Michelle. "Army, Marine Corps unveil counterinsurgency field manual" US Army News 15 December 2006. 18 October 2008. <http://www.> 4 Gates, Robert. "Landon Lecture at Kansas State University" Manhattan, Kansas (26 November 2007). Retrieved on 10 March 2008. <http://www.>. 5 DeYoung, Karen. "State Dept. To Order Diplomats To Iraq." The Washington Post 27 October 2007. A01. 10 March 2008 <http://www.washingtonpost. com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/10/26/AR2007102602417.html>. 6 Ibid 7 Murdock, Clark and Michele A. Flournoy. "Beyond Goldwater-Nichols: US Government and Defense Reform for a New Strategic Era." Washington, DC: Center for Strategic International Studies, July 2005. 8 Nash, William L. "In the Wake of War: Improving U.S. Post-Conflict Capabilities." Washington, DC: Council on Foreign Relations, July 2005. 9 Gates, Robert. "Landon Lecture at Kansas State University" Manhattan, Kansas (26 November 2007). Retrieved on 10 March 2008. <http://www.>. 10 Nash, William L. "In the Wake of War: Improving U.S. Post-Conflict Capabilities." Washington, DC: Council on Foreign Relations, July 2005. 11 Perito, Robert. "The US Experience with Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan: Lessons Identified." Washington, DC: US Institute of Peace, October 2005. 12 Powell, Dina and Barry Lowenkron. "Briefing on National Security Language Initiative." US Department of State.Washington, DC: 5 January 2006. 13 "Quadrennial Defense Review Report." US Department of Defense. 6 February 2006: 78-79. 14 "U.S. Military Index". Foreign Policy Magazine March/April 2008: 70-80. 15 "The White House." National Security Council. 9 March 2008. The White House. <> 16 Nash, William L. "In the Wake of War: Improving U.S. Post-Conflict Capabilities." Washington, DC: Council on Foreign Relations, July 2005: 11. 17 Wright, Robin. "Civilian Response Corps Gains Ground" The Washington Post 15 February 2008. A19. 11 March 2008. <http://www.washingtonpost. com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/02/14/AR2008021403433.html?nav=rss_politics> 18 Chiarelli, Peter W. and Patrick Michaelis. "Winning the Peace: the Requirement for Full-Spectrum Operations." Military Review July/August 2005: 417.Ibid. 19 Perito, Robert. "The US Experience with Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq and Afghanistan." Washington, DC: Testimony before the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. 18 October 2007. 20 Joint Publication 3-0. US Department of Defense. February 2008. 21 Reighard, Robert. "Security Cooperation Integrating Strategies to Secure National Goals." Carlisle, PA: US Army War College Strategy Research Project, 15 March 2006. 22 "About AFRICOM," US Africa Command. 19 October 2008. <> Photo Courtesy of U.S. Military


Cornell International Affairs Review

Israel and Palestine

The Twilight of the Two State Solution

Maurice Chammah Cornell University, 2010

College Scholar Program, Near Eastern Studies and Music Intern for Rabbis for Human Rights, Jerusalem; Faculty for Israeli-Palestinian Peace Harrop and Ruth Freeman Fellow, Cornell Peace Studies Program

At a time when large scale political visions regarding the Israeli-Palestinian impasse have become subsumed by day to day concerns and a peace process losing in credibility, many Israelis and Palestinians nevertheless discuss a range of possible final statuses for their respective populations and nations. This article shows how the idea of two states living side by side has been increasingly challenged in the recent past, both by ideologies on the left and right and by "facts on the ground," leading many to consider a range of possibilities involving a single state. From the U.N. Partition Plan of 1947 through to the plans laid out at the Annapolis Conference sixty years later, plans for a "final status" have been discussed throughout academia, the world of high politics, think tanks, and between average people throughout all levels of Israeli and Palestinian societies. At the current moment, with a desperate humanitarian situation in Gaza, rocket attacks into Sderot, the expansion of Israeli settlements and the construction of the barrier in the West Bank, "final status" negotiations have come to seem frivolous as both communities descend into localized issues or ignore the conflict altogether. The purpose of this article is to assess current discourse about possibilities for a solution between the Israelis and Palestinians, and to explain several different models that have been proposed across a wide spectrum of sources. At this time there are roughly the same number of Israelis and Palestinians in the area, and I hope to show how the vision of two states living side by side, while still thriving in public discourse, has become increasingly challenged by voices throughout Palestine and in smaller sectors of Israeli society lobbying for a political future involving one state, either as a desirable outcome, or as an inevitability. My purpose is not to argue for one solution over another, as I make no great claims to what is universally desirable, but to assess a very modest portion of current discourse. David Ben-Gurion's exclamation that there can be "no solution!," adding that "we, as a nation, want this country to be ours; the Arabs, as a nation, want this country to be theirs ," finds echoes in Edward Said 1999 argument that "the conflict appears intractable because it is a contest over the same land by two peoples who always believed they had valid title to it and who hoped that the other side would in time give up or go away." As a result of this impasse, we see a striking similarity between long term visions on the part of the far left and far right political groups in both societies who desire a single state between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea. The Hamas charter and Likud platform both argue for something of a "one state solution," albeit a state cleansed of the opposing nationality (if they are even allowed the status of "nation"). There is also, however, a certain ambiguity in the ideologies of both parties. In the chapter of the Likud platform entitled "Peace and Security," the phrase claiming that the "Likud government will honor all the international agreements signed by its predecessors" is followed closely by the striking declaration that "The Government of Israel flatly rejects the establishment of a Palestinian Arab state west of the Jordan river2." Thus, the party acknowledges the possibility of its own loss in the case that another political party negotiates a solution creating a Palestinian state in the 29

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West Bank and Gaza. The Hamas charter, full of poetic language and religious invocation, does not allow this, as it renounces the ability of "any king or president" to allow any of the land, an Islamic Waqf, to be "squandered" or "given up3." At the same time, Hamas Prime Minister Ismail Haniya, was quoted immediately after his election in the Washington Post, saying "If Israel declares that it will give the Palestinian people a state and give them back all their rights, then we are ready to recognize them4." Both societies have democratically elected parties like Hamas and Likud that work towards an exclusionary state intermittently throughout the years. From the 1993 letter from PLO leader Yasser Arafat to Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin that "recognizes the right of the State of Israel to exist in peace and security5," up until the election of Hamas in 2006 and their subsequent isolation in Gaza, the official representatives of the Palestinian people have actively recognized the existence of an Israeli state. In Israel, governments dominated by Likud and its major opponent, Labor, which opposed a Palestinian state until a change in its platform in 19966, have fluctuated since Israel's birth on whether or not there should be a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza, so a temporally consistent reading of Israeli government policy is less visible. At the same time, both Israelis (a handful on the far left including historian Ilan Pappe and activist Eitan Bronstein) and Palestinians (including mainly Diaspora professors and activists like Joseph Massad and Ali Abunimah) signed the One State Declaration at a conference on the subject in November 2007. This discussion of a political future goes deeper into the issue of national identity, as it addresses the issue of Palestinian citizens of Israel, claiming that the Israeli government "denies their rights by enacting laws that privilege Jews constitutionally, legally, politically, socially and culturally" (Abunimah and Aruri 2007). Even with the establishment of a state in Gaza and the West Bank, claim the fourteen authors of the declaration, long 30

term justice for Palestinians in Israel will not exist without a challenge to the very roots of Zionism. This argument had been brought to public attention in the U.S. in articles by Tony Judt, Virginia Tilley, Edward Said, and others, and was reiterated again during the Haifa Conference for the Right of Return and Secular, Democratic State in Palestine in June 2008. This one-state vision was consigned to the margins of Palestinian society until recently, when a Haaretz article published interview material with Sari Nusseibeh, described by the Israeli newspaper as "the secular Palestinian, the symbol of moderation7." He claimed "I still favor a two-state solution and will continue to do so, but to the extent that you discover it's not practical anymore or that it's not going to happen, you start to think about what the alternatives are." Nusseibeh was answered by Israeli Knesset Member Ami Ayalon, who said "If a man like him...comes to the conclusion that the two-state solution is no longer an option, it means that the whole pragmatic Palestinian approach is crumbling." Why has the one-state model been so appealing or inevitable for these arenas of Israeli and Palestinian society? Whether viewed favorably by the Israeli right or negatively by Palestinian society, Israeli settlements in the West Bank, as they stand today, negate the ability of a future Palestinian state to be contiguous and viable. Even George W. Bush, a President with strong support for Israel, quipped in Ramallah in early 2008 that "Swiss cheese isn't going to work when it comes to the territory of a state8." The legal aspects of the settlements are the subject of much discussion, but for our purposes it is more important to show how they work against a two-state model. The demographic and geographic reasons for this are many, but a microcosmic and clear example is the planned "E-1 corridor," which would connect the city of Jerusalem to the settlement of Ma'ale Adumim, an area of 30,000 people which Israelis already consider a non-negotiable neighborhood of Jerusalem.

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The large settlement is located so far east, a short distance from the Jordan River, that the planned 12 square kilometers of E-1 would break territorial contiguity between the North and South West Bank. There would still be a possibility for "transportational connectivity9," in the words of Peace Now Settlements Watch Director Dror Etkes, but not "a continuous area in which Palestinian life ­ commerce, economy, education, health services, political activity, etc. ­ can function and flow normally, and hopefully flourish, as required for Israel's long-term security and regional stability." Furthermore, Israeli discourse of security ensures the continued expansion of the settlements, or at the very least, the maintenance of many existing settlements.

Jeffrey Helmreich from the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, following the Israeli governments' position that the West Bank is not occupied, but merely `disputed,' shows how "most settlements are concentrated in a few areas that, for security reasons, Israel cannot afford to cede10." He goes on to give the example of Ofra, a community near the military base at Baal Hatzor, which is the "location of the main early warning station for the Israeli air force." While Helmreich does not explain the need for a settled community by this military base, he implicitly suggests that if Israel allows a Palestinian state to fill out the West Bank, Israeli security will be compromised. Israeli discourse also often points to the example of the Gaza strip, which has become a security threat to Israel since settlers were removed in 2006. Another example of this was recently outlined by architect and researcher Eyal Weizmann. He gives the story of a Palestinian controlled hilltop, around which a road built for settlers curves11. Several years ago, settlers driving along this road complained that for the twenty seconds it took to curve around the hill, they lost cell phone reception. Furthermore, this was a security threat, because in the event of an attack, they would not be able to phone for help. According to Weizmann, this led the Israeli government to commission the building of a cell phone tower on top of the hill, with a guard from the Israeli Defense Forces living next to the tower. A year passed, and eventually the guard allowed other Israelis to move onto the hill, creating a small neighborhood of trailers that are generally referred to as "outposts," and which in most cases are designed to illegally expand existing settlements, but here was designed to augment the security around the cell phone tower. Thus, the need for security for existing settlements led to the building of new settlements, in a chain which one would imagine can go on indefinitely. The issues of settlement are not only geographic and military, but also economic. The settlement bloc known as Ariel sits atop 31

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an important aquifer, called the Western Aquifer Basin, that would be an important resource for the infrastructure of a Palestinian state. The settlement, which includes over 16,000 Israelis, is generally accepted as an area that would remain part of Israel in final status negotiations, but which includes vital water resources underground needed for Palestinian infrastructure. According to a Palestinian NGO, Israel controls roughly 80% of West Bank water resources, leading to a situation where the West Bank (according to the Green Line of 1967) and Israel have become increasingly intertwined with regard to resource consumption12. The level of economic integration between the West Bank and Israel goes beyond the need to share resources. At the Palestine Investment Conference, held in Bethlehem in May 2008, the Salaam Fayyad government looked at initiatives involving the growth of a tourism industry in Bethlehem and a proposed `border industrial zone' near Jenin, in the north of the West Bank. The latter has been critiqued by the Stop the Wall campaign, a Palestinian NGO who claims that "it is highly unlikely that the Israeli administration will relinquish control of the area," leading to a situation where "industries in JIE [Jenin Industrial Estate] will be highly vulnerable to changes in the political situation and dependent on the will of the Israeli administration to facilitate access to the market13." Economic integration with Israel, supported by the Fatah government in the West Bank, is becoming a more common approach to development than an approach that would lead to an autonomous, functioning Palestinian economy, which would be necessary for a second state in the region. Furthermore, it is questionable whether any Palestinian state could be initially economically self-sufficient without East Jerusalem as its focal point, as the World Bank has shown that 40% of the Palestinian economy would revolve around Jerusalem, due to the potential of the tourism industry14. In addition, according to the World Bank, "any robust recovery of the Palestinian 32

economy assumes that the Israeli labor market would be re-opened to Palestinians." Since the second intifada 2000-2002, when West Bank residents were barred from working inside Israel, no replacements in terms of employment were created in the West Bank. As a result, the economies of Israel and the West Bank were not severed in way beneficial to Palestinians, but rather immediately in a way that made them more economically dependent on Israel's markets. The growth of settlements, their permanence within Israeli discourses of security, their network of economic and infrastructural links to Israel, economic integration through development models, and resource dependence are only a few examples of a long list of integrationist policies that have led Israelis and Palestinians on both the left and right politically to see the two-state solution as nearly, or completely, untenable. It may seem a stretch for me to now explain the different models that assume the demise of a two state solution, but I aim to show what the possibilities are given the continuation of current trends regarding the settlements, economic integration, and the fulfillment of Israel's security concerns. Considering how long it has been since an Israeli leadership has offered a policy radically different from that of today, it seems likely that the two regions will continue to integrate. First, one can imagine a regional future connected to the model proposed for the Jenin Industrial Estate, in which Palestinians are economically integrated into and dependent upon Israel without political rights, autonomy, or freedom of movement. This is likely, due to the way in which freedom of movement is already restricted, and the ways in which the economy of the West Bank is tied to Israel, seen most obviously in the Israeli currency used in this region, the shekel. Arguments that this would (or even does today) resemble Apartheid as it existed South Africa are common among voices from former U.S. president Jimmy Carter to Israeli

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academic Uri Davis. These voices are met with disdain among the Israeli and American Jewish communities, but are becoming increasingly public. A much less likely scenario for the region, which nevertheless exists for political ideologies of many in both societies, is a vision in which the opposing nation simply leaves. It is implicit in the early Zionism of Theodor Herzl, who has been often quoted suggesting that "we shall try to spirit the penniless population across the border by procuring employment for it in the transit countries, while denying it employment in our country15." The power of resistance of either population to simply "leave" the area makes this situation extremely unrealistic, but it brings up the interesting issue of political representation. Writers on both sides who have voiced this opinion may recognize that the other party will not disappear, but may also recognize that they can exist without political representation. This opinion is based on the idea that to "exist" in the world, one must be politically represented and possess self-determination. It is therefore worth investigating if these fantasies of the Palestinian and Israeli far right are more about actual coexistence or political compromise. A final model for a political future, more common among Palestinians than Israelis, but discussed among Israelis on the far left like academics Ilan Pappe and Uri Davis, is for a single, binational state that is, in a sense, postZionist. In this model, discussed at length by Ali Abunimah in One Country: A Bold Proposal to End the Israeli-Palestinian Impasse, Israeli Jews and Palestinian Arabs would retain their national identities, but in a political framework that brings them together for the purpose of governance, as in Ireland, South Africa, and Belgium. This idea is viewed understandably with a great deal of resentment by Israeli Jews because it is, quite literally, a challenge to their state's existence, and perhaps by assumption their national existence. The real danger of the one-state solution, for many on both sides who do not

want a binational single state, is that it creates a zero-sum game where the final outcome is fully existential. If one gives up the idea that the two societies can live side by side, then the only options are integration or expulsion of one of the societies. This was explained by Uri Avnery, a famous ideologue of the Israeli peace movement, who said that arguing for a onestate solution "diverts the effort from a solution that has now, after many years, a broad public basis, in favor of a solution that has no chance at all16," thus alienating the Israeli public to the degree that they would again support either an Apartheid-like arrangement at best, or a forcible transfer at worst. There is a necessary divide between what a given speaker views as desirable and what he/she views as inevitable. Palestinians must assess whether they should focus on a vision of the future that is nearly impossible (two states or a completely Palestinian single state) or one that almost no Israelis, or their supporters, will agree to at any time in the near future (one, binational state). Israelis, on the other hand, are in control of the majority of the West Bank (over 50%), and so must decide whether to continue settlement expansion and the growth of the West Bank's economic links to Israel, leading to a vision that would be universally condemned (a non-democratic state with a Jewish majority), or a democratic vision undesirable to them (a state with a nonJewish voting majority). According to many, the time of possibility for a two-state solution to become a reality has not completely closed. The Geneva Initiative, encapsulated in the 2003 Geneva Accord, provides a model that many in both societies with to pursue, involving evacuation of the settlers, a sovereign Palestinian state with part of Jerusalem as its capital, and various other compromises and arrangements to achieve two states. U.S. foreign policy continues to be the greatest outside influence to the dynamics of the conflict, in both peace-making and arming roles, and while administrations under Bush, 33

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Clinton, and those who came before have publicly supported the two-state solution, they have simultaneously given the Israeli government roughly three billion dollars in aid every year that Israel does not need to account for, and can therefore put towards expanding the settlements17. Likewise, since 1982 the U.S. has vetoed 32 U.N. resolutions critical of Israel's actions, while passing bills like the Palestinian Anti-Terrorism Act of 2006, suggesting that the sole cause of conflict in the region is Palestinian violence18. Thus, public utterances may suggest an even-handed approach, but money and legislation have both shown the U.S. to favor a preservation of the status quo in Israel and the West Bank. The next administration, under Obama or McCain, will have to decide whether the status quo is indeed beneficial to America's interests. The answer may truly be that peace and two states are not America's priority, in which case their administration will support the current trend that has led many to the one-state solution. Finally, there are other models of political arrangement possible, though not

widely discussed. The most present of these is perhaps relatable to the way economic integration has accompanied national and cultural singularities in the context of the European Union. How similar or different this model is from a single binational state is too large a subject to approach here, and there are other imaginative arrangements being discussed that would allow for Israelis and Palestinians to transcend a logic of governance that has, up until now, left both without security, and one without a sovereign state. Nevertheless, imagination is going to be the crux of how to disentangle these two societies from a web of beliefs, fears, economic and geographic facts, and predictions that will only lead to more violence, and away from any solution at all.



Said, Edward. "The One-State Solution." The New York Times Magazine. 1999 January 10. < C143EF933A25752C0A96F958260> 2 "Peace and Security." Likud Party Platform. The State of Israel.1999. <> 3 The Covenant of the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas). MidEast Web Historical Documents. 18 August 1988. < hamas.htm> 4 Weymouth, Lilly. `We Do Not Wish to Through Them into the Sea': Interview with Ismail Haniya. 26 February 2006. <http://www.> 5 Arafat, Yasser. "Letter from Yasser Arafat to Yitzhak Rabin." Jewish Virtual Library. 1993 September 9. < Peace/recogn.html> 6 Greenberg, Joel. "Israeli Labor Party, in Switch, Lends Support to Palestinian State." New York Times. 1996, April 26. 7 Eldar, Akiva. `We are running out of time for a two-state solution." Haaretz. 2008 August 16.<> 8 Abu Toameh, Khaled. `Palestine Can't Be Swiss Cheese.' The Jerusalem Post. Online. 10 January 2008. e=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull&cid=1198517338431. 10 October 2008. 9 Etkes, Dror. "What is E-1?". Peace Now: Settlements in Focus. 2005 May. <> 10 Helmreich, Jeffrey. "Diplomatic and Legal Aspects of the Settlement Issue." Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs Jerusalem Issue Brief. Vol. 2, No. 16. 19 January 2003 11 Weizman, Eyal. Lecture delivered at Faculty for Israeli-Palestinian Peace Conference: The Predicament of Gaza and Palestine: US/Israeli policies and the role of Academia. 2 July 2008. 12 Water in Palestine. Palestine Monitor Factsheet. 20 August 2007. <> 13 "Development of Normalization? A Critique of West Bank Development Approaches and Projects." Stop the Wall Campaign. 14 Halper, Jeff. The End of a Viable Palestinian State. Counterpunch. 2005 March 31. <> 15 Herzl, Theodor. The Complete Diaries of Theodor Herzl. Thomas Yoseloff Ltd. 1960. p.88 16 Avnery, Uri. "The Bed of Sodom." 17 Mearsheimer, Walt, and Stephen Walt. "The Israel Lobby." The London Review of Books. Online. 23 March 2006. < .html> 10 October 2008. 18 Ibid. Photo Courtesy "Settlers Against Settlement." 16-10-2008 25 Oct 2008 <>.


Cornell International Affairs Review

The Myth of 9/11 in Latin America

Ana Isabel López García, University of Oxford

MPhil, Latin American Studies BA, International Relations, Instituto Technologico Autonomo de Mexico

It is often argued that the first and most visible impact of the terrorist attacks of 9/11 has been the reordering of Washington's priorities in its relations with Latin America. The United States (U.S.) has focused its attention outside the hemisphere and placed Latin America at the "bottom of U.S. terrorist agenda" (Youngers 2003). Various scholars argue that the U.S has returned to its ColdWar stance, in which it only notices those developments in Latin America that directly challenge U.S. interests (Hakim 2006). Accordingly, after 9/11 U.S. security demands have overshadowed other issues that Latin American countries consider priorities (Youngers 2003, 2). Susan Kauffman (2002), for instance, posits that: "once again the United States is looking at Latin America through a security lens, while Latin America wants the emphasis to remain on economic development." The effects of U.S. foreign policy towards Latin America after 9/11 have not repeated the pattern of the Cold War. Although Latin America no longer is the overriding priority of American foreign policy, the U.S. has not neglected the region, nor, as many analysts have argued (Shifter 2004; Youngers 2003; Hakim 2006; Roett 2006), has it become disengaged from the hemisphere. The terrorist attacks did not introduce a different agenda for U.S.-Latin American relations from that of the post-Cold-War period. Free trade, illegal migration and the fight against drugs have continued to be the main issues of U.S.-Latin American relations. Even the trend towards militarization of U.S. foreign policy began in Latin America long before the terrorist attacks. U.S.-Latin America relations have been affected significantly not by the consequences of 9/11, but rather by the negative effects of the U.S-promoted economic model in the region. The failures of the so-called Washington Consensus are not linked to the terrorist attacks.

Trade and Economic Aid

It can be argued that the U.S. has rewarded countries that supported its War on Terror with foreign aid and trade concessions. By contrast, it has punished and neglected the interests of those countries that have opposed this anti-terrorist campaign. Peter Hakim points out that seven out of 34 Latin American countries supported the war in Iraq, of which six (five in Central America, plus the Dominican Republic) were engaged in trade negotiations with the U.S., while the seventh, Colombia, was receiving the greatest amount of U.S.-military aid.1 Moreover, the U.S. Congress delayed the approval of a free-trade pact with Chile and terminated a migration agreement with Mexico because these nations voted against U.S. intervention in Iraq in the United Nations

Security Council. Hakim notes that the U.S. cut off foreign aid to Latin American countries that refused to exclude U.S. soldiers from prosecution before the International Criminal Court (ICC). This view, however, is not entirely accurate. The terrorist attacks have not affected U.S. trade and economic policy towards Latin America. On the one hand, although U.S. economic assistance to Latin America has decreased in the past years, this trend dates back to before the events of 9/11. U.S. economic aid to the region has declined since the early 1990s and most of it is now concentrated in Central America and the Caribbean.2 Since 1995, the European Union (EU) has displaced the U.S. as the principal donor of foreign-development assistance for Latin America (Smith 2001).3 On 35

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the other hand, trade agreements have not been subordinated to U.S. security concerns in the wake of 9/11 (Hakim 2006; Tokatlian 2003). Although Colombia has been one of Washington's most loyal allies in the War on Terror and has made important progress in containing organised crime, the U.S. Congress has not yet approved the free-trade agreement with Colombia. The free-trade pact with Colombia has faced vehement opposition from the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFLCIO), and has raised broader concerns about human rights in the country (Hakim 2008). It thus seems that cooperation with the U.S. in the post-9/11 period necessarily entails the grant of privileges or advantages.4 Since the end of the Cold War, the U.S. has viewed free trade, not economic aid, as the most effective cure for Latin American underdevelopment. Accordingly, free trade agreements do not merely expand trade, but also open the Latin American countries to foreign direct investment, promote structural reforms, accelerate growth, and, consequently, create new jobs. In practice, however, the market has proved unable to reduce levels of poverty on its own. Negotiations for a Free-Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), which was projected to be completed by 2005, have stalled. Despite this, the Bush administration has pursued a more active bilateral trade policy towards Latin America. President Bush has twice obtained the fast-track negotiating trade authority that President Clinton failed on several occasions to secure. The Bush administration has signed free-trade agreements with Chile, Peru, Panama, other Central American republics, and the Dominican Republic. It has expanded trade preferences for Andean countries, and has signed an investment agreement with Uruguay. Prior to 9/11 (using this phrasing might lead the reader to believe that 9/11 did have an effect on U.S.-Latin America relations), the U.S. had no trade agreements in Latin America, save for the North American Free 36

Trade Agreement (NAFTA). If trade agreements are considered part of U.S. assistance to Latin American development, it could be argued that the U.S. has not completely neglected Latin American development concerns in the wake of 9/11. The U.S. might be responding to Latin America's interest in placing its commodities in the American market. Many Latin American countries want to negotiate free-trade agreements with the U.S. (Hakim 2006).5 However, Latin American nations not only want free trade but also want aid for social development. This request for aid has been largely disappointed under the Bush administration, as under previous post-Cold War administrations. Clearly, U.S. economic assistance and trade policy towards Latin America has been unaffected by the terrorist attacks.

Security and Military Assistance

Militarization is a word frequently used by scholars to describe U.S.-Latin American relations in the post-9/11 period (Youngers 2003). While U.S. economic assistance has stagnated, military aid and training for the region has increased since 2000.6 Latin America currently is the second greatest recipient of U.S. military aid and training, behind Iraq.7 Undoubtedly, the balance between economic and military aid is a strong indicator of how the U.S. is projecting its power in the region and the world (WOLA 2008). Nevertheless, the increase in the scope of military aid owes little to 9/11. After the terrorist attacks, the U.S. reinforced security on its southern border and increased the amount of military aid to Mexico for homeland security purposes.8 The U.S. and Mexico have also signed several agreements to increase security along their border. In 2005, for instance, both countries signed a trilateral security agreement with Canada, known as the Alliance for Security and Prosperity in North America (ASPNA). The U.S. has also claimed that the Triple Border, shared by Paraguay,

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Brazil and Argentina, is the location of a variety of drug-trafficking, human-trafficking, and terrorist activity. The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) were active in the area, and the Lebanese Hezbollah and Palestinian Hamas also had a presence in the region (Youngers 2003; Prevost 2007). Despite this, counter-terrorist activities do not account for the trend towards militarization of U.S. policy towards the region. Unlike the Soviet Union, terrorism is a trans-national and non-state adversary. For the State Department, the term "terrorism" encompasses a broad range of illegal activities, such as drug-trafficking, illegal migration, intellectual property violations, moneylaundering, and arms-trafficking (Olson 2004; Tokatlian 2003; Youngers 2003). For the U.S., drug-trafficking revenues are a key source for financing terrorism, which affects both the U.S. and Latin American countries. In fact, Colombia's three guerrilla groups ­ the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), the National Liberation Army (ELN), and the United Self-Defence Groups of Colombia (AUC) ­ have been listed by the U.S. State Department as terrorist organisations (Youngers 2003). Although the rest of Latin America suffers from high levels of violence, there have been few U.S.-sponsored measures or programs geared towards tackling organised crime under the banner of antiterrorism. Furthermore, they represent only a small portion of overall U.S. military aid to Latin America (WOLA 2004). The militarization of U.S. foreign policy does not stem from the irrelevance of the region in the State Department after 9/11. The Pentagon has increased its role in U.S. foreign policy towards Latin America. Its leadership in foreign military and training has increased over the past years. Currently, military-aid funding to the region is not only financed from the U.S. government foreign-aid budget. The US Defence Department pays for roughly 25% of all military aid to Latin America (WOLA 2008). Scholars often cite the War on

Terror as a reason for this trend in U.S. foreign policy (Youngers 2003, 5). However, the U.S. military, especially its Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), began assuming responsibility over U.S. foreign policy tasks in Latin America during the 1980s (WOLA 2008). Currently, SOUTHCOM has more staff dedicated to Latin American issues than the Departments of State, Commerce, Treasury and Agriculture combined (Youngers 2003). SOUTHCOM has defined drug-traffickers as the greatest threat to U.S. interests in the region. In fact, 80% of U.S. military aid is allocated to anti-narcotics activities. Nevertheless, U.S. collaboration in

anti-narcotics activities in Latin America long predates 9/11 (WOLA 2004). Over the past two decades, the U.S. has provided increasing amounts of military aid and training to counter drug-trafficking in the region.9 Plan Colombia, a US$1.7 billion anti-drug program enacted by the U.S. Congress in 2000, constitutes most of the U.S. military assistance to the region.10 It is increasingly being marked as an antiterrorist initiative, but it had been launched as an anti-drug initiative prior to 9/11. In 2001 Plan Colombia was expanded as the "Andean Counter-Drug Initiative" extending its reach to other countries such as Bolivia, Ecuador, Panama, Peru and Venezuela. More recently, Plan Colombia has been renewed, and similar plans are to be applied in Central America as "Operation Enduring Friendship" and in Mexico as the "Merida Initiative".11 Mexico and Colombia have welcomed U.S. help to contain 37

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the wave of criminal violence ­ what Tokatlian (2003) calls "intervention by invitation." It could be argued that the traumatic events of 9/11 have simply reasserted non-state and transborder threats, especially drug-trafficking, as a fundamental part of the U.S. regional-security agenda. The Costs of U.S. Neglect? Several surveys show that regard for the U.S. across the region has fallen sharply over the past years. According to a Zogby poll, 87% of international opinion-leaders disapprove of Washington's foreign policy (Hakim 2008). Moreover, most opinion-leaders no longer see the U.S. as a reliable partner. A BBC poll shows that 53% of South Americans had a negative view of U.S. influence. Across the region, around 39% of Latin Americans hold an unfavourable opinion of the U.S., up from 14% in 2000 (Haugaard 2006). U.S. disregard for international precepts in its invasion of Iraq to some extent account for this fall. Latin American countries have condemned U.S. unilateral action, its campaigns to limit the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court, as well as human right abuses in Guantánamo Bay. In 2005, for instance, Washington's candidate for General Secretary of the Organization of American States, former Salvadorian president Francisco Flores, was defeated for the first time in history. At the fourth Summit of the Americas in Argentina in 2005, hostile crowds condemning both the FTAA and U.S. foreign policy greeted President Bush. Venezuela's Hugo Chávez has become the leader of the anti-American movement across Latin America. President Chávez has defied Washington on a number of issues. He has not allowed U.S. planes engaged in anti-drug activities to fly over Venezuelan territory. He has also forged closed alliances with governments hostile to the U.S. (like Fidel Castro's regime in Cuba and Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's in Iran) and drawn other Latin American countries (such as Bolivia, Ecuador and Nicaragua) into these alliances. It is also 3

said that his government is threatening U.S. security interests by supporting the FARC in Colombia and other guerrilla groups in Latin America. Declining support for the U.S. is not the result of American disengagement from the region in the aftermath of 9/11, as some authors have argued (Shifter 2004; Hakim 2006; Hakim 2008). Neither is the turn to the left and to populist politics in Latin America an unintended consequence of the Iraq invasion and the subsequent escalation of the violence (Hakim 2008).12 Defensive attitudes towards the U.S. in the region result more from the failure of the Washington Consensus to generate benefits for the region's citizens. The performance of neo-liberalism has been dismal. Around 40% of Latin Americans live in poverty, 20% in extreme poverty. The inability of the neo-liberal model to provide economic growth over the past two decades has helped to undermine U.S. support across the region. In this regard, as Lisa Hauggard (2006) points out, a negative image of the U.S. in Latin America is nothing new. Diminished support for the U.S. in the region also stems from increased economic interdependence (Muñoz 2000) and not from the Bush Doctrine (Roett 2006; Erikson 2008). As Latin American nations have opened their economies, they have become less dependent on the U.S. Since the 1990s, South American countries have expanded their diplomatic and commercial relations with extra-hemispheric powers, such as the EU and China.13 In 2006, Chile signed a free trade agreement with China, and Peru is discussing a similar accord. Even one of the most loyal allies of the U.S. in the region, Colombia, has opened negotiations with China in search of trade agreements and investment. Thus, economic interconnectedness, and not the 9/11 attacks, is the main reason why Latin American countries are enjoying a greater autonomy visà-vis the U.S than at any time during the Cold War (Castañeda 1994). As Daniel Erikson (2008) argues, "the era when the U.S. could treat Latin

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America and the Caribbean as its backyard... is receding faster into history." Conclusion After the terrorist attacks, security concerns were once again at the top of Washington's agenda for the hemisphere. Most scholars have stressed U.S. indifference towards the region in the aftermath of 9/11. With the exception of Mexico and Colombia, scholars argue that the rest of Latin America has become irrelevant for U.S. security. Yet, the region is neither a source of nor a target for international terrorism. Nevertheless, U.S.Latin American relations have not changed significantly after the terrorist attacks of 2001. The hemisphere has never been and will not be a priority of U.S. foreign policy, an effect some Latin American leaders ignored. They believed the Bush administration would define a new relationship with the region based not only on free markets but also on social aid. These expectations have remained unfulfilled. The region has not disappeared from the U.S. agenda. However, the new global threat of terrorism has not set any new agenda

for U.S.-Latin American relations. Trade, drugtrafficking and migration still dominate the agenda, and will probably continue to do so into the foreseeable future. Additionally, the militarization of the U.S. approach to the region precedes the terrorist attacks. The terrorist attacks have simply reasserted the military and security element in U.S foreign policy towards Latin America in the post-Cold War period. In this sense, there is considerable continuity in U.S.-Latin American relations before and after 9/11. How has Latin America been affected by the consequences of 9/11? As argued above, Latin America has not suffered from U.S. distraction with the War on Terror, but instead from "unrealistic expectations" of a special relation with the U.S. under the Bush administration (Shifter 2004). If Washington is losing Latin America (Hakim 2006), it is not because of its new foreign policy, but because of the long-term failure of the Washington Consensus to deliver benefits to millions of Latin Americans. This failure has generated defensive reactions against the U.S. across the hemisphere.



Since the inception of Plan Colombia, Colombia has received over US$4.4 billion in military and police aid from the U.S. In 2006, the U.S. provided close to US$800 million to the Colombian government, mostly in the form of military aid. 2 U.S. economic aid to the region, for example, dropped from US$1.8 billion in 1985 to US$687 million in 1996 (Muñoz, 2001). 3 The EU gives around US$2.2 billion per year in foreign aid to Latin America (Muñoz, 2001). 4 Similarly, an immigration reform involving Mexico was already unlikely before 9/11, thanks to U.S. domestic constraints unrelated to terrorism (Montaño, 2005). 5 The U.S. is the largest or second-largest trading partner of almost every Latin American nation. So far ten countries in Latin America have signed freetrade pacts with the U.S. (Hakim 2008). 6 During the late 1990s, U.S. military assistance to the region doubled. Since 2000, military aid has nearly equalled economic assistance (US$907.8 million in military aid, US$1.026 billion in economic assistance in 2006). The U.S. budget for 2007 includes a 17% reduction from the 2005 level of Latin American in economic-support funds (Haugaard 2006). 7 Between 1997 and 2007, the U.S. gave Latin America a total of US$7.3 billion in military and police assistance. Colombia, Bolivia, Ecuador and Mexico are among the top twelve recipients of U.S. military and police aid recipients in the world for 2005 and 2007. Colombia has been the region's number-one recipient of U.S. military assistance since the inception of Plan Colombia. It receives around 62% of U.S. total military assistance to Latin America (WOLA 2008). 8 U.S. military aid to Mexico has more than tripled over the last five years. Military assistance to Mexico has consisted mainly of provision of equipment to the Mexican military and police. 9 The level of resources spent by the US government to combat drug-trafficking in Latin America has increased nearly tenfold over the past 25 years (amounting to more than $6.5 billion since 2000) (Shifter 2007, 59). 10 Colombia produces 80% of the world's cocaine, 70% of which goes to the U.S. market. (Bouvier 2003). 11 The Merida Initiative, also known as "Plan Mexico", is a U.S.$1.4 billion aid package to combat drug-trafficking and organised crime in Mexico and Central America. During the first year, the U.S. will provide US$550 million, 500 million of which will be given to Mexico, and the rest within Central America. Currently, Mexico provides 90% of cocaine entering the U.S. market (Benítez Manaut 2007). 12 When President Bush took office, most of the region was governed by rightist pro-market rulers. During his two terms, Latin Americans have elected and/or reelected leftist governments in eight countries: Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva in Brazil in 2002 and 2007; Néstor and Cristina Kirchner in Argentina in 2003 and 2007; Tabaré Vázquez in Uruguay in 2004; Evo Morales in Bolivia in 2005; Michelle Bachelet in Chile in 2006; Rafael Correa in Ecuador in 2006; Daniel Ortega in Nicaragua in 2006; and Chávez in Venezuela in 2006. 13 China has increased its economic involvement in Latin America as it has looked abroad for raw materials to fuel its economic growth. The volume of trade between China and Latin America has grown from US$8 billion in 1999 to more than US$80 billion in 2007 (Erikson 2008; Haugaard 2006). Much of Chinese trade and investment is concentrated in Brazil, Argentina, Mexico, and Chile. It is expected that China will invest US$100 billion

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in Latin America over the next decade.


Benítez Manaut, R. "The Merida Initiative: Challenges in the Fight against Crime and Drug Trafficking in Mexico." Análisis del Real Instituto El Cano (2007): 130. Bouvier, V. M. "Colombia Quagmire: Time for U.S. Policy Overhaul." IRC Americas Program Policy Brief (2003, September). Castañeda, J. "Latin America and the End of the Cold War: An Essay in Frustation." In Latin America in a New World, Edited by A. F. Lowenthal and G. F. Treverton. Boulder: West View Press, 1994. Erikson, D. P. "Requiem for the Monroe Doctrine." Current History (2008, February): 58-64. Hakim, P. "Is Washington Losing Latin America." Foreign Affairs. (2006, January/February). ________ "Latin America: the next U.S. President's agenda." Great Decisions (2008, January): 65-76. Haugaard, L. Tarnished Image. Latin America Perceives the U.S. The Latin American Working Group Education Fund, 2006. Montaño, J. "Nuevos Temas y Nuevos Actores en la Relación Bilateral", mimeo, 2005. Olson, J. "Terrorism: Stop Inflating the Concept." Cross Currents (2004, June): 1-3. Pastor, R. Whirlpool: U.S. Foreign Policy toward Latin America and the Caribbean. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1992. Prevost, G. "Introduction - The Bush Doctrine and Latin America." In The Bush Doctrine and Latin America, G. Prevost and C. Oliva. New York: Palgrave, 2007. Purcell, S. K. "U.S. Foreign Policy since September 11th and its Impact on Latin America." Paper presented in the conference Power, Asymettry and International Security. Buenos Aires: PENT, 2002. Roett, R. "Estados Unidos y América Latina: estado actual de las relaciones." Nueva Sociedad 206 (2006): 110-125. Shifter, M. "Latin America's Drug Problem." Current History (2007, February). ________ "The US and Latin America. Through the Lens of Empire." Current History (2004, February). Smith, P. H. "Strategic Options for Latin America." In Latin America in the New International System, Edited by J. S. Tulchin and H. R. Espach. Boulder: Lynne Rieneer Publishers, 2000. Tokatlian, J. G. (2003). "El orden sudamericano después de Irak." Nueva Sociedad 185 (2003): 102-114. WOLA. Below the Radar. U.S. Military Programs with Latin America. 1997-2007. Washington: Washington Office for Latin America, 2008. _______ Blurring the Lines. Trends in U.S. Military Programs with Latin America. Washington: Washington Office for Latin America, 2004. _______ Ready, Aim, Foreign Policy. Washington: Washington Office for Latin America, 2008. Youngers, C. "The U.S. and Latin America After 9-11 and Iraq." Foreing Policy In Focus Report (2003, June). Photo Courtsey of Agência Brasil


Cornell International Affairs Review

The Re-Emergence of Russian Super-Power?

Jennifer Fishkin Cornell University, 2010

Industrial Labor Relations, International Relations VP Political Cornell Israel Affairs Committee, Center for Furture Security Strategies Intern Hudson Institute, Diamond Intern at American Israel Public Affairs Committee

Russian-American relations have become increasingly adversarial with Russian efforts to regain its power and standing in the world. While Russian-American relations are not at Cold War levels of antipathy, the Russian Foreign Minister, Sergei Lavrov, has described them as "alarming,"5 and with senior Bush officials commenting that "Russia has provided overwhelming evidence that it seeks to weaken America. Thus wherever possible internationally, Moscow will work to stop America from achieving success".5 Russian foreign policy has currently been steering away from the relative accord and partnership of the two countries under the Yeltsin era. It has become what some call the Red-Brown coalition of rule, which has led to changes in foreign policy with the goal of building coalitions to hedge against the United States. To understand this Russian foreign policy, it is necessary to address the Russian domestic political factions, as well as their policy vis-à-vis Iran. With the fall of the Soviet Union, Russia looked to the United States to bail it out of its economic crisis and looked to the ideas of liberalism. Yeltsin's policy was to convince the West, with the US in particular, that it was within the US interest for Russia to be integrated into the multilateral international framework for managing the global capitalist economy, eventually becoming part of the G-8.15 According to Peter Shearman in a book entitled Russian Foreign Policy Since 1990, "Yeltsin made it clear immediately with the collapse of the Soviet Union that Russia did not see the United States as a potential threat, but rather as an ally in developing new methods of collective security."15 Under Yeltsin the push to liberalism and pro-US policy was remarkable, however it did not last. This was in part due to the greater complexity of Russian domestic politics as well as the many economic problems that Russia faced that emerged out of the rapid privatization of the economy and the political chaos caused by the shift away from a one party state.18 While there are reformers within the Russian Duma, also known as the Russian parliament, the Red-Brown alliance, the alliance of communists and nationalists, is a powerful force that has since captured increasing power, especially with the increased economic stability of Russia. By the end of 1999 there was a clear shift from the initially strong proWestern policy in 1992 to one characterized by high nationalism. This was due to a shift in power within the government where there were three main groups vying for power within the Russian political scene. The first supported Yeltsin's pro-Western foreign policy, including such things as positive relations with Israel and the reform and privatization of the Russian economy.6 The second group advocated a "Eurasian emphasis in foreign policy" which focused on good relations with the US, Western Europe, China, and the Middle East. While in favor of reform, this group advocated a far slower process of privatization.6 The last group of the Red-Brown alliance needs to be analyzed extraordinarily carefully, as this group has since become increasingly powerful in Russian policy formation today. This third group wanted a powerful and confrontational approach toward the United States, seeing it as Russia's main ally, strengthening ties with Iraq and Iran, as well as establishing dominance over the former soviet republics (NIS).6 To understand the evolution of Russian foreign policy, it is essential to understand this RedBrown alliance more clearly and the ways in 41

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which it influenced the Putin regime. The Red-Brown alliance is a political alliance of neo-communists, hoping for the reinstitution of Stalin-esque regime, of rightwing nationalists, and of whites romanticizing the Czarist period. These forces were all united in their desire to see Russia rescued from the powers of the West subjugated under Yeltsin's policies.9 They wanted to expand their country to reflect the days of the Russian empire. In fact, a subcategory of this movement, Eurasianism, made most famous by Aleksandr Dugin, (although some within this coalition disagree), affirm "the necessity of maintaining the Russian imperial structure and reject any prospect of a global equilibrium."10 Dugin thus asserts that all anti-globalization tendencies are Eurasianist and proposes an alliance structure based on this conception of the world (Russian version of the European radical right). Putin's and now Medvedev's policies clearly have undertones of this ideology although both men also have an understanding, however decreasingly so, of their need for the Western powers and of appearing legitimate in the liberal international institutional arena. Increasingly, with the Russian-Georgian War, as well as Russian policies toward Iran, it is

clear that Russia is trying to separate itself and hedge against US/Western power, although still having a semi-schizophrenic policy of not fully alienating itself from western institutional structures and alliances. This, especially in the Georgian scenario, becomes obvious because Russia is linked financially to the rest of the world. Thus, with the current collapse of financial markets in the US and Europe, and the resulting pullout of Russian troops, Russia realizes it still has a lot to lose from a total breakdown of relations with their "western partners".11 Despite this, there is no questioning the nationalist tendencies such as the reestablishment of the two headed eagle as the national symbol, the reinstatement of the tune of the Soviet Union as the national anthem, and the redefinition of citizens of the Russian Federation as "Rossiyane" implying that the various ethnic groups of the Russian Federation--as in the USSR and Imperial Russia--are now one people, one nation.16 As Leon Aron states in his book "Russia's Revolution," "the deterioration of Russian-American relations is to blame on each side's pursuit of its ideologically determined strategic agendas and of its perceptions of the other's reaction to the implementation of these


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agendas."3 He continues to explain that the weakening of the Russian state in the 1990s was seen as shameful and caused a return of policy reflecting the conception of state tantamount to society and a desire to reclaim Russian authority. This led to a reassertion of a sphere of influence, the demise of the goal of the integration of Russia into the Western capitalist democratic world, and a policy of realpolitik.3 By looking at Russian policies towards Iran, the evolution of Russian foreign policy and Russian self-conception becomes evident. Russian policy toward Iran has evolved from a more careful relationship to one that reflects their mutual antipathy toward the United States. It is not only because of motivation from opposition to the US, but also because many feel that the US is a hegemon, that it could form or already has formed a dictatorial regime, and therefore that needs to be stopped. Thus, there needs to be an alliance made against it. This concept is a large underlying force toward the Moscow-Tehran alliance.14 Proof of Russian expansionist, anti-American desires is shown in a Council on Foreign Relations Report that states:

Russia has sold Iran hundreds of major weapons systems, including twenty T-72 tanks, ninety-four air-to-air missiles, and a handful of combat aircraft like the MiG-29. Late last year, Russia agreed to sell Iran a $700 million surface-to-air missile defense system (SA-15 Gauntlet) along with thirty TOR M1 air-defense missile systems, ostensibly to defend its soon-to-be-complete, Russianbuilt nuclear reactor at Bushehr. Moscow also plans to upgrade Tehran's Su-24, MiG29 aircraft, and T-72 battle tanks. Iran has shown interest in S-300 anti-aircraft missiles from Russia and Belarus, which can intercept enemy aircraft ninety to 180 miles away.4

However, when looking through the 1990s it appears that Russia's policy was to deny arms sales to the US and other western countries (such as Israel19), while making massive arms sales and nuclear deals with Iran.2 (In addition, the Bushehr plant construction alone was a $1 billion dollar deal.) Furthermore, Moscow has been unwilling to

step up pressure on Iran after the March 2007 resolution. The specter of crisis with Iran also drives up oil prices to Russia's benefit. Even the threat of a U.S. military strike on Iran, might, from a Russian perspective, be seen as "win-win-win": it would raise the oil price further, isolate the U.S. globally and set back the Iranian nuclear program. Russia seeks the restoration of its pride, re-acquisition of the states lost in the breakup of the Soviet Union, and restoration of its superpower status.8 It is believed that China, Iran and Russia compose the new axis seeking to thwart the United States.7 The Russians are clearly looking toward their own self-interest both financially and in terms of their own hegemonic agenda rather than engaging in the liberal western structure. However, the inability to fully commit to the Iranians, due to the wish of the Russians not to fully isolate the West, as well as their understanding that they are interdependent, has led to problems with their policy vis-à-vis Iran. In many Iranian newspapers14 it appears that the Iranians are uncomfortable with Russian policy towards them because they feel as if Russian support is simply a means to achieve its own interests concerning the US. While Russia has been reticent to step up pressure on Iran by trying to find other solutions mediating between Iran and the western powers, for instance selling them nuclear fuel for civilian purposes, they have supported Security Council resolutions for sanctions.1 Thus, while Iranian relations are largely an economic decision for the Russians, their relationship demonstrates how Russian alliance structures are overwhelmingly based on their competing domestic identities and how those react vis-à-vis the United States. The Russian problem presents a key factor in what is currently a quintessential turning point in history in terms of the world order that will emerge. With the utter failure of the American liberal, capitalist structure that has occurred with the collapse of the financial markets, it is clear that not only is it 43

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necessary that the United States reconfigure its conception of its place in the world, but also how dependent the rest of the world is on the United States whether they like it or not--Russia included. As is clear from this study of domestic politics and foreign policy, Russia is recreating its position in the world system, both in terms of wanting to hedge against the United States and regain its power in the world and in realizing how dependent it is financially on the Western economic

institutions. As a result, the consequences of how the United States engages Russia at this critical time are vital to whether or not Russia will seek to join an American sponsored multilateral conception of states. If such a world system is not constructed, Russia will fully emerge as a critical threat to US power through the creation of a strong Russo-SinoIslamist alliance structure, leaving the RedBrown alliance conception of Russian identity as the sole Russian foreign policy.

Works Cited

1. "Adopting Resolution 1803." United Nations Security Council, Security Council Tightens Restrictions On Iran Proliferation-Sensitive Nuclear Activities, Increases Vigilance Over Iranian Banks, Has States Inspect Cargo, 3 Mar. 2008, New York. Security Council. 3 Mar. 2008. UN Security Council. 9 Oct. 2008 <>. 2. "The American Foreign Policy Review of Russian Government Actions and U.S. Policy." Russia Reform Monitor. 1996. American Foreign Policy Council. 22 Oct. 2008 <>. 3. Aron, Leon. Russia's Revolution : Essays 1989-2006. New York: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 2007. 4. Beehner, Lionel, comp. "Russia-Iran Arms Trade." Backgrounder. 1 Nov. 2006. The Council On Foreign Relations. 10 Oct. 2008 < publication/11869/russiairan_arms_trade.html>. 5 Blank, Stephen J. "Towards A New Russia Policy." Feb. 2008. Strategic Studies Institute. 9 Oct. 2008 < pdffiles/pub833.pdf>. 6. Freedman, Robert O. "Russian-Iranian Relations in the 1990s." Middle East Review of International Affairs 4 (2000). 7. Glazov, Jamie. "The China-Russia-Iran Axis." 22 Jan. 2008. 11 Oct. 2008 < aspx?guid=1bfad8e3-3390-4cc9-bca6-d8cb60c9a1b1>. 8. Gordon, Philip H."Russia is Crucial to Action over a Nuclear Iran."4 Dec. 2007. Brookings. 10 Oct. 2008 < iran_gordon.aspx>. 9. Lee, Martin A. The Beast Reawakens : Fascism's Resurgence from Hitler's Spymasters to Today's Neo-Nazi Games and Right-Wing Extremists. New York: Routledge, 1999. 10. Lurell, Marlenne. "Aleksandr Dugin: A Russian Version of the European Radical Right?" Kennan Institute. 11. Matthews, Owen. "Why Russia Plays Nicer." Georgian Front. 4 Oct. 2008. Newsweek. 8 Oct. 2008 <>. 12. Parland, Oscar. The Extreme Nationalist Threat in Russia : The Growing Influence of Western Rightist Ideas. New York: Routledge, 2004. 13. Rogozin, Dmitriy. "Russia's New Foreign Policy Priorities." The Nixon Center (2000). 14. "RUSSIA: Yelstin Returns; Moscow Woos China and Iran." Foreign Media Reaction Daily Digest 1 July 1997. 15. Shearman, Peter, ed. Russian Foreign Policy since 1990. New York: Westview P, 1995. 16. Shlapentokh, Dmitry. "Two Sides of the Georgia-Russia Conflict." Prague Watchdog. 16 Nov. 2006. 10 Oct. 2008 < php?show=000000-000004-000003-000127=1>. 17. . Van Dyke, Vernon. "Communism in Eastern and Southeastern Europe." The Journal of Politics 9 (1947): 355-91. 18. Worth, Owen. Hegemony, International Political Economy and Post-Communist Russia. Grand Rapids: Ashgate, Limited, 2005. 19. "Yeltsin Says Russia Will Not Sell Missiles to Iran." Weapons of Mass Destruction. 12 . Mar. 1997. 22 Oct. 2008 <>. Photo Courtesy of: Carlos Latuff 2008


Cornell International Affairs Review

The Lebanese Blogosphere

Speaking For and Against Sectarianism

Elisheva Yun Cornell University, 200

Near Eastern Studies, History of Art Research Intern at Hudson Institute

Over a decade after the close of the fifteen-year Lebanese Civil War, the cultural and political landscape of sectarianism has shifted significantly in Lebanon. Circumstances of uncertainty and upheaval in the past couple of years--Prime Minister Rafik al-Hariri's assassination in 2005, the subsequent Cedar Revolution that spurred Syria's withdrawal from Lebanese territory, a string of assassinations of anti-Syrian politicians, the Israel-Hizbullah War of 2006, anti-government protests and Hizbullah's seizure of sections of Beirut in May 2008--have both fed into and arose from tensions between religious groups. Recent events suggest the centrality of sectarianism to questions about Lebanon's stability. The momentous political changes that Lebanon has witnessed have raised questions as to the changing nature of sectarianism as well. In particular, given that sectarianism has fed into significant conflict, is it appropriate or productive to maintain sectarianism as the guiding principle for the political system? How have new avenues of discussion influenced Lebanon's experience of sectarianism? Blogs, collectively referred to as the blogosphere, have provided an increasingly popular means of expression in Lebanon. Blogging has become more prominent through moments of conflict, namely the Cedar Revolution in 2005 and the Israel-Hizbullah conflict in the summer of 2006. As the Lebanese blogosphere virulently debates the unfolding events and the role of sectarianism in Lebanon, blogs offer an illuminating lens as to whether the Lebanese population deems sectarianism to be an appropriate organizing principle for its government.

Sectarianism in Politics

The Lebanese Civil War of 1975-1990 inspired sharp debate over the obliteration or the preservation of the confessional system. After reading approximately 100 blogs' entries, generally written between 2005 and 2007 by Lebanese both in the country and abroad, I have found that the debate over whether sectarianism is an appropriate political organizing principle is largely irrelevant to many Lebanese bloggers. While Lebanese bloggers may often superficially appear to occupy pro-sectarian and antisectarian camps or, in other words, camps that advocate either the continuation or elimination of the confessional political system, such a distinction often becomes impossible; the majority of bloggers fall into a grey area. Those who promote the continued presence of sectarianism most actively, and

even polemically at times, can also appear anti-sectarian at times in their criticism of the present strain of sectarianism's deficiencies. Those who advocate the continued presence of Lebanon's sectarian government do not deny the reality that political sectarianism can be problematic as well. Furthermore, those who appear to argue for the obliteration of sectarianism point to specific and potentially reconcilable problems within political sectarianism that often coincide with "prosectarian" critiques. For instance, The Thinking Lebanese blog demonstrates critical support for sectarianism as an organizing principle for the government. The blog, founded by Faysal, a young Lebanese male located in Beirut, posted Michael Young's article, "In Praise of Lebanese Sectarianism." Young argues that sectarianism "is the only system reflecting the true nature

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of social relations, imposing humility on all the parties, and offering the Lebanese a pluralism so abysmally lacking elsewhere in the Middle East" (Young quoted in The Thinking Lebanese 2005). Yet, Young also acknowledges the varied shortcomings of sectarianism, namely that "confined to confessional boundaries, politics or public service means that the most ambitious must either tie their fate to sectarian political leaders to get somewhere, or emigrate" (2005). Young then asserts that a revised sectarian political system is necessary (2005). Anton Efendi of the blog, Across The Bay, asserts that "Michael's opinion is similar to mine, and I would say similar to Raja's [a contributor to Across the Bay]" (2006). Comments on the Thinking Lebanese blog about Young's article evidence that support for sectarianism is often nuanced by a desire to improve the system. For example, Firas asserts that "the Lebanese are sectarian," and thus "we should work to change it, bravely and with determination" (The Thinking Lebanese 2005). The Lebanese Political Journal blogger, Charles Malik, similarly advocates the perpetuation of sectarianism as an organizing principle for the government, yet acknowledges the destructive elements of the current system of sectarianism in Lebanon. Malik argues that, "the problem in Lebanon is not sectarianism. It's the inability of the state to protect its citizens" (2006). He also argues that, "the trouble with the sectarian system is that it does not breed national leaders, thus creating a national spirit is quite difficult" (Malik 2006). In this sense, his word choice is crucial. Creating national spirit is "difficult," not impossible. Furthermore, the Blacksmiths of Lebanon blog encourages an altered sectarianism: "That way relies on us moving forward towards a political equation that guarantees equality, democracy, sovereignty, stability, and security for the nation as a whole, in such a way as to minimize the importance of sectarianism when compared to the nation that guarantees all of the above" (2006). Lazarus from the Letters Apart blog 46

features an image with the word "sectarianism" in Arabic crossed out. He superficially appears to argue for the elimination of the sectarian government, taking issue with Michael Young's article, "In Praise of Lebanese Sectarianism." Lazarus argues that the "main reason there is not much (if any) anecdotal evidence in lebanon to the contrary (which would have been enough to disprove his conclusion [that sectarianism is the only system truly reflecting Lebanese social relations]) is that sectarianism is the ONLY system lebanon has ever tried" (2006). Yet, even as Lazarus writes in the context of his agenda towards a nonconfessional system, he also writes that,

only after gathering information with regards to these different scenarios, such as their likelihood and the possible introduction of methods that mitigate various and justified worries (such as introducing a system of civil liberties and rights), can we really make the best decision of whether to simply `modify' the current system, as young and others suggest, or to deconfessionalise it (Lazarus 2006).

In contrast to an advertising campaign that urges Lebanon to install a non-confessional government, the response to advertisements in Lebanese Bloggers was more targeted. R, of Lebanese Bloggers, evaluates the advertising campaign in the specific context of personal status laws, asserting that, "everytime I think about the piece of crap (discriminatory) laws we have that govern marriage and citizenship I just remember where we are to where we should be" (2006). R, in this particular context, urges the Lebanese specifically to change "the sectarian (and sexist) laws" rather than the confessional structure itself. Hence, the frustration that is apparent in seemingly anti-sectarian blogs often suggests that antisectarian arguments occupy a grey area. While they primarily advocate the erasure of political sectarianism, the details of their arguments often criticize specific failures within the current sectarian system. As the line blurs between antisectarianism and pro-sectarianism,

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dissatisfaction and frustration with political elites prevails through blogs of nearly all stances. In this context, discontent with political leaders lies at the juncture between many profoundly different discourses about Lebanese sectarianism. For instance, Sophia of the Les Politiques blog argues that, "we should not accept to look at war criminals mutated into statesmen dictate what we should do and think," expressing a common and often broad rejection of those in power--of elites that bloggers often vaguely define or that bloggers define with the exemption of their own sectarian leaders (2007). Jonathon Cook of the Beirut Live blog also posts and praises "The Wise," a video that was written and directed by Pierre Dawalibi. Cook argues that, "This is probably one of the strongest messages I have seen so far [...] Don't follow your leaders, follow your nation" (Beirut Live 2007). The Simply Human blog clearly communicates the frustration towards the leaders as well, pleading, "Don't you all know that whether its Nasrallah, or Hariri, or Seniora, Fatfat, Aoun, Jounblat, Gemayel, Geagea, [...] THEY DON'T CARE ABOUT YOU!" (2007). Yet, amongst the truly widespread frustration towards Lebanese political elites, many bloggers stress the agency of the Lebanese people in sustaining the elites. For instance, Charles Malik of the Lebanese Political Journal blog argues that, "The Lebanese political parties do not control sectarian anger, despite popular belief that the war will only start if the leadership orders it" (2007). The bloggers' deep frustration with the political elite coincides with a pervasive criticism of the political elite amongst the scholarly community. Both the lack of legitimacy of many politicians and the discontent towards Lebanese politicians largely stem from the installation of militia leaders--politicians who likely committed war crimes--in the post-civil war government. Judith Palmer Harik asserts that, "With few exceptions, militia representatives were made ministers without portfolios" (1998).

Fawwaz Traboulsi also asserts that, "The only `legitimacy' the warlords, militia-leaders and assorted Mafiosi [in the government] can claim is one based on terror and intimidation" (1990). Moreover, Aida Kanafani-Zahar argues that the leadership of the sectarian elites intensifies sectarianism, as "Militia chiefs succeeded during moments of the war in transforming a political conflict into a religious one" (2002). Thus, dissatisfaction with the political elites often forms an intersection between the scholarly community, bloggers, individuals of different sects, those in favor of a modified sectarian system, and those who encourage the obliteration of political sectarianism.

The Role of the Blogosphere

While "blogging remains the activity of a tiny elite, as only a small minority of the already microscopic fraction of the Arabs who

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regularly use the Internet actually write or read blogs," the blogosphere presents a critical juncture between many different physical and social spaces (Lynch 2007). As Marc Lynch argues, "A large portion of the readers of Arab blogs are political activists, journalists, and other politically influential elites (as well as foreign scholars and governments trying to gauge Arab public opinion), a high quality audience even if a relatively small one" (2007). Blogs offer an intersection of voices that rarely emerges from other means of communication. In this sense, the mere interaction between different communities presents a space for coexistence on a variety of levels, even in the form of acerbic online arguments. As bloggers and blog readers log on from a multitude of locations, undoubtedly possessing profoundly different political outlooks and sharply different experiences, they partake in a common dialogue and reading experience. While this dialogue is often far from rational, it exists between various communities and thus fosters a sense of Lebanese solidarity, as limited as it may be. Those in Lebanon can blog their experiences alongside the Lebanese diaspora population. Thus, the blogosphere cultivates solidarity of mediated experiences across localities. For instance, Vivian Salama writes that, "For Jij, the violence being meted out on his country, Lebanon, on this lazy Sunday afternoon [in Massachussetts] is all too real," and "Jij, or Jihad Ibrahim as he is more commonly known, was not alone as an Arab in America writing about the Israel-Hizbulla War online" (2007). The result, according to Salama, is that "the strong participation of the Lebanese diaspora in blogging the war demonstrates the potential of the medium in bringing together shifting and disparate commentaries, and in juxtaposing multiple overlapping identities" (2007). Both within and beyond territorial Lebanon, individuals of different sects and political dispositions post blog entries for one another to read and comment upon. In fact, Sune Haugbolle 4

stresses that,"These media [the new generation of media] are characterized by their interactive nature" (2007). It is this interactive nature of the blogosphere that lends itself towards dialogue across sects and political stances. For instance, Ms Levantine describes her dialogue about sectarianism with Abu Ali, a blogger who strongly disagrees with Ms Levantine:

I have been having an ongoing argument about sectarianism with Abu Ali for quite some time. I am of the opinion that it is overly inflated by our political class in order to serve its own narrow interests, and that we should fight it at any cost. Abu Ali on the other hand insi[s]ts it is a Lebanese reality and that it should be dealt with accordingly. He keeps repeating that Lebanon is not Ras Beirut, and that I need to have realistic expectations

(2007). Ms Levantine also engaged with a dialogue on the comments section of Letters Apart, Lazarus' blog, about Michael Young's "In Praise of Sectarianism" and about sectarianism in general. She thus contributes to a comments section that included profoundly different analyses and viewpoints. While bloggers certainly do not agree and, as Lazarus notes,"the different sides do not seem to really convince the other," the blogosphere's existence as a space for cross-sectarian interaction begins to break down barriers between sects (2006).


Hence, in their response to recent events, bloggers often aggressively argue for either the eradication of sectarianism as a polluting political force or the modification of sectarianism as the potential basis for egalitarian politics. Yet, it would be simplistic to divide bloggers into pro-sectarian and anti-sectarian camps as both often present common arguments. Nearly all bloggers reject sectarianism as it stands now. Both bloggers who advocate the erasure of sectarianism and bloggers who advocate its perpetuation actually agree upon many of the destructive forces within political sectarianism. The

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blogosphere's ability to foster dialogue between individuals of different sects and political opinions that perhaps otherwise would not debate presents a promising, although limited, means for coexistence and

negotiation. Perhaps as bloggers from diverse positions continue to interact, they may begin to notice the striking similarities in their seemingly opposing arguments.


Blacksmiths of Lebanon. 2006. (accessed April 4 2008). Lebanese bloggers. 2006. (accessed April 10 2008). Ms. Levantine. 2006. (accessed April 10 2008). The thinking Lebanese. 2005. (accessed April 4 2008). Bey, Tony. 2006. Across the bay. (accessed April 3 2008). Haugbolle, Sune. From A-list to webtifada: Developments in the lebanese blogosphere 2005-2006. Arab Media & Society (February 2007), http://www. Kanafani-Zahar, Aida. 2002. The religion of the `other' as bond: The interreligious in lebanon. In Religion between violence and reconciliation., ed. Thomas Scheffler. Beirut: Ergon Verlag Wurzburg in Kommission. Lebanon Vendetta. 2007. Simply human. (accessed April 20 2008). Lynch, Marc. Blogging the new arab public. Arab Media & Society (February 2007), Malik, Charles. 2007. Lebanese political journal. (accessed April 5 2008). Palmer Harik, Judith. 1998. Democracy (again) derailed: Lebanon's ta'if paradox. In Political liberalization and democratization in the arab world., ed. B. Korany, B. Brynen and P. Noble. Vol. 2. Boulder, CO: Lynne Reiner. Salama, Vivian. From long island to lebanon: Arabs blog in america. Arab Media & Society (February 2007), ?article=18. Traboulsi, Fawwaz. 1990. Confessional lines. Middle East Report 162, (January-February 1990). Photo Courtesy: advertisement, part of a `Stop Sectarianism Campaign,' highlights the pervasiveness of sectarianism within Lebanon

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A Violent Peace

The Ongoing Conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo

History, International Relations, French Executive Board, Americans for Informed Democracy Research Intern , Ford Institute for Human Secutiry, University of Pittsburgh

Alexandra Taylor Cornell University, 2009

Since 2003, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) has enjoyed only a tenuous peace. For the past decade, a period spanning two official wars and years of continued violence, the only constant division has been between those who have guns and those who do not. The transitional government, established in 2003, brought the main rebel groups from the Second Congo War into the government, a move to stabilize the intertwined political and military conflict. However, a constantly shifting web of armed groups continues to operate in the DRC, particularly in the northeast. The alliances sometimes cross borders. In this very fluid conflict, identifying the aggressor, the allegiance of certain fighters, or the location of a group of refugees or internally displaced persons fleeing conflict can change almost monthly. Despite five years since "peace," national elections, and the presence of the most expensive current United Nations peacekeeping operation, the DRC remains destabilized and has seen no drastic improvement. The internationally recognized conflict in the DRC began in 1997. The country, then known as Zaire, had been ruled for decades by a notoriously corrupt dictator who was more preoccupied with increasing his own wealth than promoting the safety and stability of his nation. The rebel Laurent-Désiré Kabila seized the opportunity to overthrow the dictator, Mobuto Sésé Seko, and proclaim a republic. His successful war, which had been actively backed by neighboring Rwanda and Uganda, started anew when Kabila ordered the expulsion of all foreign troops from the Congolese territory in 1998. Some of his former supporters took up arms against him, some independently and some strongly backed by neighboring states. Sparked by his reaffirmation of sovereignty, a new international war began and more troops poured in. At the height of the conflict, five foreign nations had troops in the DRC--Rwanda, Uganda, Angola, Zimbabwe, and Namibia. Roughly half of the nations supported Kabila's government, while the other half supplied and financed nascent rebel movements. Uganda and Rwanda in particular supported the Rassemblent congolais pour la democratie (RCD), one of two main opponents to Kabila's power. 50 The other main rebel group, the Mouvement pour la libération du Congo, is considered to be an independent Congolese movement. Laurent- Désiré Kabila was assassinated in January 2001; his son assumed the mantle of power the next day, keeping the main players similar. The Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement was signed on 10 July 1999 by the DRC, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda, Zimbabwe, and Angola. On 1 August 1999, the Mouvement pour la libération du Congo (MLC) became a signatory, followed by the other main rebel group, the Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie (RCD) on 31 August 1999. Though the ceasefire agreed to in July 1999 was flagrantly violated for years, this agreement set the table for continued international involvement. The United Nations has deployed varying numbers of military observers and formed units in the DRC since late 1999, ostensibly to assist with implementation of the original ceasefire, though their mandate has evolved considerably over time.

Official Cessation of Hostilities

From the beginning, the resolution of the Second Congo War, also known as Africa's First World War, was never going to

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be a straightforward process. In late August 2000, President Kabila began insisting to the international community that the "war of aggression" against the DRC needed to be considered separately from the internal political conflict (SG-1). This is, in fact, the way in which the international community did address the war. On July 30, 2002, the DRC and Rwanda signed the Pretoria Agreement. This was followed shortly thereafter by the Luanda Agreement between the DRC and Uganda, which effectively ended violence between DRC and its two main foreign rivals. Resolving the internal factionalism took much longer and was conducted in multiple stages. It concluded with the signing of the Global and All Inclusive Agreement in December 2002 and the establishment of a transitional constitution and government on April 4th, 2003. The new government incorporated President Kabila and the leaders of the two main armed rebel factions. However, as any human rights group will be quick to point out, the Democratic Republic of Congo is not a peaceful place. Violence continues to this day. While the transitional government officially began the reconstruction process, it is unclear if the root causes of the conflict were actually addressed. The nature of the current violence in the DRC is notable for two reasons. The first notable aspect is that the continued unrest in the DRC is simultaneously a civil conflict and an international conflict. In the northeastern DRC, an area that was the flashpoint for both previous wars and continues to be the most volatile region today, the "border" with Rwanda and Uganda is largely a porous concept. The domestic conflict has affected the nations bordering the DRC, most significantly with refugee flows and spillover violence. Many of the Congolese armed groups are supported by foreign governments, both implicitly and explicitly, creating a network of interests that is hard to unravel and trace. Most importantly to future security, the DRC is still said to harbor foreign rebel groups within its borders that

threaten the security of Rwanda and Uganda. The second notable characteristic of the war being waged, besides its dual civil and international nature, is that it is a war on the population. Consider this statement by the International Crisis Group in 2005: "The main reason for the impasse, including postponement of elections, has been the reluctance of the former belligerents to give up power and assets for the national good. All have maintained parallel command structures in the army, the local administration and the intelligence services. Extensive embezzlement has resulted in inadequate and irregular payment of civil servants and soldiers, making the state itself perhaps the largest security threat to the Congolese people" ("A Congo Action Plan"). These former rebels spent years warring against the established state power and now find themselves responsible for state security. All sides, all armed groups, Congolese and foreign, have committed horrible war crimes including the use of child soldiers, rape, looting, and the murder of civilians. Who is "right," who is "wrong," and why does it matter?

An International Conflict Waged within One Country's Borders

The porous eastern border of the DRC is an endemic problem. One of the original causes of both the First and Second Congo Wars was the presence of armed rebel groups based in eastern Zaire launching cross border attacks on Uganda and Rwanda. The poor security situation was in fact acknowledged on both sides. President Kabila reached security agreements with both neighbors shortly after his rise to power (Clark, 271). Rwanda was allowed in DRC territory in order to sweep out rebel groups that were believed to have perpetrated the 1994 genocide and continued to carry out cross-border attacks on Rwanda (Clark, 271). Uganda was similarly concerned about cross-border attacks by the Allied Democratic Forces (Clark, 271-272). Uganda and Rwanda had both been present 51

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on DRC soil before 1998 with permission from the president they had helped put in power. As Clark explains, "both Kagame and Museveni had already become disenchanted with Kabila on a number of accounts, but mainly because of his failure to establish effective control over eastern Congo" (279). It was only with the expulsion of all Tutsi troops by President Kabila in July 1998 that their continued presence became a hostile occupation (Clark, 271). Since the end of official hostilities, the cross-border nature of the conflict has become more difficult to qualify. Instability in the northeast of the DRC destabilizes the entire surrounding area, collectively known as the Great Lakes region. Three provinces in the northeast of the country are nearly synonymous with armed groups, displacement, cross-border violations, and a flashpoint for larger patterns of conflict; North and South Kivu, described together as the Kivus, were the originating point of both the First and Second Congo War. Ituri, another province, continues to be plagued by widespread violence and warring factions. Ituri and the Kivus share a border with both Rwanda and Uganda. An international conflict continues, essentially carried about through suspected proxy wars among internationally supported Congolese warlords.

Sometimes, the threat originates from foreign nations violating the sovereignty of the DRC. However, equally as often, the conflict within the DRC spills across the border, affecting foreign nationals or even Congolese 52

citizens seeking refuge. One of the stated reasons for the Second Congo War, as well as continuing tensions between the DRC, Rwanda and Uganda, is the presence of foreign rebel groups taking shelter on DRC soil. Even since the Pretoria Agreement and cessation of official hostilities in 2002, Rwanda has threatened to invade to disarm these rebels if the DRC does not. In 2004, rumors circulated for months confirming the presence of Rwandan soldiers on Congolese soil, while MONUC, the United Nations Mission to the Democratic Republic of Congo, reported suspected Rwandan troop incursions in the face of firm denial by the Rwandan government (Snow; IRIN-1). Rwandan Hutu militias, known as the ex-FAR (former Rwandan Army) and Interahamwe (a youth militia), believed by many to be perpetrators of the 1994 genocide, continue to hide in the DRC, despite being targeted by the national army and the United Nations Mission in the DRC (MONUC) in recent years. The Lord's Resistance Army, a rebel group from Uganda led by Joseph Kony, has also been reported to be taking refuge in the DRC wilderness within the last few years (SG-2, SG-3). There are also numerous instances of armed Congolese rebels violating the border. In August 2004, militias attacked and burned Gatumba, a refugee transit center for Congolese located in Burundi. Though the identity of the group is disputed (Burundian or Congolese), the perpetrators were most likely a combination of armed groups based in the DRC. In another instance, in 2004, a Congolese rebel known as Jules Mutebutsi fled with over 100 armed men across the border into Rwanda after losing a battle. His troops took shelter in a United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees run transit center in Rwanda, only to redeploy back across the border a few months later, a blatant breach of international refugee laws ("Letter"). Much of the international tension over the continued civil unrest in the DRC stems from fears about cross-border attacks and that the volatility of the DRC conflict will spill

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over and destabilize neighboring states. The country is already one of the largest producers of refugees in the world, with camps for Congolese refugees in thirteen different African nations. Large refugee encampments occupy valuable land space, creating resentment among neighboring peoples as well as their governments. In Rwanda and Uganda in particular, the nations that border the most volatile regions, it does not look as if the refugee flow will be ultimately reversing any time soon.

A War on the Population

In 2004, a joint report issued by the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Human Affairs, German Agro Action, and the European Commission for Humanitarian Affairs declared that 80% of North Kivu was empty ("Timeline"). 100,000 civilians were displaced in a single week due to internal fighting in the national army. The national army, supposedly a tool of central power and stability, is composed of previous rebel groups and continues to be fractionalized by different leaders continuing to place their own interests above those of the state. In order to document or put an end to the atrocities committed against civilians, the first logical step is to identify the perpetrator. Here, one runs into difficulties. Every group involved in the conflict has committed atrocities. The multitude of acronyms used to identify armed groups can be a bit difficult to follow. The Congolese national army can be referred to as the FAC, the FARDC, or integrated FARDC brigades, depending on the year of reference. Frequently, attackers are identified only as "rebel forces." The range of attackers includes foreign nations from the late 1990's, Congolese rebel groups affiliated with other nations, Congolese militias, foreign rebel groups based within the DRC, and factions that split from each of the preceding groups. Who reports these atrocities? First, United Nations affiliated groups. IRIN, the UN's independent news service, is a fairly reliable

source of information on battles, violence, attacks, and looting. The information often concerns humanitarian and aid organizations operating within the area--their safety, the proximity of violence, or new flows of population displacement. Another source of information on war crimes are watchdog groups like Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch. These groups often gather their information from confidential interviews with victims, refugees, and aid group officials on the ground. Sources, and therefore findings, are difficult to independently verify. Despite the difficulties of finding truth in a war zone, as well as the difficulties of identifying the "rebels" in a nighttime attack by armed men, when something big happens, it gets noticed. It will get reported and investigated, but whether or not the picture is ever resolved is another matter. For an example of the confusion regarding the identity of the perpetrator, one can observe a relatively small-scale incident that took place in late April 2000. The village of Izege in South Kivu was torched by armed groups. A local human rights organization identified the culprits as Rassemblement congolais pour la democratie (RCD) soldiers who were seeking to flush out Mayi-Mayi fighters in retaliation for a recent attack (IRIN2). Five villagers were killed. Both RCD soldiers and Mayi-Mayi fighters are Congolese; the RCD opposed the Kabila government with support from Rwanda, while the Mayi-Mayi are resistance fighters who oppose foreign presence on Congolese soil. Mayi-Mayi fighters generally support the Kabila government, although the designation is a general term for numerous Congolese armed groups. Days later, the governor of South Kivu refuted the identity of the attackers of Izege, blaming instead Interahamwe militia for attacking villagers accused of supporting RCD-Goma (IRIN-3). In this account of events, only one person was killed. RCD-Goma is a faction of the RCD, while the Interahamwe are Rwandan Hutu forces that fled Rwanda following the 53

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1994 genocide, in which they were generally believed to have been perpetrators. In one small event in one village in one year of a decade-long conflict, the exact number of civilians killed cannot be agreed upon; four different armed groups are blamed, two of whom are amorphous groups with constantly changing leadership structures. On a much larger scale, consider the event known as the Gatumba massacre. On August 13th 2004, armed forces descended upon the UN administered Gatumba transit camp in Burundi. The camp, which was close to the border, housed Congolese refugees from the Banyamulenge ethnic group. The Banyamulenge, also referred to as Congolese Tutsis, are an ethnic minority in the DRC and are often discriminated against. Over 160 refugees, mostly women and children, were brutally killed and burned in the nighttime attack. The transit center was only one kilometer from the border with the DRC (IRIN4). The day after the attack, a Burundian rebel group known as the Palipehutu-FNL (Parti pour la liberation du peuple Hutu Forces nationales de libération) claimed responsibility for the attack, saying they had originally been aiming to hit a military base nearby ("Tutsis massacred," BBC News). However, the governments of both Rwanda and Burundi, as well as some victims of the attack, blamed cross-border attacks by Congolese and Rwandan rebel groups ("Burundi," Amnesty International). The United Nations Security Council ordered an investigation into the attacks. MONUC and ONUB, the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations in the DRC and Burundi respectively, conducted a joint investigation to determine the identity of the perpetrators. In his first report on ONUB, Secretary General Kofi Annan noted that, "Eyewitnesses reported to ONUB that FNL had actually attacked a nearby FAB (Burundi Armed Forces) base, while Congolese Mayi-Mayi and FDLR (Rwandan [Hutu] ex-FAR/Interahamwe) elements carried out the Gatumba massacre." Human Rights Watch also published an 54

extensive report on the attacks, determining that in fact the FNL were "the chief force in the slaughter at Gatumba. Witnesses both in and near the camp agree that the attackers arrived making music and singing religious songs in Kirundi. This has been standard practice for FNL attacks for several years, a practice not found among other Burundian armed groups nor ordinarily among groups in the Congo. Many witnesses said that women accompanied the combatants and carried off looted goods. Several witnesses commented also on the young age of some of the attackers. In the last two years, FNL forces included women and children in many attacks. In addition, the site of the refugee camp at Gatumba lies near the Rukoko forest where the FNL are known to have an important base" ("Burundi," Human Rights Watch). Whether or not the camp had been attacked was never disputed.


An internationalized civil conflict in which all forces exhibit continued disregard for the human rights of civilians creates a dangerous spiral. What the Democratic Republic of Congo's government still lacks is a regard for its civilians as the most important part of a state. With a displaced population numbering into the millions, with a conflict whose length has surpassed a decade, with an estimated one thousand people dying each day from war related causes in 2008, war is an ever-present reality for the people of the DRC ("DRC," International Crisis Group). People continue to turn to armed warfare. Raped women have little recourse in the justice system. Demobilized child soldiers are shunned for atrocities they committed. Demobilized soldiers often take up arms again because there are few options for peaceful occupation in an area characterized by violence. According to the International Displacement Monitoring Centre, in late 2007 at least 1.4 million people remained internally displaced ("Worsening humanitarian"). In late

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2006, the United Nations estimated that over half of an estimated 17,500 foreign combatants present in the Kivus refuse to disarm (IRIN-5). In the past eight years, an estimated 3.9 million people have died (IRIN-6). Much of the conflict in the DRC is said to revolve around exploitation of its natural resources, which include copper, coltan, diamonds, gold and cobalt (Ross, 48). As Ingrid Samset explains, "war facilitates excessive resource exploitation, and excessive exploitation spurs continued fighting. The circumstances of armed conflict, which suspend norms of sovereignty and democracy, are used by internal and external actors alike to justify and facilitate excessive exploitation... While the initial aim may have been military victory over an identified enemy, the case of the DRC shows that adversaries can end up sharing a common aim in sustaining stalemate" (477). In this unstable region, the rule of law is weak and the power of the central government only remotely felt. It is difficult to decide which problem engenders the other--violence or weak infrastructure--

making it even more difficult to bring peace to the troubled populace. The problem must be addressed from all possible angles. The continued demobilization of armed groups is an important step, but requires cooperation from the soldiers themselves. With few other opportunities in this war-ravaged zone, incentives to reintegrate are sparse. Perhaps the most significant sign of progress in the DRC will be successful local elections. As recently as January 2008, MONUC's mandate was expanded to include assistance for the preparation, organization, and carrying out of local elections ("Resolution 1797"). As the Secretary-General reported in April 2008, the "successful conduct of credible local elections has been identified as an important benchmark for the eventual withdrawal of MONUC" (SG-4). Behind the vagaries of his language is a belief that the security, rule of law, transparency, popular participation, and the respect thereof, that are all necessary for "credible local elections" will become entrenched in a country sorely in need of positive habits.


"A Congo Action Plan." Africa Briefing No. 34, 19 October 2005. International Crisis Group. Online at cfm?id=3758&l=1. "Burundi: Gatumba Massacre--an urgent need for justice," Amnesty International, 18 August 2005. Online at asset/AFR16/010/2005/en/dom-AFR160102005en.html. "Burundi" The Gatumba Massacre--War Crimes and Political Agendas," Human Rights Watch Briefing Paper, September 2004. Online at http://www. Clark, John. "Explaining Ugandan Intervention in the Congo: Evidence and Interpretations." The Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 39, No. 2, (June 2001,) pp. 261-278. Cambridge University Press. (accessed via JSTOR). "Democratic Republic of Congo," International Crisis Group, Online at IRIN-1: "DRC-Rwanda: MONUC Spots suspected Rwandan soldiers in eastern Congo," IRIN News, 1 December 2004. Online at http://www.irinnews. org/Report.aspx?ReportId=52283. IRIN-2: "DRC: Village reportedly torched by RCD, human rights group says," IRIN News, 26 April 2000. Online at aspx?ReportId=14011. IRIN-3: "DRC: South Kivu governor rejects ASADHO report," IRIN News, 28 April 2000, Online at IRIN-4: "Burundi-DRC: Government offers new sites for DRC refugees," IRIN News, 20 August 2004. Online at aspx?ReportId=51104. IRIN-5: "DRC: Finding an end to violence," IRIN News, 28 July 2006. Online at IRIN-6: "DRC: Transitional justice and sexual violence in DRC: which way forward?" IRIN News, 28 June 2006. Online at aspx?ReportId=59490. "Letter dated 15 July 2004 from the Chairman of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1533 (2004) concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo addressed to the Secretary-General," S/2004/551, 15 July 2004. Online at UNDOC/GEN/N04/419/80/IMG/N0441980.pdf?OpenElement, accessed 16 July 2008. "Resolution 1797 (2008)," United Nations Security Council, S/RES/1797. Adopted by the Security Council at its 5828th meeting, on 30 January 2008. Online at Ross, Michael L. "How do Natural Resources Influence Civil War? Evidence from Thirteen Cases." International Organization, Vol. 58, No. 1, Winter 2004, pp. 35-67. (Accessed through JSTOR). SG-1: "The Fourth Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo." S/2000/888, 21 September 2000. Online at SG-2: "The Twentieth Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo." S/2005/832, 28 December 2005. Online at SG-3: "The Twenty-first Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo."

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S/2006/390, 13 June 2006. Online at SG-4: "The Twenty-fifth Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo." S/2008/218, 2 April 2008. Online at Samset, Ingrid. "Conflict of Interests or Interest in Conflict? Diamonds and War in the DRC." Review of African Political Economy, Vol. 29, No. 93/94, "State Failure in the Congo: Perceptions and Realities," Sep.-Dec. 2002, pp. 46-480. (Accessed through JSTOR). Snow, Keith Harmon. "Rwanda's Secret War: US Backed Destabilization of Central Africa," Global Policy Forum, 10 December 2004. Online at http://www. "Timeline: 2004," International Institute for Strategic Studies Armed Conflict Database. Online at ConflictTimeline.asp?ConflictID=160&YearID=1103&DisplayYear=2004, accessed 13 August 2008. "Tutsis massacred in Burundi camp," BBC News, 14 August 2004. Online at "Worsening humanitarian crisis as displacement escalates in the east," Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, 29 November 2007. Online at http:// Photo Courtesy of Endre Vestvik


Cornell International Affairs Review

Crisis in Burma

A Lack of "International Voluntarism"

Edward Bong Geul Joo Cornell University, 2010

Government and International Relations President, Korean Students Association

On September 24, 2007, the conflict in Burma, also known as Myanmar, between the public and the military junta, officially known as the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), reached a serious point. The military junta, which represented the Burmese government, had raised the price of oil through its monopoly, which subsequently elevated food prices. In response, the public, including 1000 monks, protested against the tyrannical rule of the junta. The junta reacted by killing thousands of people and arresting democratic leaders such as U Gambira, the leader of the protesting monks. Amidst this turmoil, many foreign countries intervened to try to find a solution. Keck and Sikkink suggest that these are voluntary and angel states coming to the aid of others. On the other hand, Kaufmann and Pape argue that these are states masking their acts as aid while looking for gains for themselves. They add that these political gains are made at the costly price of economic loss. By examining how the United States has been involved in the crisis in Burma, Kaufmann and Pape's view on these states appears to be more correct than that of Keck and Sikkink, who believe in the existence of voluntary states.

The theories and their difference

Before showing which theory is more applicable to reality, it is necessary to understand clearly each point of view. Keck and Sikkink claim that states that have intervened in the crisis in Burma are inspired by "an international voluntarism" in transnational networks (Keck and Sikkink, 6). These units are defined as "activists ­ people who care enough" that "they are prepared to incur significant costs and act to achieve their goals" (Keck and Sikkink, 14). These individuals are described as those willing to do things for others even though there might not be profits or gains from participation in an act. Keck and Sikkink cite Great Britain's effort from 1807 to 1860 in suppressing the Atlantic slave trade. They point to the "most current and careful historical research" which argues that "the impetus behind abolition was primarily religious and humanitarian" (Keck and Sikkink, 42). They emphasize Great Britain's genuine will to help others. On the other hand, Kaufmann and

Pape insist that societies do not have "the level of commitment to an other--regarding universalist ethic that would be needed" to "accept high costs for a moral effort designed to benefit foreigners" (Kaufmann and Pape, 632). They argue that such an attitude is "virtually never available". They also refer to Great Britain's anti-slavery policy. They reason that Britain abolished its slave trade because the British elite wanted to satisfy the majority of the British citizenry who were religious, against slavery, and believed that "their own society [was] corrupt and in need of reform" (Kaufmann and Pape, 663). They include the costs that the government of Great Britain incurred by enacting its policy: they lost 5000 British lives in slave trade suppression efforts, faced conflicts with the US and France for intervention in their domestic politics, and amounted economic losses with the end of slavery. The main difference between the two explanations is that while the former embraces the idea of "an international voluntarism," the 57

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latter refuses to accept it, stating that group interests direct governmental intervention policies (Keck and Sikkink, 6). The interest at stake, in the case of Britain's anti-slavery position, was obtaining more votes for the leading party in government. But to confirm the validity of this comparison, one needs to apply these theories to other case studies. We can find such a comparison in Burma's recent rebellion against its military junta and the U.S participation in the political turmoil. e

Burma's political turmoil and the US 's s involvement nt

Burma is suffering from its worst unrest since a 1988 peaceful demonstration by civilians against the junta that brought about 3000 deaths. Ever since, Burma"has sunk further into poverty and repression and become a symbol for the outside world of the harsh military subjugation of a people."(Mydans, New York Times, September 27, 2007). In addition, the military junta has detained the pro-democracy leader Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, a pro-democracy leader of the National League for Democracy (NLD) against the junta, which has finally pushed the monks and students out into the streets out of despair and anger. This has caused international institutions such as United States Campaign for Burma and The Freedom for Campaign to reach out to other countries such as the United States for help and intervention in Burma's affairs. Thus, many countries have responded to heed this call and have been aiding the NLD. In addition, the United States has sought to punish the junta government for its tyrannical rule through economic sanctions. On October 19, 2007, President George Bush "announced tighter US sanctions on Myanmar's military rulers" ("Bush slaps new sanctions on Myanmar." AFP Google Online News (Oct. 19, 2007). He sought to pressure the tyrannical rulers to loosen their tight grip over the country. Laura Bush has also announced her support for boycotts of precious stones that come from Burma, such as jewels and gems ("Laura 5

Bush wants Burma jewel boycott." ABC News on the web (Nov. 17, 2007). Last but not least, Burmese activists have also found support in the US Congress. Dr. Khin Zaw Win is a political activist who has spent 10 years since 1994 s 4 peacefully criticizing the Burma. In his lecture . "On Ending Myanmar's Sisyphean Ordeal" at Cornell University on November 2, 2007, he revealed how he had discovered during his trips to the Congress two bills that asked for "the sanction against buying precious stones" by American businesses. Through economic sanctions, the United States wants to pressure the Burmese government into submission. The United States has also been politically active in helping the civilians of Burma. It has granted one million dollars to the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) to work on Burma's HIV/Aids crisis through non-governmental organizations. It has also signed the United States-Association of Southeast Nations (US-ASEAN) Joint Declaration to Combat International Terrorism, which includes "cooperation with the US to improve intelligence, information sharing, suppression of terrorist financing, and border and immigration control" (Clark 133). Sometimes, the United States went out of its way to show its support. After meeting with Daw Suu Kyi and General Khin Nyunt, then-Secretary of SPDC, the U.S Congressman Tony Hall asked for the "immediate granting of humanitarian aid with no political strings attached" (Seekins, 21). Thus, through economic and political activities, the U.S government has tried to help the civilians of Burma. As a result of getting involved with the crisis in Burma, the United States is facing , economic losses. American businesses are pulling out of Burma and ending deals involving materials such as precious stones and natural resources because of economic sanctions that the federal and state governments imposed on Burma. For example, the state of Massachusetts penalized U.S companies "by forbidding states from doing business with [SPDC]" (Seekins, 22).

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Thus, a parallel can be drawn with the United States to Great Britain in facing the same kind of losses when it tried to end slave trade.

Economic and Political Benefits for the United States and its significance

Research shows a correlation between those ethical acts and tangible economic benefits for the United States government. Despite the fact that the economic sanctions were designed to punish the SPDC, Dr. Khin revealed how in the two bills he saw in Congress, "none of these mentioned oil [and] gas." He adds that 75 percent of foreign businesses are there for oil and gas and "cannot understand why they stop the businesses of garment and precious stones whilst leaving that of oil and gas alive," a clear double standard of the American government implementing these economic sanctions. Whilst the government disallows independent and individual businesses from participating, it allows companies that have relations with people within the government to stay there: Khin says such corporations "never will leave the country." He referred to the Chevron Corporation, explaining that since Condolezza Rice, the Secretary of State, owns a significant proportion of the company, Chevron will remain in Burma while other companies will not. Therefore, despite the sanctions, key interests for the actors involved provide loopholes for individuals and companies to benefit from economic involvement in Burma. The US can find political benefits in the region as well. Burma has a strong political attraction due to its geographical location next to a resurgent China. Burma fears "a possibility of China one day invading [it]" and thus, has formed close ties with them. (Holmes, 240). Many states, including the United States, are afraid of this relationship because it has the potential to lead to an increasing sphere of influence for China. Thus, many states try to . "woo Burma away from its strong relationship with China and into a more non-aligned position within the region" (Clark, 130). The

United States is intent on preventing the Chinese government from finding another ally in the Asia-Pacific region and thus wants to distort the China-Burma relationship to gain a political dominance for itself in that specific area. However, both China and India refused to comply with the economic sanctions that the United States had imposed and for which it had asked other nations to support ("India, China, Russia jointly oppose sanctions on Myanmar." Indo-Burma News on the web (Oct 25, 2007). China's "joint" refusal with India is a sign of its determination to support a political ally and perhaps, a sign of frustration against the United States' efforts to gain more influence in the region. These economic and political benefits for the US can be understood in terms of the political alliances that Great Britain won for its abolition of slavery in Pape's model. Abolition deprived Great Britain of further economic profits. But because so many British civilians wanted to see such humanitarian acts by its government, the British elite carried out the legislation in order to appease them. In a similar fashion, although American economic sanctions have ended economic benefits from precious stones and garments, individuals in the government are receiving personal benefits by allowing companies which they hold an interest in to stay and effectively monopolize the highly lucrative oil and gas trade. Also, through the use of sanctions, the United States is attempting to maintain its position in a part of the world where its influence is losing ground to emerging regional powers such as China and India. In other words, these altruistic acts are not as voluntary or ethical as they appear. The United States, as a key actor, would not give up the gains it could achieve from its interactions with Myanmar without a justified compensation of some sort. One note that needs to be made between Kaufmann and Pape's model and mine is that the former believes the decision to take actions are derived from both the state and public levels. The British government 59

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ended slavery and gained political popularity from the religious public who believed slavery to be immoral. In other words, the end of slave trade ensued in two levels of benefit at both the state and the public level. On the other hand, in the case of the United States' involvement in Burma, it is clear that it is only at the interest of the state's political and economic profits that the United States participated in Burma. The public did not make any profits. However, this fact only reinforces the idea that states will only be enforced into taking action to satiate one's self-interest. Whether the public is interested or not, a state will take acts veiled in those of voluntarism if there are profits to be made by participating.


American involvement in the fight for democracy in Burma weakens Keck and Sikkink's belief in "international voluntarism" and questions the existence of voluntary and altruistic acts of states ­ countries willing

to provide such kinds of services to others without looking for anything in return. The activities of the United States government in Burma confirm Kaufmann and Pape's theory that states will not act unless they can benefit from participation. In this case, the benefits of American involvement were continued influence in that strategic part of the AsiaPacific region and economic gains from the monopoly of the oil and gas industries in Burma for individuals in the United States. Kaufmann and Pape's theory is made concrete by the two factors: the actions of United States relative to this conflict and the political and economical profits it gains. These facts confirm their theory that states are self-interested and will not act for another motivated by humanitarianism. Perhaps what is most important is that states that participate in such international acts should be cautious to not let their strategic goals and economic motives override the needs of those of who really need the aid.

Works Cited

Clark, Allen L. "Burma in 2002: A Year of Transition." Asian Survey, Vol. 43, No. 1 (2003): 127-134. Holmes, Robert. "Burma's Foreign Policy toward China Since 1962." Pacific Affairs, Vol. 45, No. 2 (1972): 240-254. Kaufmann, Chaim D., and Robert A. Pape. "Explaining Costly International Moral Action: Britain's Sixty-year Campaign Against the Atlantic Slave Trade." International Organization, Vol. 53, No. 4 (1999): 631-668. Keck, Margaret E., and Kathyrn Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1998. Khin, Zaw Win. "On Ending Myanmar's Sisyphean Ordeal." Cornell University, Ithaca, NY. Nov. 2, 2007. Mydans, Seth. "Monks' Protest is Challenging Burmese Junta." New York Times, Sept. 27, 2007. Seekins, Donald M. "Burma in 1999: A Slim Hope." Asian Survey, Vol. 40, No. 1 (2000): 16-24. "Bush slaps new sanctions on Myanmar."AFP Google Online News (Oct. 19, 2007), (accessed Nov. 17, 2007). "India, China, Russia jointly oppose sanctions on Myanmar." Indo-Burma News on the web (Oct 25, 2007) (accessed Nov. 17, 2007). "Laura Bush wants Burma jewel boycott." ABC News on the web (Nov. 17, 2007) (accessed Nov. 17, 2007).


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